Lastin v. Warden of Imperial Region Detention Facility

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MAKSIM LASTIN,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden, Imperial Regional Detention Facility,
Respondent.
Case No.: 26-cv-974-RSH-DDL
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
On February 16, 2026, petitioner Maksim Lastin filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner, a citizen of
Russia, is detained by U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Imperial
Regional Detention Facility in Calexico, California. Respondents have filed a return. ECF
No. 3. As set forth below, the Court grants the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On November 20, 2024, Petitioner applied for entry to the United States at a port of
entry. See ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 3 at 2. Petitioner did not possess any valid entry
documents. ECF No. 3 at 2. He was taken into immigration custody and thereafter placed
in removal proceedings. Id. On March 13, 2025, an immigration judge granted asylum to
Petitioner. Id. However, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appealed,
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and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) sustained the appeal and remanded the case
to the immigration judge. Id. On October 27, 2025, on remand, the immigration judge
denied relief and ordered Petitioner removed to Russia. Id. Petitioner has appealed that
order to the BIA, and his appeal remains pending. Id.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	ANALYSIS
Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which
provides, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a
doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” pending removal proceedings.
The issue presented here is whether, in the circumstances of this case and at this point in
time, applying this mandatory detention regime violates Petitioner’s due process rights.
A. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents first challenge this Court’s jurisdiction to hear the Petition, relying on
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). ECF No. 3 at 4–5. That provision states that, except as otherwise
provided in Section 1252, and notwithstanding any other provision of law including
8 U.S.C. § 2241, “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf
of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this
chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents argue that because Petitioner challenges his
detention during removal proceedings, that detention “arises from” the Attorney General’s
decision to commence such proceedings. ECF No. 3 at 4–5.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the jurisdiction-stripping provision in Section
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1252(g) narrowly, limiting it to “three discrete actions”: the “‘decision or action’ to
‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.–Arab
Anti–Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The
Supreme Court noted that “[t]here are of course many other decisions or actions that may
be part of the deportation process.” Id. In a later decision, the Court explained that it did
not interpret Section 1252(g) “to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to “arise
from” the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, [the Court] read the
language to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez,
583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018).
Here, Petitioner is seeking to review the legality of his detention, arguing that the
length of time he has been detained here is unlawful—rather than challenging the decision
to commence proceedings, the adjudication of his removal case, or an action to execute his
removal order. He does not seek to litigate in this Court questions of whether he is
removable or whether he is entitled to relief from removal. The relief he seeks here is
release from custody or a bond hearing at which his release may be considered by an
immigration judge. The Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim is not barred by Section
1252(g).
B. 	Whether Petitioner Has a Due Process Claim
Respondents argue that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of
Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), Petitioner has no due process
rights beyond those that Congress has provided, and that his due process claim therefore
fails. ECF No. 3 at 7–8. In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court rejected a habeas petitioner’s
argument that the due process clause conferred rights to challenge his expedited removal
beyond those established by Congress, stating that “an alien at the threshold of initial entry
cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.” 591 U.S. at 107. The
petitioner in that case had “attempted to enter the country illegally and was apprehended
just 25 yards from the border.” Id. The Supreme Court determined that the “political
department of the government” had plenary authority to admit or exclude aliens seeking
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initial entry, and thus “an alien in respondent’s position has only those rights regarding
admission that Congress has provided by statute.” Id. at 139–40.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam, some district courts have
adopted Respondents’ reasoning to dismiss or deny habeas petitions in the context of
arriving aliens subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b). See Petgrave v.
Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 679 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“As far as Petitioner is concerned,
whatever procedure Congress has authorized is sufficient due process.”); Gonzales Garcia
v. Rosen, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329, 536 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (“Petitioner is on the threshold of
initial entry into the United States and . . . he accordingly is not entitled to procedural
protections beyond those provided by statute.”).
Most courts have ruled otherwise. See Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State
Annex Det. Facility, No. 25-cv-98-SAB-HC, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25,
2025) (“Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process
requires a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) … ‘essentially
all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the
right to due process.’”) (quoting Martinez v. Clark, No. C18-1669-RAJ-MAT, 2019 WL
5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019)); Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772
(S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts across the country in concluding
that 	an 	unreasonably 	prolonged 	detention 	under 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b) 	without 	an
individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). This Court agrees with the majority
position that a person detained under Section 1225(b) may assert a due process challenge
to prolonged mandatory detention without a bond hearing.
This Court likewise agrees with those district courts that interpret Thuraissigiam as
circumscribing an arriving alien’s due process rights to admission, rather than limiting that
person’s ability to challenge detention. See A.L. v. Oddo, 761 F. Supp. 3d 822, 825 (W.D.
Pa. 2025) (“Nowhere in [Thuraissigiam] did the Supreme Court suggest that arriving aliens
being held under § 1225(b) may be held indefinitely and unreasonably with no due process
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implications, nor that such aliens have no due process rights whatsoever.”); Hernandez v.
Wofford, No. 25-cv-986-KES-CDB (HC), 2025 WL 2420390, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21,
2025) (“Although the Supreme Court has described Congress’s power over the ‘policies
and rules for exclusion of aliens’ as ‘plenary,’ and held that this court must generally ‘defer
to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area,’ it is well-established
that the Due Process Clause stands as a significant constraint on the manner in which the
political branches may exercise their plenary authority’—through detention or otherwise.”)
