Estate of Monica Liliana Cameroni De Adams et al v. City of San Diego et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ESTATE OF MONICA LILIANA
CAMERONI DE ADAMS, by
and through its Administrator
Eliot Cobb Adams; ELIOT COBB
ADAMS, an individual; and
NATALIE DANIELLE
CAMERONI-ADAMS, an
individual,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF SAN DIEGO, a public
entity; CITY OF SAN DIEGO
POLICE DEPARTMENT, a
public entity; OFFICER
MATTHEW BRACE, an
individual; OFFICER
MALLORY MARASCHIELLO,
an individual; CHIEF DAVID
NISLEIT, an individual; KHATI
BROTHERS INVESTMENTS,
INC., dba ROADWAY TOWING
& RECOVERY, a California
corporation; TOW &
TRANSPORT, INC., dba
ROADWAY TOWING &
RECOVERY, a California
corporation; JORDAN
MAXIMILIAN LOPEZ, an
individual; and DOES 1–25,
inclusive ,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-cv-1447-WQH-MSB
ORDER
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HAYES, Judge:
The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint filed by
Defendant City of San Diego, Defendant Officer Matthew Brace, Defendant Officer
Mallory Maraschiello, and Defendant Chief David Nisleit. (ECF No. 2.)
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 2, 2025, Plaintiff Estate of Monica Liliana Cameroni de Adams, by and
through its Administrator Eliot Cobb Adams; Plaintiff Eliot Cobb Adams; and Plaintiff
Natalie Danielle Cameroni-Adams (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint in the
Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego, Case No.: 25CU017593C.
(Compl., ECF No. 1-2.) On May 5, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Petition for an Order Relieving
Plaintiffs from Government Entity Claim Filing Requirements (the “Petition”) in the same
court. (ECF No. 1-4.)
On June 5, 2025, Defendant City of San Diego, Defendant Officer Matthew Brace,
Defendant Officer Mallory Maraschiello, and Defendant Chief David Nisleit (collectively,
“San Diego Defendants”) removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 1.)
On June 12, 2025, San Diego Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Complaint (the “Motion to Dismiss”). (ECF No. 2.) In support, San Diego
Defendants also filed a Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 2-6) and submitted a “true
and correct copy of the Body Worn Camera (BWC) video captured by Defendant Officer
Brace when he arrived and investigated the accident scene on November 5, 2023.” (ECF
No. 2 at 10–12.)
On July 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition. (ECF No. 3.) Plaintiffs also filed an
Objection to San Diego Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice. (ECF No. 3-1.) On July
14, 2025, San Diego Defendants filed a Response. (ECF No. 4.)
II. 	ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
On November 5, 2023, Monica Liliana Cameroni de Adams (“Ms. Cameroni de
Adams”) was parked in her 2001 Honda Odyssey minivan at or around 4200 Clairemont
Mesa Boulevard in San Diego, California. (Compl. ¶ 34.)
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At approximately 1:08 a.m., Defendant Jordan Maximilian Lopez (“Lopez”) rear-
ended Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s vehicle and collided with another parked vehicle.
Id. ¶ 35. At the time of the incident, Defendant Lopez was driving under the influence of
drugs and/or alcohol. Id. ¶ 36.
Shortly after the collision, Defendant Officer Matthew Brace (“Officer Brace”),
Defendant 	Officer 	Mallory 	Maraschiello 	(“Officer 	Maraschiello”) 	(together, 	“the
Defendant Officers”) and Defendants Khati Brothers Investments and Tow & Transport,
Inc. (together, “Towing Defendants”) arrived at the location of the automobile crash. Id.
¶¶ 12, 15, 36.
Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s vehicle sustained “moderate property damage,” including
to the rear door, hood, and front bumper, in the accident. Id. ¶ 37. Ms. Cameroni de Adams
“remained inside her vehicle and was visible to anyone looking inside [her] vehicle.” Id.
Ms. Cameroni de Adams had “sustained survivable blunt force injuries from the collision.”
Id.
Defendant Officer Brace, Defendant Officer Maraschiello, and Towing Defendants
did not “look[] inside of Ms. Cameroni de Adams’ vehicle for victims.” Id. ¶ 40. Instead,
the Defendant Officers and Towing Defendants arranged for Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s
vehicle to be taken to a tow yard owned by Towing Defendants, which is located at 5975
Fairmont Avenue. Id. ¶¶ 38, 40.
Ms. Cameroni de Adams “relied on [the Defendants’] affirmative actions” and
believed that “she was [being] transported to receive medical care and/or treatment.” Id.
¶ 38. Ms. Cameroni de Adams was transported to the tow yard without receiving medical
attention. Id. ¶ 41.
Approximately ten days later, on November 14, 2023, Plaintiff Eliot Cobb Adams
(“Eliot”) and Plaintiff Natalie Danielle Cameroni-Adams (“Natalie”)—the children of Ms.
Cameroni de Adams—filed a missing person report. Id. ¶ 44.
On December 6, 2023, a yard worker contacted law enforcement to report a “pungent
smell” coming from Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s vehicle. Id. ¶ 45. “Law enforcement and
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fire personnel” found Ms. Cameroni de Adams in the middle row of her vehicle. Id. Ms.
Cameroni de Adams was declared dead on the scene. Id. The law enforcement and fire
personnel described Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s body:
Signs of decomposition included a foul odor, skin discoloration, fluid loss,
and parts of her skeleton being visible. The decedent was wearing a bodily
fluid soiled t-shirt, bra, and underwear. Her face was unrecognizable due to
the condition of her body. Her eyes were not viewable, but her hair appeared
gray. No obvious ligature mark furrow was noted. No trauma was noted to her
torso or extremities. No illicit drug use marks were noted in her arms. No
tattoos were noted.
Id. ¶ 46. Plaintiff Eliot and Plaintiff Natalie were unable to bury or cremate Ms. Cameroni
de Adams’s body because of the advanced state of her decomposition. Id.
Between December 6, 2023, and October 15, 2024, Plaintiffs “attempted to obtain
information related to the time, place, and manner of Ms. Cameroni de Adams’ death.”
Id. ¶ 22. During this period, representatives from the San Diego County District Attorney’s
office represented to Plaintiffs that Defendant Lopez was the person “who solely and
exclusively caused the death of their mother.” Id.
On August 9, 2024, the San Diego Medical Examiner completed a report (the
“Medical Examiner’s Report”) related to Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s death. Id. ¶ 25. On
October 16, 2024, Plaintiffs received a copy of the Medical Examiner’s Report. Id. The
Medical Examiner’s Report indicated that Ms. Cameroni de Adams “survived the
collision” and did not die until after being transported in her vehicle to the tow yard. Id.
¶ 26. This was the “first time that Plaintiffs learned” that San Diego Defendants were
“involved in causing the death of Ms. Cameroni de Adams.” Id. ¶ 27.
On November 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed claims against the City of San Diego and an
Application for Permission to Present Late Claims pursuant to California Government
Code § 911.4. Id. ¶ 28.
On November 22, 2024, the City of San Diego denied the Application for Permission
to Present Late Claims. Id. ¶ 30.
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Plaintiffs allege that Defendants left Ms. Cameroni de Adams “trapped inside of her
vehicle” and “deprived [her] of life-saving medical care and treatment.” Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiffs
allege that Defendants failed to maintain reasonable policies “related to conducting
reasonable inspections, examinations and/or otherwise investigations of vehicles to
ascertain and confirm the presence of persons in the vehicles prior to vehicles being towed”
and to adequately supervise its representatives and employees related to the same. Id. ¶ 48.
