Ba v. Lyons et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
HENRI BA,
Petitioner,
v.
TODD LYONS, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:25-cv-2871-CAB-BJW
ORDER DENYING HABEAS
PETITION AND MOTION FOR TRO
AS MOOT
[Doc. Nos. 1, 2]
Before the Court is Petitioner Henri Ba’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, [Doc. No. 1 (“Petition”)], and a motion for a temporary
restraining order, [Doc. No. 2 (“TRO”)]. 	On November 18, 2025, Respondents released
Petitioner from custody under multiple new conditions, such as ankle monitoring. [Doc.
No. 16 at 2, Doc. No. 16-2 at 4.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the
Petition as MOOT.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner 	is 	a 	Senegalese 	national 	who 	was 	previously 	released 	from 	U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody on November 10, 2004 on his
own recognizance. [Doc. No. 1 at 2–3.] He remained free from custody for twenty-one
years during his ongoing removal proceedings and applications for asylum, withholding of
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removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. 	[Id. at 2.] 	Petitioner’s
immigration case is currently pending at the Board of Immigration Appeals after an
immigration judge granted ICE’s request to terminate removal proceedings against
Petitioner over Petitioner’s opposition. [Id.] Petitioner asserts that he is not subject to a
final administrative order of removal. [Id. at 4.]
On August 19, 2025, ICE officers arrested Petitioner at his ICE check-in. 	[Id.]
Petitioner filed the Petition on October 24, 2025. On November 6, 2025, an Immigration
Judge released Petitioner on an $5,000 bond. [Doc. No. 12 at 2.] Petitioner remained in
custody until he paid the bond, and ICE released him on November 18, 2025. 	[Doc. No.
16 at 2.]
Upon release, ICE imposed new conditions on Petitioner. 	Petitioner must wear a
GPS monitoring ankle bracelet, attend frequent in person office visits, and not travel
outside 75 miles without Respondents’ permission, among several other new conditions.
[Doc. No. 19 at 2.] Petitioner seeks to have his previous conditions of release reinstated.
[Id. at 8–9.]
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the Court has the authority to determine a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in which the petitioner asserts he is being held in custody “in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” “[T]he essence of habeas corpus
is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner seeks to have the Court control the conditions of Petitioner’s release.
Petitioner argues that his new conditions amount to custody. [Doc. No. 19 at 2.] A habeas
petition challenges the custody of an individual, not their release conditions. The habeas
statute does not empower courts to manage ICE supervision programs. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241(c)(3).
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Petitioner’s response addressing mootness cites Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland for the
proposition that Petitioner’s release with new restrictions does not moot his habeas petition.
[Doc. No. 19 at 8.] 	In Rodriguez Diaz, the petitioner was released pursuant to an order
from the district court, so the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) appeal of that
order was not mooted by the petitioner’s release. 	Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th
1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022). 	Here, however, DHS released Petitioner on bond at DHS’s
discretion, and Petitioner was not released pursuant to an order from this Court. Therefore,
because Petitioner left DHS custody on bond before this Court had an opportunity to rule
on the Petition, Rodriguez Diaz does not apply.
Petitioner’s reply also cites Moran v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, No.
ED 20-CV-00696-DOC-JDE, 2020 WL 6083445, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020). [Doc.
No. 19 at 8.] 	In Moran, the petitioners sought habeas, injunctive, and declaratory relief
from DHS’s alleged failure to protect detainees amid the COVID-19 pandemic. 	Id. at *1
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020). The Moran court found that the same conditions of detention
would continue to exist if petitioners were re-detained, thus keeping the controversy live.
[Id. at 7.] 	Here, however, DHS will continue to control Petitioner’s conditions of
supervision because the authority to impose certain conditions of supervision belongs to
DHS, not the district court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (authorizing the Attorney General to set
conditions for release on bond).
In Munoz v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit denied a habeas petition where the petitioner
argued 	that 	his 	conditions—including 	sex 	offender 	registration, 	fees, 	and 	ankle
monitoring—amounted to custody. 17 F.4th 1237 (9th Cir. 2021). The Ninth Circuit held
that to meet the “in custody” requirement, conditions must impose significant restraints on
physical liberty beyond those shared by the public generally. Munoz, 17 F.4th at 1246. To
meet the custodial threshold, conditions must “severely and immediately restrain” physical
liberty. Id. at 1239.
Although Petitioner has new restrictive conditions imposed on him, he is not in
custody. 	His conditions compare more closely to those in Munoz than that of someone
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confined to home detention. Therefore, the Court DENIES the Petition as MOOT because
Petitioner is out of detention.
Moreover, if Petitioner wishes to appeal his conditions of release, the appropriate
avenue is an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). See Prieto–Romero v.
Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The alien may appeal the [Immigration
Judge]’s bond decision to the BIA, see 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(3), but discretionary decisions
granting or denying bond are not subject to judicial review, see § 1226(e).”)
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court ORDERS that:
1. Petitioner’s motion for TRO is DENIED AS MOOT.
2. The Petition is DENIED AS MOOT.
3. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 27, 2026
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