(PC)Quintana v. Sanchez et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
IVAN QUINTANA,
CDCR #AM-7791,
Plaintiff,
vs.
D. SANCHEZ, Correctional Officer;
BERMUDEZ, Correctional Officer;
MELGAR, Correctional Officer;
JIMENEZ, Nurse,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-03771-AJB-DEB
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AND DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL
TO EFFECT SERVICE OF
PROCESS PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3)
(Doc. No. 2)
Plaintiff Ivan Quintana, proceeding pro se and while incarcerated at Richard J.
Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, filed a civil rights
Complaint (“Compl.”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. No. 1), together with a Motion
to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. No. 2), in the Eastern District of California
on December 8, 2025. Because Quintana claims RJD correctional officers and a nurse used
excessive force against them 1 and refused to provide emergency medical care after an
1 Quintana uses the pronouns they/their when referring to themselves in the body of the Complaint, so the
Court does the same. (See Compl. at 3.)
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attempted overdose on September 28, 2024, United States Magistrate Judge Chi Soo Kim
determined venue was proper in the Southern District of California and transferred the case
here pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). (See Doc. No. 4 at 1–2.)
For the reasons explained, the Court GRANTS Quintana’s motion to proceed IFP,
screens the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), finds it alleges
plausible Eighth Amendment claims against all named Defendants, and DIRECTS the
United States Marshal to effect service of process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3).
I. 	IFP MOTION
All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the
United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. 2 See
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a failure to pay the entire fee at the
time of filing only if the court grants the Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); cf.
Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[W]here [an] IFP
application is denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s]
[a]re paid.”).
“While the previous version of the IFP statute granted courts the authority to waive
fees for any person ‘unable to pay[,]’ . . . the PLRA [Prison Litigation Reform Act]
amended the IFP statute to include a carve-out for prisoners: under the current version of
the IFP statute, ‘if a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the
prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a filing fee.’” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)). Section 1915(b) “provides a structured timeline for
collecting this fee.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)-(2)).
2 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. See
28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.
Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed
IFP. Id.
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To proceed IFP, prisoners must “submit[] an affidavit that includes a statement of
all assets [they] possess[,]” as well as “a “certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account
statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding
the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,
1119 (9th Cir. 2005). Using this financial information, the court “shall assess and when
funds exist, collect, . . . an initial partial filing fee,” which is “calculated based on ‘the
average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s account’ or ‘the average monthly balance in the
prisoner’s account’ over a 6-month term; the remainder of the fee is to be paid in ‘monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s
account.” Hymas, 73 F.4th at 767 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2)). Thus, while
prisoners may qualify to proceed IFP without having to pay the statutory filing fee in one
lump sum, they nevertheless remain obligated to pay the full amount due in monthly
payments. See Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2);
Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
Here, Quintana’s IFP motion complies with both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2).
Attached is a copy of Quintana’s California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(“CDCR”) Inmate Trust Account Statement Report, as well as a Prison Certificate
authorized by a RJD accounting officer (Doc. No. 2). See also S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2;
Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These documents show Quintana had an available balance of
$90.86 at the time of filing, and the same average deposit and balance in the account over
the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. (Id. at 4, 5.)
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Quintana’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2)
and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $18.17 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). This
initial fee will be collected only if sufficient funds are available in Quintana’s account at
the time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event
shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal
judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the
initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts
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as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure
to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). The CDCR
must thereafter collect the full balance of the $350 total fee owed and forward payments to
the Clerk of the Court as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
II. 	SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)
A. 	Standard of Review
Because Quintana is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, their Complaint requires
preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). “On review, the
court shall . . . dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of
Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); see also Hebrard
v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
1126‒27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). “The standard for
dismissal for prisoner claims at screening is the ‘same as the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.’” Long v. Sugai, 91 F.4th 1331,
1336 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012));
Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (Section 1915A screening
“incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 prescribes “the information that a plaintiff must
provide about the merits of his claim at the outset of litigation.” Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S.
___, ___ S. Ct. ___, No. 24-440, 2026 WL 135974, at *4 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2026). Thus, Rules
8 and 12(b)(6) together require a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
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B. 	Factual Allegations
On September 28, 2024, Quintana alleges to have been evaluated in RJD’s TTA3
“for an overdose on pills.” (Compl. at 1, 2, 4.) Quintana claims “poison control gave [an]
order for Nurse Jimenez to administer liquid charc[oal] to counteract the side effects, but
he refused.” (Id.) Instead, Quintana claims to have been “dragged,” “battered,” and
“removed” from the TTA with “deadly force.” (Id. at 3, 4.)
