Kimball v. County of San Diego et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
ZACK KIMBALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; EMILIO
CASTILLERO,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-0682-BAS-VET
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF No. 35)
Presently before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants
County of San Diego and Deputy Emilio Castillero (“Defendants”). (ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff
Zack Kimball (“Plaintiff”) opposed. (ECF No. 36.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 40.) The
Court benefitted from oral argument to resolve the present motion. (ECF No. 48.) Upon
review, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. (ECF No. 35.)
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A court’s role at summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims or defenses” so that they are “prevented from going to trial with the
attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources.” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 327 (1986). A court thus appropriately grants summary
judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and
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entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact
“might affect the outcome of the suit.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248(1986). And a “genuine” issue of material fact means “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248.
At summary judgment, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255. The Court steers clear of
“[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate
inferences from the facts.” Id. And the Court need only consider the materials cited from
the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
The burden-shifting scheme defines the motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). The party that moves for summary judgment initially carries the burden. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see also Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210
F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). To satisfy this burden, the movant can either: (1) present
evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmovant’s case, or (2) demonstrate that
the nonmovant did not sufficiently support an essential element, on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.
Assuming the movant meets his burden, the nonmovant must “go beyond the
pleadings” and by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,”
designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. The
nonmovant cannot rely on “metaphysical doubt.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).
II. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
To set the factual context, the Court relies on Deputy Castillero’s body-worn camera
footage and the evidence as presented by Plaintiff.1 Then, the Court enumerates the
undisputed facts submitted by the parties. (ECF No. 37.)
1 When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court can view the “facts in the light depicted
by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007). However, “[t]he mere existence of video
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On August 29, 2023, a reporting party called 911 about an African American male
standing at the end of his driveway, looking into vehicles in the neighborhood. (Ex. 2, ECF
No. 36-2; Ex. 4, ECF No. 36-3.) The reporting party made no mention of weapons. (Id.;
see also Castillero Decl. 202:1–3, 68:7–15, Ex. 21, ECF No. 35-9.) Deputy Castillero
responded to the call. (Ex. 4, ECF No. 36-3.) In the five minutes before contacting Plaintiff,
Deputy Castillero canvassed the neighborhood and did not see any burglarized cars.
(Castillero Decl. 99:3–17.)
The footage begins with Deputy Castillero getting out of his car and pointing a light
at Plaintiff. (Ex. C. 0:00:30, ECF No. 35-5.) Plaintiff is sitting on a wall, scrolling through
his phone. (Id.) Deputy Castillero walks up to Plaintiff saying: “Hey, so the reason I am
here is because I got a call referencing you—wearing the same attire—that was looking
into vehicles. Do you live here in the neighborhood?” (Id. 0:00:32.) Plaintiff looks up from
his phone and says: “I wasn’t looking at vehicles.” (Id. 0:00:40.) Deputy Castillero then
states, “I know. But that’s what was explained to me though.” (Id. 0:00:42.)
During the conversation, Deputy Castillero is putting on his gloves and Plaintiff
remains seated. (Id. 0:00:40–0:01:00.) Deputy Castillero follows up: “Do you live here in
the area?” (Id. 0:00:47.) Plaintiff responds, “Yes, I do.” (Id. 0:00:48.)2 Deputy Castillero:
“Where do you live at?” (Id. 0:00:49.) Plaintiff: “I am homeless right now, Sir. But I work
at the Chevron, and my girlfriend is right here, I’ve been waiting for her….” (Id. 0:00:51.)
Deputy Castillero: “Okay, are you currently on probation or parole?” (Id. 0:00:59.)
Plaintiff: “No.” (Id. 0:01:00)
With Plaintiff still seated, Deputy Castillero moves next to him, stating, “Do me a
favor, put your hands behind your back real quick. Alright?” (Id. 0:01:02.) Plaintiff looks
footage of the incident does not foreclose a genuine factual dispute as to the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from that footage,” and “[t]he record is viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmovants[.]” Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Court will consider the footage and draw all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor.
2 Plaintiff lived in his van close to the Chevron. (Kimball Decl. 115:4–8, 117, Ex. 22, ECF No. 36-
10; Ex. C. 0:05:48, ECF No. 35-5.)
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up, asking, “What did I do wrong, Sir?” (Id. 0:01:05.) Deputy Castillero: “I am here,
investigating you, looking at vehicles, I want to make sure nothing got broken into.” (Id.
0:01:08.) Plaintiff: “I didn’t look at no vehicles, Sir.” (Id. 0:01:11.) Deputy Castillero
interjects, “I understand. You’re not under arrest. But you’re going to be lawfully detained.
Alright?” (Id. 0:01:14.)
Deputy Castillero elaborates, “I wanna make sure you didn’t break into anything.
That’s all it is. Once I discover that you didn’t, you’ll be free to go, but for now you’re
lawfully detained. Alright? So put your hands behind your back.” (Id. 0:01:17.) Plaintiff
then says, “Hold on, Sir, let me just take a picture of this.” (Id. 0:01:24.) Deputy Castillero
responds, “Hey! We’re not doing that. Alright?” (Id. 0:01:26.) As Plaintiff simultaneously
says, “Why are you grabbing my stuff?” (Id. 0:01:27.) Deputy Castillero states, “You are
lawfully detained. If you continue this, you are going to be placed under arrest,” as Plaintiff
says, “No, no, no.” (Id. 0:01:30.)
The footage then shows Plaintiff raise his phone to record, saying, “I can film this,
okay.” (Id. 0:01:32.) Deputy Castillero knocks the phone out of Plaintiff’s hand and grabs
Plaintiff’s wrist, stating, “Put your hands behind your back. Put your hands behind your
back.” (Id. 0:01:34.) Plaintiff, meanwhile, is asking, “What am I doing wrong? You need
to tell me what I am doing wrong? Okay. I didn’t break nothing.” (Id. 0:01:36.) Deputy
Castillero: “You are lawfully detained—I am investigating whether you broke into
something or not. Put your hands behind your back.” (Id. 0:01:40.)
With Deputy Castillero still grabbing his wrist, Plaintiff states, “I don’t need to be
put in handcuffs, Sir.” (Id. 0:01:43.) Deputy Castillero answers, “You gotta go in
handcuffs. I am not playing again.” (Id. 0:01:45.) Plaintiff: “No, Sir, I am asking you
please....” (Id. 0:01:47.) Deputy Castillero then radios in, “231—I have one uncooperative,
I need units please.” (Id. 0:01:48.) Plaintiff then states, “Okay, but I am not going to...”—
interjected by Deputy Castillero commanding, “Put your hands behind you back”—“…jail
today, Sir. I didn’t do nothing wrong.” (Id. 0:01:52.) Deputy Castillero asserts: “Put your
hands behind your back. I am not going to tell you again.” (Id. 0:01:57.)
