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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TANYA LISETTE KEYES, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-2556-RSH-VET
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
REMAND
[ECF No. 8]
Before the Court is a motion to remand filed by plaintiffs Tanya Lisette Keyes and
Nathaniel Leon Keyes. ECF No. 8. Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court
finds the motion presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. For the
reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The instant action arises out of Plaintiffs’ purchase of an allegedly defective
vehicle.
Plaintiffs 	allege 	they 	purchased 	a 	2018 	GMC 	Yukon 	(hereinafter 	“Subject
Vehicle”) on November 30, 2018 that “suffered and continues to suffer from significant
defects and non-conformities[.]” ECF No. 1-2 ¶¶ 6, 9.
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On May 15, 2025, during pre-litigation settlement discussions, Plaintiffs provided
Defendant with documents identifying the Subject Vehicle’s purchase price and repair
history. See ECF No. 8 at 7; Declaration of Michelle Yang (“Yang Decl.,” ECF No. 8-1)
¶ 7. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit in San Diego Superior Court on May 29, 2025. ECF
No. 1-2 at 6–15. Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts claims for: (1) violation of California Civil
Code Section 1793.2(d); (2) violation of California Civil Code Section 1793.2(b); (3)
violation of California Civil Code Section 1793.2 (a)(3); (4) breach of the implied
warranty 	of 	merchantability; 	(5) 	violation 	of 	the 	Magnuson-Moss 	Warranty 	Act
(“MMWA”); and (6) violation of California’s Uniform Commercial Code. Id. at 7–14.
Defendant was served with the Complaint on May 30, 2025. ECF No. 8-1 at 5–6.
On September 26, 2025 Defendant removed the case to this Court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 1. On October 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to
remand. ECF No. 8. Defendant filed a response and Plaintiffs filed a reply. ECF Nos. 14,
15.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“The removal jurisdiction of the federal courts is derived entirely from the
statutory authorization of Congress.” Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062,
1064 (9th Cir. 1979). A defendant may remove to federal court “any civil action brought
in 	a 	State 	court 	of 	which 	the 	district 	courts 	of 	the 	United 	States 	have 	original
jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Only state-court actions that originally could have
been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court[.]” Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “[R]emovability is generally determined as of the
time of the petition for removal[.]” Local Union 598, Plumbers & Pipefitters Indus.
Journeymen & Apprentices Training Fund v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 846 F.2d 1213,
1215 (9th Cir. 1988). In cases where “state-filed complaints are removed to federal court
. . . the removing party ‘has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
removal is proper.’” Watters v. Parviz, No. 23-35601, 2024 WL 5423073, at *3 (9th Cir.
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Feb. 21, 2025) (quoting Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Est. of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka,
599 F.3d 1102, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 2010)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Timeliness
In 	their 	Motion, 	Plaintiffs 	argue 	Defendant’s 	removal 	is 	untimely 	because
Defendant did not file its notice of removal within thirty days of being served with
Plaintiffs’ Complaint. ECF No. 8 at 11–15.
1. 	Deadlines for Removal
“The mechanics and requirements for removal are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.”
Kuxhausen v. BMW Fin. Servs. NA Ltd. Liab. Co., 707 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013).
“[S]ection 1446(b) identifies two thirty-day periods for removing a case.” Carvalho v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 885 (9th Cir. 2010). “The first thirty-day
removal period is triggered if the case stated by the initial pleading is removable on its
face.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1139 (“To avoid
saddling defendants with the burden of investigating jurisdictional facts, we have held
that the ground for removal must be revealed affirmatively in the initial pleading in order
for the first thirty-day clock under § 1446(b) to begin.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The second thirty-day removal period is triggered if the initial pleading does
not indicate that the case is removable, and the defendant receives ‘a copy of an amended
pleading, 	motion, 	order 	or 	other 	paper’ 	from 	which 	removability 	may 	first 	be
ascertained.” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 885 (quoting § 1446(b)).
A removing defendant must comply with the mandatory time limits of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b). Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1249 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A
defendant has thirty days to remove a case on diversity or federal question grounds.”);
Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
statutory 	time 	limit 	for 	removal 	“is 	mandatory[.]”). 	While 	untimely 	removal 	is 	a
procedural rather than jurisdictional defect, “a timely objection to a late petition will
defeat removal[.]” Id.
