Markov v. Larose et al

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25-CV-3811 JLS (SBC)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DMITRII MARKOV,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Field
Office Director, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, San Diego Field
Office, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25-CV-3811 JLS (SBC)
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
(ECF No. 1)
Presently before the Court is Dmitrii Markov’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). 	Also before the Court is Respondents
Christopher 	J. 	Larose’s 	(Field 	Office 	Director, 	U.S. 	Immigration 	and 	Customs
Enforcement, San Diego Field Office), Kristi Noem’s (Secretary of the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security), and Pamela Bondi’s (Attorney General of the United States)
(collectively, “Respondents”) Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Ret.,” ECF
No. 4) and Petitioner’s Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 5). For the reasons set forth below,
the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
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BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a Russian national, alleges that he has been detained by the United States
Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) division at the Otay Mesa Detention Center since January 13, 2024. 	Pet. ¶ 16.
Petitioner entered the United States on the same day through the CBP One program and
app. 	Id. ¶¶ 20–21. 	ICE thereafter charged Petitioner as an applicant for admission,
detained him, and initiated removal proceedings. 	Id. ¶¶ 5, 23. 	An Immigration Judge
denied Petitioner’s request for a bond hearing on jurisdictional grounds. 	Id. ¶ 26.
Petitioner has remained in detention since January 13, 2024. Id. ¶ 6. Petitioner alleges his
prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates the Immigration and Nationality Act
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶ 10.
LEGAL STANDARD
A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the
legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of
his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial
body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the
court of appeals. 	See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat.
231, § 106(a)). 	However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising
independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention—
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. 	Nadarajah v. Gonzales,
443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez,
138 S. Ct. 830 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (citations omitted).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Ret.
at 2–3. Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause
or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any
alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s claims
arise from DHS’s decision to commence removal proceedings. 	Ret. at 3. 	The Court
disagrees.
Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” as to apply “only to three discrete actions
that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings,
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631,
2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 487 (1999)). 	Section 1252(g) “does not
prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely because they are in some fashion
connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) does not bar due process claims.
Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the petitioners’
objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but rather “to enforce their
constitutional rights to due process in the context of those proceedings”).
Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings
or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. 	Rather, Petitioner is challenging is
prolonged detention without a bond hearing. Traverse at 1–2. 	Petitioner is enforcing his
“constitutional rights to due process in the context of the removal proceedings—not the
legitimacy of the removal proceedings or any removal order.” 	Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-
CV-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). 	Therefore, §
1252(g) does not strip the Court of jurisdiction.
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II. 	Merits
Detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 must comport with due process. “Nearly all district
courts that have considered [the constitutionality of prolonged mandatory detention] agree
that prolonged mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing,
will—at some point—violate the right to due process.” 	Singh v. Barr, 400 F. Supp. 3d
1005 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (cleaned up)
(collecting cases). 	In determining whether detention has become unreasonable, courts
evaluate various factors, including “the total length of detention to date, the likely duration
of future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and
the government.” Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022).
Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention—now almost exactly one-year—
without a bond hearing violates his constitutional rights. Pet. ¶ 32. Respondents argue that
nearly one year of detention is not unreasonably prolonged, and that Petitioner has not
demonstrated that the other Lopez factors weigh in favor of granting a bond hearing. Ret.
at 8. Petitioner responds that, in addition to the unreasonable length of his detention, his
final merits hearing has been postponed five times due to the government, and now the
length of his detention “has become indefinite” and “unknown,” with no merits hearing
scheduled. Traverse at 7. The Court finds Petitioner has not established that his detention
is unreasonably prolonged based on delay or that there is “good reason to believe that there
is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 701. 	Petitioner’s length of detention, without more, does not render his
detention unreasonable. See Lopez, 631 F. Supp. at 880. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
the Petition.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (ECF No. 1) WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Petitioner MAY FILE an amended
petition within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 13, 2026
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