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With Deputy Castillero still holding on to Plaintiff’s wrist, their back and forth
continues. (Id. 0:01:58.) Plaintiff says, “Okay. I am waiting for my… Sir you don’t have
to put me in…handcuffs.” (Id. 0:01:59.) Deputy Castillero: “I already explained it to you.”
(Id. 0:02:02.) Plaintiff: “Sir… I will take off everything.” (Id. 0:02:03) Deputy Castillero:
“I want to make sure nothing got broken into and once I discover that… I investigate that…
We’ll be good to go.” (Id. 0:02:04.) Deputy Castillero continues, “Put your hands behind
your back—I am not going to tell you again.” (Id. 0:02:08.) Plaintiff says, “Okay, okay.”
(Id. 0:02:10.) Deputy Castillero: “Put your hands behind your back or else I am going to
use force.” (Id. 0:02:11.) A second later, Deputy Castillero starts applying force on
Plaintiff’s wrist. (Id. 0:02:12.) Plaintiff can be heard asking, “Can I do it myself? Can I do
it myself?” (Id. 0:02:14.) Then, for several seconds, the footage goes black. (Id.) One can
hear scuffling noises and indistinct words. (Id. 0:02:17–0:02:52.)
When the footage returns, Plaintiff is on the street, face down, his hands behind his
back, and Deputy Castillero over him. (Id. 0:02:54.) Deputy Castillero states, “Put your
hands behind your back.” (Id. 0:02:50.) And Plaintiff responds, “Okay, you’re f***ing
crazy dude. What is wrong with you? I didn’t do a d*** thing.” (Id. 0:02:52.) Several
seconds of silence ensues. (Id. 0:02:59.) Then Plaintiff shouts: “Malibu,” and Deputy
Castillero says, “Stay on the ground.” (Id. 0:03:05.)3
Still face down on the ground, Plaintiff shares a few more expletives. (Id. 0:03:10.)
As Deputy Castillero prepares to strap on the handcuffs, Plaintiff says, “So when you see
that nothing was broken in, you’re going to let me go, right?” (Id. 0:03:24.) Deputy
Castillero, however, says: “Now you’re under arrest.” (Id. 0:03:26.) Plaintiff: “For what?”
(Id. 0:03:27.) Deputy Castillero: “For resisting.” (Id. 0:03:28.) Plaintiff: “Resisting what?
You were grabbing me, and you weren’t letting me do it?” (Id. 0:03:29.) Deputy Castillero:
“You’re under arrest.” (Id. 0:03:34.) Plaintiff: “For what?” (Id. 0:03:35.) Deputy Castillero:
“For obstruction and resisting.” (Id. 0:03:36.) Plaintiff remains face down on the ground as
3 The footage later shows Plaintiff telling one of the deputies that his girlfriend’s first name is
“Malibu.” (Ex. C. 0:08:06; Kimball Decl. 135:1–5.)
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Deputy Castillero reports: “231—I got one detained use of force.” (Id. 0:03:41.) Plaintiff:
“I didn’t use no force on you, Sir.” (Id. 0:03:45.) Deputy Castillero continues to key into
his radio, “231—I will be out by where the [reporting party’s] home is.” (Id. 0:03:52.)
Deputy Castillero then asks Plaintiff, “Do you have any injuries?” (Id. 0:04:04.)
Plaintiff responds, “Uh, yeah, Sir…” (Id. 0:04:06.) Deputy Castillero questions, “What
injuries do you have?” (Id. 0:04:07.) To which Plaintiff says, “My back because you
f***ing threw me on the ground for no reason.” (Id. 0:04:08.) Deputy Castillero then
requests an ambulance. (Id. 0:04:13.) Plaintiff can be heard saying, “So extra for no
reason….” (Id. 0:04:29.) Several seconds of silence. (Id. 0:04:30.) Then Deputy Castillero
says, “I explained to you what was going on, dude….” (Id. 0:04:29.) Plaintiff: “And I told
you the truth, man.” (Id. 0:04:41.) Deputy Castillero: “Now you’re under arrest, alright?”
(Id. 0:04:43.) Plaintiff: “For what though?” (Id. 0:04:45.)
Plaintiff and Deputy Castillero continue to talk over each other. (Id. 0:04:46.)
Plaintiff: “I didn’t do nothing wrong.” (Id. 0:04:47.) Deputy Castillero: “I already
explained to you. You were lawfully detained, and you were resisting me, alright?” (Id.
0:04:48.) Plaintiff: “No, Sir, you were unlawfully detaining me. I am telling you that right
now.” (Id. 0:04:50.) Deputy Castillero: “I explained to you why I was here and what was
going on.” (Id. 0:04:52.) Plaintiff: “But it sounds like ‘bs’ to me, Sir. Okay. I will hire a
lawyer and fight this because it doesn’t make no sense.” (Id. 0:04:55.) Deputy Castillero:
“Alright go ahead.” (Id. 0:05:00.) Sirens can be heard in the background, and Plaintiff
remains on the ground face down with Deputy Castillero positioned over him. (Id. 0:04:57.)
Deputy Castillero then asks, “Do you have anything with your ID on you?” (Id.
0:05:02.) Plaintiff responds, “No, I don’t.” (Id. 0:05:03.) Plaintiff then says, “I don’t know
why the f*** I will go to jail for no reason.” (Id. 0:05:10.) Deputy Castillero then states,
“You’re going to jail, dude, we’re past that.” (Id. 0:05:12.) Plaintiff: “No, no, no, I didn’t
do a thing wrong.” (Id. 0:05:13.)
The siren sounds get closer, and Deputy Castillero turns Plaintiff over to a seated
position. (Id. 0:05:20.) “Tuck your leg in.”—Deputy Castillero commands twice. (Id.
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0:05:22.) Plaintiff: “What leg in?” (Id. 0:05:23.) Deputy Castillero: “That one; tuck it in.”
(Id. 0:05:24.) He continues, “So you’re now under arrest for resisting, alright?...” —
Plaintiff: “Okay.” —“…and I am going to get your name in a bit…”—Plaintiff: “Okay.”
—“…I explained to you that you were lawfully detained…”—Plaintiff: “Sir, I didn’t do
nothing wrong.” —“… and you didn’t get with the program.” (Id. 0:05:27.)
Another officer walks into the video frame. (Id. 0:05:36.) Plaintiff begins speaking
with the other deputy. (Id. 0:05:37.) The footage shows that at least three other deputies
have arrived on the scene. (Id. 0:05:55.) Deputy Castillero tells another officer to take
photos of the area. (Id. 0:05:57.)
With Plaintiff still sitting on the ground, Deputy Castillero rests his hand on
Plaintiff’s shoulder: “Alright, listen here buddy, so you’re under arrest….” (Id. 0:06:06.)
Plaintiff asks, “For what though?” (Id. 0:06:08.) Deputy Castillero: “…I already told you,
for 148…I told you…you were lawfully detained, I told you numerous times….” (Id.
