Fogy v. BPREP Vantage Pointe LLC et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
GIORGIO FOGY on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
BPREP VANTAGE POINTE LLC, a
Delaware Limited Liability Company,
BROOKFIELD PROPERTIES
MULTIFAMILY LLC, a Delaware
Limited Liability Company, and DOES 1-
100,
Defendants.
Case No.: 25-CV-622 TWR (VET)
ORDER (1) PRELIMINARILY
APPROVING SETTLEMENT,
(2) APPROVING OF CLASS
NOTICE, (3) CONDITIONALLY
CERTIFYING THE SETTLEMENT
CLASSES, AND (4) SETTING FINAL
APPROVAL HEARING
(ECF No. 20)
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Giorgio Fogy’s Unopposed Motion for
Preliminary Approval of the Class Action Settlement. (ECF No. 20 (“Mot.”).) The Court
took the Motion under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule
7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 21.) After carefully considering Plaintiff’s Motion, the declarations
filed in support of the Motion, the Settlement Agreement, and the relevant law, the Court
GRANTS 	the 	Motion, 	PRELIMINARILY 	APPROVES 	the 	Settlement,
CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIES the Settlement Classes, APPROVES of Class Notice,
and SETS a Fairness Hearing for Final Approval of the Settlement Agreement.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I. 	Plaintiff’s Claims
This action arises from Plaintiff Giorgio Fogy’s tenancy at Vantage Pointe, a 679-
unit apartment building located at 1281 Ninth Ave, San Diego, CA 92101. (See Mot. at
1.) “Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with Defendants on February 24, 2025, and
lived at Vantage Pointe from February 27, 2024, to May 15, 2025.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges
he and members of the Settlement Class “experienced multiple and frequent water and hot
water outages and shutoffs and elevator outages and shutoffs.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges the
hot water outages “were particularly frequent and persistent in the months of November
2024 to February 2025.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff sued “for breach of contract, breach of the
implied warranty of habitability, breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment,
private nuisance, negligence, and violation of California’s Business & Professions Code
sections 17200, et seq.” (Id.)
II. 	Litigation and Settlement
Plaintiff filed this action on February 10, 2025, and Defendants removed this action
to this Court on March 14, 2025. 	(See Mot. at 1.) 	On April 30, 2025, the Parties
participated in an early neutral evaluation conference that did not result in settlement, so
the Parties proceeded with discovery. (See ECF No. 20-1 (“Suhr Decl.”) ¶ 7.) Defendants
produced over “14,000 pages of documents” in response to Plaintiff’s discovery requests.
(See Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff’s counsel also “took the deposition of Jose Macias, Brookfield’s
Regional Engineer, and conducted a witness interview of the former Maintenance
Manager at Vantage Pointe (the highest-ranking on-site maintenance employee), Antonio
Herrera.” (Id.)
On December 11, 2025, the Parties participated in a 12-hour mediation, before Scott
Markus of Signature Resolutions. 	(See id.) 	The mediation “ended in a mediator’s
proposal—rendered by Mr. Markus after hearing detailed analysis of the case from the
parties—that both parties accepted.” (Id. at 3.) This mediator’s proposal resulted in the
Settlement Agreement. (See id.)
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III. 	The Proposed Classes
The Settlement proposes the following two classes:
1. 	The Settlement Class: All Tenants who resided at Vantage Pointe at any time
between February 10, 2021, and the date of Preliminary Approval.
2. 	The Winter 24-25 Subclass: All Tenants who resided at Vantage Pointe at
any time between November 1, 2024, to February 28, 2025.
(See ECF No. 20-2 (“Settlement Agreement”) ¶¶ 2.3, 2.4.) The Settlement Class includes
the Winter 24-25 Subclass. (Id. ¶ 2.4.) Both the Settlement Class and the Winter 24-25
Subclass exclude the Released Parties: “Defendants, together with each of their respective
affiliates, 	agents, 	employees, 	officers, 	directors, 	parents, 	subsidiaries, 	attorneys,
representatives, advisors, administrators, predecessors, successors, insurers, accountants,
advisors, or anyone acting on their behalf.” (Id. ¶ 2.31.)
IV. 	The Proposed Settlement Agreement
The 	Proposed 	Settlement 	Agreement 	“provides 	that 	Defendants 	will 	pay
$2,495,000 (the “Settlement Fund”) to the Settlement Class, with no reversion to
Defendants.” (Mot. at 3.) “Of that amount, $1,555,000 (or 62.3%) is apportioned to the
Settlement Class, and $940,000 (or 37.7%) is apportioned to the Winter 24-25 Subclass.”
(Id.) “Prior to disbursement to the Settlement Class, the Settlement Fund will be used to
pay (1) a service award to Plaintiff of no more than $10,000.00; (2) Class Counsel’s
attorneys’ fees award not to exceed 30% of the Settlement Fund; (3) Class Counsel’s
actual costs, currently estimated at $11,018.36; and (4) the Settlement Administrator’s fee,
not to exceed $20,000.00.” (Id. at 4.)
PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT
I. 	Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or
defenses of a certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only
with the court’s approval.” “[S]trong judicial policy . . . favors settlements, particularly
where complex class action litigation is concerned.” Class Pls. v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d
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1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992). 	“The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect the unnamed
members of the class from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights.” In re Syncor
ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court’s review of the settlement
is meant to be “extremely limited,” and the Court should consider the settlement as a
whole. See Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on
other grounds by Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
For approval of a class settlement, the Court determines whether the proposed
settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). 	To determine
whether a settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate,” courts should consider whether:
(1) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class;
(2) whether the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; (3) whether the relief provided
for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and
appeal, (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to the class,
including the method of processing class-member claims, and (iii) the terms of any
proposed award of attorney’s fees, including timing of payment, and (iv) any agreement
required to be identified under Rule 23(e)(3); and (4) if the proposal treats class members
equitably relative to each other. 	See id. 	Additionally, courts may still refer to the other
factors commonly used in the Ninth Circuit: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the
risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of
maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement;
(5) the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience
and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8) the reaction
of the class members of the proposed settlement. See In re Cal. Pizza Kitchen Data Breach
Litig., 129 F.4th 667, 674 (9th Cir. 2025). 	Because not all of the final approval factors
can be fully assessed at the preliminary approval stage, however, courts should focus on
whether the proposed settlement (1) appears to be the product of serious, informed, non-
collusive negotiations; (2) falls within the range of possible approval; (3) has no obvious
deficiencies; 	and 	(4) 	does 	not 	improperly 	grant 	preferential 	treatment 	to 	class
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representatives or segments of the class. See Zwicky v. Diamond Resorts Mgmt. Inc., 343
F.R.D. 101, 119 (D. Ariz. 2022).
