Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

1
26cv0578-LL-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
VALORIA FEH,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26cv0578-LL-BLM
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Before the Court is Petitioner Valoria Feh’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Respondents filed a Response [ECF
No. 4], and Petitioner filed a Traverse [ECF No. 5]. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court GRANTS the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner Valoria Feh, a citizen of Cameroon, has been detained since he arrived in
the United States on January 25, 2025 after fleeing threats from Cameroon’s military who
accused him of arming separatists. Pet. at 2. An immigration judge ordered Petitioner’s
removal on July 31, 2025, but also granted him withholding of removal to Cameroon. Id.
at 2, 7. Petitioner reserved appeal of the immigration judge’s decision, but did not file an
appeal by the August 29, 2025 deadline. ECF No. 4-1, Declaration of Concepcion
Case 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM Document 6 Filed 03/11/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 9

2
26cv0578-LL-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Arredondo (“Arredondo Decl.”), ¶ 9. ICE has been, and is still, trying to find third countries
that may be willing to accept Petitioner for removal. Id. ¶¶ 10–11.
On January 29, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition alleging that there is “no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future” and that he is
entitled to immediate release under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). Pet. at 2.
Petitioner also seeks the enjoinment of his removal to a third country without advance
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 10.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c); Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241
expressly permits the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those
aliens are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.’”). In federal habeas proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case
by a preponderance of evidence. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 (9th Cir.
2004); Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends that because he has been detained for about six months after
receiving withholding of removal to Cameroon and there is “no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” he is entitled to immediate release under
Zadvydas. Pet. at 2. Petitioner also seeks to enjoin his removal to a third country without
advance notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 10. Respondents argue that Petitioner
is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), and that “[t]o the extent Petitioner is
challenging ICE’s decision to detain him for the purpose of removal,” it is precluded by
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). ECF No. 4 at 2–3, 6–7.
A. 	Jurisdiction
Section 1252(g) states that “[e]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding
any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28,
Case 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM Document 6 Filed 03/11/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 9

3
26cv0578-LL-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
or any other habeas corpus provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause
or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
The Court finds § 1252(g) does not bar its jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims. The
Supreme Court has explained that § 1252(g) does not bar jurisdiction for the “universe of
deportation claims” but instead “applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney
General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
482 (1999); see also Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631, 2025 WL 2461663, at *2
(9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (“The Supreme Court has instructed that we should read § 1252(g)
narrowly.”). The Supreme Court later reiterated this narrow application of § 1252(g):
“We did not interpret this language to sweep in any claim that can technically be said to
‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney General. Instead, we read the language
to refer to just those three specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281, 294 (2018) (citation omitted). Petitioner is not challenging the execution of his
removal order but is instead challenging the lawfulness of his continued detention and the
due process required in removals to third countries. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
687–88, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2497, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001) (confirming that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 confers jurisdiction on federal courts to review custody challenges for individuals
with final removal orders); Ibarra-Perez, 2025 WL 2461663, at *2 (noting that a claim
based on a lack of legal authority to execute a removal order due to a violation of a court
order, the Constitution, INA, or international law, does not challenge the decision or action
to execute a removal order). Therefore, § 1252(g) does not limit the Court’s jurisdiction in
this matter.
B. 	Petitioner’s Detention and Zadvydas
When a noncitizen has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and
a final order of removal has been entered, they must be detained for up to ninety days
Case 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM Document 6 Filed 03/11/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 9

4
26cv0578-LL-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
pending the government’s efforts to secure their removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2).
This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
After the removal period, this statute “limits [a noncitizen’s] post-removal-period detention
to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that [noncitizen’s] removal from the United
States” and “does not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. A six-month
period of post-removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of
detention.” Id. at 701. After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to
“provide[ ] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If the petitioner satisfies their initial burden, then the
burden shifts to the government to rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain
reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the
‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is
no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.”
Id. at 699. In that case, the noncitizen’s release may be “conditioned on any of the various
forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances.” Id. at 700; see
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
Assuming without deciding that Petitioner’s removal order became administratively
final on August 29, 2025, Petitioner has been detained for over six months since then.1
Thus, 	the 	Court 	finds 	Petitioner’s 	current 	detention 	is 	no 	longer 	“presumptively
reasonable.”
Petitioner now has the initial burden of showing “good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 701. “Good reason to believe does not place a burden upon the detainee to
1 Petitioner contends that his order of removal was final on July 31, 2025. Pet. at 7.
Respondents attest that on July 31, 2025, Petitioner reserved appeal of the denial of his
asylum application, but when he failed to file an appeal by the August 29, 2025 deadline,
the order of removal became final on that date. Arredondo Decl. ¶ 9.
Case 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM Document 6 Filed 03/11/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 9