0:06:10.) Plaintiff interjects: “You didn’t give me no reason as to why.” (Id. 0:06:14.)
Deputy Castillero continues, “…and you started moving away from me.” (Id. 0:06:15.)
Plaintiff: “No, I didn’t pull away from you.” (Id. 0:06:16.) Deputy Castillero: “I told you I
was investigating....” (Id. 0:06:18.)
Plaintiff then turns his head around to face Deputy Castillero, asking: “Do you have
a camera?” (Id. 0:06:19.) Deputy Castillero then reaches down for Plaintiff’s handcuffs,
saying, “Alright, we are done talking. Put your leg in. Put your leg in.” (Id. 0:06:20.)
Plaintiff: “Why don’t you have your camera on you, man?” (Id. 0:06:22.) Deputy
Castillero: “Yes, it’s on. It captured everything.” (Id. 0:06:24.) Plaintiff then says, “Okay.
Well I filmed you slapping my f***ing phone.” (Id. 0:06:25.) Deputy Castillero: “I know,
I did.” (Id. 0:06:28.) Plaintiff: “Okay. Okay. Grab my arms and I will stand up.” (Id.
0:06:29.) Deputy Castillero: “Put your leg in and I’m gonna roll you to your hands and
then to your feet.” (Id. 0:06:31.)
Deputy Castillero then walks Plaintiff to the sheriff vehicle. (Id. 0:06:41.) Deputy
Castillero leans Plaintiff over the car, (id. 0:06:47), and pats down Plaintiff, asking: “Do
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you have anything that is going to poke or stick me?” (Id. 0:06:52.) Plaintiff responds, “No,
I don’t have nothing. I’m not doing nothing wrong….” (Id. 0:06:53.) Deputy Castillero
then asks: “What is your name?” (Id. 0:07:00.) Plaintiff: “My name is Zack Kimball, Sir.”
(Id. 0:07:01.) Deputy Castillero then tells another deputy, “Can one of you guys contact
the [reporting party], make sure none of her vehicles were broken into?” (Id. 0:07:11.)
Throughout this process, Plaintiff repeatedly asks for someone to get his phone from the
bushes. (Id. 0:06:47–0:08:54.)
Deputy Castillero seats Plaintiff in the sheriff vehicle. (Id. 0:09:06.) Deputy
Castillero and Plaintiff continue to argue back and forth about the encounter. (Id. 0:09:08–
0:10:34.) The footage further shows a conversation with the reporting party, discussion
with ambulance staff, and exchanges amongst the deputies. (Id. 0:11:11–0:15:00.) The
footage ends with Plaintiff getting into the ambulance. (Id. 0:17:03.)
The ambulance took Plaintiff to the hospital. (Kimball Decl. 187:3–4, Ex. 22, ECF
No. 36-10.) There, Deputy Castillero handcuffed Plaintiff to the bed. (Id. 142:5–7.)
Plaintiff had to use the restroom, and Deputy Castillero did not uncuff Plaintiff from the
bed. (Id.) A nurse provided a urinal bottle instead; Plaintiff used it and the bottle
overflowed. (Id. 184:8–16, 142:3–5.) Plaintiff urinated on himself. (Id. 142:9–10.)
Later, Deputy Castillero submitted a probable cause declaration to the district
attorney’s office. (Ex. 18, ECF No. 36-7.) A district attorney brought charges; however,
after speaking with Deputy Castillero, the charges were dropped in the interest of justice.
(Ex. 19, ECF 36-8.)
The parties submitted a joint statement of undisputed facts, agreeing on the
following. (ECF No. 37.) Deputy Castillero responded to a call, arriving at 964 Sandcastle
Drive approximately thirty minutes after the initial call was made. (Id.) After Deputy
Castillero arrived on scene, he contacted Plaintiff. (Id.) Deputy Castillero first told Plaintiff
that he was contacting him because he got a call referencing Plaintiff, wearing the same
attire [as the individual] looking into vehicles. (Id.) Plaintiff said, “I wasn’t looking at
vehicles” to which Deputy Castillero responded, “I know; that is what was explained to me
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though.” (Id.) Deputy Castillero then asked Plaintiff if he lived in the area, to which
Plaintiff replied, “Yes I do.” (Id.) Deputy Castillero asked Plaintiff if he was on probation
or parole, to which Plaintiff said, “No.” (Id.) Deputy Castillero then asked Plaintiff to put
his hands behind his back. (Id.) At the scene, Plaintiff complained of pain to his neck and
back. (Id.) Deputy Castillero called for an ambulance. (Id.) The District Attorney’s Office
filed a misdemeanor charge for Penal Code § 148(a)(1) against Plaintiff. (Id.) Prior to the
April 29, 2023 incident, Deputy Castillero did not recall any contact with Plaintiff. (Id.)
B. 	Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed a complaint on April 16, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 5.) Plaintiff then submitted a
first amended complaint. (ECF No. 6.) The Court subsequently denied as moot Defendants’
motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 7.) Defendants filed an answer. (ECF No. 8.)
In a joint motion, Plaintiff sought leave to file a second amended complaint, which
the Court accepted. (ECF Nos. 15, 16.) Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, and the
case proceeded to discovery. (ECF No. 17.) Defendants then filed a motion for summary
judgment. (ECF No. 35.) The motion has been fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 36, 40.)
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges ten claims. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff
brings six claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment violations, Fourth
Amendment unlawful detention and arrest, Fourth Amendment excessive force, Fourth
Amendment malicious prosecution, Monell liability against the County of San Diego, and
Fourteenth Amendment unlawful conditions of confinement. (Id.) Plaintiff further brings
four California state law claims, alleging negligence, battery, false arrest, and a Bane Act
violation. (Id.)
III. 	ANALYSIS
First, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s federal causes of action. Next, the Court
discusses Plaintiff’s state law claims.
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A. 	Federal Law Claims
Defendants seek qualified immunity on all § 1983 claims except the Monell,
malicious prosecution, and excessive force claims. Qualified immunity protects officers
from going to trial on “insubstantial lawsuits.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814
(1982). The Supreme Court made the immunity “qualified” to carve out situations where a
“reasonable [officer] would have known” about a constitutional right. Harlow, 457 U.S. at
818–19 (“Where an official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate
statutory or constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers
injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of action.”).
To determine whether an officer should receive qualified immunity, a court
considers: (A) “whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts
alleged” and (B) “whether the right was clearly established.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
200 (2001). A court can take these questions in any order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 236 (2009). And a court can skip the constitutional question. Id.
Clearly established means the “contours of the right” were “sufficiently clear” so
that “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). In other words, the law should place the
existence of a right “beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). And
it should affirm the right “under similar circumstances.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64
(2018) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the qualified immunity analysis does not require a
case “directly on point.” Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741. In a rare, “obvious” case, the violation
of a constitutional right may be clear even without similar circumstances. Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002).