Plaintiffs bring six causes of action in their Complaint. First, Plaintiffs bring a claim
of motor vehicle negligence against Defendant Lopez. Id. ¶ 52–60. Second, Plaintiffs bring
a claim for due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendant Officers
and Towing Defendants. Id. ¶ 61–72. Third, Plaintiffs bring a claim for municipal liability
for a failure to train under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City of San Diego and San
Diego Police Department.1 Id. ¶ 73–83. Fourth, Plaintiffs bring a claim of negligence
against all Defendants. Id. ¶ 84–99. Fifth, Plaintiffs bring a claim of tortious interference
with human remains against Towing Defendants. Id. ¶ 100–103. Sixth, Plaintiffs bring a
claim for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention against all Defendants.2 Id. ¶ 104–
112.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To state a claim for
relief, a pleading “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory[,] or an
1 Plaintiffs list Defendant Chief David Nisleit as a party against whom this cause of action is brought,
(ECF No. 1-2 at 24), but clarify that they do not assert this cause of action against him in their Opposition
to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 3 at 9.) To the extent that the Complaint purports to assert this claim
against Defendant Chief David Nisleit, the claim is dismissed.
2 Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed without prejudice this cause of action as to Defendant Lopez. (ECF
Nos. 5, 6.)
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absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New
Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Navarro v.
Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). District courts “liberally construe pleadings in
civil rights cases.” Buckey v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” 	Id. 	However, 	“a 	plaintiff’s 	obligation 	to 	provide 	the 	‘grounds’ 	of 	his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
(alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). While a pleading “does not require
‘detailed factual allegations,’” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 nevertheless “demands
more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A court is not “required to accept as true
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “In
sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content,
and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim
entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
San Diego Defendants move to dismiss “all claims in the Complaint against City,
[San Diego Police Department], Officers Brace and Maraschiello, and Chief David Nisleit”
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(e). (ECF 2-1 at 8–9.)
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The causes of action stated against San Diego Defendants in the Complaint are: (1)
the claim for due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserted against the Defendant
Officers (“Count II”); (2) the claim for municipal liability for a failure to train under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant City of San Diego and Defendant San Diego Police
Department (“Count III”); (3) the negligence claim against all San Diego Defendants
(“Count IV”); and (4) the claim for negligent hiring, retention and supervision against all
San Diego Defendants (“Count VI”).
A. Request for Judicial Notice
As a preliminary matter, the Court reviews San Diego Defendants’ request for
judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 regarding three documents filed in
support 	of 	their 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss: 	Exhibit 	A, 	the 	San 	Diego 	Municipal 	Code
§ 22.1801(b); Exhibit B, San Diego Charter, Sections 57 and 58; and Exhibit C, a copy of
Officer Matthew Brace’s body worn camera video footage from the date of the car accident
on November 5, 2023 (the “Body Worn Camera footage”). (ECF No. 2-6 at 1–2.)
In response, Plaintiffs file an Objection to San Diego Defendants’ Request for
Judicial Notice asking the Court to decline to take judicial notice of the Body Worn Camera
footage. (ECF No. 3-1 at 6.) Plaintiffs contend that district courts should not consider
material beyond the pleadings at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. at 4. Plaintiffs contend
that the “contents, nature and inferences of [the Body Worn Camera footage] are disputed”
and that their Complaint does not rely on the Body Warn Camera footage as the basis for
its allegations and claims against San Diego Defendants. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiffs also contend
that, at the time of filing their Objection, they “ha[d] not received” the Body Worn Camera
footage and could not verify its accuracy. Id. at 5.
As a general matter, “district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings
when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018).
Considering material outside the pleadings converts the 12(b)(6) motion “into a motion for
summary judgment under Rule 56” and “both parties must have the opportunity to present
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all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Id. (quotations omitted). There are two
exceptions to this rule: “the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, and judicial notice under
Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Id. Incorporation-by-reference allows a district court to
“treat[] certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.” Id. at 1002.
Judicial notice permits a district court to “notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable
dispute,” if it “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
In the context of encounters with law enforcement, district courts have reached
different conclusions when considering whether to review body worn camera footage at
the motion to dismiss stage. In Lihosit v. Flam, the District Court for the District of Arizona
chose to review body worn camera footage when adjudicating a motion to dismiss
excessive force claims brought under § 1983 because the “complaint necessarily relie[d]
on the circumstances surrounding [the plaintiff’s] arrest.” No. CV-15-01224-PHX-NVW,
2016 WL 2865870, at *1–*4 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2016). In Lee v. City of San Diego, the
Southern District of California declined to review body worn camera footage while
adjudicating a motion to dismiss excessive force claims brought under § 1983 claims
because, although the plaintiff’s claims were “based on the events surrounding his arrest,”
the complaint did not “refer to the videos” and the plaintiff’s claims were “not based on
the videos.” Lee v. City of San Diego, No. 18CV0159 W (BLM), 2019 WL 117775, at *5
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2019).
Here, the Court does not need to conclude whether incorporation-by-reference or
judicial notice would permit it to consider the Body Worn Camera footage in its review of
the pending Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not refer to nor rely on the Body
Worn Camera footage. San Diego Defendants’ contentions are likewise not premised on
any material in the Body Worn Camera footage. San Diego Defendants contend only that
the “exhibit is essential in helping the Court fully understand the events underlying the
allegations and claims made in the Complaint.” (ECF No. 2-6 at 4.) The Court does not
find reason to review the Body Worn Camera footage for the purpose of adjudicating the
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pending motion. Plaintiffs’ Objection to San Diego Defendants’ Request for Judicial
Notice (ECF No. 3-1) is denied as moot.
Plaintiffs do not object to the Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No 2-6) with respect
to Exhibit A, the San Diego Municipal Code § 22.1801(b), or Exhibit B, San Diego Charter,
Sections 57 and 58. These public documents are not “not subject to reasonable dispute”
within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), and the Court takes judicial notice
of these documents. See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d
1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (taking judicial notice of city ordinances); Lee v. City of Los
Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating that a court may take judicial notice of
“matters of public record”) (quotation omitted).
B. 	Count II: Due Process Violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiffs assert their second cause of action for due process violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendant Officers “in their individual capacities under color of
state 	law.”3 (Compl. 	¶ 	63.) 	Plaintiffs 	contend 	that 	the 	Defendant 	Officers 	“acted
affirmatively 	so 	as 	to 	place” Ms. Cameroni 	de Adams 	in 	a 	“situation 	of 	actual,
particularized danger” by transporting her and her vehicle to the tow yard while she
remained injured inside the vehicle. Id. ¶ 64. Plaintiffs also contend that the Defendant
Officers “knew and/or should have known” that Ms. Cameroni de Adams faced a
substantial risk of serious harm” and were “deliberately indifferent to [] known and
foreseeable risks” by transporting her to the tow yard without medical treatment. Id. ¶ 65.
1. Failure to State a Claim
San Diego Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for a deprivation
of constitutional rights against the Defendant Officers. (ECF No. 2-1 at 13–16.) San Diego
Defendants contend that the Defendant Officers did not “create the peril in which [Ms.
Cameroni de Adams] found herself” and “took no affirmative action which contributed to,
3 Plaintiffs also assert this cause of action against Towing Defendants. (Compl. ¶ 63.) San Diego
Defendants do not move to dismiss this cause of action as to those Defendants.