“Additionally, when (as here) the settlement takes place before formal class
certification, settlement approval requires a ‘higher standard of fairness.’” 	Lane v.
Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 	“The reason for
more exacting review of class settlements reached before formal class certification is to
ensure that class representatives and their counsel do not secure a disproportionate benefit
‘at the expense of the unnamed plaintiffs who class counsel had a duty to represent.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
II. 	Analysis
A. 	Serious, Informed, and Non-Collusive Negotiations
This settlement is the product of a 12-hour mediation and the resulting mediator’s
proposal. 	(See Mot. at 2.) 	Plaintiff’s counsel states that substantial discovery and fact
investigation occurred prior to the mediation and that the mediation was a detailed
discussion of the “facts of the Action, issues of certifiability, merits issues, and damages
issues.” (Id. at 11.) In terms of discovery, Defendants produced over “14,000 pages of
documents” in response to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. (See id. at 2.) These documents
included “invoices, work orders, vendor work descriptions, internal emails, emails to
tenants, and email and maintenance portal complaints from tenants spanning back to the
beginning of the Class Period.” 	(Suhr Decl. ¶ 8.) 	Plaintiff’s counsel, with the help of
document 	reviewers, 	examined 	these 	documents 	and 	used 	them 	to 	create 	a
“comprehensive and detailed spreadsheet that outlined the scope and duration of alleged
hot water disruptions at Vantage Pointe for the entirety of the Class Period.” 	(Id.)
Plaintiff’s counsel also “took the deposition of Jose Macias, Brookfield’s Regional
Engineer, and conducted a witness interview of the former Maintenance Manager at
Vantage Pointe (the highest-ranking on-site maintenance employee), Antonio Herrera.”
(Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel represents that by the date of the mediation, “fact discovery was
already substantially completed” and he had been able to largely construct “a timeline of
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shutoffs and outages at Vantage Pointe and find proof of the scope and duration of those
shutoffs and outages.” 	(Id. at ¶ 10.) 	Because pre-settlement discovery covered the key
facts of the case and the Settlement Agreement was negotiated by a neutral mediator, the
Court preliminarily finds the Parties’ negotiations were serious, well-informed, and
negotiated at arm’s length.
B. 	Range of Possible Approval
To determine whether a settlement “falls within the range of possible approval,” a
court must focus on “substantive fairness and adequacy” and “consider plaintiffs’
expected recovery balanced against the value of the settlement offer.” 	In re Tableware
Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. Under the Settlement Agreement, Defendants
will pay $2,495,000, with 62.3% of the Net Settlement Fund going to the Settlement Class,
and 37.7% of the Net Settlement Fund going to the Winter 24-25 Subclass. Class Counsel
represents that the Settlement Fund “is somewhere between 13% and 31% of the potential
recovery” 	based 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	damages 	calculations, 	but 	even 	higher 	based 	on
Defendant’s arguments. (Mot. at 17.) Specifically, the lower end of Plaintiff’s damages
calculations represents one day of rent for each day when an outage occurred, but
Defendants would argue that this measure is too high because an apartment is not worth
$0 on a day where there was an outage. (See Suhr Decl. ¶ 29.) Using the Court’s estimated
Net Settlement Fund of $1,705,482,1 the Net Settlement fund represents between 9% and
21% of the potential recovery.
Class Counsel argues that this reduction is reasonable given the risk of continued
litigation and the immediacy of recovery. (See Mot. at 17.) Specifically, Class Counsel
states that there are “several factual and legal issues at the core of this case that could . . .
make or break the case.” (Id. at 12.) As an example, the Parties disagree over “whether
one can support a warranty of habitability claim simply by showing the effect that an
/ / /
1 	The Court’s calculation is based on the following estimates: 30% attorney’s fees, $11,018 in
actual costs, $10,000 as a service award, and $20,000 to the Settlement Administrator.
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uninhabitable condition had on the apartment unit, or whether one must also show that the
tenant was affected by the condition.” (Id.)
“It is well-settled law that a cash settlement amounting to only a fraction of the
potential recovery does not per se render the settlement inadequate or unfair.” 	Officers
for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 628 (9th Cir.1982). 	Further, courts
routinely preliminarily and finally approve settlements with reductions of similar amounts.
See, e.g., Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co., 306 F.R.D. 245, 256 (N.D. Cal. 2015)
(finding the agreed upon common fund which represented between 11% and 27% of the
total potential recovery was fair). 	Given the risk of continued litigation, the contested
legal and factual issues, and Plaintiff’s counsel’s view that the settlement is fair, the Court
finds the Settlement Agreement’s terms fall within the range of possible approval.
C. 	No Obvious Deficiencies
Obvious deficiencies in a settlement agreement include “any subtle signs that class
counsel have allowed pursuit of their own self-interests to infect the negotiations.”
