USA v. Camberos et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 23-cr-01916-BAS-1
ORDER:
(1) 	DENYING THIRD-PARTY
PETITIONER JOSEPH
SHAYOTA’S MOTION FOR
A HEARING (ECF No. 317);
(2) 	GRANTING THE UNITED
STATES’ MOTION TO
DISMISS THIRD-PARTY
PETITION (ECF No. 323);
AND
(3) 	GRANTING THE UNITED
STATES’ MOTION TO
STRIKE DEFENDANT’S
RESPONSE IN
OPPOSITION (ECF No. 328)
v.
ADRIANA ISABEL CAMBEROS,
Defendant.
I. 	BACKGROUND
This case has a somewhat tortured history. 	In 2016, Third-Party Petitioner
Joseph Shayota and his wife, Defendant Adriana Camberos, were convicted of
conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods in connection with their business Tradeway
International, doing business as Baja Exporting LLC. (Presentence Report (“PSR”)
¶ 70, ECF No. 221; Declaration of Joseph Shayota (“Shayota Decl.”), ECF No. 317,
at 3.) 	While the case proceeded through the appellate process, Petitioner and
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Defendant dissolved their marriage. 	In a Post-Marital Agreement entered into
between the two in February 2019, the parties agreed “there shall be no community
property of their marriage.” 	(Post-Marital Agmt., Ex. A to United States’ Mot. to
Dismiss the Petition, at § E.3, ECF No. 323-2.) Instead, they provide a schedule of
their separate properties. (Id.) In addition, the parties agreed:
By entering into this Agreement, the parties confirm Wife’s separate
property 	interest 	in 	Tradeway 	International, 	Inc. 	(dba 	Baja
Exporting); . . . and to the extent any community interest may exist in the
company at the time this Agreement is executed, . . . the parties agree to
transmute any such community interest into Wife’s separate property. As
such, any interest in the company shall be the sole and separate property
of Wife. Husband understands he is voluntarily giving up any interest he
may have had in the company at this time or in the future . . . .
(Id. at § E.5.)
Shayota went to prison from 2019 to 2023. 	(Shayota Decl.) 	Adriana
Camberos went to prison until January 2021, when she received an executive grant
of clemency. 	(PSR ¶ 70.) 	Between 2021 and 2024, Adriana Camberos became
involved in the instant conspiracy to commit wire fraud, again involving Baja
Exporting. (ECF No. 75.)
After conviction by a jury, the Court ordered Preliminary Forfeiture on June
30, 2025, including funds from a Wells Fargo Bank Account ending in 8864 in the
name of Tradeway Int’l Inc. (dba Baja Exporting), funds from Adriana Shayota’s
Banco Monex, S.A. account, and funds in other bank accounts. (ECF No. 297.) After
a contested forfeiture hearing, the Court concluded that the funds in the forfeited bank
accounts were “all directly traceable to the proceeds the Camberoses [Adriana and
her codefendant brother, Andres] made in the illegal wire fraud scheme.” (ECF No.
305, at 14:15–19.)
Joseph Shayota now files a Third-Party Petition claiming that he has an interest
in the following forfeited property:
(1) 	$628,095.29 in funds from Wells Fargo Bank Account ending in 8864 in
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the name of Tradeway Int’l Inc. (dba Baja Exporting);
(2) 	Community property funds previously deposited in Defendant Adriana
Shayota’s Banco Monex, S.A. account; and
(3) 	Any remaining community property funds transferred into any of the
remaining bank accounts forfeited in this action.
(ECF No. 317.) 	Adriana Camberos opposes her ex-husband’s Petition. 	(ECF
No. 325.) The United States moves to strike Adriana Camberos’s Opposition. (ECF
No. 328.) The United States further moves to dismiss Shayota’s Petition. (ECF No.
323), and Shayota opposes (ECF No. 329).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
As a preliminary matter, a defendant has no standing to oppose a third party’s
petition claiming an interest in property already forfeited. 	21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2)
(stating any person other than the defendant may assert a legal interest); see also Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32.2 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (noting an ancillary
hearing has no bearing on the defendant’s right to the property); United States v.
Hernandez Escarsega, 886 F.2d 1560, 1575, 1576 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Hernandez has
no standing to complain of any due process violation with regard to a third-party
interest.”). Hence, the Court GRANTS the Government’s motion to strike Adriana
Camberos’s Opposition to the Petition. (ECF No. 328.)
Under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2), after forfeiture has been entered, any third party
may assert a legal interest in the property that has been forfeited. However, “[i]f a
third party fails to allege in its petition all elements necessary for recovery, including
those related to standing, the court may dismiss the petition without providing a
hearing.” United States v. White, 675 F.3d 1073, 1077 (8th Cir. 2012); Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32.2(c)(1)(A). “For purposes of the motion, the facts set forth in the petition are
assumed to be true.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(A).
“Standing in forfeiture cases has both constitutional and statutory aspects.”
White, 675 F.3d at 1078 (quoting United States v. Timley, 507 F.3d 1125, 1129 (8th
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Cir. 2007)). 	“To establish constitutional standing, ‘a party seeking to challenge a
forfeiture of property must first demonstrate an ownership or possessory interest in
the seized property.’” 	Id. 	“Statutory standing under § 853(n) requires that [the
petitioner] demonstrate a legal interest in the proceeds.” Id.