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increased, or changed the injuries which would have otherwise existed as a result of the
rear-end accident Defendant Lopez caused.” Id. at 14. San Diego Defendants contend that
the Defendant Officers had “no duty . . . to assist” Ms. Cameroni de Adams. Id. San Diego
Defendants also contend that the Defendant Officers did not have a “legally recognized
special relationship” that would create an affirmative duty to protect Ms. Cameroni de
Adams from harm. Id. at 14–16.
Plaintiffs respond that the Defendant Officers “took affirmative actions” that placed
Ms. Cameroni de Adams in “state-created danger.” (ECF No. 3 at 6.) Plaintiffs contend
that these “affirmative actions included, without limitation, (1) affirmatively transporting
Ms. Cameroni de Adams to a remote location away from life-saving medical care and/or
treatment; (2) affirmatively not conducting an inspection, inventory, examination, and/or
reasonable search of Ms. Cameroni de Adams’ vehicle; and (3) affirmatively not
conducting any reasonable inventory of the contents of Ms. Cameroni de Adams’ vehicle
at any time.” Id. at 7.
“As a general rule, members of the public have no constitutional right to sue state
employees who fail to protect them against harm inflicted by third parties.” L.W. v. Grubbs,
974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires
the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private
actors.”). There are two exceptions to this principle: “(1) the ‘special relationship’
exception; and (2) the ‘danger creation’ exception.” Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 121.
The 	“special 	relationship” 	exception 	applies 	only 	upon 	“incarceration,
institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty.” Patel v. Kent School
Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.) “The special-
relationship exception does not apply when a state fails to protect a person who is not in
custody.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs do allege that Ms. Cameroni de Adams entered the “custody
and care” of the San Diego Defendants by virtue of their transportation of her vehicle.
(Compl. ¶ 86.) However, in their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs contend
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that “the special relationship doctrine is inapplicable” here because their claim against the
Defendant Officers does “not concern their failure to protect Ms. Cameroni de Adams from
the harm caused by Defendant Driver Lopez’s collison, but rather, [their] affirmative
actions in transporting Ms. Cameroni de Adams” to the tow yard. (ECF No. 3. at 8
(emphasis omitted).) At this stage, the Court declines to consider whether the special
relationship exception applies to Plaintiffs’ claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Defendant Officers because Plaintiffs disclaim that argument.
The “danger creation” or “state-created danger” exception requires a plaintiff to
“establish that (1) a state actor’s affirmative actions created or exposed him to an actual,
particularized danger [that she] would not otherwise have faced, (2) that the injury [s]he
suffered was foreseeable, and (3) that the state actor was deliberately indifferent to the
known danger.” Sinclair v. City of Seattle, 61 F.4th 674, 680 (9th Cir. 2023) (quotation
omitted); Martinez v. City of Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 2019).
i. 	Affirmative Action
The first prong of the state-created danger test requires a district court to determine
“whether an officer affirmatively place[d]” a person in danger by “examin[ing] whether
the officers left the person in a situation that was more dangerous than the one in which
they found [her.]” Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep’t, 227 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.
2000). “Whether the danger already existed is not dispositive because, ‘by its very nature,
the doctrine only applies in situations in which the plaintiff was directly harmed by a third
party—a danger that, in every case, could be said to have already existed.’” Martinez, 943
F.3d at 1271 (quoting Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
in original)).
The affirmative-action prong of the state-created danger test may be satisfied by
officers’ conduct that deprives a plaintiff of medical care or exposes them to environmental
dangers. Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 708 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Impeding
access to medical care amounts to leaving a victim in a more dangerous situation.”); Penilla
v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “removing [the
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plaintiff] from public view” after identifying medical distress and making it “impossible
for anyone to provide emergency medical care” placed him in a more dangerous position).
In Munger, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that a district court erred in granting
summary judgment on § 1983 claims to defendant police officers who ejected an
“obviously drunk” patron “wearing only jeans and a t-shirt” into a “bitter cold night.”
Munger, 227 F.3d at 1084. The patron was discovered the following day having died from
hypothermia. Id. at 1085. The Ninth Circuit wrote that the officers “affirmatively place[d]”
the plaintiff in “a position of danger.” Id. at 1087. In Wood v. Ostrander, the Ninth Circuit
similarly held that a district court erred in granting summary judgment on § 1983 claims to
a defendant officer that arrested an intoxicated driver and then left the plaintiff passenger
“stranded [] in a high-crime area at 2:30 a.m.” 879 F.2d 583, 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1989). The
plaintiff ultimately “accepted a ride with an unknown man” who “took [her] to a secluded
area and raped her.” Id. at 586. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff had raised a triable
issue of fact as to whether the defendant officer had affirmatively placed her in a position
of danger. Id. at 589–90.
Here, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the Court concludes
that Plaintiffs plausibly allege that the Defendant Officers’ actions placed Ms. Cameroni
de Adams in a situation that was more dangerous than the one in which they found her.
Plaintiffs allege that Ms. Cameroni de Adams was transported from the scene of the
incident to the tow yard in a “remote location” after she had suffered “survivable blunt
force injuries.” (Compl. ¶ 37–38.) These allegations support an inference that Ms.
Cameroni de Adams suffered a heightened danger of failing to receive timely medical care
because the Defendant Officers transported her to a distant location with fewer passersby
and less proximity to emergency services. The likelihood that another person might
discover Ms. Cameroni de Adams and render aid was decreased by her isolation, as alleged
in the Complaint. The danger that Ms. Cameroni de Adams would die from her
“survivable” injuries was increased. At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiffs satisfy the
first prong of the state-created danger test.
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ii. 	Foreseeability
The second prong of the state-created danger test requires a district court to consider
whether the plaintiff’s “ultimate injury was foreseeable.” Martinez, 943 F.3d at 1273
(quoting Hernandez v. City of San Jose, 897 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2018)). “This does
not mean that the exact injury must be foreseeable. Rather, ‘the state actor is liable for
creating the foreseeable danger of injury given the particular circumstances.’” Id. at 1273–
74 (quoting Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1064 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006)).
The foreseeability prong is satisfied when defendant officers have knowledge of a
particular danger to which the plaintiff will be exposed or when common sense suggests
that the officers’ actions will expose the plaintiff to danger. Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 121
(describing that “[d]efendants knowingly assigned” a female nurse at a custodial institution
to work alone with a male offender with “an extraordinary history of unrepentant violence
against women and girls” created foreseeable danger); Martinez, 943 F.3d at 1268, 1274
(holding that “as a matter of common sense,” subsequent assaults against the plaintiff
following her reports of domestic violence to police while in the presence of the repeat
abuser “were objectively foreseeable”); Woods, 879 F.2d at 590 (holding that “the inherent
danger facing a woman left alone at night in an unsafe area is a matter of common sense”).
Here, Plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to establish that the Defendant Officers’
actions could foreseeably have exposed Ms. Cameroni de Adams to harm. Plaintiffs allege
that the Defendant Officers failed to “reasonably investigat[e] the scene” by “looking
inside of Ms. Cameroni de Adams’ vehicle for victims” and, instead, called for the vehicle
to be transported to the tow yard without adequate inspection. (Compl. ¶ 40.) It is plausible
that an officer’s failure to survey the scene of an automobile crash could lead to
unidentified victims. The Defendant Officers’ alleged failure to adequately investigate the
scene could be expected to deprive an injured persons on the scene of necessary medical
attention. The danger that an injured person would suffer from a heightened risk of serious
harm without medical attention would be foreseeable at the time that an officer fails to
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inspect the scene. At this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiffs satisfy the second prong of
the state-created danger test.
iii. 	Deliberate Indifference
The deliberate indifference prong of the state-created danger test requires a plaintiff
to sufficiently plead that the defendant “disregarded a known or obvious consequence of
[their] action.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410
(1997) (describing “deliberate indifference” as a “stringent standard of fault”); L.W. v.