McKinney-Drobnis v. Oreshack, 16 F.4th 594, 607 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The
Ninth Circuit has identified three such subtle signs: “(1) when counsel receives a
disproportionate distribution of the settlement; (2) when the parties negotiate a clear-
sailing arrangement, under which the defendant agrees not to challenge a request for an
agreed-upon attorney’s fee; and (3) when the agreement contains a kicker or reverter
clause that returns unawarded fees to the defendant, rather than the class.” Id. at 607–08
(citation omitted). 	Further, “[i]n the pre-certification context, the district court must do
more than acknowledge that warning-sign provisions exist and then conclude that they are
not dispositive without further apparent scrutiny.” Id. at 611.
Two of the three subtle signs are present here: a potentially disproportionate
distribution to Class Counsel and a clear-sailing agreement. 	(See generally Settlement
Agreement.) Class Counsel has not set the specific percentage of attorney’s fees they will
request, but “[a]s stipulated in the Settlement Agreement, Class Counsel will not move for
anything more than 30% of the Settlement Fund.” (Mot. at 14.) Further, the Settlement
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Agreement provides that “Defendants will not oppose Class Counsel’s motion for fees and
costs” made in accordance with the Settlement Agreement. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 8.1.)
The presence of a clear-sailing agreement means that the Court must “scrutinize the
agreement for signs that the fees requested by counsel are unreasonably high.” McKinney-
Drobnis, 16 F.4th at 610. Further, despite the fact that the Settlement is not contingent on
the award of attorney’s fees, the Court must consider the implications of the 30% upwards
bound. 	See In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 948 (“[A] severable clause simply may not be
severed from the court’s Rule 23(e) analysis”). The Court will consider the clear-sailing
agreement in conjunction with the potentially disproportionate distribution.
“Where a settlement produces a common fund for the benefit of the entire class,
courts have discretion to employ either the lodestar method or the percentage-of-recovery
method.” 	In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942. 	“Though courts have discretion to choose
which calculation method they use, their discretion must be exercised so as to achieve a
reasonable result.” Id. In common fund cases, there is a presumptive 25% benchmark on
attorneys’ fees. 	See id. at 943. But the “25% benchmark rate, although a starting point
for analysis, may be inappropriate in some cases.” Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d
1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2002). Some cases will justify a higher percentage while other cases
will justify a lower percentage. See id. In determining the proper percentage, courts may
consider (1) the extent to which class counsel achieved exceptional results for the class,
(2) whether the case was risky for class counsel, (3) whether counsel’s performance
generated benefits beyond the cash settlement fund, (4) the market rate for the particular
field of law (in some circumstances), (4) the burdens class counsel experienced while
litigating the case (e.g., cost, duration, foregoing other work), and (5) whether the case
was handled on a contingency basis. 	See In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779
F.3d at 954–955.
Assuming Class Counsel requests the upper limit that the Parties have agreed upon,
30% of the Settlement Fund is $748,500. This is 43.89% of the Net Settlement Fund (as
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approximated by the Court).2 The Court is concerned that this is disproportionate to the
amount of work Class Counsel expended in this short-lived litigation. 	See Shannon v.
Sherwood Mgmt. Co., No. 19-CV-01101-BAS-JLB, 2020 WL 2394932, at *11 (S.D. Cal.
May 12, 2020) (“[T]he earlier a case settles, the greater the concern that a percentage
award may amount to a windfall for counsel”). 	This case has been pending for shortly
over a year, and Class Counsel’s work on this case includes participating in fact discovery,
one deposition, and one witness interview. 	The Court is skeptical that a lodestar
calculation would be close to $748,500. 	Additionally, given that the Settlement Fund
represents between 13% and 31% of the class members’ potential recovery, the Court is
concerned that 30% represents overpayment to Class Counsel at the expense of the class
members.
Plaintiff’s counsel represents that an upward departure from the 25% benchmark
may be warranted because this case involved “novel legal issues and a serious risk of
nonpayment.” 	(Mot. at 14.) 	These factors could justify an upwards departure from the
25% benchmark. 	See In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d at 954–955;
Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 373 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (“The novelty of class
counsel’s legal arguments may constitute ‘special circumstances’ justifying a departure
from the benchmark.”). But the Court is unconvinced by the present record that the facts
of the current case justify an upwards departure.
The Court’s concern with the potentially disproportionate distribution in attorney’s
fees in amplified by the clear-sailing agreement; however, because 30% is not a large
departure from the 25% benchmark, the Settlement Agreement is the product of a neutral
mediator’s proposal, and the Settlement is not contingent on any award of attorney’s fees,
the Court does not find that the agreement not to oppose the fee request is inherently
collusive. Further, the lack of a reverter clause reduces the inference of collusion drawn
2 	See supra n.1.
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from the clear sailing provision. See In re Toys R Us-Del., Inc.--Fair & Accurate Credit
Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., 295 F.R.D. 438, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
Overall, despite the Court’s concerns, the potential request for 30% of the
Settlement Fund in attorney’s fees and the clear-sailing agreement do not doom the
Settlement at the preliminary approval stage. Courts routinely grant preliminary approval
of similar settlement agreements and require a more fulsome record before the final
approval hearing. 	See, e.g., Shannon v. Sherwood Mgmt. Co., No. 19-CV-01101-BAS-
JLB, 2020 WL 2394932, at *11 (S.D. Cal. May 12, 2020) (granting preliminary approval
when the potential fee award was 30% of the settlement fund and the settlement agreement
contained a clear sailing provision but requiring detailed billing records before the final
approval hearing). 	Accordingly, Class Counsel SHALL SUPPORT its Motion for
Attorney’s Fees with detailed billing records so the Court may determine an appropriate
lodestar figure and if the request is over 25%, evidence supporting an upward departure
from the 25% benchmark. 	Further, the Court ADVANCES the proposed date for filing
the motion for attorney’s fees and request for Plaintiff’s service award to provide
additional time for Settlement Class Members to consider the requests.
