Velazquez-Beltran v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MARIA VELAZQUEZ-BELTRAN,
Petitioner,
v.
Kristi NOEM, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Homeland Security;
Christopher J. LAROSE, in his official
capacity as Warden of Otay Mesa
Detention Center; Gregory J.
ARCHAMBEAULT, in his official
capacity as San Diego Field Office
Director, ICE Enforcement Removal
Operations; Todd LYONS, in his official
capacity as Acting Director of ICE; and
Pamela BONDI, U.S. Attorney General;
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT; DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-959-JES-MSB
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING COUNT ONE OF
THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 2241; AND
(2) DENYING AS MOOT COUNT
TWO OF THE PETITION.
[ECF NO .1]
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Before the Court is Petitioner Maria Velazquez-Beltran’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Pursuant to the
Court’s Order to Show Cause, Respondents (“the Government”) filed the Response. ECF
Nos. 2; 4, (“Res.”). The Court then took the matter under submission. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition and DENIES AS MOOT
Count Two of the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
In 2001, Petitioner, a Mexican national, entered the United States without inspection.
Pet. ¶ 8. On February 12, 2026, Petitioner was detained by Respondents, who then initiated
removal proceedings against her. Id. ¶¶ 2, 19. Petitioner is currently subject to mandatory
detention, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § (“Section”) 1225(b)(2)(A), at the Otay Mesa Detention
Center. Id. ¶ 2; ECF No 1-2 at 1.
Petitioner contends that she has been illegally detained by Respondents and that
seeking a bond redetermination hearing from an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) would be futile,
in light of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision in the Matter of Yajure
Hurtado. Pet. ¶ 3; 29 I&N 216 (BIA 2025) (holding that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to
noncitizens like Petitioner). Petitioner argues that she has lived in the United States for well
over two decades, and therefore, Section 1225(b) does not apply to her. Pet. ¶¶ 26-27.
Further, to the extent she remains in custody, her detention should proceed under Section
1226(a). Id. ¶¶ 23-29.
Accordingly, Petitioner seeks habeas relief as her continued detention, governed by
Respondents’ application of Section 1225(b), and not Section 1226(a), violates: (1) the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”); and (2) the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 23-34.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
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custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus
to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal
law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means
of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections
have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges
to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas
jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
Habeas corpus is “perhaps the most important writ known to the constitutional law
... affording as it does a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of illegal restraint or
confinement.” Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). “The application for the writ usurps
the attention and displaces the calendar of the judge or justice who entertains it and receives
prompt action from him within the four corners of the application.” Yong v. I.N.S., 208 F.3d
1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Court finds that the Petition’s issues—specifically, the Court’s jurisdiction and
which statute governs Petitioner’s detention—are analogous to those raised in the Court’s
decision in Martinez Lopez v. Noem, et al. No: 25-cv-2717-JES-AHG, 2025 WL 3030457,
at *2-7 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025). The Court, therefore, elects to follow the reasoning it
stated in Martinez Lopez and incorporates it by reference. Id.
A. 	Jurisdiction
Based on the facts of this Petition, the Court finds that Section 1252's jurisdiction
stripping provisions do not bar it from considering Petitioner's habeas petition. Further, the
prudential administrative exhaustion requirement for Section 2241 claims is excused.
Imposing this requirement would be futile due to the BIA’ precedential decision in Matter
of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N 216 (BIA 2025). Thus, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction
to hear the Petition.
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B. 	Section 1226 Governs Petitioner’s Detention
In November 2025, the Central District of California held that the Government's
interpretation of the INA (i.e., subjecting noncitizens to mandatory detention under Section
1225(b)(2), rather than Section 1226(a)), was unlawful and granted those petitioners partial
summary judgment. Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL
3289861, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025), Shortly thereafter, the court certified a national
Bond Eligible Class to whom it “extend[ed] the same declaratory relief [it previously]
granted to [the individual] Petitioners.” Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, 2025 WL
3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
On December 18, 2025, the court clarified its previous orders when it entered final
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) and held that “Bond Eligible
Class members are detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and are not subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2).” Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-
BFM, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2025 WL 3713987, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), judgment
entered sub nom. Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18,
2025). The court defined the Bond Eligible Class as:
All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who (1) have entered
or will enter the United States without inspection; (2) were not or will not be
apprehended upon arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department
of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.
Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, 2025 WL 3288403, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
Finally, on February 18, 2026, the court vacated Matter of Yajure Hurtado, due to
its finding that the BIA decision was contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure
Act. Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2026 WL 468284, at *12 (C.D.
Cal. Feb. 18, 2026). The Court also ordered Respondents to “promptly serve the [court
provided] Notice on all noncitizens who are newly arrested or detained by immigration
officers and who Respondents reasonably believe may be members of the class.” Id.
