Ayala v. Tapestry, Inc. et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CARLOS AYALA,
Plaintiff,
v.
TAPESTRY, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-1052-BAS-BJW
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(ECF No. 34)
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.
(ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff opposed the motion. (ECF No. 37.) Defendants replied. (ECF No.
38.) Also pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for class certification. (ECF No.
39.) Before deciding the present motion, the Court had the benefit of oral argument. (ECF
No. 48.) Upon reviewing the arguments, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 34.)
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff started work for the fashion brand Coach as an “associate store manager”
in October 2015. (Ayala Dep. 18:12–13, 35:22–24, ECF No. 34-1, Ex. A.) In December
2019, he was promoted to “store manager.” (Id. 38:13–18.) In that capacity, Plaintiff was
the highest-ranking employee on site. (Id. 68:25–69:3) For some years during Plaintiff’s
tenure, the store received an annual revenue of over six million dollars. (Id. 50:7–18.)
Plaintiff earned a fixed biweekly salary. (Id. 60:7–12). He made around $80,000.00
per year. (Id. 60:17–22.) In addition, Plaintiff received annual and monthly bonuses. (Id.
60:23–61:19). Plaintiff left Coach in June 2023. (Id. 52:4–9.)
In May 2024, Plaintiff filed nine California Labor Code claims in state court. (ECF
No. 1-2, Ex. A.) Defendants removed the action to federal court, invoking diversity
jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the claims regarding failure to
pay minimum wages and unfair competition. (Opp’n 18:14–18, ECF No. 37.) Thus, the
remaining California law claims include failure to: (1) pay overtime wages; (2) provide
meal breaks; (3) provide rest breaks; (4) timely pay all earned wages; (5) pay all wages due
upon termination; (6) reimburse business expenses; and (7) provide accurate itemized wage
statements.
Except for the reimbursement of business expenses claim, Defendants move for
summary judgment as to all claims on their affirmative defense, stating Plaintiff is exempt
from the California Labor Code as an “executive” employee. (Mot. 1:8–9, ECF No. 34.) In
the alternative, Defendants move for summary judgment on some of Plaintiff’s causes of
action. (Id. 1:22–23.) In response, Plaintiff counters that Defendants mischaracterized him
as exempt. (Opp’n 1:4–8.) And Plaintiff defends the viability of his claims. (Id. 2:21–22.)
The parties submitted a brief statement of undisputed facts. The parties agree on the
following: (1) Plaintiff worked as the store manager of the Coach outlet store in Alpine,
California, from December 2019 to June 2023; (2) Plaintiff’s resume upon leaving Tapestry
stated that he “set and communicated goals for the team, tracked store’s performance at all
times and adjusted according to trend,” “demonstrated strong business acumen,” and
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“strategically forecasted, planned, and budgeted to the needs of the business (i.e. Payrolls,
staffing, scheduling, etc.)” (cleaned up); (3) Plaintiff worked five days per week; (4)
Plaintiff spent one hour serving as a Coach “brand ambassador” at various charity events,
local events, and mall initiatives; and (5) Plaintiff spent twenty to thirty minutes per week
“shopping a competitor,” meaning Plaintiff visited other retailers to assess their sales
strategies. (ECF No. 42.)
II. 	ANALYSIS
A court’s role at summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses” so that they are “prevented from going to trial with the
attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 327 (1986). A court thus appropriately grants summary
judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact
“might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248(1986). And a “genuine” issue of material fact arises “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.
At summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. The Court steers clear of
“[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts.” Id. And “[t]he Court need consider only the cited materials”
from the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
The burden-shifting scheme defines the motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). The party that moves for summary judgment initially carries the burden. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099,
1102 (9th Cir. 2000). “Where the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of
persuasion at trial, such as where the moving party seeks summary judgment on its own
claims or defenses, the moving party must establish ‘beyond controversy every essential
element of its’ [claim].” Geer v. Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc., No. 20-cv-05613-SVK,
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2021 WL 4979426, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2021) (citing So. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of
Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003)). The nonmovant can defeat summary
judgment by showing a triable issue remains for at least one element of the affirmative
defense. See So. Cal. Gas Co., 336 F.3d at 888. The nonmovant cannot satisfy his burden
by alluding to “metaphysical doubt.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).