Grubbs, 	92 	F.3d 	894, 	900 	(9th 	Cir. 	1996) 	(“Grubbs 	II”) 	(requiring 	“[d]eliberate
indifference to a known, or so obvious as to imply knowledge of, danger”). “Under Grubbs,
the standard we apply is even higher than gross negligence—deliberate indifference
requires a culpable mental state.” Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir.
2011). The defendant officer must “know[] that something is going to happen but ignore[]
the risk.” Id. (quoting Grubbs II, 92 F.3d at 900).
In Estate of Soakai v. Abdelaziz, the Ninth Circuit recently considered whether the
standard for deliberate indifference had been satisfied in a case involving a high-speed
chase initiated by the defendant police officers that ended in a crash causing serious injuries
and death to bystanders. 137 F.4th 969, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2025). “Despite witnessing the
crash,” the defendant officers “neither stopped to render aid nor summoned emergency
services” and, when other officers began arriving at the crash site, the defendant officers
returned and “pretended not to have been at the scene previously.” Id. at 975. The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the defendant officers allegedly witnessed the collision, “saw that [the
plaintiffs] needed immediate medical attention,” and “knew from their training—and
common sense—that the danger to Plaintiffs would increase the longer they went without
help.” Id. at 984. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for state-
created danger. Id. at 985.
In Penilla v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss § 1983 claims against officers
that responded to a 911 call for emergency services. Id. at 708. The officers encountered a
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“seriously ill” man on his porch and “found him to be in grave need of medical care,” but
“cancelled the request for paramedics” and moved him inside without further attention. Id.
The man died of respiratory failure and was found the following morning by family
members. Id. The Ninth Circuit distinguished the case from others in which defendant
officers and firefighters had been held to not be liable because, in Penilla, the defendants
“increased the risk facing” the victim “after they had examined him and found him to be
in serious medical need.” Id. at 710 (emphasis in original); see also Munger, 227 F.3d at
1087 (describing that the defendant officers “knew” that the bar patron was intoxicated and
that their subsequent search for him “demonstrates that they were aware of the danger that
he was in”).
In Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit affirmed
a district court’s grant of summary judgment on a § 1983 claim in favor of a defendant
special-education teacher that failed to properly supervise a student because there was “no
evidence even hinting that [the defendant teacher] intended to expose [the student] to a risk
or otherwise knew that something was going to happen but ignored the risk”) (cleaned up).
Id. at 969, 976. The court wrote that, “[a]t worst,” the defendant teacher had “committed a
lapse in judgment” but that the evidence did not suggest she “harbored the requisite mental
state of intentionally or knowingly subjecting [the student] to a known or obvious danger.”
Id. at 976.
Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the Complaint does not
contain sufficient allegations to establish that the Defendant Officers acted with deliberate
indifference. Plaintiffs’ allegations do not support the conclusion that Defendant Officers
knew that transporting Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s vehicle would subject her to heightened
danger nor that such a risk was “obvious.” Grubbs II, 92 F.3d at 900. There is no allegation
that the Defendant Officers were subjectively aware that Ms. Cameroni de Adams
remained in her vehicle at the time that they ordered its transport to the tow yard. Unlike
in Penilla, there is no allegation that the Defendant Officers had been called to render aid
to a particular victim and, unlike in Estate of Soakai, there is no allegation that the
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Defendant Officers witnessed the automobile crash and should have understood that those
involved were in dire need of assistance. Plaintiffs do not allege that any information at the
scene provided the Defendant Officers with actual—or even constructive—knowledge of
Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s presence. There are likewise not sufficient allegations to
suggest that Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s presence in a parked car at 1:08 a.m. should have
been obvious to the Defendant Officers. Plaintiffs do not allege that the Defendant Officers
ignored clear indications that Ms. Cameroni de Adams was at the scene of the automobile
crash. Plaintiffs instead allege that the Defendant Officers did not “reasonably investigat[e]
the scene.” (Compl. ¶ 40.) This allegation does not support an inference that the Defendant
Officers’ conduct meets the high standard for deliberate indifference. Patel, 648 F.3d at
975 (“Under Grubbs, the standard we apply is even higher than gross negligence—
deliberate indifference requires a culpable mental state.”). Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the third
prong of the state-created danger test.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 based on a state-created danger theory.
2. Qualified Immunity
San Diego Defendants also contend that qualified immunity protects Defendant
Officer Brace and Defendant Officer Maraschiello from liability. (ECF No. 2-1 at 23–24.)
San Diego Defendants contend, as above, that no violation of constitutional rights occurred
and, if the Court holds otherwise, that the constitutional right at issue was not clearly
established. Id. Plaintiffs respond that the Defendant Officers violated Ms. Cameroni de
Adams’s constitutional rights and that the right to be free from state-created dangers is
clearly established by Ninth Circuit and United States Supreme Court precedent. (ECF No.
3 at 19–21.)
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Reese v. Cty. of
Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
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223, 231 (2009)). In determining whether qualified immunity applies, a district court
inquires whether, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,” the
“facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and, if so,
“whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
The Court has concluded that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently plead a constitutional
violation against Defendant Officer Brace and Defendant Officer Maraschiello based on a
theory of state-created danger. San Diego Defendants raise the issue of qualified immunity
as an alternative theory to their earlier contentions. (ECF No. 2-1 at 22). The Court
accordingly declines to reach the qualified immunity analysis because the facts alleged do
not show that the Defendant Officers violated a constitutional right.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ second
cause of action for due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendant
Officers.
C. 	Count III: Failure to Train under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiffs assert their third cause of action against Defendants City of San Diego and
San Diego Police Department for a violation of Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for a failure to train under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 77.) Plaintiffs contend that Defendants City of San Diego and San
Diego Police Department maintained inadequate training policies and failed to train their
employees to appropriately address recurring situations, like the automobile incident at
issue here. Id. ¶¶ 77–78.
Municipalities are considered “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and may be liable
for causing a constitutional deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690
(1978). A municipality, however, “cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under [§ 1983] on a
respondeat superior theory.” Id. at 691. Liability only attaches where the municipality itself
causes the constitutional violation through “execution of a government’s policy or custom,
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whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy.” Id. at 694.
In order to establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a
plaintiff must prove “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of
which he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this
policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right;
and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional
violation.”
Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original)
(quoting Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)).
“Failure to train may constitute a basis for Monell liability where the failure amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of those who deal with municipal employees.”
Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing City of
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388–89 (1989)).
1. San Diego Police Department
San Diego Defendants contend that Plaintiffs may not assert a § 1983 claim against
Defendant San Diego Police Department because it is not a “person” within the meaning
of the federal statute. (ECF No. 2-1 at 12.) San Diego Defendants contend that the San
Diego Police Department is a “municipal department within the City of San Diego” and
that Plaintiffs may only assert their claim against the “parent entity.” Id. Plaintiffs do not
respond to this argument.
