Medina Gomez v. Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EDISON MEDINA GOMEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-00134-BAS-VET
ORDER GRANTING AMENDED
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS (ECF No. 4)
Petitioner Edison Medina Gomez filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(ECF No. 4.) 	The Petition alleges: (1) his re-
detention after being paroled into the country violates the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”) because it was “arbitrary and capricious” under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); (2) the
failure of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to notify Petitioner of the
reasons for revoking his parole violates his due process rights; and (3) his detention in
immigration custody has been unnecessarily prolonged. (Id.)
Respondents filed a Return. 	(ECF No. 7.) 	In the Return, Respondents argue
Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he has a pending appeal of
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his bond denial. 	(Id.) 	Respondents do not address the argument that Petitioner’s re-
detention violates the APA or his due process rights. (Id.)
Petitioner filed a Traverse. (ECF No. 8.) In the Traverse, Petitioner withdraws the
last ground seeking release for prolonged detention and relies solely on the unaddressed
issues of the APA and alleged due process violations.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). 	“The traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates he or
she is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
The writ is available to non-citizens detained within the United States. Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). Since Petitioner is in custody, and since he is seeking release
from custody, he has standing to pursue this Petition.
II. 	STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioner was born in Venezuela and became involved in Proyecto Venezuela, a
political party opposed to the Venezuelan government. (Amended Pet., Ex. A, ECF No.
4-1, at ¶ 1.) He came to the United States in 2023 and applied for asylum. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.)
He was paroled into the United States pending a hearing on his asylum claim. (ECF No.
4.) He attended all court hearings. (Id.) Two weeks before his asylum hearing, on May
29, 2025, without notice or explanation, ICE arrested him as he was leaving immigration
court for a scheduled hearing. (Id.) It is not clear whether his parole was officially revoked,
and, if so, why. He has now been detained for eight months.
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Violation of the APA
Under the APA, a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action
. . . found to be— [] arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law” or “without observance of procedure required by law.” 5 U.S.C. §
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706(2)(A), (D). 	“[A]n agency’s action can only survive arbitrary or capricious review
where it has articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.” 	Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F.
Supp. 3d 1123, 1144 (D. Or. 2025) (citing Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Petrick, 68 F.4th
475, 493 (9th Cir. 2023)). Although the court “is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the agency,” Persian Broad. Serv. Glob., Inc. v. Walsh, 75 F.4th 1108, 1111–12 (9th Cir.
2023), and the scope of the review is narrow, “[a] court ‘may not infer an agency’s
reasoning from mere silence,’” Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1144 (quoting Arlington v.
Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Section 1182 allows the Secretary of Homeland Security, in her discretion, to
temporarily parole a noncitizen into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). “[W]hen
the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland Security,
have been served, the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which
he was paroled.” Id.
In this case, the purpose of Petitioner’s parole into the United States was to allow
him to pursue his asylum claim. This purpose has not yet been served. Nor did either the
Secretary or the Respondents attempt to claim otherwise. 	Instead, there is deafening
silence as to the reason for revoking Petitioner’s parole. The fact that the Government in
its Return makes no attempt to justify the decision or argue that the APA was not violated
could be construed as a concession that the parole revocation had no justification. 	See
Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210 n.7 (N.D. Cal 2013) (finding an
argument was conceded where defendant failed to address it in its opposition); Sportcare
of Am., P.C. v. Multiplan, Inc., No. 2:10-4414, 2011 WL 589955, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 10,
2011) (“In most circumstances, failure to respond in an opposition brief to an argument put
forward in an opening brief constitutes waiver or abandonment in regard to the uncontested
issue.”). There is no attempt to address Petitioner’s claim that the decision was arbitrary
and capricious. Instead, Respondents argue Petitioner is lawfully detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) without addressing the fact that his parole into the United States was abruptly
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withdrawn without explanation. Without further explanation, the Court finds the decision
to revoke Petitioner’s parole was “arbitrary and capricious.”
In addition, the decision to revoke Petitioner’s parole was made “without observance
of procedure required by law.” 	5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). 	Parole may be terminated “upon
accomplishment of the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion [of
designated] officials . . . neither humanitarian reasons nor public benefit warrants the
continued presence of the alien in the United States,” but it requires written notice to the
individual who received parole. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2). Since Petitioner received no such
written notice, nor in fact any notice whatsoever, the Court similarly finds the revocation
violates the APA.
B. 	Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Respondents argue Petitioner has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
After his parole was revoked, Petitioner was given the opportunity to argue before an
Immigration Judge that he was entitled to release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). Despite the
fact that he had appeared for every court hearing scheduled when he had been paroled into
the country, the Immigration Judge ruled he was now a flight risk. (ECF No. 7-1, Ex. 3.)
He appealed this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which has been
pending since July of last year. (Id. Ex. 4.)
Where Congress specifically mandates exhaustion of administrative remedies, such
exhaustion is required before a habeas petition may be filed. 	McCarthy v. Madigan, 503
U.S. 140, 144 (1992). However, “where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion,
sound judicial discretion governs.” Id.
“Courts may require prudential exhaustion if ‘(1) agency expertise makes agency
consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2)
relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative
scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own
mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review.’” 	Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812,
815 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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Nonetheless, even if these three factors weigh in favor of prudential exhaustion, “a court
may 	waive 	the 	prudential 	exhaustion 	requirement 	if 	‘administrative 	remedies 	are
inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture,
irreparable 	injury 	will 	result, 	or 	the 	administrative 	proceedings 	would 	be 	void.’”
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370
F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). 	Federal courts considering exhaustion should consider
“the interest of the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial forum” against
the above countervailing institutional interests favoring exhaustion. 	McCarthy, 503 U.S.
at 146.
In this case, Congress has not specifically mandated administrative exhaustion.
Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA does not address the original decision to revoke his parole
or Respondents’ violation of the APA. Thus, agency expertise is not necessary to generate
a proper record, nor does allowing the case to go forward encourage deliberate bypass of
any administrative scheme. Since the appeal addresses bond under § 1226(a) and not the
revocation of Petitioner’s parole, the BIA appeal is not likely to lead to any correction of
mistakes. 	Furthermore, the appeal has been pending for seven months without any
resolution in sight. Since the appeal is unlikely to resolve the issues posed in this habeas
petition and Petitioner is suffering irreparable injury by remaining in immigration custody
without resolution, the Court finds prudential exhaustion is not necessary.
C. 	Due Process and Prolonged Detention
In light of the Court’s finding that Respondents violated the APA when they revoked
Petitioner’s parole into the country before the purpose of the parole had been served and
without any explanation, the Court finds the other grounds for release to be moot.
//
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner Edison Medina Gomez’s Amended Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED (ECF No. 4). 	The Court issues the following
writ:
The Court 	ORDERS 	Edison Medina Gomez (A#245-155-680) released
immediately on the same terms and conditions that he was released on parole
in 2023.
The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 10, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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