A court may decide a motion for summary judgment before addressing the issue of
class certification. See Wright v. Schock, 742 F.2d 541, 543–44 (9th Cir. 1984).
A. 	The “Executive” Exemption
The California Labor Code protects “non-exempt” employees through, for example,
wage and hour as well as meal and rest break regulations. However, the California
Legislature carved out certain employees from the California Labor Code’s reach. These
employees are considered “exempt.” One such category of exempt employees are
“executive” employees in the mercantile industry under Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §
11070(1)(A)(1). Defendants categorized Plaintiff’s position as exempt, but Plaintiff
maintains that he was misclassified and therefore the California Labor Code’s protections
should apply. (Mot. 1:8–9; Opp’n 3:23.) One identifies an exempt “executive” through the
following characteristics:
(a) Whose duties and responsibilities involve the management of
the enterprise in which they are employed or of a customarily
recognized department or subdivision thereof; and
(b) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or
more other employees therein; and
(c) Who has the authority to hire or fire other employees or
whose suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring or
firing and as to the advancement and promotion or any other
change of status of other employees will be given particular
weight; and
(d) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretion and
independent judgment; and
(e) Who is primarily engaged in duties which meet the test of the
exemption. […]
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(f) Such an employee must also earn a monthly salary equivalent
to no less than two (2) times the state minimum wage for full-
time employment. Full-time employment is defined in Labor
Code Section 515(c) as 40 hours per week.
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1)(a)–(f).
Here, Defendants bear the burden of satisfying all six elements of the “executive”
exemption. See Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., Inc., 20 Cal.4th 785, 795–95 (1999)
(“[T]he assertion of an exemption from the [California Labor Code] is considered to be an
affirmative defense, and therefore the employer bears the burden of proving the employee’s
exemption.”). In his opposition brief, Plaintiff contests only three of the six exemption
requirements.1 (Opp’n 7:1–2.) Thus, the Court addresses the three disputed elements.
1. 	Whether Plaintiff Could Hire or Fire Other Employees
An exempt executive “has the authority to hire or fire other employees” or, even if
he does not directly make employment decisions, his suggestions and recommendations
receive “particular weight.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1)(c).
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony admits that he could hire employees. Plaintiff
attests: “Q: So, if you were hiring a sales associate, for example, did you need approval?
A: No. Q: And did you in fact hire sales associates without approval? A: Yes. Q: Do you
recall about how many? You can estimate. A: Depending on the season it could range from
between five and ten.” (Ayala Dep. 116:11–20.)
In response, Plaintiff argues that because he could not “fire” employees, Defendants
did not satisfy their burden. But this argument lacks support in the statutory text and the
case law. The statute relies on the employee’s authority to “hire or fire other employees,”
using the expansive conjunction “or.” Plaintiff cites no case law supporting a different
reading of the statute.2
1 Specifically, Plaintiff concedes that he managed the enterprise, directed the work of at least two
employees, and earned a salary greater than twice the minimum wage. (Opp’n 7:1–2.)
2 Instead, Plaintiff focuses on a company policy that suggests a store manager has to discuss
employment decisions with the district manager or a human resources partner before taking action. (Opp’n
14:0–12; Davis Dep. 34:18–20, ECF No. 37-1, Ex. 1.) As Misty Davis, a district manager, explained in
her deposition, however, this policy indicates a preference for managers like Plaintiff to consult or partner
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In any case, Plaintiff’s recommendations and suggestions received considerable
weight. In a discussion about the hiring of other management level employees, Plaintiff
confirms, “Q: Did the person you recommended for hire end up being hired – A: Yes. Q:
– by the company? Do you ever recall a circumstance where you recommended hiring
somebody and your recommendation was rejected? A: Not necessarily rejected but a push
back. Q: And what ultimately became of the candidate? A: Hired.” (Id. 117:25–118:9.)
