Yousefi v. Larose

1
3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MOHAMMAD HASSAN YOUSEFI,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior Warden,
Otay Mesa Detention Center,
Respondent.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET
ORDER DENYING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
[Doc. 1]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Mohammad Hassan Yousefi’s (“Petitioner”)
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) For
the reasons set forth below, the Petition is DENIED without prejudice.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen and national of Iran. 	(Doc. 4-2, Declaration of Deportation
Officer Christian Castellanos (“Castellanos Decl.”), ¶ 3.)1 Petitioner unlawfully entered
the United States from Mexico on September 6, 2024, when he was taken into Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody and processed for expedited removal. (Id. ¶ 4.)
1 The Court cites the CM/ECF electronic pagination unless otherwise noted.
Case 3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET Document 6 Filed 02/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
1 of 6

2
3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Petitioner 	requested 	asylum 	and 	protection 	under 	the 	Convention 	Against 	Torture
(“CAT”). (Id. ¶ 5.) On October 30, 2024, an asylum officer concluded that Petitioner did
not have a credible fear of persecution or torture. 	(Id. ¶ 6.) 	On November 4, 2024, an
immigration judge vacated that determination and found that Petitioner did have a credible
fear. (Id. ¶ 7.) The next day, Petitioner was served with a Notice to Appear and charged
as inadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act as a noncitizen present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled and as a noncitizen not in possession of a
valid entry document. (Id. ¶ 8; Doc. 4-1 at 2–5.)
On September 3, 2025, an immigration judge denied Petitioner’s requests for
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief and ordered Petitioner removed to Iran.
(Castellanos Decl. ¶ 10; Doc. 4-1 at 7–10.) Petitioner reserved an appeal but did not file
one, and the removal order became final on October 3, 2025. 	(Castellanos Decl. ¶ 10.)
“On January 9, 2026, at approximately 1:00 a.m., ICE transported [Petitioner] from the
Otay Mesa Detention Facility to San Diego International Airport for removal to Iran.”
(Doc. 5 at 2, Declaration of Mohammad Hassan Yousefi (“Yousefi Decl.”), ¶ 12.)
Petitioner was kept in ICE custody at the airport overnight, and the next morning was
returned to Otay Mesa Detention Center without being removed from the United States.
(Id. ¶ 13.) 	Petitioner was not given an explanation for why this removal attempt failed.
(Id.)
ICE attests that it “has a valid Iranian passport for Petitioner” and scheduled him for
a removal flight on January 25, 2026 (Castellanos Decl. ¶ 11), but removed him from that
flight because of the pending Petition and the Court’s Order to Show Cause. (See Doc. 2
at 2 (ordering that “Petitioner SHALL NOT be transferred outside of the Southern District
of California pending a ruling in this matter”) (emphasis in original).)
Petitioner filed the Petition on January 16, 2026. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed their
Return in Opposition to Petitioner’s Habeas Petition (“Response”) on January 28, 2026.
(Doc. 4.) Petitioner filed his Notice of Supplemental Evidence (“Reply”) on February 10,
2026. (Doc. 5.)
Case 3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET Document 6 Filed 02/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
2 of 6

3
3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Supreme Court’s
decision in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 6, 13; Doc. 1-10 at 1–3;
Doc. 5 at 5–10, 45–61.) 	Respondents argue that: (1) “[t]o the extent Petitioner is
challenging ICE’s decision to detain h[im] for the purpose of removal, such a challenge is
precluded” by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); and (2) Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim is premature, and
even if it were not, Petitioner cannot show that there is no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future because ICE has Petitioner’s Iranian passport and can
schedule his removal imminently. (Doc. 4 at 2–6.)
A. 	Jurisdiction
At the outset, the Court notes that parts of the Petition appear to directly challenge
the merits of the immigration judge’s findings. (See Doc. 5 at 7–8 (arguing that removal
to 	Iran 	would 	violate 	due 	process 	because 	Petitioner 	“has 	established 	a 	credible,
individualized risk of severe harm if returned to Iran”); id. at 9 (arguing that Petitioner’s
“asylum denial cannot justify immediate removal because the [asylum proceedings were]
fundamentally unfair”); id.at 11–35 (lodging evidence likely in support of Petitioner’s
claim that he has established a viable claim for asylum or other relief).) 	To the extent
Case 3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET Document 6 Filed 02/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
3 of 6