Specifically, Quintana claims Correctional Officers Sanchez, Melgar, and Bermudez
“wrap[p]ed a shirt around [Quintana’s] neck,” and “strangle[d] them while their legs were
shackled.” (Id. at 3.) Quintana further claims their glasses and cane were confiscated, and
they could “barely walk without [their] DMEs,”4 so they “ran after” two of the officers in
an effort to “explain[.]” (Id.) When Quintana “tripped and fell,” however, the officers
“thought they were resisting,” and “slammed [Quintana’s] face to the concrete,” beat them
with closed fists in the head and ribs, and “separated [Quintana’s] ear from [their] skull
with a fully[-]extended metal . . . baton.” (Id.)
Based on these events, Quintana now seeks $100,000 in damages based on alleged
violations of their Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care and to be free from
excessive force. (Id. at 3, 4, 7.)
///
///
3 TTA is an acronym for Triage and Treatment Area. It is “the prison’s equivalent of the emergency room.”
Arevalo v. Palacios, No. 2:22-CV-00774-JDP PC, 2022 WL 17417626, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2022).
4 Quintana does not explain, but the Court assumes, the cane and glasses they claim were confiscated were
previously authorized for use as Durable Medical Equipment (DME) intended to accommodate some
mobility impairment. See California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHCS), Health Care Operations
Manual, 	see 	https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/hcdom/dom/chapter-3-health-care-operations/article-6-durable-
medical-equipment-supplies-and-accommodations/3-6-1-durable-medical-equipment-and-medical
supply, Ch. 3, Art. 6, § 1(a) (providing that CCHCS “shall provide Durable Medical Equipment (DME)
and medical supplies to California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) patients at no
charge and as medically necessary to ensure the patients have equal access to services, programs, or
activities.”) (last visited Feb. 26, 2026).
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C. 	42 U.S.C. § 1983
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the
color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030,
1035‒36 (9th Cir. 2015). Here, all Defendants are alleged to be RJD correctional officials
acting in both their individual and official capacities as employees of the CDCR at the time
Quintana was injured.5 See Naffe, 789 F.3d at 1036 (explaining that a state employee
generally acts under color of state law when the employee “wrongs someone while acting
in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law.”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court next considers
whether Quintana has alleged facts sufficient to plausibly show a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights.
1. 	Medical Care Claims
“[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an
inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439
F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This
requires Quintana to allege facts sufficient to show: (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by
demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant
injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) that “the defendant’s
response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974
5 To the extent Quintana seeks damages for actions taken in Defendants’ official capacity, as opposed to
their individual capacities, however, those claims are dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii) and 1915A(b)(2). See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989);
Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars claims for
damages against a state official acting in his or her official capacity.”). While the Eleventh Amendment
bars a prisoner’s section 1983 claims against state actors sued in their official capacities, it does not bar
damage actions against state officials sued in their personal or individual capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502
U.S. 21, 31 (1991); Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472–73 (9th Cir. 1992).
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F.2d 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992)) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted),
overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997)
(en banc).
Quintana first alleges that they were being treated in the TTA for an “overdose on
pills[.]” (Compl. at 4.) While Quintana fails to explain whether their September 28, 2024
overdose was intentional or negligent, “[a] heightened suicide risk or an attempted suicide
is a serious medical need.” Conn v. City of Reno, 572 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009), as
amended, 591 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. City of
Reno, Nev. v. Conn, 563 U.S. 915 (2011), opinion reinstated in part, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir.
2011); see also Moore v. Dunlap, No. 24-2704, 2026 WL 184223, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 23,
2026).
Moreover, prison officials act with deliberate indifference when they “intentionally
interfer[e] with . . . treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. “[A]llegations
that a prison official has ignored the instructions of a prisoner’s treating physician are
sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d
1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999). Quintana alleges Jimenez refused to follow an “order” from
“poison control” to counteract the side-effects of a potential drug overdose while being
evaluated for emergent care in RJD’s TTA. (See Compl. at 4.) Because deliberate
indifference may be found where prison officials “intentionally interfere[e] with . . .
treatment once prescribed,” Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1165 (internal citation and quotation
omitted), or where prison officials are alleged to “deny, delay, or intentionally interfere
with [a serious need for] medical treatment,” Hallet v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 734 (9th Cir.
2002), the Court finds Quintana’s Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care allegations
involving Nurse Jimenez sufficient to survive the “low threshold” set for sua sponte
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at
1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
///
///
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2. 	Excessive Force Claims
With respect to the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims alleged against
Correctional Officers Sanchez, Melgar, and Bermudez, the Court also finds Quintana’s
allegations sufficient to sufficient to survive initial screening. See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at
1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Eighth Amendment forbids “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986) (citation omitted). “[W]henever prison
officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is that set out in Whitley: whether
force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992). Factors relevant
to this inquiry include: “the need for application of force, the relationship between that
need and the amount of force used, the threat ‘reasonably perceived by the responsible
officials,’ and ‘any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.’” Id. at 7
(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 1085). The sadistic and malicious use of force to cause harm
violates the Eighth Amendment regardless of “whether or not significant injury is evident.”