D. 	No Preferential Treatment to Class Representatives or Segments of the
Class
District courts must be “particularly vigilant” for signs counsel has allowed the
“self-interests” of “certain class members to infect negotiations.” 	In re Bluetooth, 654
F.3d at 947. 	For that reason, preliminary approval of a class action settlement is
inappropriate where the proposed agreement “improperly grants preferential treatment to
class representatives.” In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
1. 	Segments of the Class
Here, the Winter 24-25 Subclass Members are entitled to additional compensation.
(See Mot. at 14.) Plaintiff contends that the difference in compensation is based on “the
strength of the Winter 24-25 Subclass Members’ claims and extent of their damages
compared to those of the other members of the Settlement Class.” (Id. at 15.) Specifically,
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“during the Winter 24-25 Subclass Period, there was a higher volume of hot water
interruptions of long duration, broad scope, and uniform effect, and the evidence of those
interruptions was comparatively stronger than the evidence of interruptions outside of the
Winter 24-25 Subclass Period.” 	(Id.) 	Given the higher volume and duration of
interruptions 	in 	the Winter 24-25 	period, the Court 	does not 	find 	the additional
compensation for the Winter 24-25 Subclass is preferential treatment. 	See In re
Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“It is reasonable
to allocate the settlement funds to class members based on the extent of their injuries or
the strength of their claims on the merits.”) (citation omitted).
2. 	Class Representative
“A 	disproportionate 	service 	award 	can 	indicate 	preferential 	treatment 	that
undermines both the reasonableness of a settlement for absent class members and the
adequacy of representation by the class representative.” 	Wilson v. J.B. Hunt Logistics,
Inc., No. 218CV03487SVWAFMX, 2020 WL 11626082, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2020)
(citing Staton, 327 F.3d at 975–78). 	The Settlement Agreement provides that “Class
Counsel shall apply to the Court to approve a Service Award for Plaintiff Giorgio Fogy in
an amount not to exceed $10,000.00, subject to approval by the Court.” 	(Settlement
Agreement ¶ 8.2.) Even though the Settlement is not contingent on the award of a service
fee, the Court must consider the implications of the $10,000 upwards bound. 	See In re
Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 948 (“[A] severable clause simply may not be severed from the
court’s Rule 23(e) analysis”).
The relevant factors in determining an appropriate service award include (1) the
actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, (2) the degree to which
the class has benefitted from those actions, (3) the amount of time and effort the plaintiff
expended in pursuing the litigation, and (4) fears of reputational risk. See Staton, 327 F.3d
at 977; Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff’s
counsel represents that they will seek $10,000 to compensate Plaintiff for “(1) his
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willingness to serve, without which there would be no case, and (2) the time and effort he
invested in this litigation.” (ECF No. 20-3 (“Treglio Decl.”) ¶ 4.)
While it appears that Plaintiff has actively participated in this litigation, (see Suhr
Decl. ¶ 6), the Court is concerned that the contemplated $10,000 service award is not
reasonable compensation for protecting the interests of the class and helping with the
litigation. Comparing $10,000 to the estimated payout for class members, the upper limit
of the suggested service award appears disproportionately high. The Court’s preliminary
calculation of the Net Settlement Fund is $1,705,482.3 Applying the calculations provided
by Plaintiff, this would result in a class member who is part of both the Settlement Class
and the Winter 24-25 Subclass receiving $786.69 and a Settlement Class member who is
not also a Winter 24-25 Subclass member receiving $261.38. 	A $10,000 service award
represents 1,271% of $786.69 and 3,826% of $261.38. While the Court recognizes that
Plaintiff has participated meaningfully in the litigation process, this level of discrepancy
in award level is concerning.
The fact that the service award is a small percentage of the overall Settlement Fund,
however, weighs in favor of reasonableness. 	See Katz-Lacabe v. Oracle Am., Inc., No.
3:22-CV-04792-RS, 2024 WL 4804974, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2024) (approving
$10,000 service awards when they represented a small portion of the settlement fund and
the amount they recovered for the class was less than 50 cents per class member). 	A
service award of $10,000 represents 0.4% of the Settlement Fund and 0.6% of the
estimated 	Net 	Settlement 	Fund. 	Therefore, 	at 	the 	preliminary 	approval 	stage,
notwithstanding the Court’s concerns, the Court does not find that the upper limit on
Plaintiff’s service award request constitutes “preferential treatment” such that it should
defeat preliminary approval. See In re ImmunityBio, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 3:23-CV-01216-
GPC-VET, 2025 WL 834767, at *13 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2025) (finding that “because
incentive awards are not per se unreasonable,” the service award provision setting an upper
3 	See supra n.1.
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limit of $15,000 on the lead plaintiff’s service award request did not bar preliminary
approval of the settlement agreement). 	Plaintiff SHALL SUPPORT his request for a
service award with how many hours Plaintiff spent working on this case. 	See, e.g.,
Ontiveros v. Zamora, 303 F.R.D. 356, 366 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (using the hours the plaintiff
estimated he worked on the case and a reasonable hourly rate to calculate the appropriate
service award); Griffin v. Consol. Commc’ns, No. 2:21-CV-0885 WBS KJN, 2022 WL
16836711, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2022) (granting preliminary approval but stating that
if the plaintiff did not reduce the amount of her requested reward “she should be prepared
to present further evidence of her substantial efforts taken as class representative or other
relevant personal sacrifices to better justify the high incentive award requested” of
$7,500).
E. 	Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the Parties’ Motion for Preliminary
Approval of the Class Settlement.
CLASS NOTICE
I. 	Legal Standard
For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), “class members must be afforded the
best notice practicable under the circumstances, which includes individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language:
(i) 	the nature of the action;
(ii) 	the definition of the class certified;
(iii) 	the class claims, issues, or defenses;
(iv) 	that a class member may enter an appearance through an attorney if the
member so desires;
(v) 	that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests
exclusion;
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(vi) 	the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and
(vii) 	the binding effect of a class judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).
Id.