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2. 	The Complaint
Plaintiffs first contend that their Complaint is removable on its face because it
asserts a claim under the federal Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act. ECF No. 8 at 11–12.
“The [MMWA] provides a [federal] cause of action for express and implied
warranty claims under state law.” Floyd v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 966 F.3d 1027, 1032
(9th Cir. 2020); see Anda v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-07354-MCS-SSC, 2025 WL
2938454, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025) (“[A]n MMWA claim based on breach of a
written or implied warranty is effectively a federal cause of action for express and
implied warranty claims under state law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Sony
Grand WEGA KDF-E A10/A20 Series Rear Projection HDTV TV Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d
1077, 1101 (S.D. Cal. 2010). It permits “‘a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a
supplier [or] warrantor . . . to comply with any obligation under this [title 15 U.S.C. §§
2301 et seq.], or under a written warranty [or] implied warranty’ to sue in United States
district court provided that ‘the amount in controversy is [not] less than the sum or value
of $50,000 (exclusive of interest and costs) computed on the basis of all claims to be
determined in this suit.’” Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., 377 F.3d 1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)).
Although the MMWA is a federal statute, it does not confer federal jurisdiction in
every 	case. 	Instead, 	the 	statute 	precludes 	federal 	jurisdiction 	“if 	the 	amount 	in
controversy is less than the sum or value of $50,000 (exclusive of interests and costs)
computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in this suit[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 2310
(d)(3); see Shoner v. Carrier Corp., 30 F.4th 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Although the
MMWA is a federal statute, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over an MMWA
claim if the amount in controversy is less than $50,000.”); Schultz v. Gen. R.V. Ctr., 512
F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The MMWA is a somewhat unique federal statute in that
merely 	alleging 	a 	violation 	of 	the 	act 	is 	insufficient 	to 	confer 	federal 	question
jurisdiction; 	a 	separate 	$50,000 	amount 	in 	controversy 	requirement 	must 	also 	be
satisfied.”).
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Accordingly, to trigger the first thirty-day removal period, it must have been
apparent from the face of the Complaint that Plaintiffs’ MMWA claim satisfied the
$50,000 amount-in-controversy requirement.
Here, Plaintiffs concede their Complaint “does not allege a specific dollar amount
in controversy.” ECF No. 8 at 13. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argue Defendant could have
ascertained that the amount in controversy in this case exceeded $50,000 based on:
(1) the Complaint’s allegations that Plaintiffs had purchased a new 2018 GMC Yukon;
and (2) Plaintiffs’ request for restitution, consequential and incidental damages, civil
penalties, and attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 8 at 13. In support, Plaintiffs cite the Supreme
Court’s Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014) decision
for the proposition that Defendant was only required to make a plausible allegation that
the amount in controversy requirement had been met in its notice of removal. Id. at 13–
14.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dart, however, was directed at the sufficiency of
a defendant’s allegations in a notice of removal, not to when the thirty-day deadline
under § 1446 is triggered. Specifically, in Dart, the Supreme Court held that where a
defendant removes a class action to federal court based on the Class Action Fairness Act,
the defendant’s notice of removal “need include only a plausible allegation that the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Dart Cherokee, 574 U.S. at
89. But “whether a defendant can establish that federal jurisdiction exists and the
question of when the thirty-day time period begins are not two sides of the same coin.”
See Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141 n.3; see Diaz v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-08673-
MEMF-PVC, 2025 WL 3496771, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (“The issue here is not
whether Defendant could have removed, but rather whether Defendant [was] obligated to
remove within thirty days of service. Dart does not address this question at all[.]”)
(emphasis in original); Parra v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-07316-SPG-JC, 2025
WL 3201870, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025) (“Dart 	set out the standard for a
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defendant’s notice of removal, not the standard to trigger either of the thirty-day
deadlines in § 1446(b).”).
