Snow v. Connolly et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KATHLEEN-MARIE SNOW,
Plaintiff,
v.
TIM CONNOLLY; MIGUEL AVILA;
Deputy JARROD BUSWELL, in his
individual capacity; Deputy M.
MARTINEZ, in his individual capacity;
Deputy FRANK JAMES, in his individual
capacity; Officer GRAHAM NIGEL
AANESTAD, in his individual capacity;
Deputy ROBERT ROACH, in his
individual capacity; Deputy ANDERSON
LATURE, in his individual capacity;
Deputy DANIEL HOUSEHOLDER, in
his individual capacity; Deputy BRYAN
DE LOSS, in his individual and official
capacities; KELLY A. MARTINEZ,
Sheriff of San Diego County, in her
individual and official capacities; CHAD
BIANCO, Sheriff of Riverside County, in
his individual and official capacities;
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a public
entity; COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a
public entity; and DOES 1–10, inclusive,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-CV-729 TWR (JLB)
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
(ECF Nos. 27, 28, 31, 37)
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Presently before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss filed by San Diego Defendants
Deputy Jarrod Buswell, Deputy Matthew Martinez, Sheriff Kelly Martinez, and County of
San Diego (“S.D. Mot.,” ECF No. 27); Bail Agent Defendants Tim Connolly and Miguel
Avila (“Bail Mot.,” ECF No. 28); Riverside Defendants Deputy Frank James, Deputy
Robert Roach, Deputy Anderson Lature, Deputy Daniel Householder, Sgt. Bryan De Loss
(erroneously sued as Deputy Bryan De Loss), Sheriff Chad Bianco, and the County of
Riverside (“Riverside Mot.,” ECF No. 31); and Officer Graham Nigel Aanestad (“CHP
Mot.,” ECF No. 37) (together, the “Mots.”), as well as Plaintiff Kathleen Marie Snow’s
Oppositions (ECF Nos. 32 (“S.D./Bail Opp’n”), 40 (“Riverside Opp’n”), 42 (“CHP
Opp’n”)), and the Replies filed by the San Diego Defendants (“S.D. Reply,” ECF No. 38),
the Riverside Defendants (“Riverside Reply,” ECF No. 44), and Officer Aanestad (“CHP
Reply,” ECF No. 45). The Court took the Motions under submission without oral argument
pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). 	(See generally ECF Nos. 30, 36, 39.) 	Having
carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC,” ECF No. 13), those
exhibits properly subject to judicial notice or incorporated by reference,1 the Parties’
arguments, and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
the Motions, as follows.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
1 	The San Diego Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the Riverside Superior
Court files for criminal cases SWM2402249 and SWM2400305 against Plaintiff, (see ECF No. 27-2 at
186), and the Bail Agent Defendants ask the Court to consider the case reports for the same two criminal
cases; the notices of forfeiture of bail; Plaintiff’s April 23, 2024 “Plain Talk Contract” with Bail Hotline;
and Plaintiff’s April 23, 2024 Bail Hotline Notice of Pre-Trial Release, Release on Bail, Revocation, Re-
Arrest & Surrender. (See ECF No. 28 at 19–40.) The Court concludes that the Riverside Superior Court
files for criminal cases SWM2402249 and SWM2400305, the case reports, and the notices of forfeiture
of bail are all matters of public record that are properly subject of judicial notice. See, e.g., Reyn’s Pasta
Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court
filings and other matters of public record.” (citing Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of
Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998))).
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BACKGROUND
I. 	Plaintiff’s Allegations2
A. 	Plaintiff’s December 26, 2023 Arrest
On December 26, 2023, Plaintiff—a sixty-five-year-old woman who objects to being
labelled a sovereign citizen3—was pulled over by Officer Aanestad for allegedly failing to
stop at a stop sign. (See SAC at 3.) According to Plaintiff, “[t]he stop was premeditated,
as the officer was lying in wait on the opposite side of the street.” (Id.) Plaintiff provided
Officer Aanestad “with a written ‘Constructive Notice’ stating she was travelling in a
private capacity and not operative a commercial vehicle.” (Id. at 3–4.)
Irritated, Officer Aanestad told Plaintiff and her husband that they were not free to
leave and that additional officers would be summoned. (See id. at 4.) “In fear and asserting
their right to travel and to be free from unlawful seizure, the Snows continued on to a local
hardware store.” (Id.)
Officer Aanestad called for backup, and four Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputies
responded. 	(See id.) 	They 	intercepted 	Plaintiff 	and 	her husband, 	arrested 	them
“aggressively,” and searched the Snows and their vehicle, all without the Snows’ consent.
2 	For purposes of the Motions, the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are
accepted as true. See Vasquez v. Los Angeles Cty., 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that, in
ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept all material allegations of fact as true”). The Court
is also mindful that “pro se pleadings are liberally construed, particularly where civil rights claims are
involved.” See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
3 	“One leading expert in the field proposed a simple definition: ‘a sovereign citizen is someone who
believes that he or she is above all laws.’” Colin McRoberts, Tinfoil Hats and Powdered Wigs: Thoughts
on Pseudolaw, 58 Washburn L.J. 637, 642–43 & n.25 (2019) (quoting JJ MacNab, What is a Sovereign
Citizen?, Forbes (Feb. 13, 2012), ttps://www.forbes.com/sites/jjmacnab/2012/02/13/what-is-a-sovereign-
citizen/ [https://perma.cc/8D7F-LT8B]). Professor McRoberts, however, instead advocates for use of the
term “pseudolaw,” which “can [be] define[d] . . . in such a way that it captures the overall set of nonsense
legal beliefs while preserving our understanding of definable subtypes such as the ‘sovereign citizen’
movement,” and “adopt[s] the definition proposed by another expert in this field: ‘Pseudolaw is a
collection of legal-sounding but false rules that purport to be law.’” Id. at 643 & n.27 (quoting Donald
Netolitzky, A Rebellion of Furious Paper: Pseudolaw as a Revolutionary Legal System (May 3, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3177484 [https://perma.cc/5EBG-VK2T]).
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(See id.) Plaintiff “was threatened with a Taser and her husband forced to his knees.” (Id.)
“[F]acial recognition software was used on [Plaintiff] without legal justification, allegedly
retrieving her license to force a contract.” 	(Id.) 	The Snows’ vehicle was towed and
impounded. (See id.)
Plaintiff and her husband were booked into the Riverside County jail for twelve
hours on charges of resisting arrest, interfering with an officer, and “unsnapping a holster
strap,” a claim Plaintiff denies. 	(See id.; see also, e.g., ECF No. 27-2 at 94 (citation).)
They were never Mirandized. (See SAC at 4.) Plaintiff signed several documents “under
protest and duress” and was released without being taken before a judge. 	(See id.) 	She
paid a $500 bond on bail of $5,000. (See ECF No. 27-2 at 97.)
Shortly after the Snows’ release, “Plaintiff mailed rescinded citations back to the
court in red ink, asserting fraud and contractual defects.” (See SAC at 4.) She received a
letter stating, “No active cases,” which Plaintiff understood to mean that her citations had
been “nullified.” (See id.)
A misdemeanor complaint was filed against Plaintiff on January 17, 2024, People v.
Snow, No. SWM2400305 (Riverside Cnty. Super. Ct. filed Jan. 17, 2024). (See ECF No.
27-2 at 95–96.) After Plaintiff failed to appear for her arraignment on March 22, 2024, a
warrant for her arrest was issued. (See, e.g., ECF No. 27-2 at 93.)
B. 	Plaintiff’s April 18, 2024 Arrest and Eviction
Plaintiff sent a certified letter to the Riverside County Sheriff on April 7, 2024,
notifying 	Sheriff 	Bianco 	“of 	an 	illegal 	foreclosure 	and 	demanding 	constitutional
protection.” (See SAC at 5.) The letter was signed for on April 17, 2024. (See id.)
On April 18, 2024, Sgt. De Loss pulled Plaintiff over, claiming to have a warrant for
her arrest but failing to show it to her.4 (See id.) Calling Plaintiff by name, Sgt. De Loss
4 	The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that a bench warrant was issued on March 22, 2024, for
Plaintiff’s failure to appear at her arraignment, (see ECF No. 27-2 at 93), and was not recalled until
April 25, 2024, (see id. at 92). See, e.g., Mattingly v. Jurek, No. 24-CV-04595-SVK, 2025 WL 1771454,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (“[J]udicial notice can include taking ‘notice of a bench warrant as a matter
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also told Plaintiff that he “knew who she was,” despite Plaintiff never having met him
before. (See id.) Plaintiff saw Officer Aanestad “nearby, watching from a distance but not
participating, suggesting a coordinated or retaliatory effort.” (See id. at 9.)
Plaintiff insisted on seeing the warrant, but Sgt. De Loss told Plaintiff, “No, it
doesn’t work that way—get out of the car or I’ll break the window.” (See id. at 5.) Sgt. De
Loss then arrested Plaintiff and her husband, impounded their vehicle, and transported
Plaintiff and her husband separately. (See id.) Plaintiff claims that her husband “was later
released in the middle of the desert with only his phone.” (See id.)