II. 	Analysis
To effectuate notice, Defendants will supply the Settlement Administrator with the
names, email addresses, and mail addresses of the Settlement Class Members. (See Mot.
at 5.) Then, within fourteen days, the Settlement Administrator will email the Short-Form
Notice to the Settlement Class Members. (See id.) The Short-Form Notice will contain
links to the Settlement Website, the Long-Form Notice, and the Opt-Out Form. (See id.)
If any e-mails bounce back as undeliverable, the Settlement Administrator will send the
Short-Form Notice via First-Class U.S. Mail. 	(See id.) 	Settlement Class Members will
have seventy days from the date the Court grants preliminary approval of the Settlement
either to postmark or email the Opt-Out Form.
After a review of the proposed Long-Form and Short-Form Notices (the “Proposed
Notices”), the Court finds that they generally adequately explain the information required
by Rule 23(c)(2)(B) using a question-and-answer format. 	(See generally ECF No. 20-2
Exs. 1 (“Long-Form Notice”), 2 (“Short-Form Notice”).) 	The Long-Form Notice
adequately informs Class Members of the nature of the litigation, (see id. at 3); the
essential terms of the Settlement, (see id. at 4–5); the two classes being certified, (see id.
at 4); that Defendant denies liability, (see id. at 3); how the Settlement fund will be
apportioned, (see id. at 3); that a Class Member can appear through their own attorney,
(see id. at 8); and that a class judgment will be binding if the Class Member does not opt-
out, (see id. at 7). The Long-Form Notice also adequately provides procedural information
on how to object to or comment on the Settlement, (see id. at 8–9); how to opt-out of the
Settlement, (see id. at 6–7); the time and manner for opting out of the Settlement, (see id.);
and where to get more information, (see id. at 10). Further, the Short-Form Notice, which
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is to be sent via email, also provides information on 1) the nature of the action, (See id. at
1); 2) the definition of the class certified, (see id. at 2); 3) the class claims, (see id. at 1);
4) that a Class Member may enter an appearance through an attorney, (see id. at 3); 5) that
the Court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, (see id.), 6) the
time and manner for requesting exclusion, (see id.); and 7) the binding effect of a class
judgment on member, (see id. at 2).
For the Proposed Notices to be the best practicable under the circumstances,
however, the following changes should be made:
1. 	To paragraph 2 on page 5 of the Long-Form Notice, the Parties SHALL ADD
the current estimate of actual costs: “Prior to disbursement of the Settlement
Fund to the Settlement Class, Plaintiff will apply to the Court for a service
award up to $10,000.00 and Plaintiff’s attorneys will apply to the Court for
attorney’s fees of up to 30% of the Settlement Fund and for recovery of the
costs that they expended to litigate this Lawsuit, currently estimated at
$11,018.36.”
2. 	To paragraph 8 on page 2 of the Short-Form Notice, the Parties SHALL
REPLACE the statement, “Prior to disbursement of settlement payments,
the Settlement Fund may be reduced by attorney’s fees and costs, a service
award 	to 	Plaintiff 	Giorgio 	Fogy, 	and 	payment 	to 	the 	Settlement
Administrator, 	Phoenix 	Settlement 	Administration, 	for 	its 	services 	in
administering this Settlement,” with the following: 	“Prior to disbursement
of the Settlement Fund to the Settlement Class, Plaintiff will apply to the
Court for a service award up to $10,000.00 and Plaintiff’s attorneys will
apply to the Court for attorney’s fees of up to 30% of the Settlement Fund
and for recovery of the costs that they expended to litigate this Lawsuit. Such
amounts, if awarded, will be deducted from the Settlement Fund.”
Subject to the above changes, the Court concludes that this is the best notice practicable
under the circumstances. 	See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(c). 	Accordingly, the Court
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APPROVES the proposed Long-Form Notice, Short-Form Notice, and Notice Plan,
subject to the above changes.
CONDITIONAL CLASS CERTIFICATION
I. 	Legal Standard
Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, the district court
must pay “undiluted, even heightened, attention” to class certification requirements
“designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions.”
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997). To obtain class certification,
Plaintiffs must satisfy the four prerequisites identified in Rule 23(a) as well as one of the
three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). 	See id. at 614. 	“The four requirements of Rule 23(a)
are commonly referred to as ‘numerosity,’ ‘commonality,’ ‘typicality,’ and ‘adequacy of
representation’ (or just ‘adequacy’), respectively.” 	United Steel, Paper & Forestry,
Rubber, 	Mfg. 	Energy, 	Allied 	Indus. 	& 	Serv. 	Workers 	Int’l 	Union, 	AFL–CIO 	v.
ConocoPhillips Co., 593 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 2010). Rule 23(b) requires a plaintiff to
establish one of the following: (1) that there is a risk of substantial prejudice from separate
actions, (2) that declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting the class as a whole would be
appropriate, or (3) that common questions of law or fact predominate and the class action
is superior to other available methods of adjudication. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)–(3).
II. 	Analysis
For the reasons explained below, the Court finds the proposed Settlement Classes
satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3),
the Court CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIES the “Settlement Class” consisting of all
Tenants who resided at Vantage Pointe at any time between February 10, 2021, and the
date of Preliminary Approval and CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIES the “Winter 24-25
Subclass” consisting of all Tenants who resided at Vantage Pointe at any time between
November 1, 2024, to February 28, 2025.
/ / /
/ / /
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A. 	Rule 23(a) Requirements
1. 	Numerosity
The numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a) requires parties seeking class
certification to establish that the class is so large that joinder of all members is
impracticable. 	Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 2011).
“Impracticable” does not mean that joinder is a “literal impossibility,” but instead asks
whether joinder of all class members is “‘practicable’—i.e., ‘reasonably capable of being
accomplished.’” 	A.B. v. Haw. State Dep’t of Educ., 30 F.4th 828, 837 (9th Cir. 2022).