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Following the entry of judgment in Bautista, the Government generally responded
to Habeas petitions, based on this very issue, by “acknowledg[ing] that Petitioner is
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and is entitled to an order from this Court directing a
bond hearing be held pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” Return to Petition, Delvimar v. U.S.
Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 3:26-cv-00009-JES-MSB, (S.D. Cal Jan. 13, 2026), ECF
No. 4. Based on the Government’s reaction, the Court surmised that when the Bautista
Court vacated Hurtado, the Government would reasonably be foreclosed from reverting to
its prior position.
Interestingly, here, the Government—in its response, that was filed after Hurtado
was vacated—argued that Petitioner, under Hurtado, was subject to mandatory detention
under Section 1225(b). Res. at 2-3; see 29 I&N at 216. This is because she was detained
while in the United States and had not been admitted or paroled into the country. The
Government’s argument squarely conflicts with the overwhelming amount of courts, not
only from this Circuit but across the nation, that have come to the opposite conclusion. See,
e.g., Hasan v. Crawford, No. 1:25-CV-1408, 2025 WL 2682255, at *9 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19,
2025) (“For all these reasons,...Hasan's detention is governed by § 1226(a)’s discretionary
framework, not § 1225(b)’s mandatory detention procedures.”); Rodriguez v. Bostock, 779
F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1261 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“Rodriguez has shown that the text of Section
1226, canons of interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice
indicate that he is governed under Section 1226(a)’s ‘default’ rule for discretionary
detention. The Court is persuaded that Rodriguez is likely to succeed on the merits that he
is unlawfully detained under Section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention provision.”);
Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
19, 2025) (“The BIA's decision to pivot from three decades of consistent statutory
interpretation and call for Pizarro Reyes’ detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is at odds with
every District Court that has been confronted with the same question of statutory
interpretation. 	At 	least 	a 	dozen 	federal 	courts 	concur 	generally 	with 	this 	Court's
interpretation of the statutory language as applied in this context.”); Barrera v. Tindall, No.
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3:25-CV-541, 2025 WL 2690565, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025) (“Courts across the
country have been faced with similar questions of law and fact presented by the United
States. And every court who has examined this novel interpretation of Section 1225 by the
United States has rejected their theory and adopted Petitioner's. This includes courts within
the Sixth Circuit, and across the country.”); Vazquez v. Feeley, No. 2:25-CV-01542, 2025
WL 2676082, at *16 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2025) (“In sum, the Court finds that the text and
canons of statutory interpretation, including the legislative history, regulations, and long
history of consistent agency practice, as well as the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,
demonstrate that Petitioner is likely to succeed in establishing he and similarly situated
noncitizens are subject to detention under § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A).”).
Here, 	Petitioner 	entered 	the 	United 	States 	without 	inspection, 	she 	was 	not
apprehended upon arrival, and had been living in the country for over the last two decades.
Further, Respondents do not claim, nor provide any evidence to support, that Petitioner
would be subject to detention upon admission, under Sections 1226(c), 1225(b)(1), or
1231. The Court, therefore, finds that Petitioner is a member of the Bond Eligible Class.
She, thus. is entitled to the declaratory relief entered by the Central District of California—
that her current detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 is unlawful. See Hernandez v. Otay Mesa
Detention Center, 2025 WL 3724913, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2025) (Noting that
Respondents conceded that because petitioner was a member of the bond eligible class he
was considered detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), pursuant to the final judgment entered
in Maldonado Bautista); see also Mohammadi v. Larose, 2025 WL 3731737, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Dec. 26, 2025) (holding that the final judgment issued in Maldonado Bautista
provided independent support for why petitioner was not subject to mandatory detention).
Accordingly, the Court holds that Petitioner is entitled to, and will order Respondent
to provide her with, a bond hearing under Section 1226(a).
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C. 	Procedural Due Process
The Court declines to decide the merits of Petitioner's due process claim given that
the Court will grant the relief she seeks based on its conclusion that Section 1226(a) applies
here. If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing,
pursuant to Section 1226(a), or release her within the time allotted, Petitioner may renew
her Fifth Amendment Due Process claim.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing:
(1) The Court GRANTS Count One of the Petition;
(2) The Court DENIES AS MOOT Count Two of the Petition;
(3) The 	Court 	ORDERS 	Respondents 	to 	provide 	Petitioner 	with 	an
individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within ten (10)
days of this Order, or otherwise release her from custody, under the same
conditions that existed before her detention;
(4) Respondents are ORDERED to FILE a Notice of Compliance within five
(5) days of providing Petitioner with a bond redetermination hearing; and
(5) The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to CLOSE this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 25, 2026
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