Plaintiff was arrested for resisting arrest. (See id.) Despite posting a $10,000 bond
on a $100,000 bail, Plaintiff was held for an additional eleven hours. 	(See id.; see also
ECF No. 27-2 at 14 (bail bond).) A misdemeanor complaint was filed against Plaintiff on
April 30, 2024, People v. Snow, No. SWM2402249 (Riverside Cnty. Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 30,
2024), alleging a violation of California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). 	(See ECF No. 27-2 at
12–13.)
Three weeks later, a “backdated eviction notice was posted on [Plaintiff’s] home”
dated April 18, 2024. (See SAC at 6.) The notice gave Plaintiff and her husband five days
to vacate. (See id.) Soon thereafter, individuals purporting to the be “new owners” of the
property approached Plaintiff’s neighbors, accusing her of being a “‘sovereign citizen’
[who] had threatened to blow up a propone tank.” 	(See id.) 	Plaintiff believes that these
“defamatory statements” were “sourced from the Sheriff’s Department.” (See id.)
C. 	Plaintiff’s July 23, 2024 Court Appearance
On July 23, 2024, Plaintiff appeared before the Honorable Johnetta E. Anderson of
the Riverside County Superior Court. 	(See SAC at 6.) 	Judge Anderson “threatened to
forfeit Plaintiff’s bail and issue bench warrants if [Plaintiff] did not appear ‘as the
defendant or with an attorney,’” (see id.), and ultimately did so. (See id.) Plaintiff claims
of public record.’” (quoting Neylon v. Cnty. of Inyo, No. 16-cv-00712-AWI (JLT), 2016 WL 6834097, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016))).
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that Judge Anderson “concluded the hearing and recessed the court without setting another
hearing date—an act that, by legal maxim, suggests an admission of procedural defeat: he
who leaves the battlefield first admits defeat.” (See id. (emphasis in original).)
A review of the court records reveals that Plaintiff “refuse[d] to provide [Judge
Anderson] with her true name,” resulting in the forfeiture of Plaintiff’s bail bond and the
issuance of a bench warrant. (See ECF No. 27-2 at 9.) The case was recalled approximately
a half-hour later, by which time Plaintiff was not present, and Judge Anderson set an
arraignment for August 6, 2024, and held the bench warrant until that date. (See id.)
Plaintiff made an online request for the minutes of the July 23, 2024 hearing on
July 30, 2024. 	(See SAC at 6.) 	“She did so under the belief that the matter had been
resolved in her favor—that the hearing had concluded the process, and that the court’s
inaction meant no further proceedings were necessary.” (See id. at 6–7.)
“The emotional devastation of discovering otherwise cannot be overstated—
Plaintiff experienced a profound sense of betrayal by the justice system.” (Id. at 7.) When
Plaintiff received the court minutes by mail on August 6, 2024, she “discovered that Judge
Anderson had falsified the record to reflect the setting of a hearing date as though it had
happened at the hearing.” (See id.) Judge Anderson had “also made other changes that did
not reflect the actual hearing.” (Id.)
Plaintiff “notified the bail bondsmen, via phone call, that she had appeared in court
with witnesses.” (Id.) She also “sent a certified return receipt letter including a copy of
the evidence showing her court appearance and detailing the judge’s misconduct.” 	(Id.)
“She informed the bail bondsmen that failing to act on this information could constitute
misprision of a felony and . . . would implicate them in the broader violation of her
constitutional rights.” (Id.)
Plaintiff did not appear for her arraignment on August 6, 2024, (see ECF No. 27-2
at 9), resulting in the forfeiture of the bail bond and the release of the previously held bench
warrant. (See id. at 8–9; see also id. at 51.)
/ / /
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D. 	Plaintiff’s February 27, 2025 Arrest
On February 27, 2025, the Bail Agent Defendants forced entry onto Plaintiff’s
property through a locked gate and falsely identified themselves as federal agents. 	(See
SAC at 7.) 	“They handcuffed Plaintiff, barefoot, dragged her to a vehicle, and detained
her.” (Id.) The handcuffs were excessively tight and, despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests
for them to be adjusted, the Bail Agent Defendants kept her cuffed in that manner for three
hours. (See id. at 7–8.) The deputy who later removed them in jail said “these are way too
tight,” and the resulting swelling and pain lasted for over a week. (See id. at 8.)
Plaintiff’s husband called 911, and “sheriff’s deputies” arrived at the scene. 	(See
id.) They “did nothing to stop the unlawful seizure.” (See id.) “Defendants Jarrod Buswell
and M. Martinez and at least 4 other deputies who never left their vehicles were present for
these events and failed to intervene.” (Id.)
Plaintiff was removed from her property and transported “against her will” to a
detention facility. (See id.)
II. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed her initial Complaint on March 28, 2025, alleging claims for violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, criminal trespass, assault and battery, kidnapping, false arrest,
unlawful imprisonment, impersonating a federal agent, and racketeering against the Bail
Agent Defendants, Deputy Buswell, and Sheriff Martinez. (See generally ECF No. 1.) She
filed a substantially similar First Amended Complaint on April 29, 2025. (See generally
ECF No. 5.)
After the Bail Agent Defendants filed an initial motion to dismiss, (see ECF No. 7),
Plaintiff sought leave to file a Second Amended Complaint. (See ECF No. 10.) Deputy
Buswell and Sheriff Martinez then moved to dismiss, (see ECF No. 11), and Plaintiff filed
a Notice of Filing Second Amended Complaint [With Supporting Exhibits 1 and 2]. (See
generally ECF No. 13.) 	The Honorable Roger T. Benitez accepted Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint and denied as moot the previously filed motions to dismiss on July 18,
2025. (See ECF No. 25.)
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Plaintiff’s operative Second Amended Complaint added the remaining San Diego
Defendants, the Riverside Defendants, and Officer Aanestad, as well as a number of new
claims. (See generally ECF No. 13.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the following eleven
causes of action: (1) violation of her civil rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants; (2) liability pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978),
against the Counties of San Diego and Riverside; (3) failure to intervene pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against San Diego Deputy Defendants Buswell and Martinez and Riverside
Deputy Defendants James, Roach, Lature, and Householder; (4) conspiracy to violate
Plaintiff’s civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Bail Agent Defendants
and San Diego Deputies Buswell and Martinez; (5) trespass against the Bail Agent
Defendants; (6) false imprisonment against all Defendants; (7) assault and battery against
the Bail Agent Defendants; Riverside Officer Defendants De Loss, James, Roach, Lature,
and Householder; and Officer Aanestad; (8) violation of California’s Bane Act, Cal. Civ.
Code § 52.1, against the Bail Agent Defendants, the Riverside Officer Defendants, and
Officer Aanestad; (9) intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants;
(10) “kidnapping under color of law” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Bail Agent
Defendants, the Riverside Officer Defendants, and Officer Aanestad; and (11) false arrest
and excessive force in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Aanestad and Riverside Deputies James,
Roach, Lature, and Householder. 	(See ECF No. 13 at 9–13.) 	In addition to declaratory
and injunctive relief, Plaintiff seeks “compensatory damages against all Defendants, jointly
and severally, including for emotional distress, loss of liberty, reputational harm, and
psychological injury” and punitive damages against all Defendants except for the Counties
of San Diego and Riverside. (See id. at 13–15.)
The Bail Agent Defendants filed their Motion on August 14, 2025, (see generally
ECF No. 28), and the San Diego Defendants filed their Motion on August 15, 2025. (See
generally ECF No. 27.) This action was then transferred to the undersigned on August 20,
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2025. (See ECF No. 29.) The Riverside Defendants filed their Motion on August 29, 2025,
(see generally ECF No. 31), and Officer Aanestad filed his Motion on September 2, 2025.
(See generally ECF No. 37.)
LEGAL STANDARD
“A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted ‘tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.’”
Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Navarro
v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)). 	“A district court’s dismissal for failure to
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper if there is a ‘lack of
a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory.’” 	Id. at 1242 (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” 	Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Id. at 679 (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
“If a complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be
granted ‘unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the
challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” 	DeSoto v. Yellow Freight
Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well
Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). 	“A district court does not err in
denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile.” Id. (citing Reddy v. Litton
Indus., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991)).
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ANALYSIS
In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff has taken a kitchen-sink approach,
alleging an assortment of claims against a variety of different Defendants. Complicating
matters, four different groups of Defendants have filed separate Motions seeking dismissal
of all of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. Although there is some overlap between these
Motions, some of them also raise novel arguments unique to certain Defendants. The Court
therefore first addresses Plaintiff’s federal claims against each group of Defendants and
then Plaintiff’s state law claims against each group of Defendants.
I. 	Federal Claims
Plaintiff alleges that her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated by all Defendants for “[r]etaliatory arrest, unlawful entry, seizure, excessive force,
kidnapping, warrantless search of her vehicle without probable cause, and deprivation of
procedural and substantive due process.” (See SAC at 9–10.) Plaintiff also alleges Monell
claims against the Counties of San Diego and Riverside “[f]or maintaining unconstitutional
policies, customs, and practices; failing to train and supervise; and ignoring prior written
notices explicitly identifying Plaintiff’s legal status and rights.” (See id. at 10.) Plaintiff
sues the Deputy Defendants for failure to intervene, (see id.); the Bail Agent Defendants
and Deputies Buswell and Martinez for conspiracy to violate her civil rights, (see id.); the
Bail Agent Defendants, the Riverside Officers, and Officer Aanestad for “kidnapping under
color of law,” (see id. at 12); and Officer Aanestad and the Riverside Deputies for false
arrest and excessive force arising out of the December 2023 arrest, (see id.).