“State law determines whether [a] Claimant[] ha[s] a property interest, but
Federal law determines whether or not that interest can be forfeited.” United States
v. Hooper, 229 F.3d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 2000). Under federal law, the third party may
not relitigate the previous forfeitability finding. Instead, the third party must
demonstrate that he falls within two protected categories of transferees under
21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6). Specifically, a third party may establish rightful ownership
of forfeited assets by showing that he is a bona fide purchaser of that property or by
showing that his interest in the property antedated the crime. 	United States v. 101
Houseco LLC, 22 F.4th 843, 849 (9th Cir. 2022).
Petitioner in this case does not claim that he is a bona fide purchaser, so the
Court focuses on the latter ground. There is a temporal requirement to this ground.
Hooper, 229 F.3d at 821. The Government’s interest in the forfeited property vests
at the time the criminal act is committed. United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1124
(9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the petitioner’s legal right to the property must have vested
before the commission of the acts that gave rise to the forfeiture. Id. “Otherwise, a
defendant could attempt to avoid criminal forfeiture by transferring his property to
another party before conviction.” United States v. Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 647 (9th
Cir. 2007).
Thus, in Hooper, the Ninth Circuit found the petitioner’s third-party claim
must be dismissed because the forfeited property consisted of proceeds from the
offense. 	229 F.3d 818. Since the defendant’s crime “had to have been committed
before there could be any proceeds resulting from [it],” the petitioner’s legal right to
the property could not have antedated the commission of the criminal acts giving rise
to the forfeiture. 	Id. at 821. Courts have recognized “that this interpretation of
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§ 853(n)(6)(A) leads inevitably to the conclusion that § 853(n)(6)(A) is likely never
to apply to proceeds of the crime. Section 853(n)(6)(A) is far better designed to deal
with instrumentalities of the crime.” 	Hooper, 229 F.3d at 821–22; see also United
States v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 166 (2d Cir. 2015). Generally, “[p]roceeds of a crime
. . . do not precede the crime.” Id.
III. 	ANALYSIS
In 	this 	case, 	Petitioner lacks 	standing to 	claim the 	forfeited 	proceeds.
Furthermore, the Court previously found that the funds in the bank accounts claimed
by Petitioner were the proceeds of Adriana Camberos’s criminal activity. Therefore,
as explained below, the Government’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition is GRANTED.
A. 	Standing
Petitioner fails to allege facts supporting an ownership interest in the bank
accounts. Although he alleges he has a community property interest in the accounts,
the Post-Marital Agreement he signed and references in his Petition specifically
provided that “there shall be no community property” in the marriage. (Post-Marital
Agmt., at § E.3.)
Although neither the Wells Fargo account ending in 8864 in the name of
Tradeway Int’l, Inc. (dba Baja Exporting) nor the Banco Monex, S.A. bank account
appears 	on 	the 	schedules 	attached 	to 	the 	Post-Marital 	Agreement, 	Petitioner
specifically agreed that Tradeway Int’l, Inc. (dba Baja Exporting) was Adriana
Camberos’s separate property. 	(Id. at § E.5.) 	Since Petitioner fails to allege facts
supporting an ownership interest in the bank accounts or any legal interest in their
proceeds, he fails to establish standing.
B. 	No Previous Interest in Criminal Proceeds
This Court previously found that the bank accounts being forfeited consisted
of the proceeds of Adriana Camberos’s criminal activities. (ECF No. 305, at 14:15–
19.) 	Petitioner may not relitigate this finding. 	See 101 Houseco LLC, 22 F.4th at
845. Since these proceeds could not have existed until the criminal activities were
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committed, Petitioner’s legal right to the property could not have antedated the
criminal activity. See Hooper, 229 F.3d at 818.
The case of United States v. Wilson, 659 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2011), cited by
Petitioner, is distinguishable. Wilson presented a unique situation recognizing that a
Ponzi scheme results in money that is both the proceeds and the instrumentality of
the fraud. Wilson found that “petitioner’s interest, or a related interest derived from
the petitioner’s original interest, must have existed prior to the event that gave rise
to the Government’s interest.” 	Id. at 954 (emphasis original). 	Thus, the Court
allowed for the possibility that one of the victim investors suing to get back money
he had just invested unknowingly in the Ponzi scheme may be able to recoup his
interest. That situation is vastly different from this one.
Since this case is more akin to Hooper, the Court finds Petitioner cannot show
that his interest in any money predated the criminal activity in this case. 	Even
assuming all the facts alleged in the Petition are true, Petitioner fails to allege
sufficient facts that would support recovery of proceeds of criminal activity.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Joseph Shayota’s Motion for
a Hearing (ECF No. 317); GRANTS the United States’ Motion to Strike Adriana
Camberos’s Opposition to the Petition (ECF No. 328) and GRANTS the United
States’ Motion to Dismiss the Third-Party Petition. (ECF No. 323.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 11, 2025
Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge
United States District Court
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