Vongdara v. Tech Digital Corporation et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DELEE VONGDARA, on behalf of
himself and others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
TECH DIGITAL CORPORATION;
BECTON DICKINSON AND
COMPANY; and DOES 1 to 100,
inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No.: 3:25-CV-01168-H-AHG
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO STAY ACTION
[Doc. No. 30.]
On October 15, 2025, Defendants Becton, Dickinson and Company (“BD”) and
TechDigital Corporation (“TechDigital”) filed a motion to stay. (Doc. No. 30.) On January
13, 2026, Defendants filed a notice of non-opposition by Plaintiff Delee Vongdara to its
motion. (Doc. No. 37.) On January 14, 2026, the Court took the matter under submission.
(Doc. No. 38.) For the reasons below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to stay.
Background
Defendants are temporary service employers within the meaning of California Code
of Regulations, Title 8 § 11040. 	(Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶ 13.) 	Defendants employed
Plaintiff and other employees on an hourly basis as non-exempt workers to perform work
in California for various customers. (Id. ¶ 14.)
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I. 	Federal Action
On February 26, 2025, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly
situated, filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the State of California for the County
of San Diego against Defendants BD and TechDigital. (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl.) Plaintiff
alleges claims against Defendants for: (1) failure to pay wages for all hours worked at
minimum wage in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1197; (2) failure to pay overtime
wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194; (3) failure to authorize or permit meal
periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512; (4) failure to authorize or permit rest
periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7; (5) failure to provide accurate wage
statements in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226; (6) failure to timely pay all wages earned
in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203; and (7) unfair business practices in violation of
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. 	(Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13-42.) 	Plaintiff
brings this action on behalf of himself and the “California Class,” comprising of “all current
and 	former 	hourly 	non-exempt 	employees 	employed 	by 	Defendants” 	of 	multiple
subclasses, including: 1) a minimum wage class, 2) an overtime class, 3) a regular rate
class, 4) a meal period class, 5) a meal period premium wages class, 6) a rest period class,
7) a rest period premium wages class, 8) a wage statement class, and 6) a waiting time
class. 	(Id. ¶ 43.) 	On May 7, 2025, Defendant BD removed this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332(d) to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
(Doc. No. 1.)
II. 	Underlying State Court Action (“Sipos”)
On June 30, 2023, Marioara Sipos filed a class action complaint in the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of San Diego against Defendants BD and
Pharmigen Inc. 	Marioara Sipos v. Becton Dickinson and Company, et al., No. 37-2023-
00027633-CU-OE-CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. San Diego Cnty. June 30, 2023) (“Sipos”). (Doc.
No. 30-1 at 1.) Sipos alleges claims for: (1) failure to pay wages for all hours worked at
minimum and straight time wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 204, 1194, 1197; (2)
failure to pay overtime wages in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1194, 1998; (3) failure to
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authorize or permit meal periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7, 512; (4) failure
to authorize or permit rest periods in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7; (5) failure to
timely pay all wages earned in violation of Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201-203; (6) failure to
provide accurate wage statements in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 226; (7) failure to
indemnify employees for expenditures in violation of Cal. Lab. Code § 2802; and (8) unfair
business practices in violation of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. (Doc. No. 30-6,
Sipos Compl. ¶¶ 33-97.) The proposed Sipos California Class is defined as “[a]ll persons
who worked for any Defendant in California as an hourly-paid or non-exempt employee at
any time during the period beginning four years and 178 days before the filing of the initial
complaint in this action and ending when notice to the Class is sent” with additional
subclasses. 	(Id. ¶¶ 26, 29-30.) 	The parties have exchanged discovery responses and
scheduled a mediation for March 31, 2026. (Doc. No. 30-1 at 5; Doc. No. 30-3, Ferrantella
Decl. ¶ 3.)
By the present motion, Defendants move the Court to stay Plaintiff’s complaint,
pending a decision in Sipos by the California Superior Court of San Diego County. (Id. at
15.) Defendants argue that Sipos alleges “the same legal claims” as the present action “and
relies on largely the same factual allegations”; was filed two years before the present action;
covers an overlapping class that includes all BD non-exempt, hourly employees; and has a
significantly more developed procedural posture. 	(Id. at 4, 7-8.) 	Defendants opine that
staying the present action and allowing Sipos to proceed will narrow the scope of claims
at issue before the Court, avoid the unnecessary expenditure of resources, and prevent
potentially conflicting judgments. (Id. at 5-6.)