Because each group of Defendants has separately moved to dismiss, the Court will
address each group of Defendants’ arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims.
A. 	The San Diego Defendants
The San Diego Defendants argue for dismissal with prejudice of all Plaintiff’s claims
against them on several grounds, including that the Second Amended Complaint fails to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1); Plaintiff fails to state a claim under
Section 1983 because the San Diego Defendants did not participate in any of the alleged
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misconduct and are entitled to qualified immunity; the Court should abstain from
adjudicating any challenges to Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings in state court under Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits the Court from
challenging her eviction proceedings in this Court. 	(See generally ECF No. 27-1 (“S.D.
Mem.”).)
Plaintiff alleges claims against the San Diego Defendants for retaliatory arrest,
unlawful entry, seizure, excessive force, warrantless search of her vehicle without probable
cause, deprivation of procedural and substantive due process, failure to intervene, and
conspiracy to violate civil rights. 	(See FAC at 9–11.) 	She also asserts a Monell claim
against the County of San Diego. (See id. at 10.) In her Opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that
her “claims against the San Diego defendants arise from th[e February 27, 2025] San Diego
incident[.]” (See S.D./Bail Opp’n at 7.)
1. 	Claims Against the San Diego Deputies
Although Plaintiff asserts claims against Deputies Buswell and Martinez for
violation of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; failure to intervene; and
conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights, (see FAC at 9–10), the Court notes that
Plaintiff’s only allegations specific to the San Diego Deputies on February 27, 2025, are
that Deputies Buswell and Martinez “and at least 4 other deputies who never left their
vehicles” responded to her husband’s 911 call and “did nothing to stop the [Bail Agent
Defendants’] unlawful seizure” of her. (See id. at 8.) There are no allegations that either
of the two named San Diego Deputies ever entered Plaintiff’s property, assisted with her
arrest, searched her or her vehicle, or in any way communicated with the Bail Agent
Defendants. (See generally id.) Based on the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint, her only viable theory against Deputies Buswell and Martinez is for failure to
intervene. See, e.g., Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In order for a
person acting under color of state law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a
showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation.”); Burns v. Cnty. of
King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To state a claim for conspiracy to violate one’s
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constitutional rights under § 1983, the plaintiff must state specific facts to support the
existence of the claimed conspiracy.”).
“Police officers have a duty to intervene when their fellow officers violate the
constitutional rights of a citizen in their presence.” Manlove v. Cnty. of San Diego, 759 F.
Supp. 3d 1057, 1066 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (citing Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289
(9th Cir. 2000)). “Importantly, however, officers can be held liable for failing to intercede
only if they had an opportunity to intercede.” Id. (quoting Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1271).
“Apart from the conclusory allegation that officers failed to intervene in contravention of
h[er] constitutional rights, Plaintiff identifies no facts indicating who failed to intervene,
how, or whether anyone had the opportunity to intercede.” 	See id. at 1066–67. 	For
example, Plaintiff does not allege that Deputies Buswell or Martinez had reason to believe
that Plaintiff was being arrested unlawfully or that she had been handcuffed too tightly.
(See generally SAC.) 	“Without these basic facts, Plaintiff cannot plead a constitutional
claim based on the intervention theory.” See Manlove, 759 F. Supp. 3d at 1067 (citing Ivey
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART the San Diego Defendants’ Motion and
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Deputies
Buswell and Martinez.
2. 	Claims Against Sheriff Martinez
Plaintiff asserts claims against Sheriff Martinez for violation of Plaintiff’s First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See SAC at 9–10.) “A defendant may be held
liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement
in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the
supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d
1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)).
For example, “[a] supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable
action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his
acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or
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callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. (quoting Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145
F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998)).
Here, there is no allegation that Sheriff Martinez was among those who responded
to Plaintiff’s husband’s call on February 27, 2025. (See generally SAC.) Instead, Plaintiff
alleges only that she “had previously sent a Certified Return Receipt Letter to the Sheriff
of San Diego County, informing h[er] of the protected constitutional status of [Plaintiff’s]
property and her rights” but that, “[d]espite receiving these notices, [the] Sheriff[] failed to
act, train, supervise, or discipline [her] subordinates[.]” (See id. at 8.) Although Plaintiff
does not specifically mention failure to train in Count I, (see id. at 9–10), the Court liberally
construes Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint as alleging a claim against Sheriff
Martinez based on a failure-to-train theory. 	See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,
1261 (9th Cir.), as amended (May 22, 1992) (“[W]e also are mindful of Supreme Court
precedent that instructs federal courts liberally to construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se
litigants. . . . This rule is particularly important in civil rights cases.” (citations omitted)).
The San Diego Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s allegations as to Sheriff Martinez
are conclusory. 	(See S.D. Mem. at 8–9.) 	The Court agrees. 	Plaintiff “must show that
[Sheriff Martinez] was deliberately indifferent to the need to train subordinates, and the
lack of training actually caused the constitutional harm or deprivation of rights.” 	See
Flores v. Cnty. of L.A., 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51, 59 (2011)). 	“Under this standard, [Plaintiff] must allege facts to show that
. . . [Sheriff Marinez] ‘disregarded the known or obvious consequence that a particular
omission in their training program would cause [municipal] employees to violate citizens’
constitutional rights.’” Id. (fourth alteration in original) (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 61).
“A ‘pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily
necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train,’ though
there exists a ‘narrow range of circumstances [in which] a pattern of similar violations
might not be necessary to show deliberate indifference.’” 	Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62, 63).
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Plaintiff does not allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations, (see generally
SAC), nor does this appear to be the rare instance in which alleging a pattern of similar
violations is not necessary. 	Indeed, “Plaintiff here does not allege any facts about what
training was (or was not) provided that would show any of the defendants were
‘deliberately indifferent’ to h[er] constitutional rights.” 	See Voskanyan v. Unknown, No.
CV 15-06259-MWF(KES), 2015 WL 13762733, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2015). “[Sh]e
does 	not 	even 	allege 	what 	the 	supervisory 	defendants 	should 	have 	trained 	their
subordinates to do or not to do.” See id. Given Plaintiff’s failure to allege such facts, the
Court 	GRANTS IN PART 	the San Diego Defendants’ Motion and 	DISMISSES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Martinez. 	See, e.g., id.
(dismissing without prejudice failure to train claims against supervisory defendants); see
also, e.g., Est. of Bonilla v. Cnty. of Merced, No. 118CV00329DADSKO, 2019 WL
1405551, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2019) (dismissing failure-to-train claims where
“plaintiffs make conclusory and seemingly boilerplate allegations that defendant Sheriff
Warnke and the Doe defendants were deliberately indifferent in their training and
supervision” and “do not identify the training defendants should have received or
implemented to prevent the alleged constitutional violations”); Flores-Ramirez v. Three
Unknown Fed. Task Force Agents, No. CV 17-2360 SJO (SS), 2018 WL 1354240, at *4
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2018) (“Plaintiff’s conclusory failure to train allegation does not even
identify the kind of training that Plaintiff believes Defendants should have received, but
presumably did not. Accordingly, the claim against the supervisor must be dismissed, with
leave to amend.”).
3. 	Claims Against the County of San Diego
Finally, Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim against the County of San Diego “[f]or
maintaining unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices; failing to train and supervise;
and ignoring prior written notices explicitly identifying Plaintiff’s legal status and rights.”
(See SAC at 10.) 	“A local government is liable for an injury under § 1983 under three
possible theories.” 	Rodriguez v. Cnty. of L.A., 891 F.3d 776, 802 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing
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Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1249 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled on
other grounds by Castro, 833 F.3d 1060). 	“First, a local government may be liable if
‘execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflict[ed] the injury.’”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “Second, a local government
can fail to train employees in a manner that amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to a
constitutional right, such that ‘the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers
of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.’” 	Id.
(quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989)). “Third, a local government
may be held liable if ‘the individual who committed the constitutional tort was an official
with 	final 	policy-making 	authority 	or 	such 	an 	official 	ratified 	a 	subordinate’s
unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.’” Id. at 802–03 (quoting Gravelet-
Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013)).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Marinez “failed to act, train, supervise, or
discipline [her] subordinates” despite receiving Plaintiff’s “notice” of “the protected
constitutional status of her property and her rights,” “reflect[ing] a policy or custom of
ignoring lawful constitutional assertions and protections.” (See SAC at 8; see also id. at
10.) To the extent Plaintiff seeks to hold the County of San Diego liable under a failure-
to-train theory, her claim fails for the same reasons that she fails to state a claim against
Sheriff Martinez in her individual capacity. See supra Section I.A.2; see also, e.g., Nelson
v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (finding inadequate
the plaintiff’s allegations of “a general policy of not properly training deputies in the areas
of questioning, detention, and custody of individuals”).
