Stanz v. Brown et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
AARON STANZ, individually and
derivatively on behalf of Jet Genius
Holdings, Inc.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JORDAN BROWN, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No.: 22-cv-01164-GPC-JLB
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION RE:
PLAINTIFF AARON STANZ’S
NOTICE OF MOTION AND
MOTION TO ENFORCE FEE
AWARD (ECF 224) AND FOR CIVIL
CONTEMPT RE NON-PAYMENT
AND REQUEST FOR COERCIVE
PER-DIEM FINE AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES
[ECF No. 230]
AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM.
Before the Court is a Motion to Enforce Fee Award and for Civil Contempt re Non-
Payment; Request for Coercive Per-Diem Fine and Additional Fees (“Motion”) filed by
Plaintiff Aaron Stanz (“Plaintiff”). Defendants Jordan Brown, Jet Genius Holdings, Inc.,
Jet Genius Florida Holdings, Inc., Bowman Aviation, Inc., Jet Agency Global, LLC, C3
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Jets, LLC, and C3 Limo, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”) did not file an opposition. The
Court RECOMMENDS to the Honorable Gonzalo P. Curiel that the Court initiate civil
contempt proceedings against Defendants and impose a contempt sanction in the form of a
coercive per diem fine. However, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request for
attorney’s fees and costs incurred preparing the instant Motion be denied. 	The Court
certifies the pertinent facts in connection with a contempt inquiry.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND CERTIFIED FACTS
In January 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Production of Documents and
for an Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees (“Motion to Compel”). (ECF No. 188.) Plaintiff
sought to compel responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production (Set One) served on
Defendants. (Id. at 2.) Defendants filed an opposition (ECF No. 190), and Plaintiff filed
a reply (ECF No. 191). The Court held hearings regarding the Motion to Compel on May
15, 2025, and May 28, 2025. (ECF Nos. 207, 210.)
On June 6, 2025, the Court issued an Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
(“Order”). 	(ECF No. 215.) 	The Court found that Defendants’ discovery positions were
not reasonably justified and that an award of attorney’s fees would not be unjust. (Id. at
23.) 	Accordingly, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a declaration substantiating the
reasonable fees incurred by his counsel in filing his reply and attending the two hearings
within ten (10) days of the date of the Order. (Id. at 27.) 	The Court also instructed
Defendants to file any opposition challenging the reasonableness of the amount of
attorney’s fees within five (5) days of Plaintiff’s filing of his declaration. (Id.) On June
12, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Declaration of Attorney Matt Blum in support of Reasonable
Attorney’s Fees Incurred. (ECF No. 216.) Defendants did not file an opposition.
By order dated August 14, 2025, the Court awarded Plaintiff attorneys’ fees totaling
$11,400 and ordered Defendants to pay this sum to Plaintiff within 30 days of the date of
the order. (ECF No. 224.) Plaintiff’s counsel attests that Defendants have failed to remit
payment in accordance with the Court’s August 14, 2025 order. (ECF No. 230-1 at 2; ECF
No. 230-2 at 2, ¶ 2.)
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II. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Contempt
Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ failure to pay the attorney fee award within 30 days
of the Court’s August 14, 2025 order subjects Defendants to civil contempt proceedings by
the Court. (ECF No. 230-1 at 3.)
Except in limited circumstances not applicable here, 1 United States Magistrate
Judges lack contempt authority. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e); see also HM Elecs., Inc. v. R.F.
Techs., Inc., No. 12CV2884-BAS (MDD), 2014 WL 12102169, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16,
2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(e); Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 656–657 (9th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that “[m]agistrate judges themselves do not have authority to make any
findings of contempt, so must certify their findings to the district judge”). Title 28, Section
636 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part, that upon the commission of an
act constituting a civil contempt,
the magistrate judge shall forthwith certify the facts to a district
judge2 and may serve or cause to be served, upon any person
whose behavior is brought into question under this paragraph, an
order requiring such person to appear before a district judge upon
a day certain to show cause why that person should not be
adjudged in contempt by reason of the facts so certified. The
1 United States magistrate judges may, for instance, assert civil or criminal contempt
authority in any case in which the magistrate judge presides with the consent of the parties
and may exercise summary criminal contempt authority to sanction any obstruction of the
administration of justice occurring “in the magistrate judge’s presence.” 	28 U.S.C. §
636(e)(2), (4).
2 “The magistrate judge’s certification of facts serve[s] the function of the charging
document,” and “the district court conduct[s] a de novo hearing where it [may] take and
consider additional evidence.” 3A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 715 (4th ed.); see also 7A
Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 17:12 (“Trying the contempt charges de novo, the district judge will
hear the evidence as to the act or conduct complained of and, if it is such as to warrant
punishment, punish the person in the same manner and to the same extent as for a contempt
committed before a district judge.”).