When analyzing a qualified immunity defense at summary judgment, the court must
draw reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650,
651 (2014). And “[i]t is the plaintiff who bears the burden of showing that the rights
allegedly violated were clearly established.” Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024,
1035 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
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1. 	Fourth Amendment – Unlawful Detention and Arrest
Defendants move for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment unlawful
seizure claim, seeking qualified immunity. (Mot. 5:27–6:1.) The Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, paper, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Constitution thus permits government seizures to
the extent they are reasonable. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). The
Court generally views reasonableness through an objective lens. See Beck v. State of Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (noting that “it is the function of a court to determine whether the
facts available to the officers at the moment of the arrest would ‘warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief’ that an offense has been committed” (citation omitted)).
The Supreme Court has identified two categories of government seizures. First, an
arrest based on “probable cause.” See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). The
Ninth Circuit defines probable cause as “reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to
warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused has committed or was committing
an offense.” Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 237 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation modified).
Later, the Court recognized an investigative stop, also known as a “Terry Stop,” which
requires a showing of “reasonable suspicion” that “the person apprehended is committing
or has committed a criminal offense.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); Arizona v.
Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009).
To determine whether an officer engaged in a reasonable investigative stop, the
Supreme Court has outlined a “dual” inquiry: to start, a court asks, “whether the officer’s
action was justified at its inception” and next, “whether it was reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Terry, 392 U.S. at
19–20. For this dual inquiry, the Court relies on the “totality of the circumstances.”
Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014). And an officer needs to “point to
specific and articulable facts” to support reasonable suspicion, rather than “inarticulate
hunches.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
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Here, as agreed by the parties at oral argument, Deputy Castillero had reasonable
suspicion to initiate a Terry stop. (ECF No. 48.)
Even though Deputy Castillero reasonably initiated the stop, that is only half the
inquiry. At issue is whether handcuffing Plaintiff was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the stop. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 28–29 (“The manner in
which the seizure [was] conducted is, of course, as vital a part of the inquiry as whether [it
was] warranted at all.”). To frame the argument another way, Plaintiff suggests the
intrusiveness of handcuffs turned the encounter into a de facto arrest without probable
cause.4
Handcuffing “is not part of a typical Terry Stop” and “substantially aggravates the
intrusiveness of an otherwise routine investigatory detention.” United States v. Bautista,
684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir. 1982) cert. denied 459 U.S. 1211 (1983). Nevertheless, the
use of handcuffs, “if not excessive under the circumstances,” does not necessarily
transform an investigative stop into an arrest. Id. at 1289.
In limited circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has permitted intrusive techniques during
an investigative stop, namely where: (1) the suspect’s actions raise the possibility of danger
or flight; (2) the suspect is armed, according to officer’s information; (3) the Terry Stop
follows a violent crime; and (4) a violent crime is imminent, according to officer’s
information. See Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1189 (9th Cir. 1996).5
4 In their summary judgment motion, Defendants argue Deputy Castillero engaged in a lawful
arrest with probable cause because Plaintiff resisted the investigative stop in violation of Penal Code §
148. (Mot. 9:12–14, 11:20–13:24.) But, as relevant to the Court’s present inquiry, Defendants do not argue
that Deputy Castillero had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for breaking into cars or burglary. See, e.g.,
Velazquez v. City of Long Beach, 793 F.3d 1010, 1018 (9th Cir. 2015) (reversing summary judgment in
an officer’s favor for an arrest under Penal Code § 148 where “there was certainly sufficient evidence […]
on which a reasonable jury could have concluded that no probable cause existed, based both on evidence
that [the plaintiff] did not in fact resist [the officer] and evidence that [the plaintiff] did not impede [the
officer] in the exercise of his lawful duties[.]” (emphasis in original)). To the extent Defendants argue the
existence of probable cause based on the Penal Code § 148 violation, the Court rejects the applicability of
the argument to the analysis.
5 The Washington court further included as considerations the “specificity of the information that
leads the officers to suspect that the individuals they intend to question are the actual suspects being
sought,” the “specificity of information that the persons actually being sought are likely to forcibly resist
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Here, a jury could find that Deputy Castillero lacked a reasonable indication of
danger or flight; Plaintiff stayed and answered Deputy Castillero’s questions. (Ex. C.
0:00:40.) Further, there were no reports that anyone was armed. (Ex. 2, ECF No. 36-2; Ex.
4, ECF No. 36-3.) Nor did the stop follow a violent crime; in fact, no crime was reported.
(Id.) Finally, Deputy Castillero did not have information that a crime involving violence
was about to occur; Plaintiff was sitting on a wall scrolling through his phone. (Ex. C.
0:00:32.)6
At oral argument, given the opportunity to justify the handcuffs based on the
objective facts Deputy Castillero faced, Defendants did not identify an applicable
Washington factor, nor facts that would support one. (ECF No. 48.)7 Instead, Defendants
referenced the statement that officers are “authorized to take such steps as are reasonably
necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course
of the stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235–36 (1985) (finding a Terry stop
reasonable 	where 	the 	suspects 	were 	“reported 	to 	be 	armed 	and 	dangerous”). 	But
police interrogation,” and the “number of police officers present.” Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181,
1190 (9th Cir. 1996). Given that none of the four primary Washington factors have been met, the Court
does not analyze these additional considerations.
6 The Ninth Circuit’s decision United States v. Bautista is a relevant comparison, highlighting
circumstances under which an officer reasonably escalates an investigatory stop. 684 F.2d at 1286. In
Bautista, immediately following a bank robbery, the officer stopped two men suspected of the robbery.
Id. at 1287. The officer handcuffed the two men. Id. The court permitted the use of handcuffs, especially
because “the suspects appeared extremely nervous” and “suspect Bautista kept pacing back and forth and
looking, turning his head back and forth as if he was thinking about running.” Id. at 1289. The Ninth
Circuit emphasized that the two men were “suspected of robbery in which three men with guns
participated,” with the danger that “the third robber might still have been in the vicinity.” Id. at 1289–90.
The Court fails to see circumstances similar to Bautista that Defendants may rely on. When Deputy
Castillero responded to a report of someone looking into vehicles, Plaintiff made no attempt to flee,
displayed no signs of flight, and was reported to be unarmed.
7 Defendants also mention, in their brief and at oral argument, that Deputy Castillero twice at a
minimum declared that Plaintiff would be let go if the officer determined that no vehicles had been broken
into. (Mot. 8:15–16; ECF No. 48.) But a constitutional violation is not remedied because one could be “let
go” later. As the Supreme Court has highlighted, an investigatory stop “is a serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be
undertaken lightly.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
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Defendants still did not grapple with the Washington guardrails, which outline when an
officer may use handcuffs to reasonably protect personal safety.