Insofar as Plaintiff seeks to allege a claim against the County of San Diego based on
a policy or custom, Plaintiff must allege “an ‘expressly adopted official policy or a
widespread or longstanding practice or custom” that “is so closely related to the deprivation
of the plaintiff's rights as to be the moving force that caused the ultimate injury.’” Stein v.
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City of S.D., No. 24CV00953 DMS (AHG), 2026 WL 84412, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
2026) (quoting 9th Cir. Civ. Jury Instr. 9.5 (2017)). Plaintiff does not identify an expressly
adopted official policy, (see generally SAC), and “[a] widespread practice or custom must
be so ‘persistent’ that it constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled city policy’ and
‘constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local governmental entity.’” 	Stein,
2026 WL 84412, at *2 (quoting Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Because Plaintiff fails to allege any incidents similar to the incident on February 27, 2025,
the Court GRANTS IN PART the San Diego Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Monell claims against the County of San Diego.
See, e.g., Johnson v. City of San Jose, 591 F. Supp. 3d 649, 668 (N.D. Cal. 2022)
(dismissing Monell claim where the plaintiff “ha[d] not sufficiently alleged any other
examples” of the alleged custom); see also, e.g., Saved Mag. v. Spokane Police Dep’t, 19
F.4th 1193, 1201 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[A]n ‘isolated or sporadic incident[ ]’ . . . cannot form
the basis of Monell liability for an improper custom.” (second alteration in original)
(quoting Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918)).
B. 	Claims Against the Bail Agent Defendants
Plaintiff asserts claims against the Bail Agent Defendants under Section 1983 for
violation of Plaintiff’s First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, (see SAC at 9–10),
and for conspiracy to violate Plaintiff’s civil rights. 	(See id. at 10.) 	Although the Bail
Agent Defendants raise several arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff’s federal claims against
them,5 the Court need not address them all because the Bail Agent Defendants’ argument
that they were not acting under color of state law is dispositive.
/ / /
5 	Specifically, the Bail Agent Defendants contend that Plaintiff lacks standing because she suffered
no injury in fact, (see Bail Mot. at 9–11); Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to conform with
Rule 8(a), (see Bail Mot. at 11–13); the Bail Agent Defendants are private actors, not state actors, (see id.
at 15); Plaintiff was lawfully arrested pursuant to a valid bench warrant, (see id.); and Plaintiff fails to
allege an agreement or meeting of the minds to support a claim for conspiracy, (see id.).
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Plaintiff herself identifies the Bail Agent Defendants as “bail bondsmen,” (see, e.g.,
SAC at 7, 14), and “purely private conduct, no matter how wrongful, is not within the
protective orbit of section 1983.” 	Ouzts v. Md. Nat. Ins. Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir.
1974) (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
The Court “start[s] with the presumption that private conduct does not constitute
governmental action.” Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th
Cir. 1999) (citing Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992)). “[F]or private
conduct to constitute governmental action, ‘something more’ must be present.” 	Id.
(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)). “Courts have used four
different factors or tests to identify what constitutes ‘something more’: (1) public function,
(2) joint action, (3) governmental compulsion or coercion, and (4) governmental nexus.”
Id. at 835–36 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939; Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1118
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 996 (1997); Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d
1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1995); Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power
Dist., 869 F.2d 503, 506 (9th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff invokes joint action in her Opposition.
(See S.D./Bail Opp’n at 8.)
“One way to establish joint action is to demonstrate a conspiracy.” 	Collins v.
Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d
380, 383 (9th Cir. 1983)). 	Although Plaintiff does allege “[a]greement and joint action
between private and public actors to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights[,]” (see SAC at
9), Plaintiff fails to “state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.”
See Burns, 883 F.2d at 821.
“Joint action also exists where a private party is a willful participant in joint action
with the State or its agents. 	Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the
challenged action, are acting under color of law for purposes of § 1983 actions.” Collins,
878 F.2d at 1154 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 27–28 (1980)) (citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)). 	The Ninth
Circuit has “observed that [t]he joint action inquiry focuses on whether the state has so far
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insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private entity] that it must be
recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity. . . .” 	Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted and alterations in original) (quoting Gorenc, 869 F.2d at 507). “Joint action
therefore requires a substantial degree of cooperative action.” Id.
In Collins, for example, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the trial court’s
decision that employees of a non-profit provider of various women’s health services had
acted under color of state law where the employees had effected citizen’s arrests on
protestors who were violating a preliminary injunction and local police then detained the
protestors “long enough to issue misdemeanor citations for violating the injunction.” 	See
id. at 1146–47. The court concluded that “the facts alleged by the [protestors had] fail[ed]
as a matter of law to satisfy the joint activity test for state action under section 1983”
because “the impetus for the arrests came from [the non-profit’s] employees and not San
Diego police officers,” see id. at 1155 (citing Canlis v. San Joaquin Sheriff’s Posse
Comitatus, 641 F.2d 711, 717 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 967 (1981)); “the police
officer refused, after conducting an independent investigation, to arrest the protesters on
his own authority[,]” see id. (citing Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179,
196 n.16 (1988); and “the police maintained a policy of neutrality in the dispute[,]” see id.
(citing Carey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1987); Lee v. Town
of Estes Park, 820 F.2d 1112, 1115 (10th Cir. 1987); White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d
140, 143–44 (5th Cir. 1979)). 	“In short,” the Ninth Circuit concluded, “there [wa]s no
indication in the record that state agents failed to use independent judgment or in any way
coerced or encouraged [the non-profit’s] employees to effect the citizen’s arrest.” 	Id.
(citing S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Cmtee., 483 U.S. 522, 546 (1987)).
As in Collins, there is no indication of joint action here. 	As Plaintiff alleges, (see
SAC at 7–8), the impetus of Plaintiff’s arrest came from the Bail Bond Defendants—not
the San Diego Deputies, who only arrived in response to Plaintiff’s husband’s call to 911.
Further, by Plaintiff’s own admission, the San Diego Deputies did not in any way
participate in Plaintiff’s arrest. 	This conclusion follows the Ninth Circuit’s finding that
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bail bondsmen generally are not acting under color of state law for purposes of Section
1983 because they are “in the business in order to make money and . . . not acting out of a
high-minded sense of devotion to the administration of justice.” 	See Ouzts, 505 F.2d at
555.
Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to allege that the Bail Agent
Defendants were acting under color of state law, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Bail
Agent Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against the Bail Agent
Defendants under Section 1983. See, e.g., Singleton v. Bail Hotline Bail Bonds, Inc., No.
8:22-CV-01826-MRA-KES, 	2025 	WL 	3480997, 	at 	*8 	(C.D. 	Cal. 	July 	25, 	2025)
(summarily adjudicating the plaintiff’s claims against bail agents where the plaintiff “had
already been arrested before [police] officers arrived at the scene, and they had not contact
with [the plaintiff] whatsoever”); Bass v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. 5:19-CV-00231-
MWF-KES, 2020 WL 1678218, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23) (recommending dismissal with
prejudice of the plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against a bail bond company and its agents
on the grounds that those defendants were not state actors), report & recommendation
adopted, 2020 WL 1674258 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2020); Boyd v. City of Oceanside Police
Dep’t, No. 11CV3039 LAB WMC, 2013 WL 5671164, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2013)
(“[T]he Ninth Circuit has found that bounty hunters and bail bond agents are not state actors
acting under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983.” (emphasis in original).)
Although the Court doubts that Plaintiff can allege additional facts that the Bail Agent
Defendants plausibly were acting under color of state law, at this time the Court’s dismissal
is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
C. 	Claims Against the Riverside Defendants
The Riverside Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s federal claims against them are
subject to dismissal under Rule 8(a)(2) because she fails to identify which actions taken by
which of the individual Riverside Defendants violated her constitutional rights. (See ECF
No. 31-1 (“Riverside Mem.”) at 6–9.) They also argue that Plaintiff fails to state a Monell
claim against the County of Riverside because she fails plausibly to allege “that the County
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had an official practice/custom of violating the rights of citizens based on arrests or
prosecutions,” (see id. at 9–10), and that she fails to state a claim against Sheriff Biano
because “[h]is name appears only in the caption of the SAC” and “[i]t is unclear what, if
any, involvement Bianco had in the events described in the SAC.” (See id. at 12.)
1. 	Claims Against the Riverside Deputies
Plaintiff alleges claims against Riverside Deputies James, Roach, Lature, and
Householder for violation of her First, Fourt, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, (see SAC
at 9–10); failure to intervene, (see id. at 10); “kidnapping under color of law,” (see id. at
12); and false arrest and excessive force arising from her December 2023 arrest, (see id. at
12–13). The Riverside Defendants contend that these claims must be dismissed under Rule
8(a)(2). (See Riverside Mem. at 6–9.)
Although Plaintiff attempts to clarify in her Opposition, (see Riverside Opp’n at
6–12), the Riverside Defendants are correct that any “new facts cannot be considered by
the Court in ruling on the Riverside Defendants’ [M]otion.” 	(See Riverside Reply at 4
(citing Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Schneider v. Cal.
Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The ‘new’ allegations contained
in the [plaintiffs’] opposition motion, however, are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes.
