Azuaje Lozada v. LaRose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ADRIAN DAVID AZUAJE LOZADA,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden at
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 25cv3614-LL-KSC
ORDER GRANTING AMENDED
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 6]
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Adrian David Azuaje Lozada’s Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 6 (“Amended
Pet.”). Also before the Court is Respondents’ Response to the Amended Petition [ECF No.
12] and Petitioner’s Traverse [ECF No. 13]. 	For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner 	Adrian 	David 	Azuaje 	Lozada 	“fled 	Venezuela 	in 	2024 	[due 	to
persecution] and traveled to Mexico to apply for lawful entry into the United States.”
Amended Pet. at 3 (citing ECF No. 6-1 at 2-6, Declaration of Adrian David Azuaje Lozada
(“Lozada Decl.”), ¶ 2). Petitioner states that he has a “legitimate fear of torture or
persecution if [he] is returned to Venezuela due to [his] refusal to join a government-
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associated group.” Id. ¶ 8. Upon arriving in Mexico after fleeing Venezuela, he stayed there
for two and a half months, waiting to get a “CBP One” mobile application interview
appointment in order to apply for asylum upon arrival to the United States. Id. ¶ 2.
Petitioner states that he “lawfully entered the United States through the San Ysidro Port of
Entry on October 1, 2024, after obtaining a group interview appointment through the ‘CBP
One’ 	mobile 	application.” 	Id. 	(citing 	Lozada 	Decl. 	¶ 	3). 	Petitioner 	was 	granted
humanitarian parole on October 1, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 7; see also ECF No. 11 at 5 (SEALED)
(Exhibit F attached to Amended Pet.). Petitioner completed his application for asylum and
was also given paperwork that he “was to report for an in-person hearing before the
immigration court in Dallas, Texas about a year later on October 7, 2025.” Amended Pet.
3 (citing Lozada Decl. ¶ 4); see also ECF No. 6-1 at 8-11 (hereinafter “Ex. B”). After
entering the United States on October 1, 2024, Petitioner was told to call a telephone
number to let ICE know he was now in the country. Lozada Decl. ¶ 5. On or about October
4, 2024, Petitioner received paperwork from ICE indicating that he was to report for an
ICE check-in appointment on October 8, 2025. Id. Subsequently, Petitioner applied for and
received a work authorization which allowed him to work as a welder in Dallas, Texas. Id.
¶ 6.
When Petitioner appeared for his October 7, 2025 immigration court hearing, he was
told by the immigration judge (“IJ”) that he was not going to address the asylum or CAT
withholding of removal claims. Id. ¶ 7. Instead, Petitioner was given notice to attend a
subsequent in-person hearing before the IJ on December 7, 2028. Id.; see also ECF No. 1-
3. On October 8, 2025, when Petitioner attended his ICE check-in appointment, he was
arrested and detained at the Prairieland Detention Facility in Alvarado, Texas, for one week
before being transferred to the Otay Mesa Detention Center where he is now. Id. ¶ 9.
Petitioner was not given notice or a hearing prior to the revocation of his parole. Amended
Pet. at 2.
On January 5, 2026, Petitioner filed the operative Amended Petition alleging that the
“government’s effective revocation of Mr. Azuaje’s parole and detention violated the
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Administrative Procedures Act and procedural due process.” Id. at 5. He seeks a writ of
habeas corpus directing Respondents to order his immediate release under the same
conditions of parole that he had previously and to return his Venezuelan passport. Id. at
13-14.
On January 16, 2026, Respondents filed a Response acknowledging that (1) DHS
instituted a notice on July 8, 2025 requiring that “anyone arrested in the United States and
charged with being inadmissible to be considered an ‘applicant for admission’ under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
and not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)”; (2) in the class action Maldonado
Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 	25, 	2025), 	the 	district 	court 	declared 	the 	DHS 	notice 	unlawful 	under 	the
Administrative Procedures Act; (3) a final judgment was entered in Maldonado Bautista
on December 18, 2025; and (4) therefore, Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
and 	entitled 	to 	an 	order 	from 	this 	Court 	directing 	a 	bond 	hearing 	pursuant 	to
8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1226(a). 	ECF 	No. 	12; 	see 	also 	Maldonado 	Bautista 	v. 	Noem,
No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3678485, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025)
(entering final judgment for members of the Bond Eligible Class).
On January 18, 2026, Petitioner filed a Traverse arguing that a bond hearing is not
an adequate remedy for re-detention in violation of his due process rights and the
Administrative Procedures Act, and the appropriate remedy is his immediate release from
custody. ECF No. 13 at 5.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner “is in custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c); Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241
expressly permits the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those
aliens are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.’”). In federal habeas proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case
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by a preponderance of evidence. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 (9th Cir.