(citations omitted); Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (“The
holding in Thuraissigiam does not foreclose Plaintiffs’ due process claims which seek to
vindicate a right to a bond hearing with certain procedural protections.”).
Respondents also argue that a much older case, Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207–09 (1953), establishes that arriving aliens subject to a mandatory
detention scheme, regardless of the length of their detention, never become entitled by the
due process clause to a bond hearing. ECF No. 3 at 6–7. This Court does not read Mezei to
establish such a proposition. Mezei involved a noncitizen who had been “permanently
excluded from the United States on security grounds but [who was] stranded in his
temporary haven on Ellis Island because other countries [would] not take him back.” 345
U.S. at 207. In 1950, the Attorney General determined, pursuant to emergency regulations
that based on certain confidential information, the noncitizen should be excluded from the
United States “for security reasons.” Id. at 208-10, 214–15. The Supreme Court rejected
the noncitizen’s constitutional challenge, citing “considerations” of “danger to the national
security”:
Thus we do not think that respondent’s continued exclusion deprives
him of any statutory or constitutional right. It is true that resident aliens
temporarily detained pending expeditious consummation of deportation
proceedings may be released on bond by the Attorney General whose
discretion is subject to judicial review. By that procedure aliens
uprooted 	from 	our 	midst 	may 	rejoin 	the 	community 	until 	the
Government effects their leave. An exclusion proceeding grounded on
danger 	to 	the 	national 	security, 	however, 	presents 	different
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considerations; neither the rationale nor the statutory authority for such
release exists. Ordinarily to admit an alien barred from entry on
security grounds nullifies the very purpose of the exclusion proceeding
….
Id. at 215 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
This Court agrees with those courts that distinguish the constitutional holding in
Mezei as addressing the national security considerations presented in that case. See
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he Mezei Court
explicitly grounded its decision in the special circumstances of a national emergency and
the determination by the Attorney General that Mezei presented a threat to national
security.”); Lett v. Decker, 346 F. Supp. 3d 379, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“Mezei may compel
the conclusion that arriving aliens already excluded on national security grounds are not
entitled to a bond hearing prior to their arranged deportation. However, Mezei does not
compel the categorical conclusion that all arriving aliens may be subject to prolonged
confinement without a bond hearing.”); Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp. 3d at 772 (finding Mezei
inapposite to the issue of whether prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates due
process); Rash v. LaRose, No. 26-cv-8-LL-DEB, 2026 WL 249324, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
30, 2026) (same). Here, in contrast, neither the Attorney General nor any other government
component has made a determination that Petitioner should be excluded on grounds of
national security; Petitioner is not seeking to circumvent such a determination. Petitioner
is instead seeking a bond hearing.
The Court concludes that it has authority to review whether Petitioner’s detention,
pursuant to a scheme of mandatory detention, has become unconstitutionally prolonged.
C. 	Whether Petitioner’s Detention is Prolonged in Violation of Due Process
In determining whether Petitioner’s detention has become prolonged, the Court
applies a six-factor balancing test used by some district courts. See Kydyrali, 499 F. Supp.
3d at 773–74; Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1106 (W.D. Wash. 2019). That
test considers: (1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
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detention; (3) conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the
likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal. See Kydyrali,
499 F. Supp. 3d at 773–74.
Here, Petitioner has been detained for over 15 months. Respondents argue that “[i]n
general, as detention continues past a year, courts become extremely wary of permitting
continued custody absent a bond hearing.” ECF No. 3 at 8 (quoting Sibomana v. LaRose,
No. 22-cv-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2023)). This
proposition, applied to Petitioner’s length of detention, favors a bond hearing. The fact that
courts have granted habeas relief in some other cases involving longer periods of detention
does not indicate that Petitioner is ineligible for such relief; still other courts have granted
habeas relief in cases involving shorter periods of detention.1
The record does not reflect that the remaining factors favor either party.
On balance, the Court determines that Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing
has become unreasonable and violates due process. Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and
individualized bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify his continued detention by
a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a
danger to the community if released. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir.
1 See, e.g., Hoyos Amado v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 25-cv-2687-LL-DDL, 2025 WL
3079052, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (“Courts have found detention over seven months
without a bond hearing weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable.”) (collecting cases);
Tanoyan v. Andrews, No. 25-CV-00815-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013684, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Oct. 28, 2025) (“Petitioner has been detained approximately 11 months. This period …
qualifies as prolonged.”); Gao v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-2084-RSH-SBC, 2025 WL 2770633,
at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (“The Court finds that Petitioner’s detention for over 10
months without a bond hearing, in the context of the specific circumstances described
above, has become unreasonable and violates due process.”); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F.
Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (“Petitioner has been in immigration detention …
approximately one year. District courts have found shorter lengths of detention … without
a bond hearing to be unreasonable.”) (collecting cases).
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2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018)
(explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake” warranted placing the burden on
the government to “prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or
a danger to the community to justify denial of bond”); see also Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th
775, 785–86 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating that “the BIA properly noted that the government bore
the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez is a danger to the
community” with respect to a bond hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents are directed to
arrange a bond hearing for petitioner Maksim Lastin before an immigration court within
seven (7) days of this order as described above. The Court declines to order further
declaratory relief. To the extent Petitioner seeks to recover attorneys’ fees, he must do so
by noticed motion in a manner consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Local Rules of this Court, and the undersigned’s chambers pretrial procedures.
The hearing set for March 12, 2026 is VACATED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 2, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
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