Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
YERICEDT CATERINE GONZALEZ
LUENGAS,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN, Otay Mesa Detention Center,
Respondent.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00636-RBM-DDL
ORDER DENYING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Docs. 1, 2, 11]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Yericedt Caterine Gonazlez Luengas’s
(“Petitioner”) Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”)
(Doc. 1), Emergency Motion for Immediate Release (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2), and
Emergency Motion for Stay of Removal (“Motion for Stay of Removal”) (Doc. 11). For
the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES each of these filings.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Columbia. (Doc. 9-1 [Declaration of Deportation Officer
Jesus Blanco (“Blanco Decl.”)] ¶ 4.) On June 4, 2024, Petitioner was ordered removed in
absentia from the United States by an immigration judge. (Id. ¶ 5.) On or about October
10, 2025, Petitioner was physically removed from the United States to Colombia. (Id.) On
November 30, 2025, Petitioner unlawfully entered the United States. (Id. ¶ 6.) She was
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apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and determined to be
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and taken into
ICE custody. (Id.) On December 6, 2025, Petitioner was served with a Notice and Order
of Expedited Removal. (Id.)
Petitioner was provided with a credible fear interview after requesting asylum and
protection under the Convention against Torture. 	(Id. ¶ 7.) 	On December 18, 2025, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) concluded that Petitioner did not have a
credible fear of persecution or torture. (Id.) On December 30, 2025, an immigration judge
affirmed DHS’s determination and ordered Petitioner removed to Colombia. (Id.)
Petitioner does not have a Colombia passport or other travel document, but has
produced her “Cedula” number. (Id. ¶ 10.) “ICE Air Operations is able to place Colombian
citizens on removal flights with their Cedula or Passport numbers without having a physical
document.” (Id.) ICE attests that “[h]ad Petitioner not filed [the] instant habeas petition,
Petitioner likely would have been removed in February 2026,” and that they are “aware of
no reason that would prevent or delay Petitioner’s removal to Colombia.” (Id. ¶¶ 11–12.)
B. 	Procedural Background
Petitioner, through her next friend and husband, filed the Petition and TRO Motion
on February 2, 2026. 	(Docs. 1, 2.) 	Shortly thereafter, the Court set a briefing schedule.
(Doc. 3.) Respondents filed their Return to Habeas Petition (“Response”) on February 17,
2026. (Doc. 9.) Petitioner filed her Motion for Stay of Removal (Doc. 11) and Reply in
Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Reply”) (Doc. 12) on February 23, 2026
and February 26, 2026, respectively.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
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be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that her detention without a bond hearing has become unreasonably
prolonged in violation of the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 1 at 2; Doc. 1-2 at 1–3.) Petitioner
also seeks an emergency stay of removal because she has medically fragile minor children,
and her removal “would disrupt critical medical care and cause irreparable harm.” (Doc.
11 at 1–2.) Respondents argue that: (1) Petitioner’s claims are jurisdictionally barred by 8
U.S.C. § 1252; (2) Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225; and
(3) even if the Court reaches the merits, Petitioner’s detention has not been unreasonably
prolonged. (Doc. 9 at 4–15.)
A. 	Jurisdiction
The Court agrees with Respondents that it lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner’s request
for an emergency stay of removal.
In the context of expedited removal orders under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1),
federal law prohibits judicial review of “the ‘procedures and policies’ that
have been adopted to ‘implement’ the expedited removal process; the decision
to ‘invoke’ that process in a particular case; the ‘application’ of that process
to a particular [noncitizen]; and the ‘implementation’ and ‘operation’ of any
expedited removal order.” . . . 	By statute, judicial review of such orders is
limited to determinations whether the petitioner is [a noncitizen], whether the
petitioner was ordered removed under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), and whether the
petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she has
been granted status as a lawful permanent resident, refugee, or asylee.
Luengas v. Noem, Case No. 26-cv-236-RSH-KSC, 2026 WL 252582, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan.