2004); Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner argues that “the government’s effective revocation of [his] parole and
detention 	violated 	the 	Administrative 	Procedures 	Act 	and 	procedural 	due 	process.
Amended Pet. at 5. Respondents do not directly address Petitioner’s claims, instead
conceding that in light of Maldonado Bautista, Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) and entitled to a bond hearing. ECF No. 12. Petitioner filed a Traverse arguing that
a bond hearing is not an adequate remedy for re-detention in violation of his due process
rights and the Administrative Procedures Act, and the appropriate remedy is his immediate
release from custody. ECF No. 13 at 5. The Court agrees with Petitioner for the reasons set
forth below.
A. 	Due Process Clause
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that
the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.”
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306
(1993)). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the
State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127
(1990).
The Court finds that having been previously released on humanitarian parole,
Petitioner had a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention. “Even
individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the
government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi
v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the
initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the government’s
discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an
implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked
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only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in original).
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). 	To determine which procedures are constitutionally
sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court considers the following factors:
(1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the government’s
revocation of Petitioner’s parole without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be
heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his parole. See Pinchi,
792 F. Supp. 3d at 1032 (“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release
a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody
she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” (citations omitted)).
Freedom from detention is a fundamental part of due process protection. See Hernandez v.
Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))).
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s
parole was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an
opportunity to be heard. Since the initial determination that Petitioner should be paroled
because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is no evidence
that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176
(N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir.
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2018) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the noncitizen is not a
danger to the community or a flight risk.”). While on humanitarian parole, Petitioner was
given a Social Security card and work authorization, lived in the community without issue,
and applied for asylum. Traverse at 4; see also Lozada Decl. ¶¶ 6-8, 12, 14. “Once a
noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from rearresting him merely
because he is subject to removal proceedings.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d at
1176. “Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially changed
circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has become a
flight risk . . . .” Id. The risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty is high because
neither the government nor Petitioner has had an opportunity to determine whether there is
any valid basis for his detention. Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (citation omitted). It
follows that the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, such as notice and a
pre-deprivation hearing, is also high.
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning,
and a hearing is low. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“[T]he government has
articulated no legitimate interest that would support arresting [petitioner] without a pre-
detention hearing.”); Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d
963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the government wishes to re-arrest [petitioner] at
any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without
a hearing is low.”). There is no indication that providing proper notice, reasoning, and a
pre-deprivation 	hearing 	would 	be 	fiscally 	or 	administratively 	burdensome 	on 	the
government.
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his parole without
notice and a hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See,
e.g., Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, at *4 (S.D. Cal.
Sept. 26, 2025) (finding the petitioner’s parole was revoked without notice and a hearing
and without a showing of a change of circumstances, thus violating her due process rights
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and rendering her detention unlawful).1 The proper remedy for the unlawful detention is
Petitioner’s immediate release subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole. See
Noori, 2025 WL 2800149, at *1 (finding DHS violated the petitioner’s due process rights
by revoking his parole without notice or a hearing and ordering his immediate release);
Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (same); Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (ordering
immediate release after the petitioner was detained while out on bond without notice or
pre-deprivation hearing).
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition and ORDERS
Petitioner’s immediate release subject to the conditions of his preexisting parole.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ
of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 6] and ORDERS as follows:
1. 	Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody subject only
to the conditions of his preexisting parole.
2. 	Prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, he is entitled to notice of the reasons
for revocation of his parole and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral immigration
judge to determine whether detention is warranted. At such a hearing, the government shall
bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a
danger to the community or a risk of flight. See Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews,
No. 1:25-CV-01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025)
(finding that the petitioner’s initial release “reflected a determination by the government
1 The Court need not address Petitioner’s claim arising under the APA because the
Amended Petition can be resolved on due process grounds. However, the Court notes that
other courts have found violations of the APA in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Noori,
2025 WL 2800149, at *3, 13 (“Petitioner’s parole was revoked without an individualized
determination or provided reasoning, which violated the APA.”); Sanchez, 2025 WL
2770629, at *4 (finding revocation of the petitioner’s parole arbitrary and capricious
because respondents did not state any reasons for the revocation).
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that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk” and so if the
government initiates re-detention, “it follows that the government should be required to
bear the burden of providing a justification for the re-detention”); Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d
at 1038 (ordering that before the petitioner can be re-detained, she must be provided with
a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge and that she may not be
detained “unless the government demonstrates at such a bond hearing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that she is a flight risk or a danger to the community and that no
conditions other than her detention would be sufficient to prevent such harms”).
3. 	The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner's favor and close this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 23, 2026
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