Tercero Briones v. Larose et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MIGUEL ANGEL TERCERO BRIONES,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LaROSE, Senior Warden
Otay Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-03421-RBM-AHG
ORDER GRANTING HABEAS
PETITION
[Doc. 1]
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	Petitioner 	Miguel 	Angel 	Tercero 	Briones’s
(“Petitioner”) Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the lawfulness of his detention by the United States Department
of Homeland Security (“DHS”). (Doc. 1.) For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is
GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras who entered the United States in 1991 without
inspection. 	(Doc. 1 ¶ 21.)1 Although Petitioner was detained upon entry, the former
1 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Petition and the CM/ECF electronic
pagination for all other filings.
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) released him on his own recognizance and
commenced removal proceedings. 	(Id. ¶ 22.) 	An immigration judge denied Petitioner’s
asylum application in March 1992 and Petitioner appealed the denial. (Id. ¶ 23.) 2 The INS
approved an advanced parole travel document for Petitioner in June 1995 which allowed
him to depart the United States to visit his sick child. (Id. ¶ 24.) In July 1995, Petitioner
re-entered using his advanced parole document and has not departed since. (Id.) The Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denied his appeal in February 1999 and Petitioner was
placed on an Order of Supervision in May 1999. (Id. ¶ 25.) In or around 2001, Petitioner
was granted Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”). (Id.)
From May 1999 to October 2025, Petitioner reported to his check-ins as directed in
his Order of Supervision and complied with all the conditions of his release. (Id. ¶ 26.) He
has also been regularly employed with a valid work authorization and has no criminal
record. (Id. ¶ 27.) Additionally, “Petitioner is the beneficiary of an approved Form I-130,
Petition for Alien Relative, filed by his United States citizen daughter.” 	(Id. ¶ 28.)
Petitioner alleges that he is not subject to any apparent ground of inadmissibility and
therefore qualifies for a “straightforward adjustment of status” based on the approved Form
I-130 and an “old, approved labor certification.” (Id.) As a result, Petitioner filed a Motion
to Reopen with the BIA on September 2, 2025, which remains pending. (Id. ¶ 29.)
On October 16, 2025, Petitioner was detained while attending his annual check-in
with DHS. 	(Id. ¶ 30.) 	He was informed that he was detained “because his TPS had
expired.” (Id.) Petitioner remains in custody at the Otay Mesa Detention Center. (Id.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” 	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of
2 The Petition contains a duplicate paragraph numbered 23. (See Doc. 1 ¶ 23.) The Court
therefore cites the sequential paragraph numbers going forward.
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that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). “Writs of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The petitioner bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner claims his current detention violates the Administrative Procedure Act and
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 	(Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 30–47.) 	Respondents argue
that: (1) Petitioner’s claims are jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and
§ 1252(b)(9); (2) Petitioner’s detention is within the six-month presumptively reasonable
detention period under Zadvydas; and (3) even if ICE failed to comply with the regulatory
requirements, Petitioner cannot show prejudice from such violations. (Doc. 5 at 3–12.)
Respondents’ arguments are similar to those recently addressed by the undersigned.
As a threshold matter, this Court has consistently rejected Respondents’ argument that
similarly situated petitioners’ claims are jurisdictionally barred under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)
and § 1252(b)(9). See Rasakhamdee v. Noem, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02816-RBM-DEB, 2025
WL 3102037 at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (finding § 1252(g) did not bar the Court
exercising jurisdiction over the petitioner’s claims where he challenged the legality of his
detention, not the legitimacy of his order of removal); Ghafouri v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-
02675-RBM-BLM, 2025 WL 3085726, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025) (same); Alatorre
Rodriguez v. LaRose, Case No.: 3-25-cv-02940-RBM-JLB, 2025 WL 3456475, at *2–5
(S.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (holding § 1252(g) and § 1252(b)(9) did not bar jurisdiction where
the petitioner challenged the legality of his continued detention rather than the decision to
commence removal proceedings or any act to execute a removal order).
This Court has also granted several habeas petitions filed by similarly situated
petitioners based on ICE’s failure to follow its own regulations in revoking the petitioner’s
release. For example, in Rasakhamdee, the Court concluded that ICE failed to follow its
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regulations because: (1) the petitioner did not receive adequate notice of the reasons for the
revocation of his release; and (2) ICE did not conduct the required interview when it had
over six weeks to do so. 	2025 WL 3102037, at *4–5; see also Ghafouri, 2025 WL
3085726, at *4–5. 	The Court reached the same conclusion in Touch v. Noem, where the
petitioner was differently situated than the petitioner in Rasakhamdee. Case No.: 3:25-cv-
03118-RBM-AHG, 2025 WL 3278019 at *3, *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025), adopted, Case
No.: 3:25-cv-03118-RBM-AHG, 2025 WL 3296280 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025). Although
Respondents had obtained travel documents for the petitioner’s removal and provided
adequate notice, the Court nonetheless found that ICE failed to comply with the required
procedures when it failed “to provide [the petitioner] with an informal interview in the
month since he was taken into custody.” Id. at *6.
The Court has also rejected Respondents’ arguments concerning prejudice and held
that petitioners were “prejudiced by ICE’s failure to comply with its own regulations”
where they were deprived of “due process protections when [ICE] failed to provide [them]
with sufficient notice or a prompt interview to respond to the reasons for revocation of his
release.” Rasakhamdee, 2025 WL 3102037, at *5; see also Ghafouri, 2025 WL 3085726,
at *6 (“ICE deprived [the petitioner] of his due process rights and prejudiced his interests
by failing to afford him the procedural safeguards the regulations were designed to
protect.”); Touch, 2025 WL 3296280, at *1 n.1 (finding the petitioner was prejudiced
because “ICE violated regulations intended to provide due process protections.”).
In this case, it is undisputed that Respondents did not provide Petitioner with a notice
of revocation or an informal interview. 	(See Doc. 5-1, Declaration of Daniel Negrin
[“Negrin Decl.”] ¶ 12.) 	The Court therefore adopts its reasoning in the cases discussed
above and applies it here. 	For those same reasons, ICE’s failure to comply with its
regulations in revoking Petitioner’s release violated Petitioner’s due process rights and
rendered his detention unlawful.
//
//
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court finds Petitioner’s detention is unlawful
and 	GRANTS 	the Petition. 	Respondents are 	ORDERED 	to immediately release
Petitioner from custody, subject to his preexisting Order of Supervision.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATE: January 2, 2026
___________________________________
HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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