Plaintiff further challenges whether any given “class member” exercised such hiring
power. But, before class certification, the Court is only concerned with whether named
Plaintiff had the authority to hire or fire other employees. See, e.g., Hodgers-Durgin v. de
la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Unless the named plaintiffs are themselves
entitled to seek injunctive relief, they may not represent a class seeking that relief.”). Here,
Plaintiff did. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants motion for summary judgment on
this element.
2. 	Whether Plaintiff Exercised Discretion and Independent Judgment
An 	exempt 	executive 	“customarily 	and 	regularly 	exercises 	discretion 	and
independent judgment.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1)(d). The California Court
of Appeal notes the provision requires the “power to make an independent choice, free
from immediate direction or supervision and with respect to matters of significance,”
clarifying that “[t]he requirement that discretion be exercised with respect to ‘matters of
significance’ means the decision being made must be relevant to something consequential
and not merely trivial.” United Parcel Serv. Wage & Hour Cases, 190 Cal. App. 4th 1001,
1024 (2010).
before making employment decisions. (Davis Dep. 34:25–35:18.) Davis responds: “Q: Can a store
manager make a decision, an employment decision without speaking to the [district manager] and [human
resources]? A: They have the ability to, absolutely.” (Id. 34:10–13.) Notwithstanding the employer’s
preference, the policy does not negate the fact that Plaintiff hired employees. Plaintiff did in fact hire
employees and thereby satisfied this element. And anyways, the uncontested evidence shows Plaintiff’s
recommendations received considerable weight.
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Plaintiff affirms this authority, stating: “I treated that store [] – like it was my own
business, based upon my responsibilities as a leader, as a manager, with no contact.” (Ayala
Dep. 50:2–4.) In other parts of his deposition, Plaintiff verifies a lack of general oversight,
admitting: “Q: You were just left to your own devices to figure out how to make that store
profitable? A: Yes. Q: Did you manage to do that? A: Yes. Q: How did you [] manage to
do that without any support from a district manager? A: Business owner mindset.” (Id.
49:11–23.) Plaintiff further confirms responsibility of maintaining a store that generated
around six million in sales: “Q: How would you describe your job duties as the store
manager of the [Coach] store? A: Full[y] responsible for all areas of the business needs,
including sales generations.” (Id. 71:25–72:3.) And elsewhere succinctly admits: Q:
“Everything that happens in the store was your responsibility? A: Yes.” (Id. 72:14–17.)
Defendants illustrate that Plaintiff’s discretionary decisions move beyond triviality,
including: developing sales strategies to ensure the store operated profitably, evaluating
the performance of all team members, addressing customer issues, setting and adjusting
the schedule, and providing training and feedback. (Mot. 7:1–8:23.) Moreover, the
elements of the exemption analysis support each other. Plaintiff’s concession that he
directed the work of two or more employees, for example, supports Plaintiff’s exercise of
independent judgment; Plaintiff affirms, “Q: All the employees in the store reported to you;
correct? A: Yes. Q: You directed their work every day? A: Yes.” (Ayala Dep. 70:4–10);
see Wellons v. PNS Stores, Inc., No. 18-cv-02913-RSH-DEB, 2022 WL 16902199, at *23
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2022) (“Although the six requirements are distinct and each one must
be satisfied for the exemption defense to apply, there is also some overlap between those
requirements.”).
However, Plaintiff claims that he does not satisfy this element for various reasons.
Plaintiff cites a Ninth Circuit case along with several pieces of statutory text, but these
sources of authority pertain to the exemption for “administrative” employees, which is not
at issue here. McKeen-Chaplin v. Provident Savings Bank, FSBI, 862 F.3d 847 (9th Cir.
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2017); 29 C.F.R. 541.202. To the extent authority on the “administrative” exemption is
relevant, the Court fails to see the connection in Plaintiff’s brief.
Plaintiff also argues that the allegedly “exempt” and “non-exempt” employees share
many duties, thus there should be no legal difference between them. (Opp’n 11:23–25.)
But overlap in job duties and the exempt employee’s additional responsibilities can coexist.