5
26cv0578-LL-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
demonstrate no reasonably foreseeable, significant likelihood of removal or show that his
detention is indefinite; it is something less than that.” Senor v. Barr, 401 F. Supp. 3d 420,
430 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (cleaned up) (citations omitted). However, Petitioner must offer
more than “conclusory statements suggesting that he will not” be removed. Andrade v.
Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006); Quassani v. Killian, Case No. 2:17-cv-01678-
APG-PAL, 2017 WL 3396506, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 4, 2017) (questioning “whether
petitioner can meet his initial burden” given that he “has offered nothing more than
conclusory statements with respect to the likelihood of his removal in the foreseeable
future”).
The Court finds Petitioner has met his burden to show “good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Petitioner cannot be removed to his home country because he was granted withholding of
removal to Cameroon. Despite cooperating with ICE on his removal, ICE has never
identified a third country that would accept Petitioner for removal in these past six months.
ECF No. 1-2, First Declaration of Valoria Feh (“Feh Decl.”), ¶¶ 3–6. Petitioner notes a
study that in fiscal year 2017, “there were at most 21 people of the thousands with
withholding of removal deported to any country.” Pet. at 9 & n.2. The Court finds Petitioner
has sufficiently shown “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789
F. Supp. 3d 387, 398 (D.N.J. 2025) (“While the Court agrees that circumstances may
evolve and that historical outcomes do not necessarily control the result in any particular
case, the data nevertheless supports the general inference that removal for this particular
class of detainees is substantially more difficult.”).
The burden thus shifts to Respondents to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut
that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Respondents contend that ICE is diligently
seeking a third country for Petitioner’s removal; that San Diego Enforcement and Removal
Operations (ERO) Field Office contacted ERO’s Removal and International Operations
(RIO) on August 18, 2025 for assistance in doing so and requested an update on January
Case 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM Document 6 Filed 03/11/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 9

6
26cv0578-LL-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
14, 2026. Arredondo Decl. ¶¶ 10–11. RIO has not identified a third country for Petitioner’s
removal, “but efforts remain ongoing.” Id. ¶ 11.
The Court finds Respondents have not shown there is a sufficient likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Despite Respondents’ diligent efforts, a third
country has not been identified in over six months. These unsuccessful efforts are not
evidence that success is likely to occur “in the reasonably foreseeable future.” See, e.g.,
Souvannaseng 	v. 	Noem, 	No. 	3:25-CV-3473-CAB-DEB, 	2025 	WL 	3641180, 	at 	*2
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025) (finding a “vague assertion” that ICE was working diligently to
effectuate a petitioner’s removal, as well as statistics showing an increase in removals to
petitioner’s home country, was insufficient to show likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future); Azzo v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-03122-RBM-BJW, 2025 WL 3535208,
at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025) (finding the respondents failed to rebut the petitioner’s
showing where “[r]espondents have not even identified a third country to which they plan
to remove Petitioner, much less submitted a travel document or provided an estimate for
how long it would take this unidentified third country to respond”); Gilali v. Warden of
McHenry Cnty. Jail, No. 19-CV-837, 2019 WL 5191251, at *5 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2019)
(“While the respondent asserts that [the petitioner’s] travel document requests with both
the Moroccan and Iraqi Consulates remain pending and ERO continues to follow up on the
documents’ status, this is insufficient” because “[i]t is merely an assertion of good-faith
efforts to secure removal; it does not make removal likely in the reasonably foreseeable
future.”). Therefore, the Court finds that under Zadvydas, because Petitioner met his burden
to show removal is not reasonably foreseeable and Respondents failed to rebut this
showing, his continued detention is “unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700.
C. 	Third-Country Removal
Petitioner argues that if ICE did suddenly prove able to remove Mr. Feh to a third
country, it would do so under a policy that violates the Fifth Amendment, the Convention
Against Torture, and implementing regulations.” Pet. at 10. Petitioner notes that a July 9,
Case 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM Document 6 Filed 03/11/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 9

