Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ELVIS TERAN,
Petitioners,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, Warden of the
Imperial Regional Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-CV-1205 JLS (DEB)
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Presently before the Court is Petitioner Elvis Teran’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). 	Also before the Court is
Respondents’ Return to Habeas Petition (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4) and Petitioner’s Traverse
(“Traverse,” ECF No. 5). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1).
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela who entered the United States on
November 7, 2024, and was briefly detained by the Department of Homeland Security.
Pet. ¶ 2. 	Petitioner was released on parole valid through November 5, 2026. 	Id. 	On
October 1, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained when he appeared for his second master
calendar hearing. 	Id. ¶ 24. 	Petitioner was not accused of any violation, provided any
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advance notice, or provided an individualized custody determination prior to his re-
detention. Id. ¶ 30. Prior to his re-detention, Petitioner complied fully with all conditions
of his parole, attended all check-ins, has no criminal history, was lawfully employed, had
a work authorization and a U.S. Social Security Card, and lived with his domestic partner
in Queens. Id. ¶ 29.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without justification or
consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due Process Clause. Pet. ¶
33. The Court agrees.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 	U.S. Const. amend. V. 	“[T]he Due
Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether
their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles
aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 	Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,
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306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” 	Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose
liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted).
Although the initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the
government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody
creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will
be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). “Thus, even when ICE has the initial
discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that
individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of
custody.” 	Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (citing Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508,
2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)).
Respondents contend that as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225
Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and therefore his alleged statutory and
constitutional violations fail. Ret. at 2. The Court disagrees. Petitioner has been granted
humanitarian parole, granting him parole until November 5, 2026. Pet. ¶ 2. Petitioner is
not a newly arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in
the United States since November 2024. 	Id. Upon arrival, he was determined to not be a
danger to the community or a flight risk and has attended his check-in appointments. Id. ¶
29. Petitioner is not merely an “applicant for admission” at the border with minimal due
process rights; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See,
e.g., Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE custody after her
initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a
flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest in remaining
at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d
1146, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has
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[been] present in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he
is afforded the Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Alvarenga
Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding petitioner had a
protected liberty interest in his release).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient
to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. 	See
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. 	Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be
affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” Id.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. “Freedom
from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining with and providing for his family and
continuing to work. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of his
parole, he can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form
the other enduring attachments of normal life.”).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Pet. ¶ 30. Since DHS’s initial determination that Petitioner should
be paroled because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is
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no evidence that these findings have changed. 	See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d
1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the
noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). Petitioner has no criminal
record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble, has work authorization and
a U.S. Social Security Card, and has filed an asylum application. Traverse at 2. “Once a
noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely
because he is subject to removal proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to
present 	evidence 	of 	materially 	changed 	circumstances—namely, 	evidence 	that 	the
noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d
at 1760. 	Respondents, failing to address Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their
response, do not point to any material circumstances that have changed that would warrant
reconsideration of his parole. 	See generally Ret. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not
received any bond or custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is
high’ because neither the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine
whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting
Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (E.D. Cal. 2025)) (cleaned up).
Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is “low.” 	See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036; Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at
1130; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the
government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps
toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail
to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice,
reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole in
violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., Alegria Palma v.
Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2025) (granting
a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of parole without a pre-
deprivation hearing); Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629,
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at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from
custody to the conditions of her preexisting parole on due process grounds).
I. 	Attorney’s Fees
Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet. at 18. The EAJA provides in part:
A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within
thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an
application for fees and other expenses which shows that the
party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award
under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an
itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or
appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended
and 	the 	rate 	at 	which 	fees 	and 	other 	expenses 	were
computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the
United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the
position of the United States was substantially justified shall be
determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the
civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under
the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (ECF No. 1). The Court ORDERS Respondents to immediately release Petitioner
from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole. 	The Court ORDERS,
prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for
revocation of his parole and a hearing before a neutral decision maker to determine whether
detention is warranted. The Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and
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convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.1
The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by March 19, 2026, confirming
that Petitioner has been released.
Lastly, Petitioner’s attorney is directed to submit an attorney fee application and
corresponding billing records within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are
instructed to file any opposition within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee
application.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 13, 2026
1 This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 1133; Pinchi, 792
F. Supp. 3d at 1038; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez Hernandez
v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025).
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