Shah v. Peters et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
NIMESH SHAH,
Plaintiff,
v.
COLLETTE S. PETERS, BOP Director,
et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 3:23-cv-00801-RBM-JLB
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
[Doc. 24]
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a Dispositive Order and Mandate granting
Respondents’ Motion to Vacate and Remand (“Order Remanding”) on December 1, 2025.
(Docs. 21–22.1) 	On December 16, 2025, this Court issued an Order for Supplemental
Briefing Following Remand (“Supplemental Briefing Order”).2 (Doc. 23.) 	The Order
1 The Dispositive Order vacated this Court’s “order and Judgment denying [Petitioner
Nimesh Shah’s] 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition, and remand[ed] for further proceedings”
following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Gonzalez v. Herrera, 151 F.4th 1076 (9th Cir.
2025) finding First Step Act (“FSA”) credits can be applied toward reducing a term of
supervised release. 	(Doc. 21.) 	The appeal of this Court’s decision denying the Petition
had been stayed pending the decision in Gonzalez v. Herrera. (Doc. 19.)
2 The Ninth Circuit “express[ed] no opinion as to the parties’ dispute regarding the effect,
if any, of [Petitioner’s] plea agreement on his requested relief, or as to the amount, if any,
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required Respondents to file supplemental briefing by December 22, 2025 and any
supplemental response from Petitioner be filed by December 29, 2025. (Id. at 2–3.3)
Among other issues, the Court’s Supplemental Briefing Order required Respondents
to address “Petitioner’s current status and the impact of any change in his status on whether
there is an ongoing case or controversy that may be ‘redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.’” (Doc. 23 at 2 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998).) As the Court
noted in the Supplemental Briefing Order, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a § 2241 petition
is not mooted by release from custody if a reduction in a term of supervised release is
possible. 	(Id. at 2 n.2 (citing Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2005).)
However, the record before the Court reflected that Petitioner had likely completed his
term of supervised release. 	(Id. 	(noting his three-year term of supervised release
commenced on December 6, 2022).) The Order required Respondents to file supplemental
briefing by December 22, 2025 and any supplemental response from Petitioner be filed by
December 29, 2025. (Id. at 2–3.)
On December 19, 2025, Respondents’ filed their Supplemental Briefing Following
Remand and Motion to Dismiss 2241 Petition as Moot (“Respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss”). 	(Doc. 24.) 	Respondents’ Motion 	to Dismiss confirms that 	Petitioner
“completed his supervised release on December 5, 2025” and “[h]is current status with
U.S. Probation is ‘closed.’” 	(Id. (quoting Ex. 1 (email from United States Probation
officer) and citing Ex. 2 (probation record showing current status closed and closed date of
December 5, 2025).) Petitioner did not file a response to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.
“Failure to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement renders a habeas
petition moot.” 	Kittel v. Thomas, 620 F.3d 949, 951, (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Mujahid v.
Daniels, 413 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)). The case-or-controversy requirement “means
of unused time credits [he] may have remaining.” In moving to remand, Respondents had
argued that these two issues could be determined by the district court on remand.
3 The Court cites the CM/ECF electronic pagination unless otherwise noted.
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that, throughout the litigation, the [petitioner] must have suffered, or be threatened with,
an actual injury traceable to the [respondent] and likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” 	Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (internal quotations and
citations omitted). 	Here, the relief sought in the Petition is a reduction of the term of
supervised release. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Because the term of supervised release has ended, there
is no controversy “to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” 	Id. 	Like a petition
seeking release on parole becomes moot when the petitioner is released on parole, a petition
seeking to reduce supervised release becomes moot when supervised release has ended.
See Fendler v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 846 F.2d 550, 555 (1988) (finding § 2241 petition
moot when only relief sought was immediate release on parole and petitioner had been
released); see also United States v. Cottrell, 539 F. Appx. 727, 728 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding
challenges to revocation of supervised release moot because appellant was “no longer
serving a term of supervised release.”)
Based on the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED as moot. The Clerk shall close
the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 12, 2026
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