See Baldwin v. Trailer Inns, Inc., 266 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]hat the
Baldwins performed some of the same tasks as their subordinates is not in and of itself
evidence that the Baldwins do not qualify for the exemption.”). Relatedly, Plaintiff argues
that he should not be considered exempt because he clocks in and out of work and schedules
meal breaks like non-exempt employees. (Opp’n 12:24–13:1.) However, needing to clock
in and out of work does not automatically make an employee non-exempt. Baldwin, 266
F.3d at 1115.
Finally, Plaintiff’s brief attempts to dispute discretion and independent judgment by
listing various powers that Plaintiff lacked within the corporation, for example, Plaintiff
had no legal ownership in the company, (Opp’n 13:8–9), and no involvement in planning
the company’s long- or short-term business goals, (Opp’n 13:15–16). But the Court fails
to see how these powers create a genuine issue of fact. The Court’s analysis turns on
whether Plaintiff exercised discretion and independent judgment in the duties assigned to
and performed by him. See United Parcel, 190 Cal. App. 4th at 1021 (“There is no
requirement that in order to be properly classified, an executive must carry out every
conceivable function that can be classified as an exempt duty.”) Accordingly, the Court
grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this element.
3. 	Whether Plaintiff Primarily Engaged in Exempt Duties
An exempt executive must “primarily engage[] in duties which meet the test of the
exemption.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1)(e). The statutory text provides
several key definitions. To say an employee “primarily engaged” in exempt duties means
the employee spent “more than one-half the employee’s work time” on exempt tasks. Cal.
Code. Regs., tit. 8, § 11070(2)(k). To define “exempt,” the court relies on the Fair Labor
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Standards Act,3 and the California Supreme Court in Heyen listed managerial duties “easily
recognized” as exempt under that statute:
Interviewing, selecting, and training of employees; setting and
adjusting their rates of pay and hours of work; directing their
work; maintaining their production or sales records for use in
supervision 	or 	control; 	appraising 	their 	productivity 	and
efficiency for the purpose of recommending promotions or other
changes in their status; handling their complaints and grievances
and disciplining them when necessary; planning the work;
determining the techniques to be used; apportioning the work
among the workers; determining the type of materials, supplies,
machinery or tools to be used or merchandise to be bought,
stocked 	and 	sold; 	controlling 	the 	flow 	and 	distribution 	of
materials or merchandise and supplies; providing for the safety
of the men and the property.
Heyen v. Safeway Inc., 216 Cal. App. 4th 795, 819 (2013) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.102(b)).
The court considers “exempt” activities “directly and closely related to” and
“properly viewed as means for carrying out” such managerial tasks. Cal. Code. Regs., tit.
8, § 11070 (1)(A)(1)(e).4 In regard to process, the court examines the “work actually
performed by the employee during the course of the workweek” and “the amount of time
the employee spends on such work,” along with “the employer’s realistic expectations and
the realistic requirements of the job.” Id.5
Using 	Plaintiff’s 	deposition 	testimony 	and 	employment 	records, 	Defendants
calculate a 41.5-hour workweek, and argue Plaintiff spent 24.5 hours on exempt duties,
3 “The activities constituting exempt work and non-exempt work shall be construed in the same
manner as such items are construed in the following regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act
effective as of the date of this order: 29 C.F.R. Sections 541.102, 541.104-111, and 541.115-116.” Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1)(e).
4 “Exempt work shall include, for example, all work that is directly and closely related to exempt
work and work which is properly viewed as a means for carrying out exempt functions.” Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1)(e).
5 “The work actually performed by the employee during the course of the workweek must, first
and foremost, be examined and the amount of time the employee spends on such work, together with the
employer’s realistic expectations and the realistic requirements of the job, shall be considered in
determining whether the employee satisfies this requirement.” Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070(1)(A)(1)(e).
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approximately 60% of the time.6 (Mot. 13:9–15.) Plaintiff’s exempt duties included:
administrative tasks in the office, managerial tasks outside the store, communications with
the district manager after business hours, and management of the sales floor operations.
(Id. 10:3–7.) In response to Defendants’ calculation that Plaintiff spent greater than 51%
of a workweek on “exempt” duties, Plaintiff raises six objections, arguing either the
inaccuracy of the hours, or the erroneous categorization of tasks.
a. 	Whether to incorporate on-duty meal periods
Defendants calculate an average of 7.98 hours in-store a day. (Mot. 9:20–21.)