In truth, Defendants’ advocacy seemed to drop the protections of reasonableness
altogether, arguing that Deputy Castillero’s concerns for personal safety necessitated the
handcuffs. But the Court rejects that argument as it would render the Washington factors
meaningless—the exception would become the rule, and handcuffing would be routinely
justified in virtually any Terry stop. In other words, Defendants’ argument would allow an
officer’s correlation between a potential crime and its associated dangers to justify
handcuffs in the name of personal safety during any Terry stop. See, e.g., Green v. City &
Cnty. of San Francisco, 751 F.3d 1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The fact that Green was
stopped on suspicion of a stolen vehicle does not by itself demonstrate that she presented
a danger to the officers.”); see also Chinaryan v. City of Los Angeles, 113 F.4th 888, 898
(9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Cueto v. Chinaryan, 145 S. Ct. 1927, 221 L. Ed. 2d
667 (2025) (“Although vehicle theft is an ‘arguably severe’ crime, the officers had no
articulable basis to suspect that plaintiffs posed a threat to anyone beyond the generic threat
that a suspected vehicle thief poses.” (citation omitted)).
And a Terry frisk already affords officers a constitutionally sanctioned means of
addressing safety concerns short of handcuffing. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7, 27 (describing
an officer stopping three men and patting down the outside of their clothing to check for
weapons); see also Sialoi v. City of San Diego, 823 F.3d 1223, 1236 (9th Cir. 2016). “While
[the Court] must not compel police officers to take unnecessary risks, total security is
possible, if at all, only in a society that puts a much lesser premium on freedom than does
ours.” Washington, 98 F.3d at 1187.
The Court therefore recognizes a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether
Deputy Castillero stayed within the scope of a reasonable investigative stop. In other
words, relying on the totality of circumstances, a jury could find the application of
handcuffs exceeded the limits of a reasonable investigative stop, transforming the
encounter into a de facto arrest without probable cause. Accordingly, the Court denies
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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure
claim.
The Court next asks whether the Fourth Amendment right to be free from highly
intrusive 	measures 	absent 	special 	circumstances 	during 	a 	Terry 	stop 	was 	clearly
established. The Court finds it was.
In the Ninth Circuit, “if the Terry-stop suspects are cooperative and the officers do
not have specific information that they are armed or specific information linking them to a
recent or inchoate dangerous crime, the use of such aggressive and highly intrusive tactics
is not warranted, at least when […] there are no other extraordinary circumstances
involved.” Washington, 98 F.3d at 1192; Green, 751 F.3d at 1052; see, e.g., Chinaryan,
113 F.4th at 893 (finding that, taking into account Washington and Green, it was clearly
established that “officers can be held liable for conducting a high-risk vehicle stop based
on nothing more than a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen”).
And this right was clearly established under similar circumstances. For example, in
Washington, a police bulletin outlined the heights and weights of two African American
suspects and stated that “they were considered armed and dangerous.” 98 F.3d at 1183–84.
Around midnight, an officer thought two men at a Carl’s Jr. resembled the suspects’
descriptions. Id. at 1183. Based on the similarity, the officer initiated a Terry stop that
involved the intrusive tactic of handcuffs. Id. at 1184, 1190. In addition to relying on the
presumed physical similarity, officers attempted to justify the intrusive stop by noting the
late hour and behavioral contradictions. Id. at 1191–92. But the Ninth Circuit found “of no
significance” that it was night and that the detainee appeared both “nervous” and “casual”
to the officer. Id. at 1193. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of qualified
immunity. Id. at 1183, 1192 (“At most there were two African American men, one short
and one tall, in the city of Santa Monica, at night, who appeared to a police officer to be
both nervous and casual. This case is not a close one; any reasonable juror would be
compelled to find on these facts that the stop was an arrest.”).
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The facts, here, track the facts in Washington closely. Deputy Castillero had a
meager amount of information about Plaintiff, besides a general, physical description. (Ex.
2, ECF No. 36-2; Ex. 4, ECF No. 36-3.) Deputy Castillero did not have information that
Plaintiff was armed, nor that a recent, dangerous crime took place. (Id.) Plaintiff complied
and answered Deputy Castillero’s questions. (Ex. C. 0:00:40.) And the hour of night along
with Plaintiff’s seemingly contradictory statements are not extraordinary considerations.
(Id. 0:00:48.)
Under these circumstances, a reasonable officer would have known that the intrusive
measure of handcuffs during an investigatory Terry stop was unlawful. Accordingly,
Deputy Castillero is not entitled to qualified immunity for the Fourth Amendment unlawful
seizure claim.
2. 	Fourth Amendment – Excessive Force
Defendants next move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
(Mot. 15:14–20.) Excessive force is analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective
“reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). To decide
reasonableness in this context, one balances (A) the “nature and quality of the intrusion”
against (B) the “countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (citation
omitted).
The balancing requires “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case,” including consideration of: (1) “the severity of the crime at issue,” (2)
“whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,” and
(3) “whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Id. (citation omitted). Of these, “the most important Graham factor is whether the
suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others.” Mattos v. Agarano,
661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (citation modified). Looking at the totality of
circumstances, the court may weigh other appropriate factors as well. See Bryan v.
MacPherson, 630 F.3d 805, 826 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that a court considers “the totality
of the circumstances […] whether or not listed in Graham”).
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To determine if an individual poses an immediate threat, a “simple statement by an
officer that he fears for his safety or the safety of others is not enough,” instead, “there
must be objective factors to justify such a concern.” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 441–42 (citation
omitted). And “[r]esistance, or the reasonable perception of resistance,” does “not entitle
police officers to use any amount of force to restrain a suspect.” Barnard v. Theobald, 721
F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original). Further, “[i]t is a well-worn
principle in [Ninth Circuit] law that when there is no need for force, any force used is
constitutionally unreasonable.” Gonzalez v. City of Phoenix, 163 F.4th 1289, 1301 (9th Cir.
2026) (citation omitted).
Here, 	the 	intrusion 	involved 	the 	forced 	application 	of 	handcuffs. 	Believing
Plaintiff’s evidence, he claims Deputy Castillero “grabbed [his] right wrist and then pulled
[him] up from sitting down and instantly tackles [him] and kicked [his] feet and tackles
[him] to the ground.” (Kimball Decl. 134:14–16; see also Castillero Decl. 121:6–17.)
Plaintiff further describes the force: “What I remember after he kicked my legs, and I was
already falling to the ground. This dude jumped up on top to. [sic] Like, he really tried to
put all of his weight shifted like slam my face on the ground.” (Kimball Decl. 134:20–22.)
Plaintiff also maintains that he was neither resisting nor attempting to flee. (Opp’n 15:22–
24; Kimball Decl. 180:15–22.)