In this case, “[t]he fact that Defendant could have made a further inquiry to
estimate the subject vehicle’s purchase price is insufficient to trigger the [first] thirty-day
clock.” Moran v. Ford Motor Co., No. 23CV845 JM (BLM), 2023 WL 4532755, at *2
(S.D. Cal. July 13, 2023). Instead, the timeliness of removal “is determined through
examination of the four corners of the applicable pleadings, not through subjective
knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425
F.3d 689, 694 (9th Cir. 2005). This “objective baseline rule avoids the spectre of
inevitable collateral litigation over whether the pleadings contained a sufficient ‘clue,’
whether defendant had subjective knowledge, or whether defendant conducted sufficient
inquiry.” Id. at 697.
As the Ninth Circuit held in Roth v. CHA Hollywood Med. Ctr., L.P.:
[A] defendant does not have a duty of inquiry if the initial pleading or
other document is “indeterminate” with respect to removability. Thus,
even if a defendant could have discovered grounds for removability
through investigation, it does not lose the right to remove because it
did not conduct such an investigation and then file a notice of removal
within thirty days of receiving the indeterminate document.
720 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013); see Kuxhausen, 707 F.3d at 1141 (“[W]e don’t
charge defendants with notice of removability until they’ve received a paper that gives
them enough information to remove. This principle helps avoid a ‘Catch—22’ for
defendants desirous of a federal forum. By leaving the window for removal open, it
forces plaintiffs to assume the costs associated with their own indeterminate pleadings.”)
(internal quotation marks and citation removed).
Similarly, here, while Defendant could have made a further inquiry as to whether
the amount in controversy in this case exceeded $50,000, Defendant was “under no
obligation to do so where [Plaintiffs’] complaint was indeterminate.” Tirado-Lizarraga v.
Ford Motor Co., No. 23-CV-01411-RS, 2023 WL 3868377, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 6,
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2023) (holding the thirty-day removal period was not triggered by mere allegation
plaintiff purchased a 2018 Ford F-150 pickup truck); see also Diaz, 2025 WL 3496771, at
*3 (thirty-day period not triggered by allegation plaintiff purchased a 2021 GMC Sierra
1500); Parra, 2025 WL 3201870, at *3 (“[A]bsent any specific allegations of the dollar
value of the claims, bare allegations of the make and model of the vehicle and claims for
broad categories of damages are insufficient to trigger the removal deadline.”).
3. 	Notice by Pre-Litigation Documents
Plaintiffs next contend Defendant was required to file its notice of removal within
thirty days after being served with the Complaint because Plaintiffs provided Defendant
with documents identifying the Subject Vehicle’s purchase price and repair history
during pre-litigation settlement discussions. ECF Nos. 8 at 7; 15 at 6–7.
Plaintiffs’ argument is foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Carvalho v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 2010). In Carvalho, plaintiff contended
her settlement demand sent months before she filed her complaint put defendant on
notice as to the amount in controversy. 629 F.3d at 885. The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument, holding this pre-litigation letter did not trigger a thirty-day removal period
under § 1446:
It is axiomatic that a case cannot be removed before its inception. If
the second paragraph of section 1446(b) were meant to include as
“other paper” a document received by the defendant months before
receipt of the initial pleading, the requirement that the notice of
removal “be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant” of
the “other paper” would be nonsensical. Moreover, that the second
paragraph lists “an amended pleading, motion, order”—all documents
which logically cannot predate the initial pleading—before “or other
paper” leads us to conclude that “other paper” does not include any
document 	received 	prior 	to 	receipt 	of 	the 	initial 	pleading.
Accordingly, we conclude that any document received prior to receipt
of the initial pleading cannot trigger the second thirty-day removal
period.
Id. at 885–86 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Nor can “a pre-complaint
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document containing a jurisdictional clue [] operate in tandem with an indeterminate
initial 	pleading 	to 	trigger 	some 	kind 	of 	hybrid 	of 	the 	first 	and 	second 	removal
periods.” Id. at 886; see Mora v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. CV 25-8700-JFW(PVCX), 2025
WL 3124075, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2025) (“[P]re-litigation documents are irrelevant
to the deadlines to remove under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).”); Lopez v. Ford Motor Co., No.
5:25-CV-01742-JLS-DTB, 2025 WL 3022849, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2025) (rejecting
argument that removal clock started triggered defendant was served with complaint
because defendant received pre-litigation demand letter containing sales contract, service
records, and registration). Accordingly, under Carvalho, Defendant’s receipt of pre-
litigation materials—when combined with an indeterminate complaint—cannot trigger
the first or second thirty-day removal periods.