Plaintiff objects to this calculation because Defendants excluded “on-duty meal breaks.”
(Opp’n 7:16–18.) And Plaintiff seeks to include these on-duty meal breaks into the total
hours worked. (Id.) But Defendants highlight that on-duty meal breaks were a “very rare”
occasion. (Ayala Dep. 163:17–18.) The store experienced staff shortage during its post-
pandemic opening, so that once or twice a month, no secondary manager could cover
Plaintiff’s lunch break. (Id. 164:1–7.) Plaintiff otherwise confirms that he took meal breaks
at the scheduled time, stating: “Q: Okay. So with the exception of a period of time when
once or twice a month you were unable to take a meal break, you’ve always been able to
take the meal breaks consistent with the company’s policy? A: Yes.” (Id. 164:8–13).
Defendants also stress that the Court’s analysis should focus on the “typical”
workweek. Batze v. Safeway, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 5th 440, 478–49 (2017), as modified on
denial of reh’g (May 3, 2017) (“Although the significant period for determining exempt
status is the work week, and employees exempt or non-exempt status can vary on a week by
week basis, this rule in no way suggests that the trier of fact may not make reasonable
inferences about a party’s activities during the relevant period based on his or her activities
6 Using Plaintiff’s testimony and time records, Defendants calculate around eight-hour shifts on
average for five days per week. (Mot. 9:15–17). Defendants also include 1.5 hours per week working from
home. (Id. 9:21–22.) Thus, the typical weekly hours, according to Defendants, comes to 41.5 hours. (Id.
9:22–23.)
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in earlier and later periods, particularly where there is nothing to suggest the employee’s
duties and responsibilities changed significantly.”) (citation modified).
But the language from Batze does not provide a sufficient basis on which the Court
can hold as a matter of law that these “on-duty meal periods” should be excluded from the
“workweek.” See, e.g., Marlo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 639 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir.
2011) (noting that “[u]nder California law, the Court must determine whether any given
class members . . . spend more than 51% of their time on managerial tasks in any given
workweek”) (citing Dunbar v. Albertson’s, Inc., 141 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1426 (2006)
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, Defendants fail to meet their burden to show they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this basis.
b. 	The calculation of communications with the district manager
Defendants’ 	calculation 	includes 	Plaintiff’s 	after-business-hours, 	work-related
communications with the district manager. (Ayala Dep. 123:15–124:21.) Defendants
calculated these out-of-store hours to be one hour and thirty minutes per week. (Mot. 9:21–
24.) In his deposition, Plaintiff stated: “Q: How frequently did you respond to emails or
text messages while not working at the store? A: Quite frequently. Q: Was that a daily
event? A: Probably every other day. Q: And typically, every other day, how long would
you spend responding to emails and text messages? A: Depending on the urgency of the
email or text. It can range from 15 minutes to 45 minutes if I needed to gather information.”
(Ayala Dep. 123:15–25.)
Defendants construe every other day to be three days per week and use the midpoint
range of thirty minutes for the calculation. (Mot. 9:21–24.) Plaintiff claims these outside-
of-store hours were improperly calculated. (Opp’n 8:3–4.)
Based on the given range of fifteen to forty-five minutes, the Court finds a triable
issue of material fact regarding the calculation of after-business-hours’ communications
with the district manager.
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c. 	The calculation of communications with the store associates
One of Plaintiff’s responsibilities was to spend time reviewing sales goals with the
staff. (Ayala Dep. 134:13–22.) Defendants total one hour and forty minutes per week for
in-store sales goals discussions with store associates. (Mot. 10:17–18.) When describing
his communications with store associates, Plaintiff states: “Q: How much time would you
spend reviewing the sales goals with the staff? A: For each associate, five minutes. […] Q:
So that’s about 25 minutes a day reviewing sales goals with the team? A: Yes. Some came
in at the same time so it was all at once.” (Ayala Dep. 134:23–135:7.)
Plaintiff’s opposition highlights to the Court that this time could be construed as
combined; therefore, the time spent on reviewing sales goals with staff could total
approximately 20 minutes per week, and not one hour and forty minutes. (Opp’n 8:17–18.)
