Alves Santana v. Casey et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LUIS ALFREDO ALVES SANTANA,
Petitioner,
v.
JEREMY CASEY, Warden at Imperial
Regional Detention Facility, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00964-RBM-MSB
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Luis Alfredo Alves Santana’s (“Petitioner”)
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Doc. 1.)
For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela who was paroled into the United States on
November 5, 2022 pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(d)(5)(A).
(Id. ¶ 27.)1 The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) executed Petitioner’s parole
and released Petitioner into the interior of the United States. (Id.) Petitioner’s Form I-94
authorized parole through November 3, 2024. 	(Id.) 	On March 19, 2024, United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services approved Petitioner’s Form I-765 employment
authorization through March 18, 2029. (Id. ¶ 29.) On November 26, 2025, DHS officers
1 The Court cites the CM/ECF electronic pagination unless otherwise noted.
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arrested Petitioner at a vehicle stop and issued him a Notice to Appear, charging him as
inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6). 	(Id. ¶¶ 30–31.) 	On February 13, 2026, Petitioner
requested a custody redetermination hearing before an immigration judge. (Id. ¶ 32.) The
immigration judge denied Petitioner a custody redetermination, concluding that he lacked
jurisdiction under Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). (Id.)
On February 15, 2026, Petitioner filed the Petition. (Doc. 1.) On February 19, 2026,
the Court set a briefing schedule. (Doc. 2.) On February 23, 2026, Respondents filed their
Response to Petition (“Response”). (Doc. 3.) That same day, Petitioner filed his Traverse
and Request for Release or, in the Alternative, a Constitutionally Adequate Bond Hearing
(“Reply”). (Doc. 4.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that his re-detention without a hearing violates the INA and the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 36–43.) 	Respondents concede that
Petitioner, as a class member of the Bond Eligible Class certified in Bautista v. Santacruz,2
is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing. 	(Doc. 2 at 2.) 	But
2 See Bautista v. Santacruz, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25,
2025).
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Petitioner argues that the Court should order his immediate release. 	(Doc. 1, Prayer for
Relief ¶ F; Doc. 4 at 1–3.) 	Because the Parties agree that Petitioner is detained under
§ 1226, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The Court next addresses whether Petitioner is
entitled to immediate release.3
The Court previously considered this question, and answered it in the affirmative,
under nearly identical circumstances in Castellanos v. Noem, 26-cv-00232-RBM-MSB,
ECF No. 6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2026). In Castellanos, the Court applied the three-part test
established in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) and found that (1) the petitioner
had a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole; (2) the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest was high because the petitioner did not
receive an opportunity to be heard; and (3) the respondents’ interests in detaining the
petitioner without a hearing was low. Id. at *3–5 (citations omitted). “Based on this review
of the Mathews factors, the Court conclude[d] that due process require[d] [the petitioner]
to be released from custody and receive a bond hearing before an immigration judge before
he [could] be re-detained.” Id. at *5. Because the circumstances before the Court are the
same, the Court adopts its reasoning in Castellanos and reaches the same conclusion here.
IV. 	CONCLUSION4
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody under
the same conditions of release that existed immediately prior to his December 9,
2025 re-detention.
3 The Court notes that Respondents did not respond to Petitioner’s argument that
immediate release is proper. “Generally, a party waives argument when it fails to respond
to an argument made to the court.” 	United States v. Cabrera, 796 F. Supp. 3d 660, 664
(S.D. Cal. 2025) (citing United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051, 1053 n.1 (9th Cir.
2013)). Therefore, this alone may be grounds to grant Petitioner’s immediate release.
4 In light of the disposition herein, the Court declines to address the Petition’s remaining
grounds for relief.
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2. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that Petitioner shall
receive notice of the reasons for revocation of his parole and a hearing before an
immigration judge to determine whether detention is warranted. Respondents shall
bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence,5 that Petitioner
poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.6
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 24, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
5 See Sadeqi v. LaRose, — F. Supp. 3d —, 2025 WL 3154520, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12,
2025) (“Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at which
Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”)
(citing Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds
by Jennings, 583 U.S. 281 (explaining that “the substantial liberty interest at stake”
warranted placing the burden on the government to “prove by clear and convincing
evidence that [a noncitizen] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial
of bond”)).
6 This relief has been granted in similar matters. 	See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d
1083, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2025);
Duong v. Kaiser, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1030, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 2025).
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