The Ninth Circuit has instructed that “where a class is large in numbers, joinder will
usually be impracticable.” Id. at 835; see also Rannis v. Recchia, 380 F. App’x 646, 651
(9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that numerosity is typically satisfied “when a class includes at
least 40 members”). Here, the “Settlement Class is composed of 4,065 members, and the
Winter 24-25 Subclass is composed of 1,224 members.” (Mot. at 18.) Accordingly, the
Court finds that numerosity is satisfied.
2. 	Commonality
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement is satisfied where “there are questions of
law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Common questions need not
address every aspect of the claims, but they must “generate common answers apt to drive
the resolution of the litigation.” Alcantar v. Hobart Serv., 800 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir.
2015) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). A single common question is sufficient.
See id. Here, Plaintiff states there are the following common questions:
[T]he existence of water, hot water, and elevator interruptions, the duration of
those interruptions, the scope and severity of those interruptions, the causes
of those interruptions and whether those causes were reasonably avoidable by
Defendants, whether Defendants’ negligently managed their plumbing and
elevator systems and equipment thereby leading to the interruptions, whether
Defendants’ responses to the interruptions were timely and reasonable, the
frequency, duration, or severity of interruption sufficient to serve as the basis
for the causes of action alleged in the Action, [and] whether a warranty of
habitability claim depends on the effect of the uninhabitable condition on the
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unit alone or the effect on the tenant, and the proper measure of damages for
an interruption.
(Mot at 19.) 	Because common answers to these questions would apply to all class
members, commonality is satisfied.
3. 	Typicality
The typicality requirement considers whether, in comparison to the representative
parties, “other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on
conduct [that] is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have
been injured by the same course of conduct.” 	Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 685 (9th
Cir. 2014). Commonality and typicality “‘tend to merge’ in practice because both of them
‘serve 	as 	guideposts 	for 	determining 	whether 	under 	the 	particular 	circumstances
maintenance of a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiff’s claim and
the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will be fairly and
adequately protected in their absence.’” 	Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707
F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349).
The Ninth Circuit’s test for typicality is (1) “whether other members have the same
or similar injury”; (2) “whether the action is based on conduct [that] is not unique to the
named plaintiffs”; and (3) “whether other class members have been injured by the same
course of conduct.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 	Here, Plaintiff alleges that
members of the Settlement Class and Winter 24-25 Subclass suffered the same alleged
injury as him—overpayment of rent—based on the same lack of reliable access to water,
hot water, and elevators. (See Mot. at 20.) Because the Court finds that the Class Members
suffered similar injuries to Plaintiff, the action is based on common questions, and Class
Members have been injured by the same course of conduct that injured Plaintiff, typicality
is satisfied.
/ / /
/ / /
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4. 	Adequacy
Rule 23(a)(4) requires the representatives to “fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Adequacy involves a two-part inquiry:
“(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with other
class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the action
vigorously on behalf of the class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.
a. 	Named Plaintiff/Class Representative
The Court is assured that Plaintiff participated vigorously in this litigation. 	(See
Suhr Decl. ¶ 6.) 	Further, while the Court has some qualms about the potential $10,000
service award request, see supra Section II.D.2, because the Settlement is not conditioned
on any service award, (see Settlement Agreement ¶ 8.2), the Court finds no conflict of
interest between Plaintiff and the absent Class Members.
b. 	Class Counsel
Class Counsel alleges they have adequately represented the Settlement Class
Members. (See Mot. at 8–9.) Specifically, Gregory Suhr of Weeks Nelson “led the charge
in the pre- and post-filing legal research, pre- and post-filing fact investigation, discovery
review, witness identification and interviewing, and deposition in the Action.” (Id. at 8.)
And Jim Treglio of Potter Handy LLP “helped Mr. Suhr craft Plaintiff’s damages theories
and mediation strategy[;] attended the mediation to advise on viable, fair, and adequate
class settlement figures and structures[;] and reviewed and helped draft the Settlement
Agreement and its exhibits.” (Id. at 9.) The Court is assured Class Counsel participated
vigorously in this litigation. Further, as with Plaintiff, the Court has some concerns over
the potential attorney’s fees motion, see supra Section II.C, but because the Settlement is
not conditioned on any attorney’s fee award, (see Settlement Agreement ¶ 8.1), the Court
finds no conflict of interest between Class Counsel and the absent Class Members.
B. 	Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements
Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
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is 	superior 	to 	other 	available 	methods 	for 	fairly 	and 	efficiently 	adjudicating 	the
controversy.”
1. 	Predominance
First, certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is appropriate where “questions of law or
fact common to the class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Ninth Circuit has held that “there is
clear justification for handling the dispute on a representative rather than individual basis”
if “common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for
all members of the class in a single adjudication.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022. A question
is common where “the same evidence will suffice for each member to make a prima facie
showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.” Tyson Foods, Inc.
v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (alteration in original). The proper question is
thus “whether the method of proof would apply in common to all class members . . . not
whether the method of proof would or could prevail.” Lytle v. Nutramax Lab’ys, Inc., 114
F.4th 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing In re Celexa & Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Pracs.
Litig., 915 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2019)).
Here, Plaintiff asserts that the main issues in this case are common. 	(See Mot. at
21.) 	For example, common questions include whether the alleged water, hot water, or
elevator outages or shutoffs occurred; the scope and severity of those outages or shutoffs;
the duration of those outages and shutoffs; and whether these outages and shutoffs were
reasonably avoidable by Defendants. 	(See id.) 	In contrast, the individual issues would
relate to the term of a Class Member’s lease and whether their unit was within the affected
portion of the building for a particular outage or shutoff. (See id. at 22.) The Court finds
that common questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions.
2. 	Superiority
Second, Rule 23(b)(3) requires Plaintiffs to demonstrate that a “class action is
superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 	Rule 23(b)(3) enumerates a list of non-exhaustive factors
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pertinent to class certification, including: the class members’ interests in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against class members, the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum, and the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 	Id. 	The superiority
requirement “tests whether class litigation of common issues will reduce litigation costs
and promote greater efficiency.” 	In re Ferrero Litig., 278 F.R.D. 552, 561 (S.D. Cal.
