Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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26-cv-1424-AGS-DEB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Jaime FLORES-BALDERAZ,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela BONDI, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25-cv-1424-AGS-DEB
ORDER REQUIRING RETURN
(ECF 1) AND APPOINTING
COUNSEL (ECF 3)
Self-represented petitioner Jaime Flores-Balderaz seeks a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to free him from immigration detention and appointed counsel to
represent him in this matter.
A. 	Habeas Petition Screening
At this stage, Flores-Balderaz need only make out a habeas claim that is sufficiently
cognizable to warrant an answer or return. See Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the
United States District Courts, Rule 4 (authorizing summary dismissal “if it plainly appears
from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief”); id.,
Rule 1(b) (permitting application of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases to any “habeas
corpus petition”). In this context, the relevant federal rules permit “summary dismissal of
claims that are clearly not cognizable.” Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1045 (9th Cir.
2024) (cleaned up). But “as long as a petition has any potential merit, it is not so frivolous
or incredible as to justify summary dismissal[.]” Id.
In 1999, petitioner, a “citizen of Mexico,” “came into the United States” with “his
parents” when he was three years old. (See ECF 2, at 2.) Though the petition does not state
why or how he came to find himself in detention, he alleges that he “has remained in ICE
custody continuously since” September 5, 2025, “pursuant to 8 U.S.C. [§] 1231(a).”
(ECF 1, at 1–2.) He seeks release “on the grounds that continued detention violates the Due
Process Clause . . . and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).” (Id. at 1.) The Zadvydas
Court held that—after a “presumptively reasonable period of detention” of “six months”
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—§ 1231(a)(6) allowed the release of immigration detainees under certain circumstances.
533 U.S. at 701. Specifically, after this “6-month period,” if the detainee “provides good
reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future,” and the government does not “rebut that showing,” then further
detention is “no longer authorized by statute.” Id. at 699–701.
As Flores-Balderaz has been detained for over six months, he potentially qualifies
for Zadvydas relief. Thus, this challenge warrants an answer or return.
B. 	Appointed Counsel
Petitioner also requests appointed counsel in support of his habeas corpus petition.
(See ECF 3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus). Courts may appoint an attorney
for an “impoverished habeas petitioner” when “the interests of justice so require.” Bashor
v. 	Risley, 	730 F.2d 	1228, 	1234 	(9th 	Cir. 	1984) 	(cleaned 	up); 	see 	also 	18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(a)(2)(B). 	In 	this 	assessment, 	courts 	evaluate 	an 	indigent 	petitioner’s
(a) “likelihood of success on the merits” and (b) “ability . . . to articulate his claims pro
se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d
1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986).
1. Financial Eligibility
As a threshold matter, Flores-Balderaz asserts that: he “do[es] not have the ability to
pay thousands of dollars to private attorneys,” has no checking or savings account, has two
children, and only receives “$100.00 for commissary items” in detention. (ECF 3, at 3–6.)
He also asserts he had “$15[,000] for [the] last 6 months before [his] arrest.” (Id. at 4.)
Petitioner sufficiently alleges that he cannot afford counsel.
2. Likelihood of Success
Although Flores-Balderaz potentially qualifies for Zadvydas relief, he has not yet
offered sufficient facts to establish that he is likely to succeed on that claim. Beyond the
mere length of his detention—which is barely longer than the presumptively reasonable
six-month period—it is not clear what “good reason” he offers “to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See Zadvydas,
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533 U.S. at 701. Still, courts regularly grant release to detainees in Flores-Balderaz’s
circumstances once their custodial period exceeds six months, so the Court ultimately
views this factor as neutral. See, e.g., Guarin v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-03085-DMS-VET, 2025
WL 3440689 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2025) (ordering “release” after just over six months’
detention).
3. Complexity
The final attorney-appointment consideration—the complexity of the legal issues—
favors appointing counsel. The parties here must interpret intricate statutes, grapple with
indefinite-detention-related common law, and navigate agency regulations. See, e.g.,
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). This undertaking
is entirely within the immigration legal context, which has been deemed “second only to
the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.” United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar, 295 F.3d
943, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted); see also Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 923
(9th Cir. 2020) (“Divining [the immigration laws’] meaning is ordinarily not for the faint
of heart.”). Flores-Balderaz asserts that he does not “have any type of legal knowledge,”
that “the law library . . . does not help,” and that “the computer[s] have limited access.”
(ECF 6, at 3.) He has adequately shown that he cannot articulate his claims without a
lawyer.
Though it is a close case, the Court will appoint counsel for Flores-Balderaz.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner’s attorney-appointment request is GRANTED. The Court provisionally
appoints Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., to initially determine if petitioner qualifies
for representation by that organization. The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this order
to Federal Defenders.
By March 17, 2026, Federal Defenders must submit a notice to the Court concerning
whether it can and will accept the appointment. By that same date, Federal Defenders must
also state whether, under Chief Judge Order 134, it “requests to file supplemental briefing.”
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As a result, the current briefing schedule—including for the pending motion for a
temporary restraining order—will be set once the Court hears from counsel.
Dated: March 10, 2025
___________________________
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler
United States District Judge
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