Escobar v. Bondi et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
JAVIER MEDINA ESCOBAR, aka Juan
Manuel Roggio,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the
United States, in her official capacity, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:26-cv-00197-RBM-MSB
ORDER:
(1) DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
WITHOUT PREJUDICE [Doc. 1];
AND
(2) DENYING EX PARTE
APPLICATION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER AS MOOT [Doc. 2]
Pending before the Court are Petitioner Javier Medina Escobar’s (“Petitioner”)
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
(“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) and Ex Parte Application for Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO Motion”) (Doc. 2).
For the reasons set forth below, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE and the TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.
//
//
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without
inspection in March 2004. (Doc. 1 ¶ 36; Doc. 7 at 2.)1 “On August 20, 2004, Petitioner
was convicted for bringing in and harboring certain aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 and was
sentenced to 12 months and 1 day in prison.” 	(Doc. 7 at 2 (citing Doc. 7-2 at 2).) 	On
March 1, 2005, Petitioner was ordered removed by an immigration judge (“IJ”). (Doc. 7-
2 at 2; see Doc. 7-3 at 1.) After Petitioner waived appeal, the removal order became final
and he was physically removed from the United States to Mexico on March 4, 2005. (Doc.
7-2 at 2; see Doc. 7-3 at 2.) 	Petitioner subsequently re-entered the United States, “[h]is
2005 removal order was reinstated, and on January 28, 2008, he was removed to Mexico a
second time.” (Doc. 7 at 2 (citing Doc. 7-2 at 2–3).) Petitioner unlawfully re-entered the
United States that same year. (Id.)
On September 24, 2025, Petitioner was charged in this District under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1326 as a deported alien found in the United States. 	(Id. (citing United States v. Juan
Manuel Raggio-Escobar, 3:25-mj-05225-MMP-1, ECF Nos. 1-2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24,
2025)).) After Petitioner posted bond on October 7, 2025, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) reinstated Petitioner’s removal order and detained him. (Id.; see Doc.
7-4 at 1.) On the United States’ motion, the district court dismissed Petitioner’s criminal
case without prejudice that same day. (Doc. 7 at 3.)
While in detention, Petitioner claimed a fear of returning to Mexico and was
provided a credible fear interview. (Id.) An asylum officer determined that Petitioner did
not establish a reasonable possibility of persecution or torture in Mexico. (Id.; see Doc. 7-
5 at 1.) 	On Petitioner’s request, an IJ reviewed and subsequently affirmed the negative
credible fear determination during a withholding-only proceeding on November 11, 2025.
(Doc. 7 at 3; see Doc. 7-5 at 1.)
1 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Petition and the CM/ECF electronic
pagination for other citations unless otherwise noted.
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On November 10, 2025, “Petitioner filed a petition for relief with the Ninth Circuit
challenging the IJ’s withholding-only determination.” (Doc. 7 at 3; Doc. 7-7 at 4.) This
temporarily stayed Petitioner’s removal until further order of the court. (Doc. 7 at 3 (citing
Ninth Circuit General Order 6.4); Doc. 7-7 at 4.) The Ninth Circuit also granted a stay of
the Parties’ briefing pending the resolution of the Government’s dispositive motion. (Doc.
7 at 3; Doc. 7-7 at 4.)
Petitioner then sought custody redetermination under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 	(Doc. 1
¶ 3.) On December 31, 2025, an IJ held a custody redetermination hearing pursuant to 8
C.F.R. § 1236 and denied bond for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) and the “presence of a final order of
removal.” (Doc. 7-6 at 1.) The IJ also issued an alternative decision denying bond based
on a finding that Petitioner “is a danger due to criminal record.” (Id.; Doc. 1 ¶¶ 3, 46.) “As
of January 22, 2026, it is the Government’s understanding that Petitioner has not filed an
appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) concerning Petitioner’s adverse bond
determination, which is due February 2, 2026.” (Doc. 7 at 3 (emphasis in original).)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims he is being improperly detained without any statutory authority in
violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
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Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 49–82.) Respondents
argue that: (1) Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, not § 1226, because
Petitioner is subject to a final removal order; and (2) Petitioner’s detention has not been
unconstitutionally prolonged. (Doc. 7 at 4–12.)
A. 	Statutory Authority for Continued Detention
Respondents contend that Petitioner has a reinstated final removal order and is
therefore subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §1231. (Doc. 7 at 2.) Petitioner
claims his detention is governed under § 1226(a), not § 1231, because his removal is not
“executable.” (Doc. 8 at 2; see Doc. 1 ¶¶ 30–31, 54.)
Petitioner’s 	argument 	is 	inconsistent 	with 	Ninth 	Circuit 	and 	Supreme 	Court
precedent. 	See Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d 826, 830–31 (9th Cir. 2017); Johnson
v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021). 	“Section 1226(a) . . . applies only while ‘a
decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to be removed from the United States’ is
‘pending’. . . .” 	Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 831 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). 	By
contrast, § 1231(a) “governs the detention, release, and removal of individuals ‘ordered
removed.’” 	Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 578 (2022). 	Section 1231’s
detention authority applies during the “‘removal period’ . . . which begins on the latest of
three dates: (1) the date the order of removal becomes administratively final; (2) if the
removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the
[noncitizen], the date of the court’s final order; or (3) if the [noncitizen] is detained or
confined (except under an immigration process), the date the [noncitizen] is released from
detention 	or 	confinement.” 	Padilla-Ramirez, 	882 	F.3d 	at 	830 	(quoting 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii)) (cleaned up).