Discussion
Defendants seek a stay of the present action pursuant to both the first-to-file doctrine
and the Colorado River doctrine. (Doc. No. 30 at 1.) Alternatively, Defendants request a
discretionary Landis stay. 	(Doc. No. 30 at 1.) 	The Court will first address Defendants’
Colorado River argument.
/ / /
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I. 	Colorado River
In general, “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings
concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” Holder v. Holder,
305 F.3d 854, 867 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). 	However, the Supreme Court has identified
several instances in which it is appropriate for a federal court to abstain from exercising its
jurisdiction. 	See, 	e.g., Colorado 	River, 	424 	U.S. at 	813–17 	(discussing 	traditional
abstention doctrines). As relevant here, the Supreme Court recognized that “a federal court
may stay a case in favor of a parallel state court action where doing so would give ‘regard
to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation.’” Franco
v. Cent. Transp. LLC, No. EDCV 19-1464 JGB (SPx), 2020 WL 11626531, at *1 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 22, 2020) (first citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817; then citing Nakash v.
Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989)).
The Ninth Circuit recognizes eight factors that courts must weigh when considering
a stay under Colorado River:
(1) which court first assumed jurisdiction over any property at stake; (2) the
inconvenience of the federal forum; (3) the desire to avoid piecemeal
litigation; (4) the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction; (5) whether
federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits; (6) whether
the state court proceedings can adequately protect the rights of the federal
litigants; (7) the desire to avoid forum shopping; and (8) whether the state
court proceedings will resolve all issues before the federal court.
R.R. St. & Co. Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 979–80 (9th Cir. 2011). 	“These
factors are to be applied in a pragmatic and flexible way, as part of a balancing process
rather than as a mechanical checklist.” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1415. The weight “given to
any one factor may vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular setting of
the case.” Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983).
The Court will address each factor in turn.
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The first two factors are neutral because the dispute does not involve any property,
and both forums are located in San Diego.
A. 	Piecemeal Litigation
Defendants argue a stay is appropriate because “Plaintiff’s action involves the same
issues pending in the previously-filed Sipos action … thereby duplicating efforts, wasting
resources, and producing potentially different, inconsistent results as to liability and
remedies.” (Doc. No. 30-1 at 12.)
Piecemeal litigation occurs “when different tribunals consider the same issue,
thereby duplicating efforts and possibly reaching different results.” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at
979 (citations omitted). 	Any case in which Colorado River is implicated will inevitably
involve the possibility of “conflicting results, piecemeal litigation, and some duplication
of judicial efforts,” which are the “unavoidable price of preserving access to ... federal
relief.” 	Seneca Ins. Co., Inc. v. Strange Land, Inc., 862 F.3d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 2017)
(citing Neuchatel Swiss Gen. Ins. Co. v. Lufthansa Airlines, 925 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.
1991) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court agrees with Defendants that the piecemeal litigation factor weighs slightly
in favor of a stay. 	Allowing both the underlying state action and federal suit to proceed
simultaneously risks duplicative efforts and inconsistent judgments in resolving nearly
identical legal claims. Because the basis of the Court's jurisdiction rests in the Class Action
Fairness Act, California state law also provides the rule of decision for all claims. Parallel
proceedings could waste judicial resources and cause confusion in the continuing disputes
between the parties. See R.R. Street, 656 F.3d at 979–80 (identifying duplication of efforts
and possibility of differing results as the primary concerns of the piecemeal litigation
factor).
B. 	Order of Jurisdiction
The Court next considers the order in which the forums obtained jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court has instructed that the priority element of the Colorado River analysis “is
to be applied in a pragmatic, flexible manner with a view to the realities of the case at
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hand.” 	Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21, 103. 	“[P]riority should not be measured
exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather in terms of how much progress
has been made in the two actions.” Id.
Here, the state court was the first to exercise jurisdiction. The underlying state
court action was initiated in June 2023, and Plaintiff's complaint was filed in February
2025. (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl.; Doc. No. 30-6, Sipos Compl.) Defendants’ motion alleges
that the underlying state action “has progressed significantly” as the plaintiff in Sipos was
deposed, the parties have exchanged discovery responses, and the parties have a
mediation scheduled for March 2026. (Doc. No. 30-1 at 10; Doc. No. 30-3, Ferrantella
Decl. ¶ 3.) By contrast, in the instant action, Defendants have answered Plaintiffs'
complaint, but nothing further has been done. Viewing the “realities of the case at
hand,” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 21, the Court concludes that the state action has made
more progress towards resolving the underlying legal issues. Thus, this factor weighs in
favor of Defendants' motion to stay.