Turning to the countervailing governmental interests, Defendants acknowledge that
“while the crime Deputy Castillero suspected Plaintiff of was not necessarily severe,”—
the first Graham factor—Plaintiff nevertheless posed an immediate threat. (Mot. 14:28–
15:2.) Specifically, Defendants argue that Deputy Castillero was by himself, knew that
Plaintiff had not been patted down for weapons, and was trained that burglary suspects
often carry burglary tools. (Reply 6:8–11, ECF No. 40.) In addition, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff was resisting and attempting to flee. (Mot 15:10–11; Castillero Decl. 139:3–4.)8
8 Defendants use the declaration of a police practices expert to corroborate Deputy Castillero’s
testimony that his detention and use of force were consistent with standard police tactics. (Fonzi Decl.,
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Here, the Graham factors support a genuine issue of material fact. In balance,
whether Plaintiff was resisting the seizure or whether Deputy Castillero’s force was
reasonable to overcome the resistance remains a genuine issue. Nor can the Court say as a
matter of law that objective factors support an immediate threat to Deputy Castillero’s
safety beyond, for example, Deputy Castillero’s statement that he feared for his safety. And
as acknowledged by Defendants, the crime at issue was not severe. (Mot. 15:1.)
A reasonable jury could conclude that Deputy Castillero employed unreasonable
force in applying handcuffs to Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court denies summary judgment on
the excessive force claim.9
3. 	Fourth Amendment – Malicious Prosecution
Defendants 	move 	for 	summary 	judgment 	on 	Plaintiff’s 	Fourth 	Amendment
malicious prosecution claim. (Mot. 21:14.) An individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable seizures can be violated if a government official brings charges
without probable cause. Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 42 (2022). Such malicious
prosecution effectively causes the plaintiff to be seized without probable cause. Id. Relying
on the elements of the state-law tort of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show the
following: “(i) the suit or proceeding was instituted without any probable cause; (ii) the
motive in instituting the suit was malicious, which was often defined in this context as
without probable cause and for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice; and
(iii) the prosecution terminated in the acquittal or discharge of the accused.” Id. at 44
(citation modified).
A prosecutor is presumed to exercise independent judgment when filing charges. See
Newman v. Cnty. of Orange, 457 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, when a plaintiff
seeks “to hold investigating police officers liable for malicious prosecution,” he “must
ECF No. 35-7.) But having such a declaration does not absolve the Court of its responsibility to determine
reasonableness and balance the Graham factors at the summary judgment stage.
9 For the excessive force claim, Defendants neither raise qualified immunity in their motion nor in
their reply brief. (Mot. 13:25–15:20; Reply 5:14–6:27, ECF No. 40.) The Court therefore considers the
defense waived for purposes of the motion.
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overcome the presumption that the prosecutor exercised independent judgment in bringing
criminal charges.” Gonzalez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 22-55386, 2023 WL 5951015, at
*2 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2023).
The plaintiff bears the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. See
Newman, 457 F.3d at 993. Specifically, the court looks for evidence that: (1) “the district
attorney was subjected to unreasonable pressure by the police officers,” (2) “the officers
knowingly withheld relevant information with the intent to harm [the plaintiff],” or (3) “the
officers knowingly supplied false information.” Id. at 994. The “plaintiff’s account of the
incident in question, by itself, does not overcome the presumption of independent
judgment.” Id. (emphasis in original). Instead, courts have relied on evidence such as the
corroboration of an independent witness, or factual incongruencies between the officers’
accounts. See id.
Here, Plaintiff has not satisfactorily rebutted the presumption of the prosecutor’s
independent judgment. Other than his own account of the events, Plaintiff has not offered
independent evidence. More pointedly, Plaintiff does not indicate that Deputy Castillero
exercised unreasonable pressure on the prosecutor, that Deputy Castillero withheld
relevant information with intent to harm, nor that Deputy Castillero offered false
information. If anything, Plaintiff seemingly argues that the prosecutor should have
interviewed Deputy Castillero before filling charges, but that argument cannot support a
claim here. (Opp’n 17:8–10.)
No reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor. Accordingly, the Court grants
summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
claim.
4. 	First Amendment – Interference and Retaliation
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims,
seeking qualified immunity. (Mot. 5:14–20.)
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
“Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
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right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I.
The First Amendment protects public discourse about the government. See Mills v.
State of Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist about
interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a
major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs.”). The protection includes the right to gather information “concerning public
officials,” see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964), and the right to disseminate
information “relating to alleged governmental misconduct,” see Gentile v. State Bar of
Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (1991). More specifically, in the Ninth Circuit, individuals
possess a “First Amendment right to film matters of public interest.” Fordyce v. City of
Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 1995).
The 	Fordyce 	decision 	asserted the right to 	record officers 	in 	public spaces
performing their public duties. Id. at 436. There, the plaintiff was videotaping a public
protest, where “[a]mong his subjects were the activities of the police officers assigned to
work the event.” Id. at 438. The plaintiff claimed that an officer attempted “physically to
dissuade” him from recording the public protest. Id. After establishing the plaintiff’s First
Amendment right to record the officers, the court remanded for fact finding. Id. at 442.
Here, the Court asks whether the right to record an officer was clearly established
under similar circumstances. Although both the plaintiff in Fordyce and here attempted to
record an officer in a public space performing a matter of public interest, the right was not
established under similar circumstances. 	Fordyce 	and similar cases establish that a
bystander may record an officer making an arrest—not that the arrestee may record their
own arrest. See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 79–80 (1st Cir. 2011) (denying an
officer qualified immunity for First Amendment violations where the plaintiff, standing ten
feet away, filmed several officers arresting someone else in a public space). None of
Plaintiff’s cases address the precise conflict at issue: whether an individual being actively
seized retains a First Amendment right to film that seizure. (Opp’n 8:11–10:9; ECF No.
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48.) Plaintiff is not observing police conduct from a distance, he is the subject of it. Cf.
Smith v. Cnty. of Orange, 678 F. Supp. 3d 1182, 1205 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (finding that the
right to record was clearly established under similar circumstances, despite some factual
dissimilarities, because the plaintiff was “simply engaging in the First Amendment
protected activity of observing a government operation by video recording the Deputies”
(citation modified)). Accordingly, the Court denies summary judgment as to the First
Amendment claim.
Relatedly, Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s First Amendment
retaliation claim. (Mot. 4:25–5:2.) The First Amendment “forbids government officials
from retaliating against individuals for speaking out.” Blair v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 608 F.3d
540, 543 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). For a
plaintiff to allege First Amendment retaliation, he must show that: “(1) he engaged in
constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, he was subjected to adverse action by the
defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the
protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the
constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. at 543.
Here, Plaintiff argues that when he shared his intent to record, Deputy Castillero
then used force. (Opp’n 9:8–11.) Defendants successfully undercut the retaliation claim by
relying on the timing of events. (Mot. 5:8–11.) In particular, Defendants argue that Deputy
Castillero planned to handcuff Plaintiff “before” Plaintiff pulled out his phone. (Id.) Given
this sequence, Plaintiff’s filming was not the but-for cause of the force. (Id.); see Nieves v.
Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398–99 (2019) (“It is not enough to show that an official acted with
a retaliatory motive […] it must be a “but-for” cause, meaning that the adverse action
against the plaintiff would not have been taken absent the retaliatory motive.”).
