Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
AMANDEEP SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden of
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00842-BTM-BLM
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF NO. 1]
Pending before the Court is Amandeep Singh’s amended petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS
IN PART and DENIES IN PART the petition and orders the Respondents to provide him
with an individualized bond hearing before a fair, neutral, and open-minded immigration
judge.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Singh, a native and citizen of India, arrived at the U.S. border on November 28,
2024, and was taken into custody around midnight. (ECF No. 5-1 (“Decl.”), ¶ 1; ECF No.
8-1, Ex. 2 (“DHS Rec.”), at 2.) Singh was found inadmissible under the INA and detained
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). 	(See ECF No. 8-1, Ex. 1, at 1; DHS Rec., 3.) 	Singh sought
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asylum and eventually received a positive credible fear determination on January 31, 2025.
(Decl., ¶ 2, ¶ 4.) 	The Respondents then initiated Section 1229a removal proceedings
against Singh to begin on February 20, 2025. (Id. ¶ 4; ECF No. 4 (“Return”), at 4–5.)
Singh requested a continuance on February 20, March 12, and April 2, 2025, to
prepare for his removal proceedings. (See ECF No. 8-1, Ex. 4 (“EOIR Rec.”), at 3.) He
filed his asylum application in April 2025. 	(Decl., ¶ 6.) 	Singh again requested a
continuance on May 14, June 11, July 16, and August 21. 	(EOIR Rec., 3.) 	During the
hearing on September 19, 2025, the Respondents converted Singh’s group hearing to an
individual merits hearing, scheduled for January 14, 2026. (Id.) During the January 2026
hearing, Singh explained that he had not reviewed his asylum application because he had
not received it. (Decl., ¶ 8.) The immigration judge then rescheduled his hearing to June
5, 2026. (Id.)
Singh has been in custody for about fifteen months and has not received a bond
hearing. 	(See id. ¶ 1, 9.) 	He remains detained at Otay Mesa Detention Center. 	(See id.
¶ 10.) He filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus on February 9, 2026, and an amended
petition on February 19, 2026. (ECF No. 1; ECF No. 5 (“Am. Pet.”).)
II. 	DISCUSSION
Singh claims the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits unreasonably
prolonged immigration detention without a bond hearing. 	(Am. Pet., 3–8.) 	Singh also
contends that immigration judges are not neutral and thus that the Court should order his
outright release or provide additional safeguards for the bond hearing. (Id. at 8–15.)
The Respondents contend that the Court lacks jurisdiction. 	(Return, 6–7.) 	The
Respondents claim that Singh is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). (Id. at 7–
8.) Because Singh was detained at the border, they claim that he has no right to admission
into the United States. (Id.) Furthermore, the Respondents urge the Court to reject Singh’s
Due Process claim on the merits because it is not constitutionally unreasonable. (Id. at 8–
15.) 	The Respondents also contend that, should the Court find that Singh is entitled to
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habeas relief, the Court should decline to grant release and instead order a bond hearing.
(Id. at 16–18.)
A. 	Jurisdiction
The Court has long had jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus to petitioners
held in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C § 2241(c)(3); see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. 	Yet the
Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this petition under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(g).
This is the same jurisdictional argument that other decisions in this district have
soundly rejected. 	See, e.g., Tran v. Noem, 2025 WL 3005347, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 27,
2025). 	Singh is not challenging his removal, the execution of a removal order, or a
discretionary decision by the Attorney General. 	See Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796,
800 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have limited [1252(g)]’s jurisdiction-stripping power to actions
challenging 	the 	Attorney 	General’s 	discretionary 	decisions 	to 	initiate 	proceedings,
adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders.”). 	Rather, Singh solely challenges the
constitutionality of his detention without a bond hearing. Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392,
401–02 (2019) (maintaining jurisdiction on appeal following district court decisions to
review legal challenge to decision to deny bond hearings). The Court therefore adopts the
reasoning of the other decisions in this district, rejects the Respondents’ argument, and
finds that it has jurisdiction to review the petition.
B. 	Merits
i. 	Due Process rights for noncitizens1
“[T]he government’s discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by
the requirements of due process.” 	Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir.