“While local governmental units, such as counties or municipalities, are considered
‘persons’ within the meaning of Section 1983, municipal departments and sub-units,
including police departments, are not.” Paschelke v. Doe, No. CIV 09-2191 IEG(CAB),
2010 WL 2640501, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2010) (quotations omitted); Vance v. County
of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995–96 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (“[T]he term ‘persons’ does
not encompass municipal departments.”). The record indicates that Defendant San Diego
Police Department is a City Department within the City of San Diego. (See Exhibit A, ECF
No. 2-3 at 3 (identifying “Police” as one of the “departments of the City of San Diego” in
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San Diego Municipal Code § 22.1801(b)).) The Court concludes that Defendant San Diego
Police Department is not a proper defendant for a Monell claim brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ third cause of action is dismissed as to Defendant San
Diego Police Department.
2. Failure to State a Claim
San Diego Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ Monell claim should be dismissed
because Plaintiffs do not adequately plead their claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No.
2-1 at 16.) San Diego Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to identify an “underlying
constitutional violation” because the Defendant Officers did not violate Ms. Cameroni de
Adams’s constitutional rights after the vehicle collision. Id. at 17. San Diego Defendants
contend that Plaintiffs fail to “identify any specific training program, the deficiencies of
such program, a pattern of similar violations, or a constitutional violation attributable to a
lack of training.” Id. at 19. San Diego Defendants contend that Defendant City of San Diego
cannot be held liable for the acts of its Officers. Id.
Plaintiffs respond that they sufficiently allege that Defendant City of San Diego was
“deliberately indifferent” in its “failure to train its employees” about policies related to
ascertaining the presence of any persons in a vehicle prior to towing that vehicle, rendering
medical care to occupants in a vehicle after a collision, and conducting inspections or
examinations for vehicles brought to a tow yard. (ECF No. 3 at 10–11.) Plaintiffs contend
that Defendant City of San Diego “had constructive notice” of constitutional violations
when “it disregarded the obvious consequences of placing [Ms.] Cameroni de Adams away
from necessary medical treatment by entombing her inside her vehicle.” Id. at 11.
Plaintiffs also state that, “[t]o the extent that this Court finds additional facts are
required for Plaintiffs to assert [this claim], Plaintiffs request leave to amend to allege more
specific facts” related to their failure to train theory. Id. at 11. “Plaintiffs intend to plead
additional facts related to how Defendant [City of San Diego] failed to . . . comply with
Basic Course Workbook Series, Learning Domain 29, Traffic Collision Investigation,
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specifically the Collision Scene Management primary objective to determine if there are
injured parties and render medical assistance if necessary.” Id.
To state a claim for relief under a theory of Monell liability, a plaintiff must “show
an underlying constitutional violation.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741
(9th Cir. 2020); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1994) (“While the liability of
municipalities doesn’t turn on the liability of individual officers, it is contingent on a
violation of constitutional rights.”); see City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual
police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of
constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point.”).
The Court has concluded that Plaintiffs fail to adequately state their claim for a
violation of constitutional rights related to the conduct of the Defendant Officers in
transporting Ms. Cameroni de Adams to the tow yard after the vehicle collision. Based on
the Court’s preceding analysis, Plaintiffs have not alleged “sufficient facts to support a
reasonable inference of [] a constitutional violation.” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1153.
Plaintiffs do not satisfy the first element of the Monell test at this stage of the proceedings.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ third cause
of action for failure to train under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Plaintiffs fail to state a claim
under which relief can be granted.
D. 	Timeliness Under the California Government Claims Act
Plaintiffs assert two causes of action under California law against San Diego
Defendants: their fourth cause of action for negligence and their sixth cause of action for
negligent hiring, supervision, and retention. (Compl. ¶¶ 84–99, 104–112). Plaintiffs bring
both causes of action against, among others, Defendant City of San Diego.
Prior to reviewing the parties’ other contentions regarding each claim, the Court
must determine whether the tort claims asserted against Defendant City of San Diego
should be dismissed for failure to comply with the California Government Claims Act. See
Cal. Gov’t Code. §§ 810 et seq.
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San Diego Defendants contend that, pursuant to California Government Code
§ 911.2, Plaintiffs were required to file a claim with the City of San Diego no later than six
months after the accrual of their cause of action, which San Diego Defendants contend
occurred upon the discovery of Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s body on December 6, 2023.
(ECF No. 2-1 at 26.) San Diego Defendants contend that Plaintiffs failed to file a claim
within the statutory timeline required by the California Government Claims Act and
subsequently filed an application for permission to file a late claim, which the City of San
Diego denied. Id. San Diego Defendants contend that the California Government Code
now precludes Plaintiffs from asserting tort claims against Defendant City of San Diego
because their application to file a late claim has been denied.
Plaintiffs respond that their tort claims against Defendant City of San Diego should
be allowed to proceed because Plaintiffs complied with all statutory requirements under
California law. (ECF No. 3 at 21–23.) Plaintiffs allege that they “attempted to obtain
information related to the time, place, and manner of Ms. Cameroni de Adams’ death” in
the months following the discovery of her body on December 6, 2023. Id. at 22 (citing
Compl. ¶ 22). Plaintiffs contend that, during the period from December 6, 2023, through
October 15, 2024, the San Diego District Attorney’s office “represented to Plaintiffs that
it was Defendant Driver [Lopez] who solely and exclusively caused the death of Ms.
Cameroni de Adams.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 22).
Plaintiffs contend that it was not until their receipt of the Medical Examiner’s Report
on October 16, 2024, that they “were able to obtain essential facts about the circumstances
related to Ms. Cameroni de Adams’ death necessary for them to file claims against”
Defendant City of San Diego and other government entities. Id. ¶¶ 8, 22–25. Plaintiffs
contend that the Medical Examiner’s Report provided essential information that Ms.
Cameroni de Adams “had survived the collision” and “did not die” until after being
transported to the tow yard. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that they filed a claim against Defendant City of San Diego and an
Application for Permission to Present Late Claims on November 5, 2024 pursuant to the
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requirements of California Government Code § 911.4. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs allege that
Defendant City of San Diego rejected their claim and application on November 22, 2024.
Id. at ¶ 30.
Plaintiffs then filed their Petition (ECF No. 1-4) in the Superior Court of California
seeking relief pursuant to California Government Code § 946, which allows a court to
excuse 	a 	petitioner 	from 	the 	claims-presentation 	requirements 	of 	the 	California
Government Claims Act. Plaintiffs allege that the Petition was set for a hearing on
December 5, 2025, but that this action was removed to this Court prior to that hearing in
state court. (ECF No. 3 at 22 n.1.) Plaintiffs now request that the Court rule on the Petition
as part of its Order on the Motion to Dismiss. Id.
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Pursuant to the California Government Claims Act, “no suit for money or damages
may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to
be presented” until “a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has
been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board.”
Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4; see also id. § 911.2 (requiring that a “claim relating to a cause of
action for death or for injury to person” to be presented to the Department of General
Services). If a timely claim is rejected, then the claimant may file suit against the public
entity. Cal. Govt’ Code § 945.4. If an untimely claim is presented and rejected, however,
then a petition for relief from that rejection may be made to a “superior court that would
be a proper court for the trial of an action on the cause of action to which the claim relates.”
Id. § 946.6.
“The question presented by a Section 946.6 petition is whether the claimant should
be relieved of [their] obligations under the [California Government Claims Act] and,
because it is a question separate from the merits, it is not properly within a federal court’s
subject matter jurisdiction.” Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1022
(C.D. Cal. 2000); see Luers v. Smith, 941 F. Supp 105, 108 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“This court
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does not have federal subject matter or supplemental state claim jurisdiction over such a
petition.”).