In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the
complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a
defendant’s motion to dismiss.” (emphasis in original) (citing Harrell v. United States, 13
F.3d 232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 Moore’s Fed. Practice, § 12.34[2] (Matthew Bender 3d
ed.))). 	In her Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “four Riverside County
Sheriff’s Deputies responded” to Officer Aanestad’s December 26, 2023 call for backup.6
(See SAC at 4.) 	It is not clear that these four deputies are the four Riverside Deputies
6 	It does not appear that any of the Riverside Deputies were involved in the April 18, 2024, or
February 27, 2025 arrests. 	(See SAC at 5 (naming only Sgt. De Loss in connection with the April 18,
2024 arrest), 7–8 (alleging the February 27, 2025 arrest occurred in San Diego County and failing to name
the “4 other deputies who never left their vehicles”).)
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named in the Second Amended Complaint, or whether they—as opposed to Officer
Aanestad—were involved in the “intercept[ion],” “arrest[],” and “threat[] with a Taser.”
(See id.) It is also unclear which of the four Riverside Deputies—if any—were involved
in the search for Plaintiff, her husband, and/or their vehicle. (See id.) Under Rule 8(a)(2),
these allegations do not suffice to put the Riverside Deputies on notice of the claims
Plaintiff alleges against them. 	See, e.g., Washington v. Luna, No. 2:23-CV-09406-CBM-
MAA, 2025 WL 1994572, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 27) (dismissing § 1983 complaint because
“a complaint which lump[s] together . . . multiple defendants in one broad allegation fails
to satisfy [the] notice requirement of Rule 8(a)(2).” (internal quotation marks omitted and
alterations in original)), report & recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1994012 (C.D. Cal.
July 15), appeal dismissed, No. 25-5991, 2025 WL 3873185 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025);
Tafoya v. City of Hanford, No. 1:20-CV-00010-LJO-SAB, 2020 WL 353227, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. Jan. 21, 2020) (“Since Plaintiff fails to identify any specific Defendants he is referring
to when he states ‘officers’ or ‘sheriffs’ or ‘personnel,’ Plaintiff’s complaint fails to give
fair notice of all of the allegations and claims directed against the Defendants.”); Garcia v.
Cnty. of L.A., No. CV 15-3651-AG (KS), 2016 WL 8732339, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18)
(dismissing complaint where the “[p]laintiff inconsistently identifies Does 1–10 as
deputies, 	sergeants, 	lieutenants, 	detectives, 	other 	officers, 	officials, 	executives,
policymakers, and peace officers . . . , and he provides no other identifying characteristics
about the Doe Defendants, such as their gender, race, hair color, or a physical description,
to enable an identification . . . , and most damningly, Plaintiff does not allege any specific
misdeeds by the individual Doe Defendants that would support a plausible inference that
each individual Doe Defendant took an action against Plaintiff that violated Plaintiff's civil
rights”), report & recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 8738259 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2016);
see also, e.g., Jones, 297 F.3d at 936 (affirming district court’s rejection of a proposed jury
instruction regarding the standard for an unreasonable search that “would invite a jury to
find all of the officers liable for an alleged constitutional violation merely for being present
at the scene of an alleged unlawful act” because “either integral participation or personal
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involvement was required before a jury could find officers liable”). The Court therefore
GRANTS IN PART the Riverside Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the Riverside Deputies.
2. 	Claims Against Sgt. De Loss
Plaintiff alleges claims against Sgt. De Loss for violation of her First, Fourth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, (see SAC at 9–10), and for “kidnapping under color of law.”
(See SAC at 12.) 	Like Plaintiff’s claims against the Riverside Deputies, the Riverside
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims against Sgt. De Loss are subject to dismissal
under Rule 8(a)(2). (See Riverside Mem. at 6–9.)
Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. De Loss pulled her over on April 18, 2024, “claim[ing] to
have a warrant for her arrest but refus[ing] to show it.” 	(See SAC at 5.) 	Plaintiff also
alleges Sgt. De Loss stated that he “knew who she was” and told her to “get out of the car
or I’ll break your window.” (See id.) Sgt. De Loss arrested Plaintiff and her husband for
resisting arrest and impounded their vehicle. 	(See id.) 	Plaintiff claims that she and her
husband were transported separately, but it is unclear which of them—if any—Sgt. De Loss
transported. (See id.)
Unlike Plaintiff’s claims against the Riverside Deputies, see supra Section I.C.1,
Plaintiff’s allegations against Sgt. De Loss are individualized and provide sufficient notice
of the claims she asserts against him. Although the Court has reservations concerning the
sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations, because the Riverside Defendants fail to raise any
additional arguments for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Sgt. De Loss, (see
generally Riverside Mem.), the Court DENIES IN PART the Riverside Defendants’
Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of the claims against Sgt. De Loss.
3. 	Claims Against Sheriff Bianco
Plaintiff’s only federal claim against Sheriff Bianco appears to be her claim asserted
against “All Defendants” for violation of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. (See SAC at 9–10.) As the Court previously noted, see supra Section I.A.2, “[a]
defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists either (1) his or
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her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal
connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’”
Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207 (quoting Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646). For example, “[a] supervisor
can be liable in his individual capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the
training, 	supervision, 	or 	control 	of 	his 	subordinates; 	for 	his 	acquiescence 	in 	the
constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous indifference to
the rights of others.” Id. (quoting Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that, “[a]fter notifying the Riverside County Sheriff of an
illegal foreclosure and invoking her constitutional rights, Plaintiff was arrested without a
valid warrant” and, “[d]ays later, a backdated eviction notice appeared on her door.” (See
SAC at 2; see also id. at 5 (noting that Plaintiff was arrested by Sgt. De Loss on April 18,
2024, the day after the Riverside County Sheriff signed for her letter).) 	Plaintiff also
alleges that, despite receiving Plaintiff’s notice, Sheriff Bianco “failed to act, train,
supervise, or discipline [his] subordinates.” 	(See id. at 8.) 	Plaintiff does not allege that
Sheriff Biano was personally involved in the incidents of December 26, 2023; April 18,
2024; or February 7, 2025. (See generally SAC.) The Second Amended Complaint also
contains no non-conclusory allegations regarding Sheriff Biano’s training, supervision, or
control of the Riverside Officers or his acquiescence in any alleged constitutional
deprivations. 	(See generally id.) 	For the same reasons the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s
claims against Sheriff Martinez, see supra Section I.A.2, the Court therefore GRANTS IN
PART the Riverside Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Bianco.
4. 	Claims Against the County of Riverside
Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim against the County of Riverside “[f]or maintaining
unconstitutional policies, customs, and practices; failing to train and supervise; and
ignoring prior written notices explicitly identifying Plaintiff’s legal status and rights.” (See
SAC at 10.) As with Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the County of San Diego, see supra
Section I.A.3, Plaintiff does not identify an expressly adopted official policy, (see generally
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SAC), or “[a] widespread practice or custom . . . so ‘persistent’ that it constitutes a
‘permanent and well settled city policy’ and ‘constitutes the standard operating procedure
of the local governmental entity.’” Stein, 2026 WL 84412, at *2 (quoting Trevino, 99 F.3d
at 918). The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART the Riverside Defendants’ Motion and
DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Monell claims against the County of
Riverside.
D. 	Claims Against Officer Aanestad
Plaintiff asserts Section 1983 claims against Officer Aanestad for violation of her
First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights through “[r]etaliatory arrest, . . . unlawful
. . . seizure, [and] excessive force,” (see SAC at 9–10); “kidnapping under color of law,”
(see id. at 12); and false arrest and excessive force, (see id.).
As an initial matter, Officer Aanestad argues that the Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s
federal claims against him because Plaintiff “impermissibly lump[s] all defendants
together” in violation of Rule 8(a). (See CHP Mot. at 7, 13–14.) With regard to Plaintiff’s
claims for unlawful seizure (including “kidnapping under color of law”) and excessive
force, the Court agrees—after Plaintiff and her husband left the scene and Officer Aanestad
called for backup, it is unclear whether and to what extent Officer Aanestad “intercepted,
arrested aggressively, and subjected” Plaintiff’s “vehicle [to a] search,” “threatened
[Plaintiff] with a Taser[,]” used “facial recognition software” on Plaintiff, and “towed and
impounded” Plaintiff’s vehicle. 	(See SAC at 4.) 	For the same reason Plaintiff’s claims
against the Riverside Deputies fail, see supra Section I.C.1, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to
provide Officer Aanestad sufficient notice of the claims Plaintiff alleges against him. The
Court therefore 	GRANTS IN PART 	Officer Aanestad’s Motion and 	DISMISSES
WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against him to the extent they
are based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
As for Plaintiff’s claims under the First Amendment, Officer Aanestad argues that
dismissal is required because Plaintiff does not allege any facts implicating the First
Amendment. (See CHP Mot. at 8.) It appears, however, that Plaintiff may be attempting
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to allege that Officer Aanestad only arrested her after she provided him a copy of her
“Constructive Notice,” which “visibly irritated” Officer Aanestad. (See SAC at 3–4.) To
allege a retaliatory arrest claim, however, “a plaintiff must first show that there was no
probable cause for the underlying arrest.” Massengale v. Dicus, No. 5:24-CV-02352-SSS-
SSC, 2025 WL 477818, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 7) (citing Nieves v. Barlett, 587 U.S. 391,
401–04 (2019)), report & recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 474964 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12,
2025). Because Plaintiff alleges that Officer Aanestad pulled her over “for allegedly failing
to stop at a stop sign” and does not allege that she did, in fact, stop at the stop sign, (see
SAC at 3), Plaintiff does not—and cannot—allege that Officer Aanestad lacked probable
cause. 	See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 480 F. Supp. 3d 988, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(concluding that officers had probable cause to believe that a criminal defendant had
violated California Vehicle Code § 22450 “when he rolled through a stop sign”). The Court
therefore GRANTS IN PART Officer Aanestad’s Motion and DISMISSES WITH
PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against him for First Amendment retaliation.
