United States of America v. City of San Diego

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________
AND RELATED CROSS-ACTION.
Case No.: 23cv0541-LL-VET
ORDER OVERRULING
DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S AUGUST
15, 2025 ORDER
[ECF No. 191]
Before the Court are Defendant City of San Diego’s (“City”) objections to
Magistrate Judge Valerie E. Torres’ order denying the City’s motion to compel entered on
August 15, 2025 [ECF No. 184 (“Order”)]. ECF No. 191 (“Mot.”). Plaintiff United States
of America (“United States”) filed a response in opposition [ECF No. 199 (“Opp”)] and
the City filed a reply [ECF No. 200 “Reply”]. For the reasons below, the Court
OVERRULES the City’s objections.
I. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“A district court’s review of a magistrate judge’s order on a non-dispositive motion
is limited.” Lawrence v. Hoban Mgmt., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2015).
Rulings on discovery motions, such as the Order at issue, are non-dispositive. See 28
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U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Civ. Loc. R. 72.1(b). The district court will uphold the magistrate
judge’s 	order 	unless 	it 	is 	“clearly erroneous or 	contrary 	to 	law.” 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). “The ‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies to factual
findings and discretionary decisions made in connection with non-dispositive pretrial
discovery matters.” F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 196 F.R.D. 375, 378 (S.D.
Cal. 2000). A review under the clearly erroneous standard is “significantly deferential,
requiring a ‘definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Concrete
Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993). In contrast,
the “contrary to law” standard permits “independent review of purely legal determinations
by a magistrate judge.” Computer Econ., Inc. v. Gartner Grp., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980,
983 (S.D. Cal. 1999). Thus, the district court should exercise its independent judgment
with respect to a magistrate judge’s legal conclusions.
II. 	DISCUSSION
The City objects to the Magistrate Judge’s Order denying the City’s Motion to
Compel Access to the Boat Channel at the former Naval Training Center in San Diego “for
the purpose of investigation, sampling, and testing of real property including land, water,
and subaqueous land.” Mot. at 2. The City argues that Magistrate Judge Torres interpreted
42 U.S.C. § 9613 too broadly1 as to “preclude the City’s ability to verify that the contractual
conditions precedent to conveyance of the property have been satisfied.” Id.
“Section 113 of CERCLA, entitled ‘Civil Proceedings,’ sets forth the jurisdictional
basis and limits of federal courts to adjudicate actions arising out of CERCLA.” Fairchild
Semiconductor Corp. v. United States EPA, 984 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1993); see also
1 The Court declines to consider City’s attempt to distinguish Fort Ord Toxics Project, Inc.
v. California E.P.A., 189 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1999) and ARCO Env’t Remediation, L.L.C. v.
Dep’t of Health & Env’t Quality of Montana, 213 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2000) as the City
failed to address these cases before the Magistrate Judge. See Farquhar v. Jones, 141 F.
App’x 539, 540 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding an argument waived when first raised in objections
to a magistrate’s recommendation).
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generally 42 U.S.C. § 9613. Subsection (j)(1) provides that “[i]n any judicial action under
this chapter, judicial review of any issues concerning the adequacy of any response action
taken or ordered by the President shall be limited to the administrative record.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(j)(1) (emphasis added). As the Magistrate Judge correctly found, both United States
and the City assert causes of action pursuant to CERCLA (see ECF Nos. 25, 110), so there
can be no dispute that § 9613(j)(1) applies to the parties’ causes of action arising directly
under CERCLA. Order at 7–8.
As for the City’s argument that § 9613(j)(1) should not apply to the sampling request
because it relates to “the City’s ability to verify that the contractual conditions precedent
to conveyance of the property have been satisfied” (Mot. at 2, emphasis added), the Court
is not persuaded. According to the City, its sampling request seeks to gather evidence that
would demonstrate that United States or the Navy “failed to satisfy its contractual
obligations under the Memorandum of Agreement (‘MOA’) to (1) ‘take all remedial action
necessary to protect human health and the environment,’ required and (2) to obtain site
closure from appropriate regulatory authorities based on the projected use of the property
as described in the NTC San Diego Reuse Plan.” Id. In other words, the City seeks evidence
that would support its allegations that the Navy did not perform its condition precedent
under the MOA by attacking “the remedial action” taken by the Navy. The City cannot
avoid application of § 9613(j)(1) by claiming that it challenges the United States’
remediation only under the MOA, and not under CERCLA.
In fact, its own expert witness confirmed that the City intends to use the sampling to
challenge the CERCLA cleanup. See Order at 13. As the Magistrate Judge correctly found,
the City is plainly challenging the adequacy of the Navy’s remediation. See id. (collecting
cases). Accordingly, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j) limits judicial review of the adequacy of the
remediation to the administrative record, and therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s decision
that the City’s sampling request sought discovery beyond the scope allowed under
CERCLA was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Lastly, the Magistrate Judge Torres’ ruling that the City’s September 12, 2024
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sampling request was untimely is not clearly erroneous. As the Magistrate Judge explained
in detail, the fact discovery was originally scheduled to close on August 7, 2024. Order at
14. At the City’s request, the Magistrate Judge continued the discovery deadlines twice to
September 6, 2024 and November 6, 2024. Id. The parties were expressly informed that all
discovery “must be initiated a sufficient period of time in advance of the cut-off date, so
that it may be completed by the cut-off date.” Id. However, the City did not serve the
sampling request until September 12, 2024 and requested to sample from October 15, 2024
to November 7, 2024—one day after the close of fact discovery and the day that initial
expert designations and reports were due—even though it had a document outlining the
proposed sampling request since March 2024. Id. The Magistrate Judge noted that the City
failed to explain why it waited over six months to serve this discovery. Id. at 15. The City
now claims–belatedly–that the sampling was not untimely because it was made after
“United States first asserted its claim for specific performance in the counterclaim-in-reply
filed on July 11, 2024.” Reply at 7. However, this timeline still does not explain why the
City waited two months to serve the sampling request on September 12, 2024. The Court
agrees with the Magistrate Judge that permitting the proposed sampling would reopen
major portions of fact and expert discovery and cause significant delays. Therefore, the
Court finds no clear error as to Magistrate Judge’s ruling that the City’s September 12,
2024 sampling request was untimely.
In sum, the City’s arguments are not persuasive and fail to establish that discovery
is warranted under the circumstances. Accordingly, the court denies the City’s objections
to the Order.
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III. 	CONCLUSION
The City’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Order do not establish that the
Magistrate Judge’s rulings were either clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Accordingly,
the Court OVERRULES City’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s August 15, 2025
Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 27, 2026
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