Id. at 9–10.
Here, Quintana alleges to be mobility impaired, and to have been forcibly “dragged”
from the TTA by Officers Sanchez, Bermudez, and Melgar after having “over dose[d] on
pills.” (See Compl. at 3, 4.) Quintana claims all three officers strangled them with a shirt
while their legs were shackled, slammed their face to the concrete, and beat them with
closed fists and a metal-tipped baton with enough force to separate their ear from their
skull. (Id. at 3.) None of the circumstances described in the Complaint plausibly suggest a
need to apply such force against a mobility-impaired prisoner alleged to be under the
influence of a drug overdose just after being treated in the prison’s infirmary. See Hudson,
503 U.S. at 7. Instead, assuming Quintana’s allegations as true, and considering the extent
of physical injury sustained, the Court finds them sufficient to plausibly suggest Sanchez,
Bermudez, and Melgar’s use of force on September 28, 2024, was excessive under the
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circumstances. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (noting that “the
extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest ‘whether the use of
force could plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular situation.”) (quoting
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321); Kendall v. Galindo, No. 23-CV-02709-HSG, 2023 WL 4372700,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2023) (finding allegations that correctional officers “yanked” the
arms and shoulders of a non-resistant prisoner already cuffed from behind, “dragged” him
across the floor, and then “slamm[ed] him face-first into the ground” after he requested to
speak to a supervisor sufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim of excessive
force).
Thus, because the Court finds both Quintana’s Eighth Amendment inadequate
medical care and excessive force allegations against Defendants Jimenez, Sanchez, Melgar,
and Bermudez are “sufficient to warrant . . . an answer,” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123, it will
direct U.S. Marshal service on his behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the
court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or
deputy marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. § 1915.”).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court:
1) 	GRANTS Quintana’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
(Doc. No. 2).
2) 	ORDERS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from
Quintana’s trust account the $18.17 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available
at the time this Order is executed, and forward whatever balance remains of the full $350
owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding
month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in their account exceeds
$10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
///
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3) 	DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeff
Macomber, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001, via
U.S. Mail, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov.
4) 	DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Quintana’s Complaint (Doc.
No. 1) and forward it to them along with blank U.S. Marshal Form 285s for Defendants D.
SANCHEZ, BERMUDEZ, MELGAR, and JIMENEZ. In addition, the Clerk will provide
Quintana with a certified copy of this Order, certified copies of the Complaint, and the
summons so that they may serve these Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,”
Quintana must complete the Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, include
a physical address where Defendants Sanchez, Bermudez, Melgar, and Jimenez may be
found and/or subject to service, and return all these documents to the United States Marshal
at the address provided by the Clerk and according to the instructions provided in the letter
accompanying the IFP package.
5) 	ORDERS the U.S. Marshal, upon receipt of these documents from Quintana,
to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons upon Defendants D. SANCHEZ,
BERMUDEZ, MELGAR, and JIMENEZ at the addresses provided by Quintana on the
USM Form 285s, and to file executed waivers of personal service upon these Defendants
with the Clerk of Court as soon as possible after their return. Should Defendants fail to
return the U.S. Marshal’s requests for waiver of personal service within 90 days, the U.S.
Marshal must instead timely file the completed Form USM 285 Process Receipt and
Returns with the Clerk of Court, include the date the summons, Complaint, and requests
for waiver were provided to each Defendant, and indicate why service was not completed.
All costs of service will be advanced by the United States; however, if any Defendant
located within the United States fails without good cause to sign and return the waivers
requested by the Marshal on Quintana’s behalf, the Court will impose upon that Defendant
any expenses later incurred in making personal service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(2).
///
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6) 	ORDERS 	Defendants 	D. 	SANCHEZ, 	BERMUDEZ, 	MELGAR, 	and
JIMENEZ, once served, to reply to Quintana’s Complaint, and any subsequent pleading
Quintana may file in this matter in which they are named as parties, within the time
provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) and
15(a)(3). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while defendants may occasionally be permitted to
“waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte
screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a
preliminary determination based on the face of the pleading alone that the plaintiff has a
“reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” defendants are required to respond); and
7) 	ORDERS Quintana, after service has been completed by the U.S. Marshal, to
serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’
counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the
Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Quintana must include with every
original document they seek to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the
manner in which a true and correct copy of that document was served on Defendants or
their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 5.2. Any document received
by the Court which has not been properly filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a
Certificate of Service upon these Defendants, or their counsel, may be disregarded.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 27, 2026
Case 3:25-cv-03771-AJB-DEB Document 7 Filed 02/27/26 PageID.<pageID> Page
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