2011) (quoting Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996)).
Further, for a “request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not
inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems . . . for
the proposal is that there be no trial.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.
Here, Plaintiff represents that individual damages “would not be so high as to
properly incentivize individual litigation, especially in light of the potential retaliatory
ramifications.” (Mot. at 23.) The Court finds that classwide resolution is superior to other
methods of adjudicating this controversy given the unlikelihood that individual Class
Members would pursue individual lawsuits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows:
1. 	The Court PRELIMINARILY AND CONDITIONALLY CERTIFIES,
for settlement purposes only, the following Settlement Class and Winter 24-25 Subclass:
(a) 	A “Settlement Class” consisting of all Tenants who resided at Vantage
Pointe at any time between February 10, 2021, and the date of
Preliminary Approval (the “Class Period”).
(b) 	A “Winter 24-25 Subclass” consisting of all Tenants who resided at
Vantage Pointe at any time between November 1, 2024, to February
28, 2025 (the “Winter 24-25 Subclass Period”).
For both the Settlement Class and the Winter 24-25 Subclass, the term “Tenant” is defined
as “any person who 1) signed a lease for an apartment at Vantage Pointe, and 2) resided
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in an apartment at Vantage Pointe for which they signed a lease.” The Settlement Class
includes the Winter 24-25 Subclass. 	Both the Settlement Class and the Winter 24-25
Subclass exclude the Released Parties and all persons who file a timely and valid Opt-Out
Form.
2. 	Solely for purposes of the Settlement of this Class Action, the Court FINDS
that each element required for certification of the Settlement Class and Winter 24-25
Subclass pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been met.
3. 	The Court finds that, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and for the purposes of the Settlement only, Plaintiff Giorgio Fogy is an
adequate class representative and CERTIFIES him as Class Representative for the
Settlement Class and Winter 24-25 Subclass.
4. 	The Court APPOINTS Gregory Suhr of Weeks Nelson and Jim Treglio of
Potter Handy LLP as Class Counsel for the Settlement Class and Winter 24-25 Subclass
pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
5. 	The Court AUTHORIZES Class Counsel to retain Phoenix Settlement
Administration (the “Settlement Administrator”) to supervise and administer the notice
procedure in connection with the proposed Settlement as well as to process any exclusion
requests.
6. 	The Court PRELIMINARILY APPROVES the Settlement, as embodied in
the Settlement Agreement, as being fair, reasonable and adequate to the Settlement Class,
subject to further consideration at the Final Approval Hearing.
7. 	The Court SETS a Final Approval Hearing on July 2, 2026, 2026, at 1:30
p.m., in Courtroom 14A of the James M. Carter and Judith N. Keep United States
Courthouse, 333 West Broadway, San Diego, California 	92101, for the following
purposes:
(a) 	to determine whether the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate to the Settling Classes, and should be approved;
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(b) 	to determine whether a judgment should be entered to dismiss the
Class Action with prejudice;
(c) 	to determine whether the proposed plan for allocation and distribution
of the proceeds of the Settlement is fair and reasonable, and should be
approved;
(d) 	to determine whether the motion by Class Counsel for an award of
attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of costs should be approved;
(e) 	to determine whether Plaintiff’s request for a service award should be
approved; and
(f) 	to consider any other matters that may properly be brought before the
Court in connection with the Settlement.
8. 	Subject to the changes stated in this Order, see supra page 15, the Court
APPROVES, as to form and content, the proposed Long-Form Notice, the Short-Form
Notice, and the Opt-Out Form. The date and time of the Final Approval Hearing SHALL
BE INCLUDED in the Proposed Notices before dissemination.
9. 	Any member of the Settlement Class who wishes to exclude themself from
the Settlement Class MUST REQUEST exclusion in writing within the time and in the
manner set forth in the Proposed Notices. The Court APPROVES as to form and content
the Opt-Out Form affixed to the Settlement Agreement. If fully and correctly filled out
and timely and properly returned, the Opt-Out Form will be considered a valid request for
exclusion. Members of the Settlement Class can request exclusion through the Opt-Out
Form or by providing some other written request for exclusion, so long as the exclusion
request:
(a) 	is 	personally 	signed 	by 	the 	member 	requesting 	exclusion 	(the
“Requesting Person”);
(b) 	states the Requesting Person’s full name, mailing address, telephone
number, and email address, if any;
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(c) 	contains an unequivocal statement that Requesting Person wishes to
be excluded from this Settlement and from the Settlement Class;
(d) 	states the case name and case number for this Class Action; and
(e) 	states the member identification number assigned to the Requesting
Person by the Settlement Administrator in the Notice.
The exclusion requests must be emailed or mailed to the Settlement Administrator at the
mailing or email address provided in the Notice. The exclusion requests must be emailed
or postmarked by no later than seventy (70) days after the date of this Order. 	A request
for exclusion shall not be effective unless it provides all the required information and is
received by the Settlement Administrator within the time stated above or is otherwise
accepted by the Court for good cause. A Winter 24-25 Subclass Member cannot exclude
themselves from the Settlement Class while declining to exclude themselves from the
Winter 24-25 Subclass or exclude themselves from the Winter 24-25 Subclass while
declining to exclude themselves from the Settlement Class. Further, the right to opt-out
MUST BE EXERCISED INDIVIDUALLY, not as a member of a group.
10. 	Any person who timely and validly requests exclusion in compliance with
the terms stated in this Order and is excluded from the Settlement Class shall not be a
Member of the Settlement Class, shall not be bound by the terms of the Settlement or any
orders or judgments in this Class Action, and shall not receive any Settlement Payment.