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district judge shall thereupon hear the evidence as to the act or
conduct complained of and, if it is such as to warrant punishment,
punish such person in the same manner and to the same extent as
for 	a 	contempt 	committed 	before 	a 	district 	judge.
28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6)(B)(iii). 	“Essentially, the magistrate judge’s role is to determine
whether Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of contempt[.]” Moog Inc. v. Skyryse,
Inc., No. 2:22-CV-09094-GW (MAR), 2023 WL 12032095, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. May 16,
2023).
“Civil contempt . . . consists of a party’s disobedience to a specific and definite court
order by failure to take all reasonable steps within the party’s power to comply. 	The
contempt need not be willful, and there is no good faith exception to the requirement of
obedience to a court order.” 3 In re Dual-Deck Video Cassette Recorder Antitrust Litig., 10
F.3d 693, 695 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States
v. Powers, 629 F.2d 619, 627 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted) (explaining that civil
contempt is an appropriate remedy when a court aims to “enforce compliance with a court
order”). 	“[C]ivil contempt sanctions, or those penalties designed to compel future
compliance with a court order, are considered to be coercive and avoidable through
obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an
opportunity to be heard.” 	Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821, 827 (1994). 	“The party alleging civil contempt must demonstrate that the alleged
contemnor violated the court’s order by clear and convincing evidence, not merely a
preponderance of the evidence.” 	In re Dual-Deck, 10 F.3d at 695 (citation and quotation
marks omitted); see also Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827 (stating that “civil contempt sanctions,
or those penalties designed to compel future compliance with a court order, are considered
3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(vii) permits the Court to treat as
contempt of court the failure to obey any order to provide or permit discovery, except for
an 	order 	to 	submit 	to 	a 	physical 	or 	mental 	examination. 	See 	Fed. 	R. 	Civ. 	P.
37(b)(2)(A)(vii).
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to be coercive and avoidable through obedience, and thus may be imposed in an ordinary
civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard,” further explaining that
“[n]either a jury trial nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required”).
Thus,
[t]o establish a prima facie case for civil contempt, the moving
party must show, “by clear and convincing evidence,” that the
non-moving party disobeyed “a specific and definite court
order,” and that such disobedience was “beyond substantial
compliance” and “not based on a good faith and reasonable
interpretation of the court’s order.”
Daimler AG v. A-Z Wheels LLC, No. 16-CV-875 JLS (MDD), 2022 WL 281580, at *1 (S.D.
Cal. Jan. 31, 2022) (quoting In re Dual-Deck, 10 F.3d at 695). “Once the moving party
meets this standard, the burden shifts to the contemnor to demonstrate that he or she took
every reasonable step to comply, and to articulate reasons why compliance was not
possible.” 	HM Elecs., Inc., 2014 WL 12102169, at *1 (citing Donovan v. Mazzola, 716
F.2d 1226, 1240 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also United States v. Ayres, 166 F.3d 991, 994 (9th
Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (stating that “[a]n alleged contemnor may defend against a
finding of contempt by demonstrating a present inability to comply”); In re Dual-Deck, 10
F.3d at 695 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (“Substantial compliance with the court
order is a defense to civil contempt, and is not vitiated by ‘a few technical violations’ where
every reasonable effort has been made to comply”).
Here, the Court’s August 14, 2025 order awarding Plaintiff $11,400 in attorneys’ fees
constitutes a specific and definite order. (See ECF No. 224); see also Daimler AG, 2022
WL 281580, at *1. Especially in the absence of any opposition, Plaintiff’s attestation that
Defendants failed to remit payment in accordance with this Court’s August 14, 2025 order
constitutes clear and convincing evidence of Defendant’s noncompliance. (ECF No. 230-
2 at 2, ¶ 2); see also Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency v. Reziapkine, No. 2:21-CV-02235-DAD-
JDP, 2025 WL 1331306, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2025) (holding that affidavits and exhibits
proffered by plaintiff constituted clear and convincing evidence that defendant violated a
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court order). Thus, the burden shifts to Defendants to demonstrate that they “took every
reasonable step to comply, and to articulate reasons why compliance was not possible.”
HM Elecs., Inc., 2014 WL 12102169, at *1. 	However, Defendants failed to file an
opposition. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie case for
civil contempt. See Daimler AG, 2022 WL 281580, at *1; cf. Dean v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan, Inc., No. 5:22-CV-00278-MCS-KK, 2023 WL 8261408, at *1, *7 (C.D. Cal. May
31, 2023) (declining to hold counterclaim defendants in contempt of court for failure to
pay court-awarded attorney’s fees due to a demonstrated inability to pay). The undersigned
Magistrate Judge certifies the pertinent facts set forth above and recommends that the Court
initiate civil contempt proceedings concerning Defendants’ noncompliance with the
Court’s August 14, 2025 order.
