Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

3:26-cv-01431Casd26 mar 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BURAK CAYAR,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, OTAY MESA DETENTION
CENTER, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-01431-RBM-DDL
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
On February 5, 2026, Petitioner Burak Cayar (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set
forth below, the Petition is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Turkey, entered the United States on or around
July 2, 2024. (Doc. 1 at 1.) On July 3, 2024, the United States Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging him as
removable under section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“NTA”)
“for being present in the United States without being admitted or paroled.” (Id.) The NTA
also commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner. (Id.) Petitioner was subsequently
released from custody. (Id.)
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On August 20, 2024, Petitioner filed an application for asylum and withholding of
removal. 	(Id. at 1–2; see Doc. 5 at 90–104.) 	“For more than a year after his release,
Petitioner lived in the United States without incident and complied with all requirements
related to his immigration proceedings.” 	(Doc. 1 at 2.) 	Petitioner was granted work
authorization and obtained lawful employment as a truck driver. (Id.) He also “maintained
a clean record and has never been arrested or convicted of any crime.” (Id.)
On November 30, 2025, Petitioner was detained at Camp Pendleton Marine Corps
Base while he was working and taken into United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement’s (“ICE”) custody. (Id.; see Doc. 5 at 63; Doc. 5-1 at 3.) “Since that date,
Petitioner has remained continuously detained at the Otay Mesa Detention Center in San
Diego, California.” 	(Doc. 1 at 2.) 	Petitioner requested a bond hearing before an
immigration judge (“IJ”) on December 12, 2025. (Id.) On December 19, 2025, an IJ denied
his request based on a lack of jurisdiction. (Id.; see Doc. 5 at 112–113.)
On March 5, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed
a Return to the Petition (“Response”) on March 16, 2026. (Doc. 2.) On March 19, 2026,
Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 5) and Exhibits in Support of the Reply (Doc. 6).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that his continued detention without a bond hearing violates the
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Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).
(Doc. 1 at 2, 8–11.) Respondents contend that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention
under § 1225(b), because Petitioner was present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled.” 	(Doc. 4 at 2.) 	In support, Respondents attempt to incorporate by
reference arguments regarding the government’s authority for mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b) made in similar cases. (See id. at 2–4 & n.2.) 1 Respondents, however, do not
substantively address Petitioner’s due process claims. 2
This Court has granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated petitioners.
In Faizyan v. Casey, the Court held a similarly situated petitioner was detained pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226. Case No.: 3:25-cv-02884-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5–6 (S.D.
Cal. Nov. 17, 2025); accord Ayinder v. LaRose, Case No.: 26-cv-0566-JES-MSB, 2026
WL 296658, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2026) (holding that “where a petitioner is apprehended
at the border, paroled into the country, and had been residing in the country when he was
re-detained, his detention is governed by § 1226.”) (collecting cases). 	Applying the due
process inquiry in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court also found “all
three 	factors 	support 	a 	finding 	that 	Respondents’ 	revocation 	of 	[the 	petitioner’s]
conditional parole without reasoning or an opportunity to be heard deprived [the petitioner]
1 “Generally, courts do not allow incorporation by reference of arguments or ‘substantive
materials’ not contained within the relevant motions’ briefs.” 	Flores v. Bennett, 635 F.
Supp. 3d 1020, 1029 (E.D. Cal. 2022), aff’d, No. 22-16762, 2023 WL 4946605 (9th Cir.
Aug. 3, 2023) (collecting cases); see Williams v. Cnty. of Alameda, 26 F. Supp. 3d 925,
947 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (declining to consider arguments plaintiff “improperly [sought] to
incorporate by reference”).
2 Respondents “request[ ] an opportunity to submit [a more formal response] within a
reasonable timeframe” (Doc. 6 at 2 n.1), but notably failed to properly request an extension
of time. See also Sosa Inzuna v. Warden of Adelanto Det. Facility, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2026
WL 233211, at *3 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2026) (noting “the current volume of habeas petitions . . .
being filed can be attributed to Respondents’ deliberate choice to continue defying the final
judgment entered in Bautista”).
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of his due process rights.” 	Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7; see also Perez v. LaRose,
Case No.: 3:25-cv-02620-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3171742, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025);
(reaching the same conclusion as to a petitioner’s release on humanitarian parole).
Like in Faizyan, Petitioner was apprehended upon his arrival in the United States on
July 2, 2024, released from ICE custody shortly thereafter, and lived in the United States
continuously before being re-detained. 	(Doc. 1 at 2, 6.) 	As such, Petitioner is not an
“arriving” noncitizen but one that has been present in the United States for over a year. See
Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7.
Before 	his 	recent 	arrest 	in 	November 	2025, 	Petitioner 	complied 	with 	all
requirements related to his immigration proceedings, obtained lawful employment, and
“has never been arrested or convicted of any crime.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) He was also granted
work authorization and was able to apply for asylum relief. (Id.) Respondents therefore
implicitly promised Petitioner’s continued release, and he reasonably relied on that
promise. 	See Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citing
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)).
The Court therefore adopts its reasoning in Faizyan and applies it here. 	For those
same reasons, Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C § 1226 and his re-detention without a
pre-deprivation hearing violated his due process rights and rendered his detention unlawful.
See Faizyan, 2025 WL 3208844, at *7; Perez, 2025 WL 3171742, at *5. 3
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to the conditions of his preexisting release.
2. The Court ORDERS that, prior to any such re-detention, Petitioner is entitled to
notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing before an
3 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining
grounds for relief.
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immigration judge to determine whether detention is warranted. 	Respondents
shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that
Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 26, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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