As relevant here, in Guzman Chavez, the Supreme Court concluded that § 1231
“applies to [noncitizens] who were removed from the United States but later reentered
without authorization, were subject to reinstated orders of removal, and then sought
withholding of removal based on fear of persecution in the particular countries designated
by their removal orders.” 594 U.S. at 526; see Delkash v. Noem, Case No. 5:25-cv-01675-
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HDV-AGR, 2025 WL 2683988, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025) (“Detention, release, and
removal of individuals ordered removed—including those, like [Petitioner], with pending
‘withholding only’ proceedings—is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).”) (citing Arteaga-
Martinez, 596 U.S. at 578).
In this case, Petitioner was “ordered removed” within the meaning of § 1231 in
March 2005. His removal order became final on that same day and was then reinstated on
two separate occasions—first in January 2008 and most recently in October 2025. 	See
Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 831 (“[A] reinstated removal order is administratively final.”)
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)). 	Petitioner contends that his removal order is not
“executable” and that § 1231’s detention authority does not apply because the removal
period has not commenced due to a judicial stay of his removal. (Doc. 8 at 2, 4.) However,
the removal period trigger that Petitioners appears to reference—a court order lifting a
stay—is applicable only “[i]f the removal order is judicially reviewed.” 	See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(B)(2) (emphasis added). Petitioner’s pending appeal with the Ninth Circuit
concerns his request for withholding of removal, not his underlying removal order. (Doc.
7 at 3 (citing Doc. 7-7 at 1–5).) Nor could he request such review. As Petitioner “reentered
the United States illegally after having been removed . . . under an order of removal,” and
his prior order of removal was reinstated, his removal order “is not subject to being
reopened or reviewed.” 	§ 1231(a)(5); cf. Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1059
(9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]hen a court of appeals issues a stay of removal pending its decision
on a noncitizen’s petition for review of his removal order, the removal period begins only
after the court denies the petition and withdraws the stay of removal.”). Petitioner is subject
to a final order of removal, and the Government is not restricted from removing him from
the United States to the designated country of removal. § 1231(b)(3). Thus, Petitioner is
not “pending a decision on whether . . . [he] is to be removed from the United States” under
§ 1226(a).
Although Petitioner is seeking relief through withholding-only proceedings, his
“reinstated removal order remains administratively final, [and] he is detained pursuant to
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section 1231(a).” Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 832; see Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 526
(“[Section] 1231, not § 1226, governs the detention of [noncitizens] subject to reinstated
orders of removal, meaning those [individuals] are not entitled to a bond hearing while they
pursue withholding of removal.”). 	Accordingly, Petitioner’s First Cause of Action is
DENIED.
B. 	Due Process and the APA
Respondents argue “the Petition should be denied for four reasons: (1) Petitioner’s
detention is within the six-month presumptively reasonable period of detention; (2) he fails
to provide good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future; (3) he has caused the delay in his removal by seeking
withholding-only relief and obtaining a stay from the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit; and (4) he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.” (Doc. 7 at 7.)
As 	a 	preliminary 	matter, 	Petitioner 	does 	not 	challenge 	his 	detention 	as
unconstitutionally prolonged under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (See Doc. 1
¶¶ 62–73; see generally Doc. 8.) As Petitioner advances no argument that his post-removal
detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is unconstitutional, the Court need not reach this issue.
Instead, Petitioner maintains that his “[c]ontinued detention without access to a
custody redetermination hearing under” § 1226(a) and “pursuant to [the IJ’s] procedurally
defective custody determination violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”
(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 30, 72.) Petitioner contends: (1) the IJ’s application of the “categorical agency
interpretation” set forth in Matter of Yajure Hurtado “exceeds statutory authority and
conflicts with controlling Ninth Circuit law;” and (2) the IJ’s “alternative ‘danger’
determination did not comply with the procedural requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or
binding Ninth Circuit precedent.” (Id. ¶¶ 67–68 (citing Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. &
N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025)).)2 But as previously determined, Petitioner is not entitled to a
2 This Court, along with other courts in this District, has waived the prudential exhaustion
for habeas petitioners detained during the pendency of ongoing removal proceedings where
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bond determination hearing under § 1226(a) because he is detained pursuant to § 1231(a).
Indeed, in denying Petitioner’s custody redetermination request, the IJ concluded she
lacked “jurisdiction due to Matter of Yajure Hurtado and the presence of a final order of
removal.” (Doc. 7-6 at 1 (emphasis added).)
As Petitioner sets forth no other grounds in support of his due process claim, and his
APA claim is premised on the same claim that “8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s
custody” (see Doc. 1 ¶ 81), the Second and Third Causes of Action are DENIED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE and the TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: February 19, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
“exhaustion would be futile because the [BIA] is obligated to apply the binding precedent
of Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025) to find that detention is
mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).” 	Esquivel-Ipina v. LaRose,— F. Supp. 3d —,
2025 WL 2998361, at *3–4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2025).
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