Federal district courts in California considering this issue have concluded that they
may not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over a petition filed under California
Government Code § 946.6. “Although the Ninth Circuit has not interpreted § 946.6, most
California District Courts interpret § 946.6(a) as meaning that only state superior courts,
and not federal district courts, may grant relief from [California] Government Code
§ 945.4.” Hill v. City of Clovis, No. 1:11-CV-1391 AWI SMS, 2012 WL 787609, at *12
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2012), on reconsideration in part sub nom. Hill v. Clovis Police Dep’t,
No. 1:11-CV-1391 AWI SMS, 2012 WL 1833880 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2012) (collecting
cases); San Diego Branch of Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Cnty.
of San Diego, No. 16-CV-2575-JLS (BGS), 2017 WL 5194579, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9,
2017) (“The majority of courts hold the district court does not have jurisdiction to rule on
a § 946.6 petition, with two outlier cases holding the opposite.”); Garza v. Alvara, No.
115CV00234DADSKO, 2016 WL 4921542, at *9–*10 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2016), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 115CV00234DADSKO, 2016 WL 4899676 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 14, 2016) (stating that the few cases in which federal courts have exercised
jurisdiction over § 946.6 petitions relied on language that predated amendments to the
California Government Code or that the parties did not dispute jurisdiction over the
petition).
The Court agrees with the majority of California district courts and finds that it may
not exercise subject matter jurisdiction over the Petition.
2. Claim Accrual
The Court may, however, properly exercise jurisdiction over disputes regarding the
date that Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant City of San Diego accrued for purposes of
the statute of limitations and, as a result, whether Plaintiffs complied with the California
Government Claims Act in the first instance.
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District courts have distinguished between the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction
over a petition for relief filed under California Government Code § 946.6 and separate
questions of claim accrual and compliance with a statute of limitations. Ovando, 92 F.
Supp. 2d at 1022 (“There is an important distinction between petitions for leave to file a
late claim pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code § 946.6 and disputes as to whether a claim is in fact
timely. . . . A dispute over when a claim accrued is a question of whether the claimant has
complied with the [California Government Claims Act] and is within a federal court’s
jurisdiction.”). The Court may consider the parties’ contentions related to the date that
Plaintiffs’ claims against government entities accrued for purposes of the statute of
limitations. See Est. of Upton v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. EDCV 23-2655 JGB (SHKX),
2024 WL 4403899, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2024) (considering “the parties’ arguments
concerning the accrual of [the plaintiffs’] government claims and the timeliness of their
submission.”).
San Diego Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ claims against the government
accrued at the time that they “recovered [Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s] vehicle and body
from the tow yard.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 28.) The Complaint alleges that Ms. Cameroni de
Adams was discovered on December 6, 2023. (Compl. ¶ 4.)
Plaintiffs contend that their claims accrued only after receiving the Medical
Examiner’s Report on October 16, 2024. Id. ¶¶ 8–10.
Under the California Government Claims Act, a cause of action accrues on the date
“upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of
the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there were no requirement
that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public entity before an action could
be commenced thereon.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 901.
Under California law, a negligence cause of action generally accrues at the time of
injury but may accrue only at the time that a plaintiff “became aware of defendant’s
negligence as a cause, or could have reasonably become so aware through the exercise of
reasonable diligence.” Ovando, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1023 (quoting Leaf v. City of San Mateo,
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104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980)). This “discovery rule” provides that a
claim does not accrue until a “plaintiff discovers, or reasonably could have discovered,
[their] claim.” O’Connor v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002). “A
plaintiff is ‘held to [their] actual knowledge as well as knowledge that could reasonably be
discovered through investigation of sources open to [them].’” Id. (quoting Jolly v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1109 (Cal. 1988)).
In Estate of Upton, the federal district court considered the accrual date for tort
claims arising from the death of an incarcerated person at a correctional facility. Estate of
Upton, 2024 WL 4403899 at *5–*6. The decedent, a twenty-one-year-old woman, died by
suicide while in police custody on April 28, 2022. Id. at *3. The police informed the
plaintiff that their daughter had died on the same day, but the plaintiff had “no reason to
believe that her daughter had died by suicide or that [the defendants] had engaged in any
tortious behavior resulting in her daughter’s death” at that time. Id. at *6. It was not until
four months later that the plaintiff learned that her daughter had died by suicide while under
the care of the defendant officers. Id. at *7. The district court held that the plaintiff’s claim
accrued upon the discovery of that information because only then had the plaintiff obtained
a reasonable basis upon which to suspect that the defendants had played a role in her
daughter’s death. Id. at *7.
Here, Plaintiffs allegedly learned that Ms. Cameroni de Adams “was found
[deceased] inside her vehicle” on December 6, 2023. (Compl. ¶ 21.) However, as in Estate
of Upton, the knowledge of her death did not provide “sufficient reason to suspect” that
San Diego Defendants had committed any tortious act in relation to her death. 2024 WL
4403899 at *6. Plaintiffs may reasonably have believed at the time that the vehicle collision
inflicted mortal wounds and that Ms. Cameroni de Adams died immediately at the scene
of the collision. Plaintiffs allege that it was only upon receipt of the Medical Examiner’s
Report, on October 16, 2024, that they learned that Ms. Cameroni de Adams had “survived
the collision.” (Compl. ¶ 26.) This additional knowledge allegedly provided a new and
reasonable basis to suspect that San Diego Defendants’ conduct after the vehicle collision
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constituted tortious acts that contributed to Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s death. The Court
concludes that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim against Defendant City of San Diego therefore
accrued on October 16, 2024, at the time of this discovery.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed their claims against Defendant City of San Diego less
than one month later on November 5, 2024. (Compl. ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs therefore complied
with the California Government Claims Act’s requirement that a “claim relating to a cause
of action for death” be presented to the government “not later than six months after the
accrual of the cause of action.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. Plaintiffs subsequently “received
a letter from the City rejecting” their claim. (Compl. ¶¶ 30–31.) Pursuant to the California
Government Claims Act, a claim against a government entity may proceed after being
timely filed and rejected. Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4.
Plaintiffs’ 	claims 	against 	Defendant 	City 	of 	San 	Diego 	complied 	with 	the
requirements of the California Government Claims Act. The Court denies the Motion to
Dismiss to the extent that it seeks dismissal of tort claims against Defendant City of San
Diego for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the California Government Claims Act.
E. 	Count IV: Negligence
Plaintiffs assert their fourth cause of action for negligence against Defendants City
of San Diego, San Diego Police Department, Chief David Nisleit, Officer Matthew Brace,
and Officer Mallory Maraschiello.4 (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 86.) Plaintiffs contend that each
Defendant owed Ms. Cameroni de Adams a duty to “ensure her health and safety while
securing a scene following a collision and ensuring persons were transported to receive
medical care.” Id. ¶ 86.
1. Direct Liability of Defendant Officers
San Diego Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for negligence
because the Defendant Officers did not owe a duty to Ms. Cameroni de Adams. (ECF No.
4 Plaintiffs also assert this cause of action against Towing Defendants. (Compl. ¶ 93.) San Diego
Defendants do not move to dismiss the claim as to Towing Defendants.
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2-1 at 13–16, 20.) San Diego Defendants contend that, while a “duty can arise in rare and
narrow circumstances where there is a legally recognized special relationship,” there are
“no allegations of the necessary facts” here to establish a special relationship between the
Defendant Officers and Ms. Cameroni de Adams. Id. at 14–15.
