Belal v. LaRose

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MOHAMMED BELAL,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE,
Respondent.
Case No. 26-cv-00283-BAS-VET
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
(ECF No. 1)
Petitioner Mohammed Belal is self-represented. He brings this Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming prolonged detention without a bond
hearing and untenable living conditions in the immigration detention center. (ECF No. 1.)
The Government filed a Return. 	(ECF No. 4.) 	For the reasons stated below, the Court
DENIES the Petition.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Petitioner is a citizen of Bangladesh. 	On January 8, 2025, he entered the United
States without papers and was immediately detained three miles from a U.S. Port of Entry.
(ECF No. 4, Ex. A.) 	Petitioner requested asylum, and on February 8, 2025, received a
credible fear determination. 	(Id., Ex. C.) 	On September 8, 2025, an Immigration Judge
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denied Petitioner’s asylum claim, and on October 15, 2025, Petitioner appealed that
decision. (Id., Exs. D, E.) That appeal remains pending.
Petitioner requests release on bond and details “terrible” living conditions at the
immigration detention center where he is housed, including unsanitary showers, lack of
proper medical care, and expensive food and medicine, resulting in a decline in his overall
health. (ECF No. 1.)
The Government filed a Return arguing this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
Petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), Petitioner’s detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(B), and Petitioner’s detention has not been unconstitutionally prolonged.
II. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Suitability of Habeas Corpus Petition
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 	“The traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or
she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It
applies to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
687 (2001). However, “the writ of habeas corpus is limited to attacks upon the legality or
duration of confinement.” 	Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing
Preiser, 411 U.S. at 484–86). 	It is not the appropriate vehicle to attack conditions of
confinement. Pinson v. Carvajal, 69 F.4th 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2023).
Since Petitioner is in custody, to the extent he is seeking release from custody, he
has standing to pursue this Petition. However, to the extent Petitioner is complaining about
the unsanitary or unsafe conditions at the immigration detention center, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to consider those claims under a habeas corpus petition.
B. 	Jurisdiction Under Section 1252(g)
The Government argues that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips this Court of jurisdiction.
Section 1252(g) states that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
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or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien
under this chapter.”
The general rule is to “‘resolve any ambiguities in a jurisdiction-stripping statute
[such as Section 1252(g)] in favor of the narrower interpretation,’ and by the ‘strong
presumption in favor of judicial review.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, 154 F.4th 989,
995 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 2018)).
Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled Section 1252(g) applies only to three discrete actions:
commencing proceedings, adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders. 	Reno v. Am.-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999). 	“Instead of ‘sweep[ing] in
any claim that can technically be said to arise from the three listed actions,’ the provision
‘refers to just those three specific actions themselves.’” 	Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 995
(alteration in original) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). “There
are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation
process . . .” that are not one of these three. See Reno, 525 U.S. at 482 (listing possibilities).
Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they
are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Ibarra-Perez, 154 F.4th at 997.
In this Petition, Petitioner is not contesting the commencement or adjudication of
removal proceedings against him, nor is he raising an issue with respect to the execution
of removal. His detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) may be during, but is nonetheless
independent of, the removal proceedings. Thus, this Court is not stripped of jurisdiction
by Section 1252(g).
C. 	Mandatory Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225
Title 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to a non-citizen who is arriving and seeking
admission to the United States and who indicates an intention to apply for asylum or a fear
of persecution. Such an individual “shall be detained pending a final determination of
credible fear of persecution and, if found not to have such a fear, until removed.” 	8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(IV). See also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 218 (2018). Unlike
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the potentially indefinite detention at issue in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001),
detention under this Section has “a definite termination point: the conclusion of removal
proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 304.
The statute is very clear. An arriving non-citizen seeking admission to the United
States, such as Petitioner, shall be detained while his asylum claim is proceeding. Nor is
Petitioner similarly situated to those individuals who have been living in the United States
before detention. Petitioner was detained as he was entering the United States; thus, there
is no question that he was seeking admission at the time he was arrested.
D. 	Prolonged Detention
Various Courts have wrestled with whether an individual detained under Section
1225(b)(1)(B) could ever claim an unreasonably prolonged mandatory detention without
an individualized bond hearing such that it violates due process. 	See, e.g., Lopez v.
Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (exploring the various court decisions on
this issue). 	The Supreme Court made it clear that nothing in the statute compels a bond
hearing within a certain period of time. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. That said, this Court is
not prepared to say that an indefinite detention without a bond hearing could never violate
due process. However, whatever that unreasonable period of time is, this case is not it.
Petitioner’s removal proceedings have moved forward with reasonable speed. 	He
was arrested in January, received a credible fear determination in February, and had a
hearing before an Immigration Judge who denied his asylum claim in September. He has
now been allowed to appeal that ruling and filed that appeal in October. The appeal has
been pending for only four months. As such, at this point, Petitioner’s total detention has
not been unreasonable. His future detention will last only as long as it takes the Board of
Immigration Appeals to render a decision, which is unlikely to be an indefinite period of
time.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court 	DENIES 	the Petition (ECF No. 1)
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. A habeas petition is not the appropriate vehicle to raise issues
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regarding conditions of confinement. 	Furthermore, Petitioner’s detention is mandatory
under Section 1225(b)(1)(B), and his detention has not been so unreasonably prolonged
that it violates due process.
The Clerk is directed to close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 19, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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