Without a substantial causal relationship, Plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim.
Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on the First
Amendment retaliation claim.
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5. 	Monell Claim
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Monell claim against the
County of San Diego. (Mot. 16:14.) With a threshold constitutional violation surviving
summary judgment, the Court considers whether the County is liable under Monell. See
City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
Included within § 1983’s definition of “persons,” a municipality can be liable for
constitutional violations—so-called Monell liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Importantly, one cannot sue the county on a theory
of 	respondeat superior. 	Id. at 691. Instead, 	Monell 	liability is limited to suits for
constitutional deprivations caused by the county’s “officially adopted” policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision, or the county’s unofficial but entrenched “custom [or
practice].” Id. 690–91, 694. In short, a county is held liable when the execution of a
government policy or custom inflicts the constitutional injury. Id. at 694.
Failure to train employees can be considered a county’s policy or custom where the
inadequacy reflects “deliberate indifference.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
389 (1989). Deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). Notice, through a
pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees, supports a deliberate
decision. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Although a pattern is “ordinarily
necessary” to demonstrate deliberate indifference, id. at 62, a failure to train can obviously
lead to constitutional violations in a “narrow range of circumstances,” id. at 63 (citation
omitted). For example, taking into consideration “the duties assigned to specific officers,”
when “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely
to result in the violation of constitutional rights,” a county’s training can reflect deliberate
indifference. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.
“A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where
a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61. The unsatisfactory training of
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a particular officer cannot support Monell liability. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390–91.
Moreover, a particular officer’s mistakes will not suffice. Id. at 391.
Regardless of a formal policy or custom, the county can be held liable when the
officer causing the underlying constitutional violation has “final policymaking authority”
with “respect to the action ordered.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481
(1986). Effectively, the county has sanctioned that officer’s actions as de facto “final
policy.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). As an extension of this
reasoning, the county can be held liable for any actions approved by those with final
policymaking authority. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. Under this so-called “ratification”
theory, a plaintiff must show that the “authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s
decision and the basis for it.” Id. In other words, “a plaintiff must show that the policy
maker approved of the subordinate’s act” and not just that the policymaker had knowledge
of it. Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999).
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Monell claim fails under any theory of
liability. (Mot. 17:5–6.) To start, Plaintiff alleges the County had a long-standing practice
or custom of ignoring and failing to discipline deputies’ violations of constitutional rights.
(Opp’n 17:24–26.) Plaintiff cites at least three prior incidents for support. (Opp’n 17:26–
18:10.) But a custom must be so “persistent and widespread” that it essentially becomes a
“permanent and well settled city policy.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Given their varying
factual circumstances and violations, the three incidents outlined by Plaintiff do not support
a permanent and well settled city policy. Instead, the incidents indicate a series of isolated
actions made by officers. No reasonable jury could find in Plaintiff’s favor on this theory
of Monell liability.
Plaintiff also makes failure to train and supervise arguments, but Plaintiff’s
arguments suggest Plaintiff was properly trained then broke away from his training. (Opp’n
18:13.) Plaintiff states, for example: “Castillero violated County policy and training by
grabbing and throwing the phone out of Kimball’s hand while recording.” (Opp’n 20:1–2.)
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If anything, Plaintiff’s argument demonstrates the mistake of a particular officer, which as
a matter of law cannot support Monell liability on a failure to train theory.
Turning to the last theory, ratification, Plaintiff has not identified a figure with final
policymaking authority. (Opp’n 20:23–26.) Plaintiff argues that by conducting neither an
internal affair nor a use of force investigation, failing to reprimand Deputy Castillero, and
declining to further train Deputy Castillero, the County ratified Deputy Castillero’s
allegedly unconstitutional conduct. (Id. at 20:23–26.) But without a final policymaking
authority 	acting or approving, Plaintiff’s 	argument 	amounts to 	nothing 	more than
respondeat superior liability, which is expressly forbidden as a matter of law.
Plaintiff cannot prevail on these theories before a reasonable jury. Accordingly, the
Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the Monell claim.
6. 	Fourteenth Amendment – Conditions of Confinement
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim, seeking qualified immunity. (Mot. 24:14–18.) Even if
Deputy Castillero violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, qualified immunity shields him
from liability—no clearly established law put Deputy Castillero on notice that his conduct
was unlawful under these circumstances.
The Court agrees with Defendants that Taylor v. Riojas is too factually dissimilar to
place a reasonable officer on notice. (Reply 10:8–11); 592 U.S. 7, 9 (2020). There, for
example, an inmate was placed in a cell with a “clogged drain in the floor to dispose of
bodily wastes,” so that the inmate “held his bladder for over 24 hours, but he eventually
(and involuntarily) relieved himself, causing the drain to overflow and raw sewage to spill
across the floor.” Taylor, 592 U.S. at 8. Plaintiff’s facts here neither rise to that level of
shock 	or 	egregiousness, 	nor 	do 	they 	support 	an 	obvious 	constitutional 	violation.
Accordingly, the Court grants qualified immunity as to the Fourteenth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim.
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B. 	State Law Claims
Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s state law claims: (1)
Negligence, (2) Battery, (3) False Arrest, and (4) the Bane Act. Plaintiff brings the state
law claims against both Deputy Castillero and the County of San Diego. The Court
discusses each claim in turn. Defendants seek immunity from these claims.
1. 	Negligence
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim. (Mot.
22:26–28.) “Except when otherwise provided by law, public employees in California are
statutorily liable to the same extent as private persons for injuries caused by their acts or
omissions, subject to the same defenses available to private persons.” Hayes v. Cnty. of San
Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 628–29 (2013); Gov. Code § 820(a). Negligence under California
law requires the following: (1) a legal duty to use due care; (2) breach of such legal duty;
and (3) that the breach was a proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury. See Ladd v.
County of San Mateo, 12 Cal.4th 913, 917 (1996); see also USAir Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Navy, 14 F.3d 1410, 1412 (9th Cir. 1994).
Regarding the first element, officers have a duty to exercise reasonable care when
using deadly force, and by extension, excessive force. See Hayes, 57 Cal. 4th at 629; see
also Young v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 655 F.3d 1156, 1170 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Fourth
Amendment violation alleged suffices to establish the breach of a duty of care.” (citation
modified)). Reasonableness is determined “in light of the totality of the circumstances.”
Hayes, 57 Cal. 4th at 629. But this standard is “broader than federal Fourth Amendment
law” and considers an officer’s conduct prior to the use of force. Id. at 639.
Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable jury could find negligence,
especially when including Deputy Castillero’s pre-force conduct. Accordingly, the Court
denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim against Deputy
Castillero.
