Collazo Gutierrez v. Kijakazi

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21-cv-01702-JLB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MARTHA G.,
Plaintiff,
v.
FRANK J. BISIGNANO, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,1
Defendant.
Case No.: 21-cv-01702-JLB
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)
[ECF No. 20]
Before the Court is a Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) filed
by Young Cho, counsel for Plaintiff Martha G. (“Plaintiff”). 	(ECF No. 20.) 	The
Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) takes no position on the motion.
(ECF No. 22.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
///
1 Frank J. Bisignano, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security as of
May 6, 2025, is hereby substituted as the defendant in this matter pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 25(d).
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On September 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
seeking 	judicial 	review 	of 	a 	decision 	by 	the 	Commissioner 	of 	Social 	Security
(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits and for supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”). 	(ECF No. 1.)
On July 6, 2022, the Commissioner filed the Administrative Record. (ECF No. 11.) On
October 17, 2022, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Voluntary Remand pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (ECF No. 15.) The same day, the undersigned judge
granted the Joint Motion and remanded the case for further proceedings. 	(ECF Nos. 16,
17.)
On November 15, 2022, the parties filed a joint motion requesting that the Court
award Plaintiff attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to the pursuant to the Equal Access
to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (ECF No. 18.) The Court granted the joint
motion and awarded Plaintiff attorney’s fees and expenses in the amount of $4,900.00.
(ECF No. 19.)
On remand, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) issued a fully favorable
decision to Plaintiff on August 19, 2024, finding that Plaintiff has been disabled under the
Social Security Act since September 11, 2015. 	(ECF No. 20-2.) 	On October 13, 2025,
Plaintiff was awarded $118,598.00 in past due benefits. 	(ECF No. 20-3.) 	The SSA
withheld $29,649.50 from Plaintiff’s past due benefits in case they needed it to pay
Plaintiff’s representative. (Id. at 4.)
In the instant motion, Plaintiff’s counsel requests that the Court order the payment
of attorney’s fees in the amount of $29,649.00, payable to Law Offices of Lawrence D.
Rohlfing, Inc., CPC, and order reimbursement to Plaintiff in the amount of $4,900, which
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is the amount of EAJA fees previously awarded to Plaintiff and assigned to counsel. (ECF
No. 20 at 1–2.)2
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
42 U.S.C. § 406(b) provides in relevant part as follows:
Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this
subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits
to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).
The statute does not instruct the district court as to how counsel’s fees should be
calculated. See Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). With
respect to Section 406(b), the U.S. Supreme Court has held that,
[m]ost plausibly read, . . . § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee
agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully
representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls
for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that
they yield reasonable results in particular cases. Congress has provided one
boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that they provide
for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past due benefits. Within the 25 percent
boundary, . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the fee
sought is reasonable for the services rendered.
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002) (footnotes and citations omitted). Thus,
in cases in which a contingency fee agreement exists, a district court should first look to
the contingency fee agreement and then test it for reasonableness. Id. at 808.
The Supreme Court has instructed that a reduction of the fee award may be
appropriate “based on the character of the representation and the results the representative
achieved.” 	Id. 	The Ninth Circuit subsequently explained that when analyzing the
2 Plaintiff’s counsel does not seek reimbursement under 42 U.S.C. § 406(a).
(See ECF No. 20 at 10.)
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reasonableness of a fee award, a court “may properly reduce the fee for substandard
performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.”
Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). To this end, the Supreme
Court has explicitly provided:
[T]he court may require the claimant’s attorney to submit, not as a basis for
satellite litigation, but as an aid to the court’s assessment of the reasonableness
of the fee yielded by the fee agreement, a record of the hours spent
representing the claimant and a statement of the lawyer’s normal hourly
billing charge for noncontingent-fee cases.
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. Thus, in awarding fees,
a district court may “consider the lodestar calculation, but only as an aid in assessing the
reasonableness of the fee.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151 (emphasis in original).
