Rittel v. Kijakazi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WILLIAM RITTEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
Case No. 23-cv-01075-BAS-MSB
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF
ATTORNEY’S FEES (ECF No. 13)
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff William Rittel’s (“Rittel”) motion for approval
of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF No. 13.) The Commissioner of Social
Security responded to the motion. (ECF No. 16.) The Court finds Rittel’s motion suitable
for determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
78(b); CivLR 7.1.d.1. 	For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for
approval of attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 13.)
I. 	BACKGROUND
Following a decision from an administrative law judge denying Rittel’s application
for disability benefits under the Social Security Act (ECF No. 1), Rittel retained counsel to
challenge that decision in this Court (ECF No. 13 at 2), and entered into a contingent-fee
Social Security Representation Agreement (“Representation Agreement”). 	(ECF No. 13
at 3:19-21, Ex. B.) The Representation Agreement provides that Rittel’s counsel, Martha
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Yancey (“Petitioner”) should receive 25% of Rittel’s back benefits in the event of an award.
(Id.)
On June 8, 2023, Rittel sought judicial review in this Court. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	On
October 14, 2023, the Court granted Parties’ joint motion to reverse and remand the case
to Social Security Administration. (ECF Nos. 9, 10.) After a new administrative hearing,
the ALJ issued a favorable decision, finding Plaintiff disabled. (ECF No. 13 at 3:25-26.)
On January 5, 2026, the Social Security Administration issued a letter entitled
“Important Information,” indicating that $6,426.50 has been withheld for payment of
attorney’s fees and that $6,426.50 is the “balance” of 25% of past-due benefits. (Id. at 4:1-
6.)
Rittel, through Petitioner, now returns to this Court to seek approval of attorney’s
fees of $6,426.50. (ECF No. 13.) The Commissioner has filed a response. (ECF No. 18.)
II. 	ANALYSIS
The law regulates the fees that attorneys may charge Social Security claimants for
representation before the Social Security Administration and a reviewing court. 	See 42
U.S.C. § 406(a)–(b).
Rittel received an award of past-due benefits after this Court entered a judgment in
her favor (ECF No. 13, Ex. A). Hence, the relevant fee provision is 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).
This statute provides:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this
subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits
to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the
Commissioner of Social Security may . . . certify the amount of such fee for
payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such
past-due benefits.
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Accordingly, § 406(b) limits fees for representation before the
court “to no more than 25% of past-due benefits and allows the agency to withhold past-
due benefits to pay these fees.” Culbertson v. Berryhill, 586 U.S. 53, 57 (2019).
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Social Security claimants routinely enter into “contingent-fee contracts that produce
fees no higher than the 25 percent ceiling.” 	Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 800
(2002); see also Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 	In
Gisbrecht, the Supreme Court determined that Ҥ 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee
agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social
Security benefits claimants in court.” 	535 U.S. at 807. 	Instead, because the statute
authorizes a “reasonable fee,” it “calls for court review of such arrangements as an
independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.” See id.
Further, where a contingency agreement exists, the Supreme Court emphasized that
the starting point for assessing the reasonableness of the fee amount is the agreement itself,
not the familiar lodestar method. 	Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 797–809. 	In testing the
contingency 	agreement’s 	reasonableness, 	the 	court 	may 	appropriately 	reduce 	“the
attorney’s recovery based on the character of the representation and the results the
representative achieved.” 	Id. at 808. 	For example, a downward adjustment may be
justified if the attorney was responsible for delay, “so that the attorney will not profit from
the accumulation of benefits during the pendency of the case in court.” 	Id. at 808.
Moreover, where counsel is set to receive a windfall because “the benefits are large in
comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case, a downward adjustment is
similarly in order.” 	See id. at 808; accord Astrue, 586 F.3d at 1151 (“The court may
properly reduce the fee for substandard performance, delay, or benefits that are not in
proportion to the time spent on the case.”). 	“As evidence of the reasonableness of the
resulting fee, the court may require counsel to submit a record of hours spent and a
statement of normal hourly billing charges.” 	Astrue, 586 F.3d at 1151. 	However,
“‘satellite litigation’ over attorneys’ fees should not be encouraged.” Id. at 1152 (quoting
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). 	Finally, although the court’s focus is on the contingency
agreement, the court can “consider the lodestar calculation, but only as an aid in assessing
the reasonableness of the fee.” Id.
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Rittel’s Representation Agreement provides that Petitioner should receive 25% of
Rittel’s back benefits in the event of an award. 	(ECF No. 13 at 3:19-21, Ex. B.) 	In
assessing whether the requested fee is reasonable, the Court initially notes that there is no
evidence of “fraud or overreaching” in the negotiation of the Representation Agreement.
See Astrue, 586 F.3d at 1145. Indeed, such agreements are common, and Rittel has been
given the opportunity to oppose the motion for approval of her counsel’s fee. She has not
done so. 	Further, a reduction for substandard performance is not warranted. 	Petitioner
ably represented Rittel and was successful in obtaining a favorable judgment that led to her
award of substantial past-due benefits. 	Nor is a reduction for delay warranted here.
Petitioner met every briefing deadline in this case, and there was thus no “‘excessive delay’
attributable to” Petitioner in the proceedings before this Court. See id. at 1146.
In addition, the proposed fee would not be a windfall to Petitioner. The requested
fee is “not excessively large in relation to the benefits achieved.” See Astrue, 586 F.3d at
1151.
Further, the Court notes that counsel spent 6.3 hours on Torquato’s case at the district
court level. Therefore, counsel’s request for $6,426.50 in fees amounts to approximately
$1,020.07 an hour. (See ECF No. 13 at 4:7-10.) Counsel highlights various district court
decisions in the Ninth Circuit approving comparable fees at comparable hourly rates. (See
id. at 4.) 	The Court is persuaded that the effective hourly rate in this case does not
demonstrate the fee would be a windfall.
Overall, the Court finds that the requested fee is reasonable. Rittel agreed that her
counsel would be paid up to 25% of her past-due benefits, and her counsel chose to bear
the risk of non-payment in the event that the appeal was unsuccessful. Her counsel now
seeks 25% of the past-due benefits. Given the circumstances of the case, the Court finds a
downward adjustment to the requested fee is not appropriate. 	Therefore, the Court will
grant Rittel’s motion for approval of $6,426.50 in fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).
* * *
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Having approved fees under § 406(b), the Court briefly discusses Torquato’s
counsel’s prior EAJA award. The Court awarded Petitioner $1,500 in fees under the EAJA.
(ECF No. 12 at 3:7-9.) “Congress amended the EAJA in 1985 to add a savings provision
that allows attorneys to receive fees under both § 406(b) and [EAJA, 28 U.S.C.] § 2412.”
Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1218 (9th Cir. 2012). “However,
in order to maximize the award of past-due benefits to claimants and to avoid giving double
compensation to attorneys, the savings provision requires a lawyer to offset any fees
received under § 406(b) with any award that the attorney receives under § 2412 if the two
were for the ‘same work.’ ” Id.; see also Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (noting the claimant’s
attorney must refund to the claimant the smaller fee amount). 	Because here Petitioner’s
fees under the EAJA and § 406(b) are for the same work, the Court will order Petitioner to
remit the $1,500 fee award to Rittel.
III. 	CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Rittel’s motion for approval of
attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (ECF No. 13.) The Court approves Petitioner’s
request to receive $6,426.50 in fees withheld by the Social Security Administration.
Further, the Court ORDERS Petitioner to remit to Rittel the $1,500 that counsel received
under the EAJA (see ECF No. 12).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: January 28, 2026
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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