In response, Defendants state that although Plaintiff suggested these meetings can occur
“at once,” he did not state that the joint nature shortened the meeting. Reading the
deposition in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, however, makes Defendants’ argument
unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Court finds a triable issue of material fact regarding the
calculation of communications with store associates.
d. 	The calculation of other store communications
Plaintiff’s duties included monitoring and responding to store communications, and
Defendants calculate one hour per week on such communications. (Mot. 10:19–20.) But
Plaintiff highlights that the deposition testimony suggests all managers took responsibility
for the communications; Plaintiff states, “Q: Did you spend time each day monitoring and
responding to communications to the store? A: Yes Q: In a typical day, how much time did
you spend monitoring and responding to communications to the store? A: 15 to 20 minutes,
if we noticed it. Q: What do you mean by that? A: Because the emails were coming into
the store’s computer and that was in the stock room. Q: And you were responsible for
checking the communications to the store? A: All managers were. 	Q: 	Specifically, 	I
am asking about you. So is it fair to say that you would spend time each day monitoring
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store communications? A: Yes. Because they would come to my phone.” (Ayala Dep.
140:15–141:7.)
Even though Plaintiff responded with the inclusive “we,” Defendants note that the
question’s phrasing specified Plaintiff’s typical day. But reading the evidence in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds Defendants’ argument unpersuasive. Further,
the 	Court 	lacks 	definitive 	evidence 	regarding 	the 	time 	Plaintiff 	spent 	on 	such
communications. Thus, the Court finds a triable issue of material fact regarding the
calculation of miscellaneous store communications.
e. 	Whether the “brand ambassador” role should be considered
exempt
Defendants categorized as exempt the “brand ambassador” role, arguing the position
fits comfortably within the definition of an exempt duty, given that the role required
fostering relationships to promote business strategy. (Mot. 12:1–2.) Plaintiff challenges the
exempt categorization. (Opp’n 9:9–17.)
Plaintiff acknowledges his responsibilities as brand ambassador and the amount of
time he was expected to engage in that type of work, stating: “Q: Were you responsible for
attending charity events, local events, mall initiatives, and things of that nature? A: Yes.”
(Ayala Dep. 80:16–19.) Followed by, “Q: How much time did you spend doing that? Is
that a daily thing, a weekly thing? A: Weekly thing.” (Ayala Dep. 80:20–22.) And finally,
“Q: So in a typical week, how much time did you spend out in the community as a brand
ambassador for the company? A: Me, personally? Q: Yes. A: Probably about an hour.”
(Ayala Dep. 81:21–82:1.)
Moreover, when explaining his job description as store manager, Plaintiff’s first
bullet point on his resume mentions the brand ambassador role; Plaintiff’s resume states:
“Brand Ambassador to a key location in the SD location overseeing development of
business strategies to raise our customers’ pool, expand store traffic and optimize
profitability.” (Ex. 2, 83, ECF No. 34-1.) As described by Plaintiff, the role focused on
shaping business strategy and promoting the store’s profitability. See Ortiz v. Amazon.com
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LLC, 389 F. Supp. 3d 728, 735 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (relying on the plaintiff’s admissions and
duties as articulated on his resume to “support a conclusion that the position was
managerial in nature”).
With the support of Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and the description of the role
in his resume, the Court finds the role of brand ambassador to be directly and closely related
to managerial duties. Accordingly, the Court considers Plaintiff’s time spent as a brand
ambassador to be managerial.
f. 	Whether the duty of “shopping a competitor” should be
considered exempt
Defendants also include as exempt Plaintiff’s time spent assessing other mall
businesses competitive with Coach, also known as “shopping a competitor.” (Mot. 11:20–
21.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should not consider communication with other
businesses as exempt because Defendants did not specify whether the idea to develop
relationships with other mall businesses originated with Plaintiff or Defendants. But an
origination theory is not the test.
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony reflects: “Q: Have you ever heard of the term
‘shopping a competitor’? A: Yes. […] Q: Was that part of your responsibility as the store
manager? A: Yes. Q: Is that something you did? A: Yes. […] Q: Can you give me some
examples? A: You know, like, in our mall it would be, you know, it’s another brand store.
