Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SHARIPOV KHURSAND,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE,
Respondent.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-845-CAB-JLB
ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Before the Court is Petitioner Sharipov Khursand’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	[Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”).] 	Petitioner claims he is
being detained by immigration authorities in violation of the Fifth Amendment. [Id. at 6.]
He 	seeks 	immediate 	release 	or, 	at 	minimum, 	a 	bond 	hearing 	before 	a 	neutral
decisionmaker. [Id. at 7.] For the reasons below, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the
request for a writ of habeas corpus and ORDERS that Petitioner receive an individualized
bond hearing.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a Russian citizen who applied for admission at the San Ysidro Port of
Entry on November 17, 2024. 	He was determined to be an inadmissible arriving alien,
placed into expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and taken into
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody. 	[Doc. No. 4 at 3.] 	He has
remained in custody since then.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus challenges the legality of a petitioner’s custody and seeks
to secure release from that illegal custody. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a district court may
grant a writ of habeas corpus when the petitioner “is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” The petitioner bears the burden of
demonstrating that he is in illegal custody. 	See Martinez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2740-
BJCBJW, 2025 WL 3171738, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2025).
III. 	DISCUSSION
a. Jurisdiction
Respondents challenge this Court's jurisdiction based on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). [Doc.
No. 4 at 5–6.] 	This Court, and innumerable others, have repeatedly rejected the same
jurisdictional argument under similar factual scenarios. Because Petitioner challenges the
legality of his detention and not the decision to commence proceedings, the adjudication
of his removal case, or any action to execute a removal order, we reject Respondents’
jurisdictional arguments by adopting and incorporating by reference the same reasoning
expressed in Chavez v. Noem, 801 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1138–39 (S.D. Cal. 2025).
b. Due Process Claim
Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing—nearly
sixteen months—violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process. 	[Petition at 6.]
Respondents counter that the relevant statutory language of § 1225(b)(1) and Supreme
Court precedent require Petitioner’s detention until his removal proceedings are resolved.
[Doc. No. 4 at 6–16.]
The Court has previously discussed that while Supreme Court precedent does
establish that the statutory language of § 1225(b) mandates detention, the Supreme Court
has 	not 	decided 	the 	constitutional 	question 	of 	whether 	indefinite 	detention 	is
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permitted. L.R.G. v. LaRose, 3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13, at *5–6 (S.D. Cal.
Jan. 16, 2026).
Respondents cite to Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)
and Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) to argue that Petitioner has
no due process rights beyond those afforded by statute. 	Those cases, however, are
distinguishable. 	See Kydyrali v. Wolf, 499 F.Supp.3d 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020). 	Mezei
concerned a noncitizen who had already been permanently excluded from the U.S. on
security grounds, 345 U.S. at 207, and Barrera-Echavarria explicitly noted that it did not
consider “the constitutionality of indefinite or permanent detention with no prospect of
release.” 	44 F.3d at 1450. 	Rather, as this Court recently held in L.R.G., a due process
violation may occur when § 1225(b)(1) results in practically indefinite civil detention.
3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB, Doc. No. 13, at *6.
Though there is no brightline test for a violation, this Court and many others have
used the Banda test which considers the following six factors to determine when detention
under § 1225(b)(1) violates due process: (1) the total length of detention to date, which is
the most important factor; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3) the conditions of
detention; (4) delays in removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in removal
proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings
will result in a final order of removal. 	Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F.Supp.3d 1099, 1106
(W.D. Wash. 2019).
The first factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor given he has been detained for over a
year. See Sibomana v. LaRose, No. 22-CV-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL 3028093, at *4 (S.D.
Cal. Apr. 20, 2023) (finding that courts are typically wary of continued custody without a
bond hearing when detention extends beyond one year). 	Regarding the second factor,
which 	consists 	of 	“the anticipated 	duration 	of 	all 	removal 	proceedings—including
administrative and judicial appeals[,]” Petitioner’s individual merits hearing is not for
another two months and detention beyond that is likely. See Banda, 385 F.Supp.3d at 1119.
Accordingly, the second factor favors Petitioner. As to the third Banda factor, Petitioner’s
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confinement is similar to penal confinement because, as the Court explained with respect
to the petitioner in L.R.G. v. LaRose, who was also detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center,
Petitioner is detained “in a secure facility, guarded by armed personnel, and has restricted
access to outdoor space, activities, and communication.” No. 3:25-CV-3490-CAB-MSB,
Doc. No. 13, at *8.
As to the fourth and fifth factors, both Petitioner and the government have caused
delays, however, the government’s delays have been more recent and lengthier at roughly
203 days to Petitioner’s 180 days. [See Doc. No. 4 at 3–4; Doc. No. 4-1 at 7.] Moreover,
73 days of Petitioner’s delays were due to him seeking counsel and then counsel preparing
for his case. 	[Doc. No. 4-1 at 7.] 	The remaining delay was due to Petitioner’s counsel
falling sick on the date of the individual merits determination and the next one being
scheduled by the government 107 days later. 	[Id.; Doc. No. 4 at 3–4.] 	Given the
circumstances of Petitioner’s delays, the fourth weighs only slightly against Petitioner. See
Bayani v. LaRose, 3:26-CV-266-JES-VET, 2026 WL 194748, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 26,
2026). 	Finally, the Court finds the sixth factor neutral as it is unclear what the result of
Petitioner’s removal proceedings will be.
In sum, factors one (the most important), two, three, and five weigh for Petitioner,
while factor four weighs against him and factor six is neutral. The Court thus concludes
that Petitioner’s continued mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1) without a bond hearing
violates his right to due process. Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond
hearing before an immigration court, at which Respondents must justify his continued
detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee
or pose a danger to the community if released. See Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203
(9th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281
(2018) (“Given the substantial liberty interest at stake ... we hold that the government must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is a flight risk or a danger to the
community to justify denial of bond[.]”)
///
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner's prolonged detention without
a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court
therefore PARTIALLY GRANTS the writ of habeas corpus and ORDERS Respondents
to provide Petitioner an individualized bond hearing by March 17, 2026. 	Respondents
shall update the Court on the result of the bond hearing by March 18, 2026.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 3, 2026
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