Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EVERALDINO PEREIRA DOS
SANTOS,
Petitioner,
v.
MOISES BECERRA, Acting Director of
Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; TODD LYONS,
Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; KRISTI NOEM,
Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; CHRISTOPHER J.
LAROSE, Warden of the Otay Mesa
Detention Center;
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-01423-GPC-VET
ORDER ON EMERGENCY MOTION
TO CLARIFY
[ECF No. 11]
On March 12, 2026, this Court issued an Order agreeing with Petitioner that he was
being improperly subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). ECF No.
9. The Court found that Petitioner’s detention was instead governed by § 1226(a) and that
he was, therefore, entitled to a bond hearing in compliance with § 1226(a)’s requirements.
Id. at 3.
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Petitioner now seeks clarification regarding the burden of proof required at that bond
hearing. ECF No. 11.
The Ninth Circuit has described the bond hearing requirements of § 1226(a) as
follows:
Under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, a detainee
may request a bond hearing before an IJ at any time before a
removal order becomes final. If at this hearing the detainee
demonstrates by the preponderance of the evidence that he is not
a threat to national security, a danger to the community at large,
likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk, the IJ will order
his release.
Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Thus, because the Court—in accordance with Petitioner’s
arguments—ordered a bond hearing in compliance with § 1226(a), the burden of proof is
that associated with a § 1226(a) hearing. That is: Petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that he is not a flight risk or danger to
national security.
Petitioner argues that it is “customary” for the burden to be on the government at
custody hearings held in response to orders on habeas petitions. ECF No. 11. However, he
cites no Ninth Circuit case law demonstrating that, when a district court orders a bond
hearing in compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), it places the burden on the government
rather than the Petitioner.
Petitioner further relies on Casas-Castrillon v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d
942 (9th Cir. 2008) and Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). Much of
Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law, see Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 537 (9th Cir.
2023), and the standard for § 1226(a) bond hearings has since been clarified by the Ninth
Circuit in Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1197. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has made clear
that Singh does not apply to detention under § 1226(a). See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at
1202 (“To the extent that any parts of Singh [and others] remain good law—an issue we
need not decide—those cases in relevant part addressed detention under §§ 1225(b),
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1226(c), or 1231(a)(6), not detention that was based on § 1226(a) throughout.”). Thus,
Petitioner’s reliance on Casas-Castrillon and Singh is unavailing.
Lastly, Petitioner argues that the government should bear the burden of proof
because Petitioner has been in custody for more than six months. ECF No. 11, at 2.
However, Petitioner did not raise the issue of prolonged detention in his initial petition. See
ECF No. 1. Further, Petitioner does not offer any insight or argument—beyond reliance on
Singh and Casas-Castrillon—regarding how Petitioner’s length of detention would impact
the standard at a § 1226(a) bond hearing.
Thus, the Court confirms that Petitioner’s detention and release is governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), and that, as a result, Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing before a
neutral decisionmaker at which Petitioner must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that he is not a flight risk or danger to the community. Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th
at 1197; Valencia Zapata v. Kaiser, 801 F. Supp. 3d 919, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2025).
Should Petitioner have subsequent constitutional challenges to the prolonged nature
of his detention, or should the Government fail to satisfy its obligations in providing
Petitioner a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, Petitioner may seek further relief from
the Court at that time.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 23, 2026
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