11. 	Any Member of the Settlement Class who does not timely and validly request
exclusion from the Settlement Class in the manner stated in this Order shall be deemed to
have waived their right to be excluded from the Settlement Class and shall be bound by
the 	provisions 	of 	the 	Settlement 	Agreement; 	Settlement; 	and 	all 	proceedings,
determinations, Orders, and Judgments in the Class Action, including, but not limited to,
the Judgment and the Releases provided for therein.
12. 	Any Member of the Settlement Class who does not request exclusion from
the Settlement Class may enter an appearance in the Class Action, at his or her own
expense, individually or through counsel of his or her own choice, by filing with the Clerk
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of Court and delivering a notice of appearance to Class Counsel, Defendants’ Counsel,
and the Settlement Administrator, such that it is received no later than seventy (70) days
after the date of this Order, or as this Court may otherwise direct. 	Any Member of the
Settlement Class who does not enter an appearance will be represented by Class Counsel.
COURT 	CLASS
COUNSEL
DEFENDANTS’
COUNSEL
SETTLEMENT
ADMINISTRATOR
United States
District
Court, Carter-
Keep Courthouse
c/o Clerk of Court
333 W. Broadway
Suite 420
San Diego, CA
92101
Weeks Nelson
c/o Gregory N.
Suhr
c/o Gregory K.
Nelson
16236 San Dieguito
Rd.
Ste. 5-23
Rancho Santa Fe,
CA 92067
Duane Morris
c/o Deanna Lucci
c/o Courtney
Baird
750 B St.
Ste. 2900
San Diego, CA
92101
Phoenix Settlement
Administration
P.O. Box 7208
Orange, CA 92863
13. Any Settlement Class Member who does not request exclusion from the Class
may file a written objection to the proposed Settlement, the proposed plan of allocation
and 	distribution, 	Class 	Counsel’s 	motion 	for 	an 	award 	of 	attorneys’ 	fees 	and
reimbursement of costs, and/or Plaintiff’s request for Service Award and appear and show
cause, if that person has any cause, why
(a) 	the proposed Settlement should not be approved as fair, reasonable,
and adequate;
(b) 	a Final Judgment should not be entered;
(c) 	the 	proposed 	plan 	of 	allocation 	and 	distribution 	should 	not 	be
approved;
(d) 	Class Counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of costs
should not be approved; and/or
(e) 	a Service Fee Award should not be made to Plaintiff.
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14. 	Any objections, filings, and other submissions by the objecting Member of
the Settlement Class (the “Objecting Person”) must:
(a) 	state the Objecting Person’s full name, address, telephone number, and
email address, if any, and that of the Objecting Person’s counsel, if
any;
(b) 	the grounds for all objections, stated with specificity, and any evidence
the Objecting Person wishes to introduce in support of the objections;
(c) 	whether the objection applies only to the Objecting Person, to a
specific subset of the Settlement Class, or to the entire Settlement
Class;
(d) 	proof of membership in the Settlement Class and—if the objection is
specific to the Winter 24-25 Subclass—proof of membership in the
Winter 24-25 Subclass;
(e) 	a statement as to whether the Objecting Person intends to appear at the
final fairness hearing, either individually or through counsel;
(f) 	if appearing at the final fairness hearing, the identity of any witnesses
the Objecting Person intends to have testify and copies of any exhibits
the Objecting Person intends to introduce into evidence;
(g) 	the Objecting Person’s signature;
(h) 	the case name and case number for the Action; and
(i) 	the Objecting Person’s claim identification number provided by the
Settlement Administrator in the Notice.
15. 	Any Member of the Settlement Class who does not make an objection in the
manner provided herein shall be deemed to have waived their right to object to any aspect
of the proposed Settlement, the proposed plan of allocation and distribution, Class
Counsel’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of costs, and
Plaintiff’s request for a Service Award.
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16. 	Until otherwise ordered by the Court, the Court STAYS all proceedings in
the Class Action other than proceedings necessary to carry out or enforce the terms and
conditions of the Settlement Agreement.
17. 	Class Counsel SHALL FILE AND SERVE its motion for attorney’s fees
and reimbursement of costs and Plaintiff’s request for a service award no later than twenty-
five (25) days after the date of this Order. Class Counsel SHALL FILE AND SERVE
the opening papers in support of the proposed Settlement no later than thirty-five (35) days
before the Final Approval Hearing; and responsive papers, if any, shall be filed and served
no later than seven (7) days before the Final Approval Hearing.
18. 	The Court retains jurisdiction to consider all further applications arising out
of or connected with the proposed Settlement.4
19. 	The Court reserves the right to continue the date of the Final Approval
Hearing without further notice to the Class Members.
20. 	The Court SETS the following schedule:
EVENT DEADLINE 	DATE
Defendants to provide
name and contact
information to
Settlement
Administrator
5 business days from the date
of this Order
March 23, 2026
Settlement
Administrator to give
notice in accordance
with this Order
14 days from the date
Defendant provides
information to the Settlement
Administrator
April 6, 2026
Class Counsel to file
motion for attorney’s
25 days from the date of this
Order
April 10, 2026
4 	To the extent the Parties intend for the Court to retain jurisdiction after final approval of the
Settlement Agreement, in accordance with Section V of the undersigned’s Standing Order for
Civil Cases, the Parties SHALL EMAIL a completed Consent to Jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge form to efile_robinson@casd.uscourts.gov.
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fees and Plaintiff’s
service award
Deadline for Settlement
Class Members to
request exclusion or
object to the Settlement
70 days from the date of this
Order
May 25, 2026
Deadline for Class
Counsel to file papers
in support of final
approval of the
Settlement
35 days prior to the Final
Approval Hearing
May 28, 2026
Deadline for reply
papers in response to
Class Counsel’s
opening papers in
support of final
approval of the
Settlement
7 days prior to the Final
Approval Hearing
June 25, 2026
Final Approval Hearing 	N/A 	July 2, 2026, at
1:30 p.m.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 16, 2026
~,~¼~
Honorable Todd W. Robinson
Uruted States District Judge
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