Defendants also move for summary judgment on a direct and vicarious liability
negligence claim against the County of San Diego. (Mot. 23:24.) Direct liability of a public
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entity must be based on “a specific statute either declaring the entity to be liable or creating
a specific duty of care apart from the general tort principles[.]” de Villers v. Cnty. of San
Diego, 156 Cal. App. 4th 238, 251 (2007) (emphasis in original). As articulated by the
California Supreme Court:
The Tort Claims Act draws a clear distinction between the
liability of a public entity based on its own conduct, and the
liability arising from the conduct of a public employee. Although
the Act provides that a public employee generally is liable for an
injury caused by his or her act or omission “to the same extent as
a private person” (Gov.Code, § 820, subd. (a)) and that, when the
act or omission of the public employee occurs in the scope of
employment the public entity will be vicariously liable for the
injury (Gov.Code, § 815.2), the Act contains 	no 	provision
similarly providing that a public entity generally is liable for its
own conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person
or entity. Rather, the Act provides that a public entity is not liable
for an injury “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute....”
(Gov.Code, § 815.)
Zelig v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 1127 (2002) (emphasis in original).
Here, Defendants note the lack of a statutory basis to hold the County of San Diego
liable for negligent hiring or supervision. (Mot 23:26–27); see also de Villers, 156 Cal.
App. 4th at 251 (finding no “case law approving a claim for direct liability” against a
county for negligent hiring and supervision practices). Plaintiff did not oppose. (Opp’n
21:4–10.)
Regarding vicarious liability, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim against the
County fails alongside the negligence claim against Deputy Castillero. But the Court finds
a 	viable 	negligence 	claim 	against 	Deputy 	Castillero. 	The 	Court 	therefore 	grants
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Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the direct liability negligence claim but
denies it on the vicarious liability negligence claim against the County of San Diego.
2. 	Battery
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s battery claim. (Mot. 15:22–
23.) To bring a battery claim, the plaintiff must allege: (1) the officer intentionally
committed an act that resulted in harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person;
(2) the plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the contact caused harm to the
plaintiff. See Rodriguez v. City of Fresno, 819 F. Supp. 2d 937, 952 (E.D. Cal. 2011)
(citation omitted). “A prima facie battery is not established unless and until plaintiff proves
unreasonable force was used.” Edson v. City of Anaheim, 63 Cal. App. 4th 1269 (Ct. App.
1998); see also Saman v. Robbins, 173 F.3d 1150, 1157 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999).
Here, Defendants argue that without a threshold showing of excessive force,
Plaintiff’s battery claim cannot stand. (Mot. 16:3–9.) But a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to the excessive force claim. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on the battery claim.
3. 	False Arrest
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false arrest claim. (Mot.
11:21–22.) False arrest is merely “one way of committing a false imprisonment[.]” Collins
v. City & County of San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 673 (1975). False imprisonment
under California law is the “unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.” Asgari
v. City of Los Angeles, 15 Cal. 4th 744, 757 (1997). A false imprisonment claim in the
arrest 	context 	is 	established 	by 	the 	following: 	“(1) the nonconsensual, 	intentional
confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable period of
time, however brief.” Easton v. Sutter Coast Hosp., 80 Cal. App. 4th 485, 496 (2000); see
also Young, 655 F.3d at 1169. “California state law prohibits civil liability for false arrest
where an arresting officer had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.” Garcia
v. Cnty. Of Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Here, Defendants argue Deputy Castillero had probable cause to make an arrest.
(Mot. 13:16–18.) For the reasons articulated in footnote four, however, Deputy Castillero
does not establish probable cause. Drawing reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, a
genuine issue of material fact remains. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on the false arrest claim.
4. 	Cal. Civil Code § 52.1(c)
Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim. (Mot.
15:22–23.) The Tom Bane Civil Rights Act states, in relevant parts: “If a person […]
interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, […] with the exercise or enjoyment by any
individual […] of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,” that
individual may bring a civil action for damages. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 52.1(b), (c).
After analyzing several California Court of Appeal decisions, the Ninth Circuit has
held that “in excessive force cases, […] § 52.1 does not require proof of coercion beyond
that inherent in the underlying violation.” Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776,
802 (9th Cir. 2018).
Here, Defendants argue Plaintiff falls short of the Bane Act requirements because he
cannot establish excessive force, nor can he establish any First, Fourth, or Fourteenth
Amendment constitutional violation. (Mot. 15:26–28.) But that is not so. Plaintiff
maintains a genuine issue of material fact regarding a Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure
claim and an excessive force violation. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment on the Bane Act claim.
5. 	State Law Immunity
Defendants seek immunity from the state law actions under Government Code §§
820.2, 815.2. (Mot. 24:19, 25:12.) 	First, 	Defendants 	seek 	immunity 	for 	Deputy
Castillero’s individual conduct under Government Code § 820.2. (Mot. 24:19.) The statute
provides: “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an
injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the
exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion is abused.” Cal.
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Gov’t Code § 820.2. But the immunity is limited. Section 820.2 “covers only ‘policy’
decisions made by a ‘coordinate branch[ ] of government,’ and not ‘operational decision[s]
by the police purporting to apply the law.’” Sharp v. Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 920
(9th Cir. 2017) (citing Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (abrogated
on other grounds)).
Here, given that Deputy Castillero made an on-the-ground decision to detain
Plaintiff, § 820.2 immunity does not apply as a matter of law. See, e.g., Nelson v. City of
Davis, 709 F. Supp. 2d 978, 993 (E.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 685 F.3d 867 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The
discretionary immunity conferred by the statute [§ 820.2] is reserved for basic policy-level
decision making. […] It does not protect tactical choices found to be unreasonable[.]”
(citation omitted)).
Second, Defendants seek immunity for the County of San Diego. (Mot. 25:12.)
Section 815.2(a) generally makes a public entity vicariously liable for injuries caused by
its employees during the scope of employment. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a). But, as
articulated in § 815.2(b), where an employee receives immunity, a public entity will not be
held vicariously liable. Id. § 815.2(b).
Here, given that Deputy Castillero does not receive § 820.2 “discretionary”
immunity, the County cannot leverage protection from suit under § 815.2. Accordingly,
Defendants’ immunity arguments under § 820.2 and § 815.2 fail.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
First: the federal claims. The Court GRANTS the motion in Defendants’ favor as to
the free speech, malicious prosecution, Monell, and conditions of confinement claims. But
the Court DENIES summary judgment on the unreasonable seizure claim, concluding the
right clearly established under similar circumstances. The Court further DENIES summary
judgment on the excessive force claim, finding a genuine issue of material fact.
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Second: the state law claims. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion as to the
direct liability negligence claim against the County of San Diego. But the Court DENIES
Defendants’ summary judgment as to the negligence claim against Deputy Castillero and
associated vicarious liability claim against the County of San Diego, the battery claim, the
false arrest claim, and the Bane Act claim. Defendants cannot invoke state law immunity
under Government Code §§ 820.2, 815.2.
In light of this ruling, the Court ORDERS the parties to contact the magistrate judge
on or before March 6, 2026, to set a new scheduling order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: February 27, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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