Plaintiffs respond that “the duty at issue does not” require identifying a “special
relationship” between San Diego Defendants and Ms. Cameroni de Adams. (ECF No. 3 at
14 (quoting ECF No. 2-1 at 13, 14–16, 20).) Instead, Plaintiffs contend that this cause of
action is “predicated upon a negligent undertaking theory of liability” based “upon the duty
of Defendants’ employees and independent contractors to not negligently and affirmatively
place Decedent Cameroni de Adams . . . in a more dangerous situation than the situation
immediately after the collision.” Id. San Diego Defendants reply that the negligent
undertaking doctrine “does not and cannot apply to the facts of this case.”
To state a claim for negligence under California law, a plaintiff must “demonstrate
a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and the breach as the proximate
or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Vasilenko v. Grace Fam. Church, 3 Cal. 5th 1077,
1083 (Cal. 2017) (quotation omitted). “The question of whether a duty exists is a question
of law and must be decided by the court on a case-by-case basis.” Dutton v. City of Pacifica,
35 Cal. App. 4th 1171, 1174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
The California Supreme Court explained the application of “general principles of
tort law” to the “area of law enforcement and other police activities” in Williams v. State
of California:
As a rule, one has no duty to come to the aid of another. A person who has not
created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take affirmative action
to assist or protect another unless there is some relationship between them
which gives rise to a duty to act. Also pertinent to our discussion is the role of
the volunteer who, having no initial duty to do so, undertakes to come to the
aid of another—the “good Samaritan.” He is under a duty to exercise due care
in performance and is liable if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases
the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other's
reliance upon the undertaking. . . .
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[T]he rules concerning the duty—or lack thereof—to come to the aid of
another are applicable to law enforcement personnel in carrying out routine
traffic investigations. . . . [W]hen the state, through its agents, voluntarily
assumes a protective duty toward a certain member of the public and
undertakes action on behalf of that member, thereby inducing reliance, it is
held to the same standard of care as a private person or organization.
34 Cal. 3d 18, 23–24 (Cal. 1983) (cleaned up); see also Lugtu v. Cal. Highway Patrol, 26
Cal. 4th 703, 717 (Cal. 2001) (“[A]lthough law enforcement officers, like other members
of the public, generally do not have a legal duty to come to the aid of a person, in carrying
out routine traffic enforcement duties or investigations, a duty of care does arise when an
officer engages in an affirmative act which places the person in peril or increases the risk
of harm.”) (quotation omitted); Benavidez v. San Jose Police Dep’t, 71 Cal. App. 4th 853,
859 (1999), as modified on denial of reh’g (May 25, 1999) (“The police owe duties of care
only to the public at large and, except where they enter into a special relationship, have no
duty to offer affirmative assistance to anyone in particular.”) (quotation omitted).
California courts have recognized that a duty of care may arise when police officers
encounter an incident, render assistance, and become aware of a foreseeable danger. Mann
v. State of California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Dutton, 35 Cal. App
4th at 1175–76 (holding that a defendant officer did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care
when ordering her to disperse from a park because it was not clearly “more likely that [the
plaintiff] would be injured as a result of [the officer’s] order to disperse than she would be
injured if [the officer] exercised [] other options”).
In Mann v. State of California, a traffic officer stopped on the highway to assist “two
cars stranded in the speed-change lane.” 70 Cal. App. 3d at 776. The officer parked his
vehicle behind the cars and turned on a “flashing amber light” visible to other motorists.
After a tow truck operator arrived at the scene, the officer departed without warning and
“left the stranded cars unprotected by the rearward flashing amber light of his patrol car.”
Id. at 777. Minutes later, another vehicle “sideswiped one of the two cars and struck the
people around them.” Id. The appellate state court reversed the trial court’s entry of a
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directed verdict in favor of the defendant officer on the question of negligence. Id. at 781.
The appellate court reasoned that the defendant officer had “chosen to investigate the plight
of specific persons” and “informed himself of the foreseeable danger to them from passing
traffic,” which may have given rise to “a duty to exercise ordinary care to protect them
from such risk.” Id. at 780. The California Supreme Court has formulated the question of
negligence as whether “an officer voluntarily assumes a duty to provide a particular level
of protection, and then fails to do so, or if an officer undertakes affirmative acts that
increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff.” Zelig v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112,
1129 (Cal. 2002); see id. at 1118–19, 1130 (holding that defendant officers had not
assumed a duty to protect a repeated victim of domestic violence from a fatal attack by her
former husband at a family court hearing).
Here, Plaintiffs adequately allege that the Defendant Officers owed a duty of care to
Ms. Cameroni de Adams. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant Officers “responded to the
scene” of a multiple-vehicle crash that occurred at approximately 1:08 a.m. in the morning.
(Compl. ¶¶ 35–36.) Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Defendant Officers arranged to have Ms.
Cameroni de Adams’s vehicle transported to a tow yard supports an inference that the
Defendant Officers were exercising control over the crash site and attempting to render
assistance to persons and/or property in the area. In doing so, it is plausible that the
Defendant Officers were aware of the risk that the drivers and passengers involved in the
incident could have been injured. Like the traffic officer in Mann, the Defendant Officers
chose to “investigate the plight of specific persons” and became appraised to as a
“foreseeable danger” that persons at or near the crash site may have been injured and would
require medical assistance. At this stage of the proceedings, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs adequately allege that the Defendant Officers owed a duty of care to persons
involved in the automobile accident, including Ms. Cameroni de Adams.
San Diego Defendants do not raise any contentions regarding the other elements of
this negligence claim against the Defendant Officers, nor do they raise any contentions
regarding the liability of Defendant Chief David Nisleit as compared to the Defendant
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Officers.5 (ECF No. 2-1 at 21.) Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss the negligence claim
against the Defendant Officers and Defendant Chief David Nisleit is denied.6
2. Vicarious Liability
San Diego Defendants contend that California Government Code § 815 precludes
negligence liability for Defendant City of San Diego. (ECF No. 2-1 at 19–20.) Plaintiffs
respond that a public entity may be liable for the act or omission of an employee within the
scope of their employment and, separately, that a public entity may be liable for the tortious
acts of an independent contractor. (ECF No. 3 at 12 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815.2,
815.4).)
California Government Code § 815 states: “[E]xcept as otherwise provided by
statute[,] [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an
act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov’t
Code § 815. California Government Code § 815.2, however, provides that “[a] public entity
is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public
entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this
section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal
representative.” Id. § 815.2; see also Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. Auth., 31 Cal. 4th 1175,
1180 (Cal. 2003) (“Government Code section 815.2 [] makes a public entity vicariously
liable for its employee’s negligent acts or omissions within the scope of employment . . .
[with] the importation qualification that a public entity is not liable for injuries committed
by an employee who is immune from liability for such injuries.”).
“When assessing a claim for vicarious liability against a governmental employer
based on the acts or omissions of its employee, a court must examine whether the employee
5 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Chief David Nisleit “directly participated in the tortious conduct” but do
not make specific allegations about his involvement in the transportation of Ms. Cameroni de Adams’s
vehicle. (Compl. ¶ 8.)
6 San Diego Defendants also raise no contentions with respect to the alleged tortious conduct of Towing
Defendants, and the Court issues no holding regarding their liability.
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who acted or failed to act would have been personally liable for the injury.” de Villers v.
Cnty. of San Diego, 156 Cal. App. 4th 238, 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); see also Robinson v.
Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (“California . . . imposes liability on
counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of county employees; it grants
immunity to counties only where the public employee would also be immune.”).