2017). “Civil immigration detention is permissible only to prevent flight or protect against
danger to the community . . . .” 	Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1035 (N.D. Cal.
1 This order uses the term “noncitizen” as equivalent to the statutory term “alien.” 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3); see Barton v. Barr, 590 U.S. 222, 226 n.2 (2020).
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2025); see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (“A statute permitting
indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem.”); Rodriguez
v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We have grave doubts that any statute that
allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those
who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary
deprivation of liberty would have thought so. Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of
our American government.”).
The Respondents respond that Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei precludes
noncitizens from receiving this Due Process protection. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). They claim
that noncitizens “have no substantive right to be free from immigration detention.”
Barrera–Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995), superseded by statute,
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110
Stat. 3009–546, as recognized in Xi v. I.N.S., 298 F.3d 832, 837–38 (9th Cir. 2002). The
Court is not persuaded. 	In Mezei, the Supreme Court was faced with “the special
circumstances of a national emergency and the determination by the Attorney General that
Mezei presented a threat to national security.” 	Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386,
413–14 (6th Cir. 2003). Because the Petitioner has not received a bond hearing, there has
been no determination that he is a danger to national security. 	Mezei’s holding does not
apply here.
Rather, the Court agrees with other courts that the Due Process clause prohibits
unreasonably prolonged detention without a bond hearing. 	Maksin v. Warden, Golden
State Annex, 2025 WL 2879328, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025) (“Several courts including
the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuit, as well as numerous district courts, have found that
unreasonably long detention periods may violate the due process clause.” (collecting
cases)). This holds true for those detained under Section 1225, such as Singh. Kydyrali v.
Wolf, 499 F. Supp. 3d 768, 772 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (“[T]he Court joins the majority of courts
across the country in concluding that an unreasonably prolonged detention under 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1225(b) without an individualized bond hearing violates due process.”). The Court must
determine whether Singh’s detention is so prolonged as to violate the Due Process clause.
ii. 	Prolonged Detention
When deciding whether a petitioner’s continued detention would violate the Due
Process clause, many district courts have looked to the factors articulated in Banda v.
McAleenan:
(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
detention; 	(3) 	the 	conditions 	of 	detention; 	(4) 	delays 	in 	the 	removal
proceedings caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings
cause [sic] by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal
proceedings will result in a final order of removal.”
385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (quoting Jamal A. v. Whitaker, 358 F.
Supp. 3d 853, 858–59 (D. Minn. 2019)). The Court finds it appropriate to apply the Banda
test to the Petitioner’s detention as other decisions in this district have done. 	The Court
adopts the reasoning of a recent decision, Sandesh v. LaRose, 2026 WL 622690 (S.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2026), and applies it here.
The first and “most important factor,” length of detention, favors the Petitioner.
Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1118. Singh has been detained for fifteen months, a length of
time beyond what many courts have found unreasonable. See Abdul Kadir v. LaRose, 2025
WL 2932654, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025) (collecting cases). The Court agrees with the
Respondents that the length of a petitioner’s detention does not, by itself, justify granting
habeas relief. “But neither does that length of detention serve as a safe harbor or insulate
Petitioner’s case from constitutional review.” Sadeqi v. LaRose, 2025 WL 3154520, at *3
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025). Furthermore, other factors favor Singh.
The second factor, likely duration of future detention, considers “the anticipated
duration of all removal proceedings—including administrative and judicial appeals.”
Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (quoting Jamal A., 358 F. Supp. at 859). 	Here, as in
Sandesh, “Petitioner has not yet had his final merits hearing, and if he loses, will file an
appeal to the BIA and will have an opportunity to appeal to the Ninth Circuit as well.”
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2026 WL 622690, at *4. 	This process may take years. 	See Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at
1119. Even if Singh receives asylum on June 5, 2026, he would be subject to three more
months of detention from now until his hearing. This would raise Singh’s total detention
time to eighteen months, making the first factor weigh heavier in his favor. 	The Court
finds that this factor weighs in favor of the Petitioner.