B. 	Coercive Per Diem Fine
Plaintiff asserts that the Court should impose on Defendants “[a] purgeable and
compensatory per-diem fine” of $500 per day per contemnor, “payable to the Clerk, until
payment is made, insisting that such a sanction is “appropriately tailored to coerce
compliance and compensate Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 230-1 at 5 (citing Bagwell, 512 U.S. at
829-30).)
“[A] per diem fine imposed for each day a contemnor fails to comply with an
affirmative court order” can constitute a coercive civil sanction. Coleman v. Newsom, 131
F.4th 948, 962–63 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 829)). “A court, in
determining the amount and duration of a coercive fine, must ‘consider the character and
magnitude of the harm threatened by continued contumacy, and the probable effectiveness
of any suggested sanction in bringing about the result desired.’” 	Whittaker Corp. v.
Execuair Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 516 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. United Mine
Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947))).
Here, Defendants do not assert any inability to pay the $11,400 attorney’s fee award.
Indeed, as noted above, Defendants failed to oppose Plaintiff’s Motion. 	See Falstaff
Brewing Corp. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Shillitani
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v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966)) (“A court’s power to impose coercive civil
contempt depends upon the ability of the contemnor to comply with the court’s coercive
order”); 	see also Sparrow LLC v. Lora, No. CV-14-1188-MWF (JCX), 2015 WL
12778337, at *3-*4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015) (declining to sanction defendants for failure
to pay attorney’s fees, where defendants claimed an inability to pay the fee award and
provided 	some 	proof 	regarding 	their 	claim). 	Considering 	Defendants’ 	chronic
noncompliance with court orders in the instant litigation, as outlined extensively in the
contemporaneously issued order and report and recommendation regarding Plaintiff’s ex
parte motion for sanctions,4 the Court recommends a coercive sanction of $100 per day,
to be paid to the Court by Defendants until the amount of $11,400 is remitted to Plaintiff
in accordance with the Court’s August 14, 2025 Order. 	See id. 	Defendants may pay this
amount jointly or severally.
C. 	Additional Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C), Plaintiff contends that the Court
should order Defendants to reimburse Plaintiff for the fees and costs incurred preparing the
instant Motion. (ECF No. 230-1 at 5 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C)).) Rule 37(b)(2)(C)
mandates awarding attorneys’ fees incurred in connection with the failure of a party to obey
an order to provide or permit discovery.5 Here, however, Plaintiff seeks to recover
4 Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for Order to Show Cause as to Why
Defendants Should Not be Held in Contempt of Court for Failing to Comply with a Court
Order (ECF No. 217), which the Court construed as a motion for sanctions (ECF No. 223).
5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) provides, relevant part:
Payment of Expenses. Instead of or in addition to the orders
above, the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney
advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses,
including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure [to obey an order
to 	provide 	or 	permit 	discovery], 	unless 	the 	failure 	was
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of
expenses unjust.
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attorney’s fees incurred as a result of Defendants’ failure to pay the August 14, 2025
attorney’s fee award. (ECF No. 224.) Thus, Rule 37(b)(2)(C) is inapplicable.
“An award of attorney’s fees for civil contempt is within the discretion of the district
court.” 	Just Goods, Inc. v. Just, Inc., No. 18-CV-02198-WHO, 2023 WL 5345827, at *5
(N.D. Cal. July 13, 2023), aff’d sub nom. Just Goods, Inc. v. Eat Just, Inc., No. 23-16100,
2024 WL 4850827 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2024) (quoting Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal &
Prof’l Publications, Inc. v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 26 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 1994));
see also Perry v. O’Donnell, 759 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that “[a]ttorneys’
fees frequently must be expended to bring a violation of an order to the court’s attention,”
and holding that “the trial court should have the discretion to analyze each contempt case
individually and decide whether an award of fees and expenses is appropriate as a remedial
measure”).
Here, in consideration of the coercive per diem fines recommended in the instant
report and recommendation, as well as the coercive per diem fines recommended and the
attorney’s 	fees 	awarded 	in 	the 	contemporaneously 	issued 	order 	and 	report 	and
recommendation referenced above, the Court recommends denying Plaintiff’s request for
attorney’s fees and costs incurred preparing the instant Motion.
III. 	CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS to the Honorable Gonzalo
P. Curiel that the Court initiate civil contempt proceedings against Defendants and impose
a contempt sanction in the form of a coercive $100 per diem fine. 	However, the Court
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and costs incurred preparing
the instant Motion be denied. The Court certifies the pertinent facts in connection with a
contempt inquiry, as set forth in the relevant procedural background above.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), (C).
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), any party
to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no
later than February 12, 2026. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report
and Recommendation.”
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if objections are filed, any reply is due by
February 26, 2026. 	The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the
specified time may waive the right to appeal the district judge’s order. 	Martinez v. Ylst,
951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 29, 2026
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