For the above reasons, the Court concludes Defendant’s removal was timely.
Defendant was not—upon service of Complaint here—required to file its notice of
removal within thirty days.
B. 	Amount in Controversy
Plaintiffs additionally contend Defendant has not met its burden of establishing the
amount in controversy in this case exceeds $50,000. ECF No. 8 at 15–17. Notably,
Plaintiffs’ argument that this case is not removable at all is at odds with Plaintiffs’
separate argument, in the same motion, that the Complaint is removable on its face. In
response, Defendant submits that the amount in controversy in this case comprises:
(1) $42,549.94 in actual damages; (2) $85,099.88 in civil penalties; and (3) at least
$15,000 in attorneys’ fees and therefore exceeds the $50,000 amount-in-controversy
threshold under the MMWA and $75,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 14
at 27–29.1
///
1 There is no dispute between the Parties that the diversity of citizenship requirement
is met for diversity jurisdiction. ECF No. 8 at 8.
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1. 	Remedial Scheme
The MMWA “does not include a remedial scheme.” Hastings v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 19-CV-2217-BAS-MDD, 2021 WL 1238870, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 2021).
“Instead, for claims raised under the MMWA, courts look to ‘applicable state law’ to
determine damages.” Id.; see Urie v. Lucid Grp. USA, Inc., No. 3:25-CV-0837-BTM-
AHG, 2025 WL 2080805, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2025) (“Because the MMWA is silent
on the question of remedies, courts ‘turn[] to the applicable state law to determine what
remedies are available under the Act, which of necessity informs the potential amount in
controversy.’”) (quoting Tadevosyan v. Kia Am., Inc., No. CV 24-11232-DMG (JCX),
2025 WL 1425545, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2025)). The Court therefore applies the
same analysis as under California’s Song-Beverly Act to establish the amount in
controversy for Plaintiffs’ MMWA claim. See Lewis v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-CV-
07484-SVW-MAR, 2026 WL 40899, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026).
2. 	Actual Damages
Under 	California’s 	Song-Beverly 	Act, 	actual 	damages 	are 	measured 	by 	the
“amount equal to the purchase price paid by the buyer, less that amount directly
attributable to use by the buyer prior to the discovery of the nonconformity.” Cal. Civ.
Code §§ 1793.2(d)(1). “This reduction, also known as a mileage offset, is calculated by
dividing the number of miles driven prior to first delivery for correction by 120,000 and
multiplying the resulting fraction by the actual price of the new motor vehicle paid or
payable by the buyer.” Diaz v. Gen. Motors LLC, No. EDCV 25-02208-KK-MBKX,
2025 	WL 	3034060, 	at 	*4 	(C.D. 	Cal. 	Oct. 	30, 	2025) 	(citing 	Cal. 	Civ. 	Code 	§
1793.2(d)(2)(C)). “In addition, amendments to the [Song-Beverly Act] that took effect
January 1, 2025, provide for other statutory offsets based on third-party supplied
equipment and services, negative equity, manufacturer’s rebate, and unpaid interest or
financing costs.” Clay v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 2:25-CV-07962-AH-(MARX), 2025
WL 3632732, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025).
///
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Here, 	Defendant 	contends 	the 	actual 	damages 	at 	issue 	in 	this 	case 	total
$42,549.94. ECF No. 14 at 27. Specifically, Defendant calculates the amount of actual
damages available to Plaintiffs by subtracting an estimated mileage offset of $14,154.30
and $4,178.00 in offsets for optional third-party contracts from the $60,882.24 sales price
of the Subject Vehicle. Id.
Plaintiffs 	argue 	that 	Defendant 	does 	not 	submit 	evidence 	supporting 	this
calculation. ECF Nos. 8 at 16; 15 at 7–8. The Court disagrees. As evidence, Defendant
submitted: (1) an agreement showing the Subject Vehicle was purchased for $60,882.24
with 6,313 miles on the odometer; (2) a repair history from which Defendant contends
the Subject Vehicle was likely first presented for repair with the alleged defect in March
19, 2021 with 44,062 miles on the odometer; and (3) a loan payoff letter showing
Plaintiffs paid off the Subject Vehicle on December 17, 2024. ECF Nos. 14-1 at ¶¶ 2–4;
14-2 at 2; 14-3 at 2; 14-4 at 2. Plaintiffs do not address this evidence or explain why it is
insufficient.
