Garcia v. Noem et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
LEANDER FRAI GARCIA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of Homeland
Security, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25cv3759-LL-BLM
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1]
Before the Court is Petitioner Leander Frai Garcia’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Respondents filed a Return [ECF
No. 4], and Petitioner filed a Traverse [ECF No. 5]. For the reasons set forth below, the
Court GRANTS the Petition.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela who entered the United States in March 2024
seeking asylum and was released from ICE custody a few days later, after being found to
have a credible fear of persecution and given a Notice to Appear. Pet. ¶¶ 20–26. Petitioner
states he consistently appeared for his scheduled court dates and has no criminal history.
Id. ¶¶ 2, 31, 33, 46. In September 2025, Petitioner’s home was raided, he was arrested and
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held in the basement of the federal building in downtown San Diego for five days before
being transferred to Otay Mesa Detention Center where he remains detained. Id. ¶¶ 5, 34,
38. Petitioner did not receive a pre-deprivation hearing prior to his re-detention. Id. ¶ 3.
On December 24, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant Petition, alleging that his re-
detention without notice and a hearing violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
and 	the 	Administrative 	Procedure 	Act, 	and 	that 	he 	is 	wrongfully 	detained 	under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. ¶¶ 79–109.
He seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing Respondents to, inter alia, release him from
custody under the same conditions as his initial release. Id. at 20–21.
On January 6, 2026, Respondents filed a Response acknowledging that (1) DHS
instituted a notice on July 8, 2025 requiring that “anyone arrested in the United States and
charged with being inadmissible to be considered an ‘applicant for admission’ under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
and not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)”; (2) in the class action Maldonado
Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 	25, 	2025), 	the 	district 	court 	declared 	the 	DHS 	notice 	unlawful 	under 	the
Administrative Procedures Act; (3) a final judgment was entered in Maldonado Bautista
on December 18, 2025; and (4) therefore, Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
and 	entitled 	to 	an 	order 	from 	this 	Court 	directing 	a 	bond 	hearing 	pursuant 	to
8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a). 	ECF 	No. 	4; 	see 	also 	Maldonado 	Bautista 	v. 	Noem,
No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025)
(entering final judgment for members of the Bond Eligible Class).
On January 8, 2026, Petitioner filed a Traverse arguing that a bond hearing is not an
adequate remedy for re-detention in violation of his due process rights, and “the appropriate
remedy is immediate release ordered by this Court.” ECF No. 5 at 5.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c); Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241
expressly permits the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those
aliens are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.’”). In federal habeas proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case
by a preponderance of evidence. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 (9th Cir.
2004); Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his parole without notice or a
hearing violates the Due Process Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act, and that he
is wrongfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) in violation of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Pet. ¶¶ 79–109. Respondents do not directly address Petitioner’s claims,
instead conceding that in light of Maldonado Bautista, Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing. ECF No. 4.
A. 	Detention Statute
The Courts finds—independent of Maldonado Bautista—Petitioner was wrongfully
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). As a noncitizen who, at the time of his detention, had
been present in the United States for about one and a half years on conditional parole while
he sought asylum, Petitioner was and is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which states that a
noncitizen “may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen]
is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). By contrast, 8 U.S.C
§ 1225(b) applies to noncitizens arriving at the border or who very recently entered the
United States. See Beltran v. Noem, No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *4–7
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). As the Supreme Court explained, the government may “detain
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” while
§ 1226(a) allows the government to “detain certain aliens already in the county pending
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the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)
(emphasis added).
B. 	Due Process Clause
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that
the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993)). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990).
The Court finds that having been previously released on parole, Petitioner had a
protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention. “Even individuals who face
significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the government wields
significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792
F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision
to detain or release an individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the
government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’
upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[]
to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in original).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 	To determine which procedures are constitutionally
sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court considers the following factors:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s
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interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. See Pinchi,
792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release
a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody
she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” (citations omitted)).
Freedom from detention is a fundamental part of due process protection. See Hernandez v.
Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Since the initial determination that Petitioner should be paroled
because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence
that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176
(N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.
2018) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a
danger to the community or a flight risk.”). Petitioner has no criminal record, and there is
no indication that he has failed to abide by the conditions of his release. “Once a noncitizen
has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely because he
is subject to removal proceedings.” Id. “Rather, the federal agents must be able to present
evidence of materially changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in
fact dangerous or has become a flight risk . . . .” Id. The risk of erroneous deprivation of
Petitioner’s liberty is high because neither the government nor Petitioner has had an
opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for his detention. Pinchi,
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792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (citation omitted). It follows that the probable value of additional
procedural safeguards, such as notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, is also high.
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is low. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“[T]he government has
articulated no legitimate interest that would support arresting [petitioner] without a pre-
detention hearing.”); Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d
963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the government wishes to re-arrest [petitioner] at
any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without
a hearing is low.”). There is no indication that providing proper notice, reasoning, and a
pre-deprivation 	hearing 	would 	be 	fiscally 	or 	administratively 	burdensome 	on 	the
government.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole without
notice or a pre-deprivation hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is
unlawful. See, e.g., Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629,
at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2025) (finding the petitioner’s parole was revoked without notice
and a hearing and without a showing of a change of circumstances, thus violating her due
process rights and rendering her detention unlawful).1 The proper remedy for the unlawful
detention is Petitioner’s immediate release subject only to the conditions of his preexisting
parole. See Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *1 (finding DHS violated the petitioner’s due
process rights by revoking his parole without notice or a hearing and ordering his
immediate release); Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (same); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d
1 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the Petition
can be resolved on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that other courts have
found violations of the APA in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Noori, 2025 WL 2800149,
at *3, 13 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked without an individualized determination or
provided reasoning, which violated the APA.”); Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (finding
revocation of the petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious because respondents did not
state any reasons for the revocation).
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at 970 (ordering immediate release after the petitioner was detained while out on bond
without notice or pre-deprivation hearing).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus [ECF No. 1] and ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody subject only
to the conditions of his preexisting parole.
2. 	Respondents 	shall 	return 	all 	of 	Petitioner’s 	belongings, 	including 	his
identification documents.
3. 	Prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, he is entitled to notice of the reasons
for revocation of his parole and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral immigration
judge to determine whether detention is warranted. At such a hearing, the government shall
bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a
danger to the community or a risk of flight. See Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews,
No. 1:25-CV-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025)
(finding that the petitioner’s initial release “reflected a determination by the government
that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk” and so if the
government initiates re-detention, “it follows that the government should be required to
bear the burden of providing a justification for the re-detention”); Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d
at 1038 (ordering that before the petitioner can be re-detained, she must be provided with
a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge and that she may not be
detained “unless the government demonstrates at such a bond hearing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that she is a flight risk or a danger to the community and that no
conditions other than her detention would be sufficient to prevent such harms”).
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4. 	The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner's favor and close this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 26, 2026
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