C. 	Source of Law
Defendants assert the Court should grant a stay in this matter because “Plaintiff’s
action invokes no federal rights or rules.” (Doc. No. 30-1 at 12.) “[A]lthough ‘the presence
of federal-law issues must always be a major consideration weighing against surrender’ [of
jurisdiction], the ‘presence of state-law issues may weigh in favor of that surrender’ only
‘in some rare circumstances.’” 	Travelers Indem. Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1370
(9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26). This case does not present such
“rare circumstances.” 	Rather, the cases here involve “routine issues of state law.”
See id. (concluding 	the 	same 	where 	the 	cases 	involved 	state 	law 	claims 	for
misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract). 	As such, the Court
considers source of law to be a neutral factor.
D. 	Adequacy of State Court
Defendants argue this factor favors a stay because “California courts are able to
sufficiently protect the rights of employees working in California.” (Doc. No. 30-1 at 12.)
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“A district court may not stay or dismiss the federal proceeding if the state
proceeding cannot adequately protect the rights of the federal litigants.” R. R. St., 656 F.3d
at 981. The Ninth Circuit looks “to whether the state court might be unable to enforce
federal rights.” Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., 862 F.3d at 845. This factor does not evaluate the
competency of the state judiciary but instead considers whether the state court lacks power
to provide the remedy the plaintiff seeks. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26-27.
Here, there is no exclusive federal jurisdiction issue. 	California law controls the
substantive Labor Code claims made in both actions, and Plaintiff asserts only state law
claims in this matter. (See Doc. No. 1-3.) As such, there is no question that the state court
has authority to address the rights and remedies at issue. 	“Like source of law, however,
this factor ‘is more important when it weighs in favor of federal jurisdiction.’” R.R. St.,
656 F.3d at 981 (citing Travelers, 914 F.2d at 1370). 	Thus, the Court finds this factor is
neutral.
E. 	Forum Shopping
A Colorado River stay is appropriate when it is “readily apparent that the federal
plaintiff was engaged in forum shopping.” Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1417. “Forum shopping
refers to the practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim
might be heard.” R. R. Street, 656 F.3d at 981 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 726 (9th ed.
2009)). Here, Plaintiff filed his complaint in state court. (See Doc. No. 1-3, Compl.) The
present action is solely before this Court due to Defendants’ removal. 	(See Doc. No. 1,
Notice of Removal; Doc. No. 18, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand.) 	Nothing in the record
suggests that Plaintiff chose this forum because federal court would provide a more
favorable jurisdiction than state court. 	Accordingly, the Court concludes the forum
shopping factor is neutral.
F. 	Resolution of Issues in Parallel Proceeding
The final factor is “whether the state court proceeding sufficiently parallels the
federal proceeding.” R. R. Street, 656 F.3d at 982. The parallelism factor is a “necessary
precondition to Colorado River abstention.” 	Seneca Ins. Co., Inc., 862 F.3d at 845. 	As
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part of this analysis, the court must determine whether the state and federal proceedings
are “substantially similar.” 	Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416. 	“Exact parallelism” is not
required. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416 (citing Interstate Material Corp. v. City of Chicago,
847 F.2d 1285, 1288 (7th Cir. 1988)). “[T]he existence of a substantial doubt as to whether
the 	state 	proceedings 	will 	resolve 	the 	federal 	action 	precludes 	a Colorado
River stay....” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at 982 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, the actions are substantially similar such that the state proceeding can resolve
all issues. The Court agrees with Defendants that the legal claims brought in both actions
are nearly identical, with the underlying state action bringing an additional legal claim not
brought by the federal action. 	(Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13-42; Doc. No. 30-6, Sipos
Compl. ¶¶ 33-97.) 	The parties are also substantially similar with overlapping putative
classes and defendants. 	As Defendants note in their motion, “both cases name BD, and
pursue a putative class that includes all non-exempt, hourly employees of this entity.”
(Doc. No. 30-1 at 7, 12-13) (citing Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 3, 43-4 and Doc. No. 30-6,
Sipos Compl. ¶ 26.) 	While Plaintiff does allege claims against Defendant TechDigital,
who is not named in Sipos, Defendants point out that Plaintiff “alleges BD and TechDigital
are virtually indistinguishable.” 	(Id.) (citing Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 10-11.) 	Further,
“[e]xact parallelism” is not required. Nakash, 882 F.2d at 1416. The Court concludes the
threshold parallelism factor has been satisfied.