II. 	State Law Claims
In addition to her federal claims, Plaintiff asserts a surfeit of state law claims—many
of which are redundant of her federal claims—for trespass against the Bail Agent
Defendants, (see SAC at 10–11); false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional
distress against all Defendants, (see id. at 11); and assault and battery and violation of the
Bane Act against the Bail Agent Defendants, Sgt. De Loss, the San Diego Deputies, and
Officer Aanestad, (see id.).
A. 	The San Diego and Riverside Defendants
Although they raise many other arguments for dismissal of Plaintiff’s state law
claims, the San Diego and Riverside Defendants both contend that all of Plaintiff’s state
law claims against them must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to comply with the
claim presentation requirement appearing in Section 945.4 of the California Government
Claims Act (formerly the California Tort Claims Act), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810–998.3. (See
S.D. Mem. at 15; Riverside Mem. at 10–12.) Plaintiff fails to address this argument in her
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Opposition to the San Diego Defendants’ Motion, (see generally S.D. Opp’n), but argues
in response to the Riverside Defendants’ Motion that she “substantially complied with the
Government Claims Act by sending certified notices, lawful notifications, and Notices of
Liability to Sheriff Bianco, his deputies, and related supervisors,” (see Riverside Opp’n at
16), and that “any technical deficiency . . . [is] excused by equitable estoppel and equitable
tolling.” (See id.)
Despite Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary, (see Riverside Opp’n at 16 (citing City
of San Jose v. Super. Ct., 12 Cal. 3d 447, 456 (1974)), “[e]ven if the public entity has actual
knowledge of facts that might support a claim, the claims statutes still must be satisfied.”
DiCampli-Mintz v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 55 Cal. 4th 983, 990 (2012) (citing City of
Stockton v. Super. Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 730, 738 (2007)); see also id. at 987 (reversing Court of
Appeal’s holding that “a claim may substantially comply with the act, notwithstanding
failure to deliver of mail it to one of the specified recipients” as “judicial expansion of the
statutory requirements”). 	Further, “[t]he filing of a claim is a condition precedent to the
maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity and is therefore an element
that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting
Del Real v. City of Riverside, 95 Cal. App. 4th 761, 767 (2002)). 	“Thus, under these
statutes, failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a
plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” Id. (quoting City of Stockton, 42 Cal. 4th
at 737–38). “The claimant bears the burden of ensuring that the claim is presented to the
appropriate public entity.” 	Id. at 991 (citing Life v. Cnty. of L.A., 227 Cal. App. 3d 894,
901 (1991)).
In arguing that she “substantially complied” with the claim presentation requirement
by sending notices to the Sheriff, (see Riverside Opp’n at 16), Plaintiff concedes that she
failed to deliver a claim to the “clerk, secretary, auditor, or . . . . governing body” of either
the San Diego County or Riverside County Sheriff’s Office as required by Section 915(a)
of the Government Claims Act. 	Plaintiff also produces no evidence that “the clerk,
secretary, auditor[,] or board of the local public entity” actually received a claim. See Cal.
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Gov’t Code § 915(e)(1). Accordingly, “neither section 915(a)’s specific requirements for
compliance, nor section 	915(e)(1)’s 	provision 	deeming 	actual 	receipt 	to 	constitute
compliance, were satisfied.” See DiCampli, 55 Cal. 4th at 991–92.
Not only has Plaintiff failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement, but
it appears that she no longer can do so. “A claim relating to a cause of action . . . for injury
to person . . . shall be presented . . . not later than six months after the accrual of the cause
of action,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2(a), and, “[w]hen a claim that is required by Section
911.2 to be presented not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action is
not presented within that time, a written application may be made to the public entity for
leave to present that claim,” Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4(a), “within a reasonable time not to
exceed one year after the actual of the cause of action.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.4(b). Here,
the last of Plaintiff’s claims accrued on February 27, 2025. See, e.g., Ridley v. City & Cnty.
of S.F., 272 Cal. App. 2d 290, 291–92 (1969) (claims for assault, battery, false arrest and
imprisonment by police officers accrued on day of incident). Consequently, Plaintiff was
required to present a claim related to her February 27, 2025 arrest on or before August 25,
2025, and to apply for leave to present an untimely claim on or before February 27, 2026.7
Nonetheless, Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to equitable estoppel or equitable
tolling. Equitable tolling, however, is not available. See Willis v. City of Carlsbad, 48 Cal.
App. 5th 1104, 1121 (2020) (“[T]he doctrine of equitable tolling cannot be invoked to
suspend section 911.2’s six-month deadline for filing a prerequisite government claim.”).
As for equitable estoppel, “[a] public entity may be estopped from asserting noncompliance
with the claims statutes where its agents or employees have deterred the filing of a timely
claim by some ‘affirmative act.’” 	Christopher P. v. Mojave Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal.
App. 4th 165, 170 (1993) (citing John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 48 Cal. 3d 438,
7 	Consequently, Plaintiff was required to present claims related to her December 26, 2023 arrest by
June 26, 2024, and to apply for an extension by December 26, 2024, and to present claims regarding her
April 18, 2024 arrest by October 18, 2024, and to apply for an extension by April 18, 2025. 	These
deadlines have long expired.
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445 (1989)). This would require Plaintiff to allege “(1) the public entity was apprised of
the facts, (2) it intended its conduct to be acted upon, (3) plaintiff was ignorant of the true
state of facts, and (4) relied upon the conduct to his detriment.” Id. (citing Johnson v. San
Diego Unified School Dist., 217 Cal. App. 3d 692, 700–701 (1990); DeYoung v. Del Mar
Thoroughbred Club, 159 Cal. App. 3d 858, 862 (1984)). 	Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint contains no such allegations. (See generally SAC.)
Because Plaintiff fails to allege that she timely presented a claim to either the San
Diego County or Riverside County Sheriff’s Office—or is excused from doing so—the
Court GRANTS IN PART the San Diego Defendants’ and Riverside Defendants’ Motions
and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s state law claims against them without reaching their additional
arguments for dismissal. 	Although the Court doubts that Plaintiff will be able to plead
additional facts indicating that she timely complied with the claim presentation requirement
or that the San Diego or Riverside Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting her
noncompliance, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s state law
claims against the San Diego and Riverside Defendants.
B. 	The Bail Agent Defendants
Plaintiff asserts state law claims against the Bail Agent Defendants for trespass, false
imprisonment, assault and battery, violation of the Bane Act, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. (See SAC at 10–11.)
1. 	Trespass
Plaintiff alleges a claim for trespass against the Bail Agent Defendants based on their
“[u]nlawful entry onto clearly marked private property.” (See SAC at 10–11.) The Bail
Agent Defendants contend that dismissal is warranted because “Plaintiff contractually
waived her rights to claim unlawful entry” in her “Plain Talk Contract” with Bail HotLine.
(See Bail Mot. at 15–16 (citing Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366 (1873)). Indeed, the “Plain
Talk Contract” provides:
I hereby acknowledge the authority of the surety to arrest the defendant at any
time and at any place and therefore specifically and irrevocably grant the bail
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[agent] permission and authority to enter and search any and all real property
and chattel that is or reasonably believed by the surety to be under possession,
control or occupancy at any time by the Defendant.
(See id. at 37.) Plaintiff responds that this agreement is not properly considered at the Rule
12(b)(6) stage and that “contracts do not override constitutional protections.” 	(See
S.D./Bail Opp’n at 10 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); Turner v.
Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Cir. 2004)).)
Although consent is a valid defense to trespass, see, e.g., Civic W. Corp. v. Zila
Indus., Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 1, 16–17 (1977) (“The essence of the cause of action for
trespass is an ‘unauthorized entry’ onto the land of another . . . . Where there is a consensual
entry, there is no tort, because lack of consent is an element of the wrong.), the Court agrees
with Plaintiff that the Plain Talk Contract is not properly incorporated by reference. The
incorporation-by-reference “doctrine prevents plaintiffs from selecting only portions of
documents that support their claims, while omitting portions of those very documents that
weaken—or doom—their claims.” 	See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d
988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998),
superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem.
Co., 443 F.3d 676, 681–82 (9th Cir. 2006)). 	“[A] defendant may seek to incorporate a
document into the complaint ‘if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the
document forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim.’” 	Id. (quoting United States v. Ritchie,
342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003)). “However, if the document merely creates a defense
to the well-pled allegations in the complaint, then that document did not necessarily form
the basis of the complaint.” Id.