30, 2026) (quoting Mendoza-Linares v. Garland, 51 F.4th 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2022)
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)).
By seeking a stay of her expedited removal order, Petitioner seeks the Court’s review
of the “implementation and operation of any expedited removal order.” 	The Court does
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not have jurisdiction to hear such a claim. 	Therefore, Petitioner’s Motion for Stay of
Removal (Doc. 11) is DENIED.
The Court has jurisdiction, though, to hear Petitioner’s claim that her detention has
become unreasonably prolonged in violation of due process. See Constantinovici v. Bondi,
806 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1161–62 (S.D. Cal. 2025). 	Such a challenge seeks to enforce
Petitioner’s 	“constitutional 	rights 	to 	due 	process 	in 	the 	context 	of 	the 	removal
proceedings—not the legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal order.”
Garcia v. Noem, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (emphasis in original).
B. 	Prolonged Detention
Respondents argue that “inadmissible arriving noncitizens seeking initial entry into
the United States . . . have no due process rights ‘other than those afforded by statute,’” but
that even if she did, Petitioner cannot show that her detention has been unreasonably
prolonged. (Doc. 9 at 10–15 (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
103, 107 (2020).) 	Even assuming that Petitioner is entitled to due process and that the
Court can decide whether her detention has become prolonged, Petitioner’s claim fails on
the merits. 	In considering whether detention under § 1225(b) has become unreasonably
prolonged, the Court has frequently applied a six-factor balancing test that considers:
(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future
detention; (3) conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings
caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the
government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in
a final order of removal.
Gao, 805 F. Supp. 3d at 1111.
As to the first factor, which has been described as “the most important,” Banda v.
McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2019), Petitioner has been detained
for less than four months. (See Blanco Decl. ¶ 6.) The Court finds that this factor weighs
against Petitioner. 	Cf. Sibomana v. LaRose, Case No.: 3:22-cv-933-LL-NLS, 2023 WL
3028093, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2023) (“In general, as detention continues past a year,
courts become extremely way of permitting continued custody absent a bond hearing.”);
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Abdul Kadir v. Larose, Case No.: 25cv1045-LL-MMP, 2025 WL 2932654, at *5 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 15, 2025) (“Courts have found detention over seven months without a bond hearing
weighs toward a finding that it is unreasonable.”).
Additionally, 	the 	second 	and 	sixth 	factors 	weigh 	heavily 	against 	Petitioner.
Petitioner has already been issued an Order of Expedited Removal, and ICE attests that it
would have been able to remove her to Colombia but for the Court’s Order to Show Cause
enjoining removal. 	(Blanco Decl. ¶¶ 6, 10–12.) 	And the fourth and fifth factors are, at
most, neutral, because there really has been no delay in the removal proceedings. Petitioner
was apprehended at the border on November 30, 2025. (Id. ¶ 6.) One week later, she was
issued an Order of Expedited Removal, and one month after that, an immigration judge
had affirmed DHS’s determination that Petitioner did not have a credible fear of
persecution or torture. (Id. ¶ 7.) It is only the third factor that weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
“The more that the conditions under which the [noncitizen] is being held resemble penal
confinement, the stronger his argument that he is entitled to a bond hearing.” Banda, 385
F. Supp. 3d at 1119 (citation omitted). As multiple other courts have found, detention at
Otay Mesa Detention Center is “indistinguishable from penal confinement.” Kydyrali, 499
F. Supp. 3d at 773 (citation omitted).
Five of the six factors, including “the most important one,” weigh against Petitioner.
Therefore, Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b) has not become unreasonably prolonged.
Accordingly, the Petition (Doc. 1) and TRO Motion (Doc. 2) are DENIED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1), TRO Motion (Doc. 2), and Motion
for Stay of Removal (Doc. 11) are DENIED. The Clerk is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: March 24, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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