The third factor, conditions of detention, favors the Petitioner. “The more that the
conditions under which the noncitizen is being held resemble penal confinement, the
stronger his argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing.” 	Banda, 385 F. Supp. 3d at
1119. Singh’s declaration states that he is “locked behind razor wire and concrete,” wears
a “color-coded jump suit,” “can’t use the internet,” has restricted access to visitors and the
outside, and is “guarded at all times with guards authorized to punish [him] for violations
of the rules.” 	(Decl., ¶ 10.) 	The Court finds that Singh’s detention resembles penal
confinement, and so finds that this factor weighs in his favor.
The fourth and fifth factors, delays caused by the parties, are neutral when reviewed
together. The initial detention from November 28, 2024, to February 20, 2025, does not
appear to involve delay by either party. 	Of the remaining thirteen months in detention,
Singh caused seven months of delay by continuing his hearings from February 20, 2025,
to September 19, 2025. The Respondents then scheduled Singh’s individual merits hearing
four months later on January 14, 2026. Whether this was a delay by the Respondents or
the next available time for an individual hearing is unknown. 	But the last delay—
continuing Singh’s hearing from January 14, 2026, to June 5, 2026—was likely caused by
the Respondents. They contend that Singh’s hearing “could have been held on January 14”
but “he had not reviewed his asylum application.” 	(Return, 15.) 	But Singh had not
reviewed his application because he had not received it. Because Singh is in a detention
facility operated by the Respondents and receives mail when they provide it to him, the
Respondents likely are at fault for the immigration judge not hearing Singh’s case.
Regardless, the Court finds that both parties have delayed the immigration process. Any
weight given to the delay of one is negated by the weight given to the delay of the other.
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The sixth factor, the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final
order of removal, is neutral. Although Singh has a positive credible fear finding, the Court
“is in no position to judge the likelihood of success of this argument” or his claim for
asylum. Sandesh, 2026 WL 622690
Because the first three factors favor the Petitioner and the remaining factors are
neutral, the Court determines that Singh’s prolonged detention without a bond hearing
violates the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
C. 	Relief
Singh 	claims 	that 	the 	neutrality 	of 	immigration 	judges 	has 	been 	“severely
compromised.” (Am. Pet., 8.) He contends that immigration judges have been encouraged
to rule for the Respondents and “minimize due process.” (Id. at 12.) Thus, Singh argues
that immigration judges will not be fair and impartial and seeks release as a remedy. (Id.
at 15.) In the alternative, he also requests this Court to hold a bond hearing. (Id. at 16.)
The Court is ordering an individualized bond hearing with additional safeguards to
address Singh’s concerns. 	The bond hearing must be before a fair, neutral, and open-
minded immigration judge who is ordered to determine whether the Petitioner is a danger
to the community or a flight risk and what bond conditions, if any, would be appropriate
to ensure the Petitioner’s appearance. During the bond hearing, the Respondents shall bear
the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Singh poses a danger or
flight risk. See Sandesh, 2026 WL 622690, at *5 (“[I]t [is] appropriate to continue to apply
the standard set forth in Singh [v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011)] in the case of
bond hearings for those subjected to prolonged detention under § 1225(b) to protect the
critical liberty interest and due process rights of such individuals.”). 	If the immigration
judge denies bond, the judge must make specific findings as to why Singh is a flight risk
or a danger to the community.
If the Petitioner believes that the Respondents or the immigration judge violated this
order and the writ, the Petitioner can apply to this Court for appropriate sanctions. If past
history is any guide, the Respondents have shown the upmost respect for this Court’s
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judgments and has timely followed them thereby enabling the mutual respect of the Court.
There is no reason to believe that the mutual respect for coequal branches of the
government will not continue here in the Southern District of California. The remedy of
release without bond is denied without prejudice. The alternative remedy of a bond hearing
in front of this Court is also denied without prejudice.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED IN
PART. The Respondents are ordered to grant Singh an individualized bond hearing before
a fair, neutral, and open-minded immigration judge in accordance with the requirements
ordered above. 	The hearing must be held no later than March 23, 2026. 	The remedy of
release without bond is DENIED without prejudice. 	The alternative remedy of a bond
hearing in front of this Court is DENIED without prejudice. The parties shall file a joint
statement as to compliance with this writ and order and the result of the bond hearing by 5
p.m. on March 25, 2026.
The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the writ.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 10, 2026
___________________________
Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz
United States District Judge
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