In the absence of any meaningful rebuttal, the Court concludes Defendant has met
its burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, of substantiating its calculation of actual
damages. See Brindas-Puga v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. CV-25-08425-AGR, 2025 WL
3072628, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) (holding defendant had reasonably calculated
actual damages based on lease contract, repair history, and payment history); Larch-
Miller v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. CV 25-8460-JFW(BFMX), 2025 WL 3043354, at *3
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2025) (holding defendant had reasonably calculated actual damages
based on sales contract, repair history, and payment history); Sosa v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,
No. 8:25-CV-01185-JVS-RAO, 2025 WL 2938075, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025)
(holding defendant had reasonably calculated actual damages based on sales contract and
repair history).
3. 	Civil Penalties
The Song-Beverly Act provides for civil penalties up to two times the amount of
damages if a defendant’s failure to comply with the Act was willful. See Cal. Civ. Code §
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1794(c). Here, Defendants contend that the maximum civil penalties available under the
Song-Beverly Act should be considered in determining the amount in controversy. ECF
No. 14 at 28. In response, Plaintiffs contend Defendant has not met its burden of
establishing, by a preponderance of evidence, “the willfulness that might support such an
award” of civil penalties. ECF No. 15 at 11.
“Courts in this District and throughout the Ninth Circuit disagree as to whether the
Song-Beverly Act’s civil penalties should be included in the calculation of the amount in
controversy.” Stars Bay Area, Inc. Ramos v. McLaren Auto., Inc., No. 24-CV-324 TWR
(SBC), 	2024 	WL 	3635561, 	at 	*5 	(S.D. 	Cal. 	June 	12, 	2024) 	(collecting 	cases).
Nevertheless, “[t]he majority of courts in recent years have included the maximum
penalties in determining the amount in controversy.” Id. (collecting cases).
In this case, the Court concludes it is appropriate to include the maximum civil
penalty that Plaintiffs could be awarded in calculating the amount in controversy.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint specifically alleges that Defendant’s actions were “willful” and
requests a “civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiffs’ actual damages[.]” ECF
No. 1-2 ¶¶ 24, 28, at 14. To the extent Plaintiffs contend Defendant must affirmatively
offer evidence of willfulness, “[i]t would be absurd to suggest a defendant must offer
evidence showing it willfully failed to comply with the Song-Beverly Act.” Urie, 2025
WL 2080805, at *3 (quoting Brooks v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV 20-302 DSF (KKX),
2020 WL 2731830, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2020)); Modiano v. BMW of N. Am. LLC,
No. 21-CV-00040-DMS-MDD, 2021 WL 973566, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2021) (“The
Court declines to require defendants to justify civil penalties by arguing their own
conduct was willful.”); Canesco v. Ford Motor Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d 872, 902 (S.D. Cal.
2021) (“[T]his Court sides with the majority of courts and more recent cases, which find
civil penalties appropriate for inclusion in the calculation of the amount in controversy
without the defendant needing to ‘prove a case against itself’ with respect to liability for
civil penalties.”).
///
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As outlined above, Defendant calculates the actual damages to be $42,549.94.
When combined with the maximum potential civil penalties of $85,099.88, the total
amount in controversy—exclusive of attorneys’ fees—is $127,649.80. This exceeds the
$75,000 amount-in-controversy threshold for diversity cases and $50,000 threshold for
MMWA cases. For these reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant has met its burden
to 	establish 	by 	a 	preponderance 	of 	the 	evidence 	that 	the 	amount-in-controversy
requirement is satisfied. 2
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 21, 2026
____________________
Hon. Robert S. Huie
United States District Judge
2 Defendant also contends that the amount-in-controversy includes at least $15,000
in attorneys’ fees. ECF No. 14 at 28–29. Plaintiffs contend Defendant has not met its
evidentiary burden to establish attorneys’ fees in this case. ECF No. 15 at 13–15. As the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional thresholds for both diversity jurisdiction
and jurisdiction under the MMWA even without including attorneys’ fees, the Court does
not reach this issue.
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