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not refer to the Plain Talk Contract,
(see generally SAC), and, because the Plain Talk Contract “merely creates a defense” to
Plaintiff’s trespass claim, it does “not necessarily form the basis of” Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint. See Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002. The Court therefore declines to treat
the Plain Talk Contract as incorporated by reference into Plaintiff’s Second Amended
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Complaint. Because the Bail Agent Defendants’ only argument for dismissal of Plaintiff’s
trespass claim hinges on the Plain Talk Contract, (see Bail Mot. at 15–16), the Court
DENIES IN PART the Bail Agent Motion to the extent it seeks dismissal of the trespass
cause of action. The Court warns Plaintiff, however, that this claim does not appear to be
warranted by existing law or evidentiary support. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)–(3).
2. 	False Imprisonment
Plaintiff asserts that the Bail Agent Defendants falsely imprisoned her when they
arrested her on February 27, 2025. (See SAC at 11.) Under California law, the tort of false
imprisonment “consists of the nonconsensual, intentional confinement of a person, without
lawful privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.” 	Fermino v. Fedco,
Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 715 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Molko v. Holy
Spirit Ass’n, 46 Cal. 3d 1092, 1123, as modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 1, 1988),
superseded in part by statute on other grounds as stated in Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co.,
25 Cal. 4th 826 (2001)). 	The Bail Agent Defendants contend that they “had express
authority to arrest Plaintiff under: A valid court-issued bench warrant; California Penal
Code § 1299; [and] Plaintiff’s signed waiver agreements.” (See Bail Mot. at 16.)
“California law does allow false imprisonment claims for arrests by law officers in
two situations: when an arrest is made without a warrant . . . , and when an officer
‘maliciously arrests and imprisons another by personally serving an arrest warrant issued
solely on information deliberately falsified by the arresting officer himself[.]’” 	Blaxland
v. Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198, 1205 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003) (first
citing Jackson v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. App. 3d 579, 585 (1981), overruled on other
grounds by Asgari v. City of L.A., 15 Cal. 4th 744, 758 n.10 (1997); then quoting McKay
v. Cnty. of San Diego, 111 Cal. App. 3d 251, 253 (1980)). The Court takes judicial notice
of the fact that Plaintiff’s February 27, 2025 arrest was subject to a bench warrant issued
in August 2024, for Plaintiff’s failure to appear at her arraignment. (See ECF No. 27-2 at
8–9, 51); see also, e.g., Mattingly, 2025 WL 1771454, at *1. “A bench warrant issued for
failure to appear in a pending criminal matter is a valid warrant and provides authority for
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police officers to arrest the person identified in the warrant,” Cannon v. City of Petaluma,
No. C 11-0651 PJH, 2012 WL 1183732, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2012) (first citing United
States v. Gooch, 506 F.3d 1156, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 2007); then citing Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 91 (1964); then citing Cal. Pen. Code § 978.5), and “[b]ail bond agents have
authority to arrest fugitive defendants.” 	Bass v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. 5:19-CV-
00231-MWF-KES, 2020 WL 1678218, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23) (citing Cal. Pen. Code
§ 1301), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1674258 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2020).
Because the Bail Agent Defendants arrested Plaintiff pursuant to a bench warrant,
Plaintiff can only state a claim against them for false imprisonment if they maliciously
arrested her using a “warrant issued solely on information deliberately falsified by the
arresting officer himself.” 	See Blaxland, 323 F.3d 1205 n.4. 	Plaintiff alleges, however,
that it was Judge Anderson who “falsified the record,” (see SAC at 7), not the Bail Agent
Defendants. 	Further, the fact that Plaintiff informed the Bail Agent Defendants of her
belief that the bench warrant was issued “under false pretenses,” (see id.), did not suffice
to put the Bail Agent Defendants on notice that the validity of the warrant was in question
because “reasonable agents would conclude that the perpetrator would lie to avoid
incarceration.” 	See Bass, 2020 WL 1678218, at *6. Because Plaintiff fails to allege any
facts plausibly showing that the Bail Agent Defendants’ February 27, 2025 arrest of her
was not pursuant to a facially valid warrant, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Bail Agent
Defendants’ 	Motion 	and 	DISMISSES 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against 	them 	for 	false
imprisonment. Although the Court doubts that Plaintiff can plead additional facts to cure
these deficiencies, dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE at this time.
3. 	Assault and Battery
Plaintiff brings a claim for assault and battery against the Bail Agent Defendants
based on their “[u]se of physical force in absence of legal authority.” 	(See SAC at 11.)
The Bail Agent Defendants argue for dismissal because the “[u]se of reasonable force to
detain a fugitive pursuant to a valid warrant does not constitute battery.” (See Bail Mot. at
16 (citing Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269 (1998)).) “By failing to respond
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to the arguments raised by Defendant on these claims, Plaintiff failed to oppose the motion
to dismiss these claims. Where a party fails to address arguments against a claim raised in
a motion to dismiss, the claims are abandoned and dismissal is appropriate.” 	Shull v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, No. 13-CV-2999-BEN WVG, 2014 WL 1404877, at *2 (S.D.
Cal. Apr. 10, 2014) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 471
F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006) (“A plaintiff who makes a claim . . . in his complaint, but
fails to raise the issue in response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss . . . , has effectively
abandoned his claim[.]” (citing Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026 (4th
Cir. 1994))). 	Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Bail Agent Defendants’
Motion and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claim against them for assault
and battery. See, e.g., Lucky Star Enters. III, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 585 F. Supp.
3d 1297, 1303 (W.D. Wash. 2022) (dismissing abandoned claim with prejudice); Digby
Adler Grp., LLC v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., LLC, No. 14-CV-02349-TEH, 2015 WL
5138080, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (collecting cases and dismissing with prejudice
claim that the court “consider[ed] . . . abandoned and the argument conceded” where the
plaintiffs failed to respond to the defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim); T.B. ex rel.
Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., No. 08-CV-28-MMA (WMC), 2012 WL
12953527, at *3 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2012) (“[T]he abandoned claims are deemed to have
been dismissed with prejudice.”).
4. 	Bane Act
Plaintiff alleges a Bane Act claim against the Bail Agent Defendants based on their
“[i]nterference with Plaintiff’s rights through threat, intimidation, or coercion.” (See SAC
at 11.) 	The Bane Act “proscribes any ‘interfere[nce] with’ or attempted ‘interfere[nce]
with’ protected rights carried out ‘by threat, intimidation or coercion.’” Cornell v. City &
Cnty. of S.F., 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 800, as modified (Nov. 17, 2017). 	The Bail Agent
Defendants contend that “lawful arrest and detention do not constitute coercion under the
Act.” (Bail Mot. at 16 (citing Shoyoye v. Cnty. of L.A., 203 Cal. App. 4th 947 (2012)).
/ / /
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“A Bane Act claim cannot proceed where there is no constitutional violation.”
Hollamon v. City of L.A., 709 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1006 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (citing Reese v. Cnty.
of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1044 (9th Cir. 2018)), aff’d, No. 24-341, 2025 WL 927310
(9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2025). Because Plaintiff has failed plausibly to allege that the Bail Agent
Defendants violated her constitutional rights, see supra Sections I.B & II.B.2–3, the Court
GRANTS IN PART the Bail Agent Defendants’ Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s
Bane Act claims against them. See, e.g., Hereford v. City of Hemet, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1126,
1160 (C.D. Cal. 2025); Hollamon, 709 F. Supp. 3d at 1006; Jaime-Gonzalez v. Cnty. of
L.A., No. CV186600MWFJPRX, 2018 WL 8058840, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2018).
Because the Court has dismissed without prejudice the claims from which Plaintiff’s Bane
Act claims derive, dismissal of the Bane Act claims is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
5. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, Plaintiff alleges a claim against the Bail Agent Defendants for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. (See SAC at 11.)
A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when
there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the
intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing,
emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional
distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by
the defendant’s outrageous conduct.
Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993)) (citing Christensen v.
Super. Ct., 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991)). “A defendant’s conduct is outrageous when it is
so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Id.
at 1050–51 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001). “And
the defendant’s conduct must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization
that injury will result.” 	Id. at 1051 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Potter, 6
Cal. 4th at 1001). “Severe emotional distress means emotional distress of such substantial
quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be
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expected to endure it.” 	Id. at 1051 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1004).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct
by forcibly seizing Plaintiff, falsely imprisoning her, subjecting her to intimidation, and
disregarding her clearly established legal rights.” 	(See SAC at 11.) 	The Bail Agent
Defendants urge that “a lawful arrest under a valid bench warrant and pursuant to
contractual consent, does not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of ‘outrageous.’” (See
Bail Mot. at 17.) The Court agrees—in light of Plaintiff’s failure plausibly to allege a claim
against the Bail Agent Defendants for wrongful arrest, false imprisonment, excessive force,
assault, or battery, Plaintiff also fails plausibly to allege that the Bail Agent Defendants’
conduct was extreme or outrageous. See, e.g., Ngo v. City of Westminster, No. 8:25-00705
ADS, 2025 WL 3672539, at *5, *8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (dismissing claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress where “there was probable cause for Plaintiff’s
arrest” and “the [complaint] contains no allegations of extreme and outrageous conduct by
the Defendants”). The Court therefore GRANTS IN PART the Bail Agent Defendants’
Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s claims against them for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 	Again, because dismissal of the claims from which Plaintiff’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims would derive is without prejudice,
dismissal of the intentional infliction of emotional distress claims is also WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
C. 	Officer Aanestad
Plaintiff also alleges state law claims for false imprisonment, assault and battery,
violation of the Bane Act, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Officer
Aanestad. (See SAC at 11.) As an initial matter, Officer Aanestad contends both that this
Court lacks supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against him, (see
CHP Mot. at 18), and that he has immunity under California Government Code section
820.2. (See CHP Mot. at 18–19.) Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims against Officer Aanestad without prejudice, see supra
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Section I.D, it would be premature for the Court to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against him at this time. 	See, e.g., Tolan v.