Here, the Court construes the Complaint as asserting a theory of vicarious liability
against Defendant City of San Diego and Defendant San Diego Police Department for the
alleged negligent conduct of the Defendant Officers. See ECF No. 3 at 12 (citing Cal. Gov’t
Code § 815.2(a)). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police
Department employed the Defendant Officers at the time of the automobile crash, and that
the Defendant Officers were acting within the scope of their employment at all relevant
times. (Compl. ¶¶ 6–7, 10–11, 85). San Diego Defendants do not raise any contentions to
the contrary. To the extent that Plaintiffs assert their negligence claim on a theory of
vicarious liability, California law permits the public entity to be held liable for the conduct
of its employees.
Accordingly, 	Plaintiffs 	have 	adequately 	pled 	their 	negligence 	claim 	against
Defendants City of San Diego and San Diego Police Department at this stage of the
proceedings. The Motion to Dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of
action for negligence.
F. Count VI: Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and Retention
Plaintiffs assert their sixth cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and
retention. (Compl. ¶ 105.) As a preliminary matter, San Diego Defendants contend that
“[i]t is unclear who Plaintiffs bring this cause of action against.” (ECF No. 4 at 9.) The
Complaint indicates Plaintiffs assert this claim against all Defendants. (Compl. at 31.)
Plaintiffs suggest, in their Opposition, that the claim is asserted against only Defendants
City of San Diego, San Diego Police Department, and Chief David Nisleit, and that their
liability arises from those Defendants’ hiring and retention of the Defendant Officers and
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Towing Defendants. (ECF No. 3 at 16–17.) The Court construes the claim in this manner
for the purposes of the pending Motion to Dismiss.
San Diego Defendants contend that the Complaint does not make clear “if this claim
is rooted in common law negligence or arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a Monell claim”
and move for dismissal because the claim is “legally vague.” (ECF No. 2-1 at 20.) Plaintiffs
respond that their claim is “rooted in common law negligence,” and that their Complaint
makes this clear. (ECF No. 3 at 16.) San Diego Defendants contend that Defendant City of
San Diego is immune from liability under California law and, separately, that Plaintiffs fail
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
1. Public Entity Immunity
San Diego Defendants contend that, “if the claim is grounded in common law
negligence, it fails for the same reasons the negligence claim fails: the City [of San Diego]
cannot be liable for negligence and can only be sued based on statute.” (ECF No. 3 at 22.)
“With respect to hiring and supervision practices[,] there is no statutory basis under
California law for declaring an entity directly liable for negligence.” Johnson v. Shasta
Cnty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 936 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ negligence claim
“based on defendant [county’s] hiring, training, supervision, or retention of individual
police officers”); Sanders v. City of Fresno, No. CIVA 05-0469 AWISMS, 2006 WL
1883394, at *22 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2006) (“[C]laims of negligent hiring, retention, training,
supervision, and discipline made against the entity or the Police Chief are claims for the
direct acts of the entity. As such, Plaintiff was required to identify a statute that imposes
this duty on the entity.”); Reinhardt v. Santa Clara Cnty., No. C05-05143, 2006 WL
3147691, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2006) (“All allegations of direct liability on the part of
the entity defendants, such the failure-to-train allegations, fail as a matter of law, because
plaintiff has cited no statute imposing such liability.”).
Here, unlike the preceding cause of action asserting a vicarious liability theory of
negligence, Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendants directly liable for their hiring, retention, and
supervision practices. As discussed above, California Government Code § 815 provides
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that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute[,] [a] public entity is not liable for an injury,
whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public
employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a). The carve-out for vicarious
liability reflected in § 815.2 is inapplicable to this cause of action seeking to hold
Defendants City of San Diego, San Diego Police Department, and Chief David Nisleit
directly liable for their hiring and supervisory practices under a common law negligence
theory. This Court agrees with other district courts in holding that a direct liability theory
of common law negligence for hiring, supervision, and retention may not be maintained
against public entities under California law.
2. Failure to State a Claim
San Diego Defendants also contend, separately, that “Plaintiffs fail to allege that the
City [of San Diego], SDPD or Chief Nisleit knew or should have known that hiring either
of these Defendant Officers created a particular risk of harm that in fact occurred in this
case.” (ECF No. 4 at 9.)
“An employer may be liable to a third person for the employer’s negligence in hiring
or retaining an employee who is incompetent or unfit.” Roman Cath. Bishop v. Superior
Ct., 42 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 1564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). “Liability for negligent hiring and
supervision is based upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with
characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise
should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees.”
Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1139 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
“Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it ‘knew or should have known
that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm
materializes.’” Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1139 (Cal. Ct. App.
2009) (quoting Doe v. Capital Cities, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1038, 1054 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)).
Here, Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege that Defendants City of San Diego, San
Diego Police Department, and Chief David Nisleit knew or had reason to know that hiring
the Defendant Officers and Towing Defendants would create a “particular risk” of harm.
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Id. Plaintiffs make only conclusory allegations that San Diego Defendants “knew and/or
should have known that” the Defendant Officers and Towing Defendants were “unfit
and/or incompetent to ensure the health and safety of all persons involved in collisions
whereby vehicles were towed and impounded to a tow yard” and that San Diego
Defendants “knew and/or should have known” that they were unfit. (Compl. ¶ 107.)
Plaintiffs do not allege any prior conduct or information provided to San Diego Defendants
suggesting that the Defendant Officers or Towing Defendants were unfit to carry out their
employment responsibilities. See Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790,
815–817 (affirming summary judgment in favor of defendant employer that “had no
knowledge of the content of any of [its employees’] threatening emails” sent to plaintiff)
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Martinez v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 481 F. Supp. 3d 1076, 1101
(S.D. Cal. 2020) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant employer because the
plaintiff did not raise an issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant employer
“had prior knowledge as to [employee’s] propensity to discriminate against persons with
disabilities”).
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss is granted with respect to Plaintiffs’ sixth cause
of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention.
G. Punitive Damages
San Diego Defendants contend that there can be no punitive damages against
government entities and that the facts alleged do not support an award of punitive damages
under 42 U.S.C § 1983. (ECF No. 2-1 at 24–26.) Plaintiffs, in response, “waive their claim
for punitive damages as it relates to City Defendants.” (ECF No. 3 at 21.)
H. Leave to Amend
Plaintiffs 	request 	that 	the 	Court 	deny 	the 	pending 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	and,
alternatively, “grant [] leave to amend to cure any alleged deficiencies.” (ECF No. 3 at 23.)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a district court should “freely give
leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). This policy
is “to be applied with extreme liberality.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244
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F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). A district court should grant leave to
amend unless it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”
Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998)). Here, to the extent
that the Court grants the San Diego Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, its dismissal of
Plaintiffs’ claims is without prejudice and with leave to amend.
V. 	CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint (ECF
No. 2) is granted in part and denied in part as follows. The motion is granted with respect
to Plaintiffs’ claims against San Diego Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II, Count
III) and Plaintiff’s claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision (Count VI) without
prejudice and with leave to amend. The motion is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’
negligence claim (Count IV).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs may file an Amended Complaint that
addresses the deficiencies identified herein no later than twenty-one (21) days from the
filing of this Order. If no Amended Complaint is filed, San Diego Defendants shall file an
Answer to the Complaint no later than thirty (30) days from the filing of this Order.
Dated: March 26, 2026
Case 3:25-cv-01447-WQH-MSB Document 19 Filed 03/26/26 PageID.<pageID>
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