Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
FIDEL JORGE RAMOS GREGORIO,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-5538 JAO (VET)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Before the Court is Fidel Jorge Ramos Gregorio’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1. Also before the Court is Respondents’
Return to the Petition, ECF No. 4, and Petitioner’s Traverse, ECF No. 5.
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus on due process grounds.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala who entered the United States as an
unaccompanied minor without inspection on December 8, 2022. See ECF No. 1 ¶ 5; ECF
No. 4 at 1. Petitioner was taken into the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement
(“ORR”), and then subsequently released to the care of his uncle on February 11, 2023.
See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 5–6. Petitioner was 16 years old at the time of his release from ORR.
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See id. He remained at liberty for more than three and a half years while removal
proceedings were initiated against him. See id. ¶ 7. Those proceedings are currently
pending before the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”). See id. ¶ 8.
On September 16, 2026, Petitioner was arrested for driving under the influence and
was taken to the San Diego Central Jail, though no charge was ultimately filed. See ECF
No. 4 at 2, ECF No. 5 at 2. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Officers
learned of Petitioner’s arrest through a database search and took him into custody in the
lobby of the jail as he was being released. See ECF No. 5 at 3. The government failed to
provide Petitioner with prior notice or any opportunity to be heard and identified no
changed circumstances that would justify the revocation of his release. See ECF No. 1
¶ 11.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district
of her confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole
judicial body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or
removal is the court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas
v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-
13, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral
issues arising independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of
indefinite detention—federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court.
Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other
grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F.
Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that his re-detention without notice or a pre-deprivation hearing
violates due process. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13–22. Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner
is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 and do not oppose an order
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from this Court directing a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), but urge the
Court not to reach Petitioner’s due process argument. See ECF No. 4 at 1–2. The Court
however concludes that Petitioner’s re-detention without notice violates due process and
that only immediate release affords relief because Petitioner is entitled to process before
the revocation of his prior release.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment
entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a
hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch,
494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their
liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a
protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D.
Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an
individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to
release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that
individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the
. . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
(1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen
pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a
protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032
(citing Romero v. Kaiser, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Petitioner has been out of custody since 2023, when the government implicitly
determined he was not a danger to the community or a flight risk and released him from
federal custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[The petitioner’s] release
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from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the
government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [the
petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those
criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1164 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’
noncitizen but one that has [been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial
amount of time indicates he is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process
before removal.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1129 (E.D. Cal.
2025) (finding the petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release). Petitioner
was at liberty for more than three and a half years following his release from federal
custody. Furthermore, Respondents offer “no legal authority in support of the
proposition that [P]etitioner’s DUI arrest justifies re-detaining him without prior notice or
a pre-detention hearing.” Vargas Monsalve v. Chestnut, 2026 WL 242066, at *2 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 29, 2026); see generally ECF No. 4. Petitioner thus has a protected liberty
interest continuing to remain out of custody.
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally
sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Mathews factors.
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the
Government’s interest including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.”
Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a determination that the
Government’s re-detention of Petitioner without notification, reasoning, or an
opportunity to be heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed
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above, Petitioner has a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to
his release in 2023. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody,
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due
Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see also Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471
at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free
to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal
life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as
Respondents revoked Petitioner’s release from custody without providing Petitioner with
notification, reasoning, or a hearing. Since the government’s initial determination in
2023 that Petitioner should be released into the country, there is no evidence that these
findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a
danger to the community or a flight risk.”). “Once a noncitizen has been released, the
law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal
proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially
changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has
become a flight risk[.]” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1176. “Where as here, ‘the
petitioner has not received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an
opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for [her] detention.” Pinchi,
792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D.
Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up).
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” See Alvarenga Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1130; Pinchi, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1036; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”).
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Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release in
violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Monroy
Martinez v. Lyons, 2026 WL 1047937, at * 5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026) (granting a writ of
habeas corpus on due process grounds where the petitioner’s release on bond was
revoked); Navarro Sanchez v. LaRose, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the
conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) on due process grounds, and ORDERS Respondents to
immediately release Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting
parole.1
The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is
entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of his parole and a hearing before a neutral
decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The government shall bear
the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a
danger to the community or a risk of flight. See, e.g., Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1133;
Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1038; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal.
2025); Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28,
2025); Isaev, v. LaRose, et al., 2026 WL 1162758, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2026). The
Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by October 23, 2026, confirming that
Petitioner has been released. As this concludes the litigation in this case, the Clerk of
Court SHALL CLOSE the file.
1 Petitioner requested attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice
Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. See ECF No. 1 at 9. Petitioner’s counsel may submit
an appropriate EAJA fee application within 30 days of the issuance of this Order. See 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 9, 2026
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