Hartshorn, No. 3:10-CV-17-ECR-RAM, 2010 WL 5070932, at *8 (D. Nev. Dec. 6, 2010)
(continuing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where federal claims were dismissed with
leave to amend).
As for Section 820.2, although the Court agrees that Plaintiff “has not successfully
refuted the state-law immunities afforded to Officer Aanestad,” (see CHP Reply at 10), it
is Officer Aanestad who bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to immunity.
AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 639 (9th Cir. 2012). “As a matter
of law, section 820.2 [‘discretionary’] immunity does not apply to an officer’s decision to
detain or arrest a suspect.” 	Sharp v. Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 920 (9th Cir. 2017)
(alteration in original) (quoting Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011),
abrogated in part on other grounds by Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754 (9th Cir.
2023)). “Nor would this immunity extend to any other police action in this case because
Cal. Gov. Code § 820.2 covers only ‘policy’ decisions made by a ‘coordinate branch[] of
government,’ not ‘operational decision[s] by the police purporting to apply the law.’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Liberal, 632 F.3d at 1084–85).
Because the Court concludes it would be improper to decline supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against Officer Aanestad at this time and that
Officer Aanestad is not entitled to immunity under Section 820.2, the Court will proceed
to analyze the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s allegations.
1. 	False Imprisonment
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Aanestad falsely imprisoned her when he “[d]etain[ed]
Plaintiff without lawful justification.” 	(See SAC at 11.) 	Officer Aanestad contends that
this claim is statutorily barred by California Penal Code section 847(b), (see CHP Mot. at
19), which provides:
(b) 	There shall be no civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action
shall arise against, any peace officer or federal criminal investigator or
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law enforcement officer described in subdivision (a) or (d) of Section
830.8, acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or
false imprisonment arising out of any arrest under any of the following
circumstances:
(1) 	The arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the
arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.
(2) 	The arrest was made pursuant to a charge made, upon reasonable
cause, of the commission of a felony by the person to be arrested.
(3) 	The arrest was made pursuant to the requirements of Section 142,
837, 838, or 839.
Cal. Pen. Code § 847(b). Plaintiff responds that, “[b]ecause the SAC alleges a warrantless
and punitive arrest with a manufactured probable cause, the arrest is unlawful and therefore
Plaintiff states a valid false imprisonment claim.” (See CHP Opp’n at 17.)
The question, therefore, is whether Plaintiff plausibly alleges that her arrest was
unlawful or that Officer Aanestad lacked reasonable cause to believe that the arrest was
lawful. 	Here, Plaintiff alleges that she “was pulled over by California Highway Patrol
Officer Graham Nigel Aanestad for allegedly failing to stop at a stop sign.” (See SAC at
3.) 	Officer Aanestad therefore had reasonable suspicion to stop her. 	United States v.
French, 468 F. App’x 737, 738 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205
F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2000)); see Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)
(“As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police
have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”). 	Although Officer
Aanestad “informed Plaintiff and her husband that they were not free to leave,” Plaintiff
and her husband then “continued on to a local hardware store.” (See SAC at 4.) Plaintiff
and her husband were arrested after Officer Aanestad and backup Riverside Deputies
caught up to them. 	(See id.) 	Accordingly, Officer Aanestad also had probable cause to
arrest Plaintiff based on her fleeing the traffic stop. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 516
F.2d 318, 320 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that fleeing from an officer’s stop “is probative of
criminal activity”); see also, e.g., Randolph v. Adams, No. C 02-4196 JSW (PR), 2006 WL
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2032542, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 18, 2006) (concluding police had probable cause to believe
the petitioner had evaded a police vehicle where he continued to drive after officers
activated red lights and siren and instructed him to pull over and, after a mile, “pulled over,
briefly stopped, and then resumed driving”); Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.1(a) (“Any person
who, while operating a motor vehicle and with the intent to evade, willfully flees or
otherwise attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle, is guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . .”). Further, to the extent Plaintiff suggests that Officer Aanestad’s initial
stop or subsequent arrest were motivated by some improper purposes, (see, e.g., SAC at 3
(“The stop was premeditated, as the officer was lying in wait on the opposite side of the
street.”), 4 (“This assertion visibly irritated the officer[.]”)), “an officer’s subjective
thoughts play no role in the Fourth Amendment analysis.” 	United States v. Ramirez, 473
F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 811–13). Because it is clear
from the face of the Second Amended Complaint that Officer Aanestad had probable cause
to arrest Plaintiff, the Court 	GRANTS IN PART 	Officer Aanestad’s Motion and
DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims against him for false imprisonment
under California Penal Code section 847(b).
2. 	Assault and Battery
Plaintiff asserts a claim against Officer Aanestad for assault and battery based on his
“[u]se of physical force in absence of legal authority.” 	(See SAC at 11.) 	Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that she was “threatened with a Taser,” “arrested aggressively,” and “facial
recognition software was used on [her] without legal justification.” (See id. at 4.) Officer
Aanestad argues that these allegations fall short of excessive force and that it is unclear
whether Office Aanestad or the Riverside Deputies applied the alleged force. 	(See CHP
Mot. at 21–22.) Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff fails to allege that Officer Aanestad,
as opposed to any of the other officers on scene, applied the alleged force, (see, e.g., SAC
at 4 (“The couple was subsequently intercepted, arrested aggressively, and subjected to a
vehicle search. Kathleen was threatened with a Taser . . . , and facial recognition software
was used on Kathleen without legal justification.”)), the Court GRANTS IN PART
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Officer Aanestad’s Motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims
against him for assault and battery for the same reasons the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Officer Aanestad. 	See supra Section
I.D.
3. 	Bane Act
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Aanestad violated the Bane Act by “[i]nterfer[ing] with
Plaintiff’s rights through threat, intimidation, or coercion.” 	(See SAC at 11.) 	Officer
Aanestad contends “[P]laintiff cannot state a valid claim against Officer Aanestad for
violation of the United States Constitution or California law; thus, [P]laintiff cannot state
a claim under the Bane Act.” (See CHP Mot. at 22.) As with the Bail Agent Defendants,
see supra Section II.D, because Plaintiff has failed plausibly to allege that Officer Aanestad
violated her constitutional rights, see supra Sections I.D & II.C.1–2, the Court GRANTS
IN PART Officer Aanestad’s Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims against
him. Because the claims on which Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim is premised were dismissed
without prejudice, dismissal of the Bane Act claim is also WITHOUT PREJUDICE at
this time.
4. 	Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Officer Aanestad intentionally inflicted emotional
distress on her when he “forcibly seiz[ed] Plaintiff, falsely imprison[ed] her, subject[ed]
her to intimidation, and disregard[ed] her clearly established legal rights.” 	(See SAC at
11.) 	Officer Aanestad argues that, because Plaintiff’s arrest was supported by probable
cause and the preceding stop was justified by reasonable suspicion and probable cause,
“Plaintiff fails to allege that Officer Aanestad engaged in conduct that is sufficiently
outrageous or extreme to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as
required under California law.” 	(See CHP Mot. at 24.) 	For the same reasons the Court
granted the Bail Agent Defendants’ Motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, see supra Section II.B.5, the Court GRANTS IN PART
/ / /
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Officer Aanestad’s Motion and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims
against Officer Aanestad for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART
the Motion. 	Specifically, the Court DENIES the Motions as to Plaintiff’s Section 1983
claims against Sgt. De Loss and trespass claims against the Bail Agent Defendants and
DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claims for assault and battery against the
Bail Agent Defendants and for First Amendment retaliation and false imprisonment against
Officer 	Aanestad. 	The 	Court 	DISMISSES 	WITHOUT 	PREJUDICE 	Plaintiff’s
remaining claims. Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended complaint curing the above-identified
deficiencies on or before April 30, 2026. 	The Court advises Plaintiff that any amended
complaint must be complete in itself without reference to her prior complaints and any
defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the amended complaint will be
considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; see also Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d
896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not
re-alleged in an amended pleading may be considered waived if not repled); Hal Roach
Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989), as amended
(Feb. 22, 1990) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”). Should Plaintiff elect
not to file an amended complaint, this case SHALL PROCEED as to Plaintiff’s surviving
claims under Section 1983 against Sgt. De Loss and for trespass against the Bail Agent
Defendants.
Defendants SHALL RESPOND to Plaintiff’s operative pleading on or before
May 21, 2026. In accordance with Section III.B.3 of the undersigned’s Standing Order for
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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Civil Cases, Defendants “must make every effort to coordinate and consolidate the briefing
or use the notice-of-joinder procedure to avoid duplication in briefing.”
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 26, 2026
___________________________
Honorable Todd W. Robinson
United States District Judge
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