Let’s say Actate, or anyone we felt that it was in competition.” (Ayala Dep. 127:6–128:10.)
Defendants argue that, by assessing the strategy of other mall businesses, the purpose
of this work was to gather information for business strategy. (Mot. 11:17–20; Ayala Dep.
128:1–5.) The Court agrees. The responsibility as store manager to shop a competitor is
directly and closely related to Plaintiff’s managerial responsibility to determine the
techniques to be used. See Leatherbury v. C & H Sugar Co., 911 F. Supp. 2d 872, 884
(N.D. Cal. 2012), aff’d, 607 F. App’x 676 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Although Leatherbury’s
conclusory declaration describes 70% of his work as “clerical,” much of the shift reports,
inventory reports, managerial meetings, checking over the plant, and troubleshooting
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various problems were ‘directly and closely’ related to his management of the union
employees, and thus are still considered exempt work.”).
Accordingly, the Court considers Plaintiff’s weekly assessment of competitive mall
businesses a managerial duty.
To 	address 	Plaintiff’s 	objections, 	Defendants 	recalculate. 	Regarding 	the
communications with the district manager, Defendants calculate the low-end of 15 minutes
for three days per week, for a sum of 45 minutes per week. Defendants also assume only
five joint minutes for each store associate meeting, totaling 20 minutes per week. Further,
Defendants eliminate time reviewing and monitoring store communications from the
calculation. Moreover, Defendants at oral argument discount 45 minutes for rare on-duty
meal breaks.
After making all these inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendants’ recalculation
comes out to a 40.75-hour week, with 21.35 hours spent on exempt duties, translating to
52% of the workweek. (Reply 4:11–15, ECF No. 38; ECF No. 48.) Accepting Plaintiff’s
admissions and construing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Defendants have
established as a matter of law that Plaintiff primarily engaged in exempt duties in a
workweek. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants motion for summary judgment on
this element.
In conclusion, finding all six elements satisfied, the Court grants the partial motion
for summary judgment in Defendants’ favor, having shown entitlement to judgment as a
matter of law on their affirmative defense.
B. 	Plaintiff’s Claims Against All Tapestry’s Brands Are Inappropriate
Finally, the Court grants summary judgment as to all claims against Defendants Kate
Spade, LLC and Stuart Weitzman IP, LLC. See Stilwell v. Caesars Ent. Corp., 2023 WL
2634502, at *5 (D. Nev. Mar. 24, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-15585, 2023 WL
7179476 (9th Cir. Oct. 18, 2023) (granting summary judgment as to claims against holding
company that never employed plaintiff); see also Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.,
975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992).
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Here, Plaintiff did not work for these named Defendants. Nor does Plaintiff make
any claims against them. Instead, Plaintiff attempts to connect these Defendants to the
lawsuit by stating Defendant Tapestry is the parent company of the brands Coach, Kate
Spade, and Stuart Weitzman, and Plaintiff’s performance reviews and paystubs feature
only Tapestry’s logo. In other words, because Tapestry’s documents did not differentiate
between the three companies, they are all liable. The Court finds this basis of connection
weak.
Plaintiff also suggests similar policies and practices across the three brands,
suggesting inclusion of Kate Spade and Stuart Weitzman’s store managers in the class.
(Opp’n 18:25–26.) But Defendant Tapestry, not its holding companies, employs potential
class members. (Reply 10:7–9.) Further, the Court has not granted class certification, and
the only question before the Court is whether Plaintiff asserts triable claims against
Defendants. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment as to all claims against
Defendants Kate Spade, LLC and Stuart Weitzman IP, LLC.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Upon reviewing the arguments, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment. (ECF No. 34.)
The Court GRANTS summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on their affirmative
defense of executive exemption under Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11070.
The claim for reimbursement of business expenses, which Defendants did not move
on, shall proceed to trial.
Finally, the Court GRANTS summary judgment in Defendants Kate Spade, LLC
and Stuart Weitzman IP, LLC’s favor as to all claims against these Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 26, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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