G. 	Evaluation of All Factors
“Ultimately, ‘the decision whether to dismiss a federal action because of parallel
state-court litigation’ hinges on ‘a careful balancing of the [relevant] factors ... with the
balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction.’” R.R. St., 656 F.3d at
983 (citing Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16). 	None of the factors that would preclude
a Colorado River stay—issues of federal law, inadequacy of the state court forum, or a
possibility that the state court proceeding will not resolve the dispute—are concerns in this
case. 	Rather, all factors are neutral or weigh in favor of granting a stay. 	Because the
avoidance of piecemeal litigation and the progress made in the underlying state action
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weigh against jurisdiction, the Court grants a stay in this matter.
II. 	First-to-File Rule
Defendants also rely on the first-to-file doctrine. (Doc. No. 30-1 at 6-10.)
The first-to-file rule allows a district court to stay proceedings if a similar case with
substantially similar issues and parties was previously filed in another district court. Kohn
Law Grp., Inc. v. Auto Parts Mfg. Miss., Inc., 787 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2015); see
also Ceders–Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that
when two actions involving the same parties and issues are filed in federal courts of
concurrent jurisdiction, the first-to-file rule applies, giving the second court discretion to
transfer, stay or, dismiss the second case). The first-to-file rule is a generally recognized
doctrine of federal comity. 	Wallerstein v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 967 F.Supp.2d
1289, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 2013). It is intended to “serve[] the purpose of promoting efficiency
well and should not be disregarded lightly.” Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946
F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1991).
Defendants recognize that the first-to-file rule is usually applied between two federal
cases but argues that the rule has “been extended to overlapping federal and state court
actions.” (Doc. No. 30-1 at 6.) 	While several courts in the Ninth Circuit have ruled that
the first-to-file doctrine is inapplicable to cases where the first case was filed in state
court, Murphy v. Viad Corp., 2022 WL 3137720, *3 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2022), the Ninth
Circuit has not ruled definitively on the issue. There are federal district courts in the Ninth
Circuit 	that 	have 	applied 	the 	first-to-file 	doctrine 	in 	the 	state-federal
context. See, e.g., Shannon v. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC, 2018 WL 1902680 at *2 (D.
Or. Apr. 20, 2018); Gens v. SEZ Am., Inc., 2007 WL 832050, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19,
2007).
The Court need not resolve the apparent conflict because it finds that a stay is
warranted pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine. The Court concludes that, to the extent
the first-to-file doctrine also applies in the state-federal context, staying proceedings is
appropriate.
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The court analyzes three factors in determining whether to apply the first-to-file rule:
chronology of the lawsuits, similarity of the parties, and similarity of the issues. Alltrade,
946 F.2d at 625. Here, there is no question that Sipos was filed first. The underlying state
court action was initiated in June 2023, and Plaintiff's complaint was filed in February
2025. (Doc. No. 1-3, Compl.; Doc. No. 30-6, Sipos Compl.) As discussed above, there is
also substantial similarity of the parties and issues. The first-to-file rule does not require
the parties or issues to be identical. See Kohn, 787 F.3d at 1240. Rather, the court asks
whether there is “substantial overlap” between the issues and claims of the two actions. Id.
The underlying state action and present action share overlapping putative classes and
defendants. 	(Id.) 	The legal claims brought in both actions are nearly identical, with the
underlying state action bringing an additional legal claim not brought by the federal action.
(Doc. No. 1-3, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13-42; Doc. No. 30-6, Sipos Compl. ¶¶ 33-97.)
Thus, the first-to-file doctrine supports staying the current case.
III. 	Requests for Judicial Notice
Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of four documents filed in state
court, which are attached to Defendants’ motion. (See generally Doc. No. 30-6, Ex. 1; 30-
7, Ex. 2; 30-8, Ex. 3; 30-9, Ex. 4.) 	To date, Plaintiff has not filed any objections to
Defendants’ request.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of a fact that
is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial
court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 	Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Khoja v.
Orexigen 	Therapeutics, 	Inc., 	899 	F.3d 	988, 	999 	(9th 	Cir. 	2018). 	Proper 	subjects
of judicial notice may include matters of public record. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also
United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244,
248 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[W]e may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and
without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at
issue.”) (citation omitted); Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746
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n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public
record.”).
The Court finds it appropriate to take judicial notice of the Sipos complaint because
whether the claims and parties in the Sipos action overlap substantially with those in this
action bears directly on whether the Court should stay this case. See ScripsAmerica, Inc.
v. Ironridge Global, LLC, 56 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1135–36 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Accordingly,
the Court grants Defendants’ requests to take judicial notice of Doc. No. 30-6, Exhibit
1. Because the Court does not rely on Exhibits 2, 3, or 4 in reaching its conclusion below,
the Court denies as moot these remaining requests.
Conclusion
For the reasons above, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Stay for one year
with a status conference to be set for or after January 25, 2027.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 27, 2026
MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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