4
3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Petitioner seeks review of the immigration judge’s determinations, the Court does not have
jurisdiction over these claims. See Guerrier v. Garland, 18 F.4th 304, 309 (9th Cir. 2021)
(noting that binding precedent “would seem to foreclose . . . the petitioner’s request for
review of an immigration judge’s negative credible fear determination”); Singh v. United
States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Case No. C19-1224-JLR-MAT, 2020 WL 420589, at *9
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 3, 2020) (finding that the court had no jurisdiction over the petitioner’s
“challenge to the merits of [the asylum officer’s] finding that he was not credible and the
[immigration judge’s] affirmance of this decision”).
The Court does, however, have jurisdiction over Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim. 	The
Court may not exercise jurisdiction over the Attorney General’s decision to “commence
proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any [noncitizen].”
8 U.S.C § 1252(g). Aside from the claims discussed above, Petitioner does not challenge
the decision to commence removal proceedings or any act to execute a removal order.
Rather, he challenges his ongoing detention without “an individualized bond hearing
despite the existence of [a] final order of removal and no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	(Doc. 1 ¶ 6.) 	He is therefore enforcing his
“constitutional rights to due process in the context of the removal proceedings—not the
legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal order.” 	Garcia v. Noem, 803 F.
Supp. 3d 1064, 1074 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (emphasis in original); see United States v.
Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting a “district court may consider a
purely legal question that does not challenge the Attorney General’s discretionary
authority, even if the answer to that legal question . . . forms the backdrop against which
the Attorney General later will exercise discretionary authority”). 	Thus, § 1252(g) does
not strip the Court of jurisdiction over Petitioner’s Zadvydas claim.
B. 	Zadvydas
The Supreme Court has recognized a six-month presumptively reasonable period of
detention after a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final. 	Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
“After this 6-month period, once the [noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there
Case 3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET Document 6 Filed 02/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
4 of 6

5
3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
is 	no 	significant 	likelihood 	of 	removal 	in 	the 	reasonably 	foreseeable 	future, 	the
Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.
1. 	Presumption of Reasonableness
Petitioner’s order of removal became final on October 3, 2025. (Castellanos Decl.
¶ 10.) Therefore, the six-month presumptively reasonable period expires on April 3, 2026.
But even if this were not the case, or even if the Court found that Petitioner had rebutted
the presumption of reasonableness, see Ndandu v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02939-RBM-
MSB, 2026 WL 25848, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026), Petitioner cannot succeed on his
claim.
2. 	Good Reason to Believe
After the six-month period expires, Petitioner has the initial burden of showing
“good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. “Good reason to believe does not place a
burden upon the detainee to demonstrate no reasonably foreseeable, significant likelihood
of removal or show that his detention is indefinite; it is something less than that.” Senor v.
Barr, 401 F. Supp. 3d 420, 430 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (cleaned up). Assuming without deciding
that Petitioner met his burden through the arguments raised in his Petition, the burden shifts
to Respondents to “respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” 	Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701. As discussed below, Respondents have met that burden.
3. 	Significant Likelihood of Removal in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future
Respondents argue that they have rebutted Petitioner’s showing because they have
Petitioner’s valid Iranian passport and had arranged his removal to Iran. (Doc. 4 at 4–5.)
“Petitioner had a seat on a flight [to Iran] for January 26, 2026” that Respondents cancelled
because of the pending Petition and the Court’s Order to Show Cause, and “[o]nce the
Court 	lifts 	its 	stay 	of 	Petitioner’s 	removal, 	Respondents 	will 	promptly 	effectuate
Petitioner’s removal.” 	(Id. (citing Castellanos Decl. ¶ 11).) 	Under these circumstances,
the Court finds that Petitioner’s removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable
future. 	Accord Marquez v. Wolf, Case No.: 20-cv-1769-WQH-BLM, 2020 WL 6044080,
Case 3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET Document 6 Filed 02/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
5 of 6

6
3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2020) (denying Zadvydas claim where the respondents had
obtained a travel document for the petitioner and scheduled a removal flight to Peru);
Ashour v. Noem, Case No.: 3:26-cv-00422-RBM-SBC, 2026 WL 310198, at *2–3 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 5, 2026) (denying Zadvydas claim where the respondents had identified a flight
for the petitioner’s removal to occur in two weeks). Accordingly, the Petition is DENIED.
In light of Petitioner’s representation that ICE has previously attempted and failed
to remove him to Iran, the Court also ORDERS Respondents to file a Status Report on or
before March 6, 2026 indicating whether Petitioner was removed to Iran.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	the 	Petition 	(Doc. 	1) 	is 	DENIED 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. Respondents SHALL FILE a Status Report on or before March 6, 2026
indicating: (1) that Petitioner has been removed to Iran or, if he has not (2) Respondents’
progress toward effectuating Petitioner’s removal and an estimated date by which they
expect his removal to occur.
If Petitioner has not been removed by March 6, 2026, and Respondents are unable
to provide a date by which they expect his removal to occur, Petitioner may file an amended
Petition. Accord Ashour, 2026 WL 310198, at *3; Feliciano v. Warden of Mesa Verde Det.
Facility, Case No. 1:25-cv-02031-KES-SKO (HC), 2026 WL 63646, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
8, 2026) (dismissing a petition raising a Zadvydas claim without prejudice).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 13, 2026
____________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:26-cv-00272-RBM-VET Document 6 Filed 02/13/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
6 of 6