7
26cv0578-LL-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2025 ICE Memo allows removal of a noncitizen to a third country with no notice or an
opportunity to be heard if the country has given credible “assurances” that the removed
person will not be persecuted or tortured. ECF No. 1-3 at 2. The memo also states that even
without assurances, third-country removal can occur with twenty-four hours’ notice—or
as little as six hours if the noncitizen is given an opportunity to speak with an attorney prior
to removal—and the government “will not affirmatively ask whether the alien is afraid of
being removed to the country of removal.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Respondents contend that prior to removal to a third country, ICE will provide
written notice of the intended third country, and Petitioner will be referred to an asylum
officer if he claims a fear of removal to that country. ECF No. 4 at 5; Arredondo Decl.
¶ 13. They further attest that ICE will generally wait twenty-four hours before removal, or
six or more hours in “exigent circumstances” if the noncitizen is “provided reasonable
means and opportunity to speak with an attorney prior to removal.” Arredondo Decl. ¶ 12.
“ICE may not remove a noncitizen to a country if the noncitizen’s life or freedom
would be threatened in that country because of the noncitizen’s race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” See Aden v. Nielsen, 409
F. Supp. 3d 998, 1007 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)). “If the noncitizen
expresses fear of persecution or harm upon return to any of the countries designated by the
[immigration judge], the [immigration judge] must inform the noncitizen that he or she
may apply for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against
Torture.” Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(1)). “[B]oth the due process clause and the
governing statute place the burden on the government . . . to provide a meaningful
opportunity to be heard on asylum and withholding claims.” Nguyen v. Scott, 796
F. Supp. 3d 703, 727 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (quoting Aden, 409 F. Supp. 3d at 1010 (first
alteration in original)). “Failing to notify individuals who are subject to deportation that
they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for withholding of
deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates both INS regulations and
the constitutional right to due process.” Andriasian v. I.N.S., 180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir.
Case 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM Document 6 Filed 03/11/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
7 of 9

8
26cv0578-LL-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1999). “In the context of country of removal designations, last minute orders of removal to
a country may violate due process if an immigrant was not provided an opportunity to
address his fear of persecution in that country.” Najjar v. Lynch, 630 F. App’x 724
(9th Cir. 2016).
This Court agrees with the other courts in the Ninth Circuit who have held that the
policies provided in the July 9, 2025 ICE memo violate due process and Ninth Circuit
precedent. See, e.g., Giebashvili v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3432-BJC-VET, 2026 WL 114422,
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2026) (collecting cases); Azzo v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-03122-RBM-
BJW, 2025 WL 3535208, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025) (citation omitted); Vu v. Noem,
No. 1:25-CV-01366-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3114341, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025)
(collecting cases); Nguyen v. Scott, 796 F. Supp. 3d 703, 728–29 (W.D. Wash. 2025); see
also A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 95 (2025) (“[N]otice roughly 24 hours before
removal, devoid of information about how to exercise due process rights to contest that
removal, surely does not pass muster.”). Respondents’ description of the procedures in
place for third-country removal is in agreement with the policies in the July 9, 2025 ICE
Memo, and Respondents do not deny that the procedures in the memo are currently being
enforced. The current procedure does not inform an individual subject to removal of his
right to apply for withholding of deportation or of the opportunity to present any fear of
persecution or harm upon return to the designated country; may provide no notice or
opportunity to be heard if the United States receives certain assurances from the receiving
country; and provides notice only twenty-four hours or less prior to removal. As such, the
policies provided in the ICE memo, if implemented without further procedures, would
violate the noncitizen’s due process rights. See A. A. R. P., 605 U.S. at 95; Andriasian,
180 F.3d at 1041.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED.
/ / /
Case 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM Document 6 Filed 03/11/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
8 of 9

9
26cv0578-LL-BLM
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to supervision pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
3. Respondents are 	ENJOINED 	from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(6) unless and until Respondents obtain a travel document for his removal and
follow all applicable statutory and regulatory procedures.
4. Respondents are ENJOINED from removing Petitioner to a third country unless
they adhere to the following procedures:
a. provide written notice to Petitioner and Petitioner’s counsel in a language
Petitioner can understand;
b. provide Petitioner a meaningful opportunity, and a minimum of ten days,
to raise a fear-based claim for CAT protection prior to removal;
c. if Petitioner demonstrates reasonable fear of removal to the country,
Respondents must move to reopen Petitioner’s immigration proceedings;
d. if Petitioner is not found to have demonstrated a reasonable fear of removal
to the country, Respondents must provide a meaningful opportunity, and a
minimum of fifteen days, for Petitioner to seek reopening of his immigration
proceedings.
5. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner's favor and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 11, 2026
Case 3:26-cv-00578-LL-BLM Document 6 Filed 03/11/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
9 of 9