“[T]he Commissioner of Social Security . . . has no direct financial stake in the
answer to the § 406(b) question; instead, she plays a part in the fee determination
resembling that of a trustee for the claimants.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 798 n.6. “Because
the SSA has no direct interest in how much of the award goes to counsel and how much to
the 	disabled 	person, the 	district 	court 	has 	an 	affirmative 	duty 	to 	assure 	that 	the
reasonableness of the fee is established.” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1149. “The attorney bears
the burden of establishing that the fee sought is reasonable.” Id. at 1148 (citation omitted).
The EAJA also permits an attorney to receive fees for successful Social Security
representations. See Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1216–17 (9th
Cir. 2012). Fees awarded pursuant to the EAJA are paid by the government rather than the
claimant. 	Id. at 1218. 	Accordingly, while “[f]ee awards may be made under both
prescriptions, . . . the claimant’s attorney must ‘refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the
smaller fee.’” 	Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (second alteration in original) (quoting Act of
Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186); see also Parrish, 698 F.3d at 1218
(“[I]n order to maximize the award of past-due benefits to claimants and to avoid giving
double compensation to attorneys, the savings provision requires a lawyer to offset any
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fees received under § 406(b) with any award that the attorney receives under [28 U.S.C.]
§ 2412 if the two were for the ‘same work.’”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Gisbrecht, the Court must first look to see if a contingency fee agreement
exists in this case. 	535 U.S. at 808. 	Plaintiff’s representation agreement with counsel
provides that “the fee for successful prosecution of this matter is 25% of the past due
benefits awarded upon reversal of any unfavorable ALJ decision for work before the
court.” (ECF No. 20-1 at 1 (emphasis removed).) Counsel now seeks $29,649.00, or 25%
of the amount awarded to Plaintiff in past-due benefits. (See ECF No. 20-3 at 2.)
In support of the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel attaches the ALJ’s decision on remand,
the SSA’s notice of award of past due benefits, her contingency fee agreement with
Plaintiff, her resume, and an itemized list of the hours she spent representing Plaintiff in
this matter. 	(ECF Nos. 20-2, 20-3, 20-1, 20-4, 20-6.) 	Counsel also attaches a Social
Security Report to Congress in March 2024 regarding the Limitation on Administrative
Expenses, and pages of the United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report
2017–2018, the USAO Fitzpatrick Matrix, and the 2025 Laffey Matrix. (ECF Nos. 20-5,
20-7, 20-7.)
Upon review, the Court finds that the amount sought by Plaintiff’s counsel is
reasonable. First, the results obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel were excellent, as the case was
jointly remanded to the Commissioner for further proceedings after the filing of Plaintiff’s
merits brief, which ultimately resulted in the award of $118,598.00 in past due benefits to
Plaintiff. 	Second, the Court finds that there was no undue delay or substandard
performance that would warrant a downward adjustment.
Third, the amount sought is consistent with the 25% cap set by Congress and is not
disproportionate to the time spent by Plaintiff’s counsel in this action. Plaintiff’s counsel
spent 20.4 hours representing Plaintiff between August 2021 and November 2022. (ECF
No. 20-5.) Between September 2021 and November 2022, a paralegal with counsel’s firm
spent an additional 2.3 hours on this case. 	(Id.) 	The effective hourly attorney rate of
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$1,453.38 (or combined hourly rate of $1,306.12), considering counsel’s experience and
results, is not out of line with hourly rates approved by courts in this District. 	See, e.g.,
Eldridge v. O’Malley, No. 20-cv-01135-CAB-RBM, 2024 WL 1744079, at *2 (S.D. Cal.
Apr. 23, 2024) (approving a $20,462 fee award with a de facto hourly attorney rate of
$1,015.98 for 20 hours and 8 minutes of work); Desiree D. v. Saul, No. 3:19-CV-01522-
RBM, 2021 WL 1564331, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2021) (approving a $16,363 fee award
with a de facto hourly attorney rate of $1,494.34 for 10.95 hours of work); Martinez v.
Saul, No. 15-CV-1994-BTM-BGS, 2019 WL 3322481, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2019)
(approving a $30,000 fee award with an effective blended attorney/paralegal hourly rate of
$1,488.83 for 20.15 hours of work); see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (Clifton, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that majority ordered payments in
underlying cases that equated to $519, $875, and $902 hourly rates for the time of both
attorneys and paralegals).
Accordingly, the Court finds an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $29,649.00
to be reasonable. 	In making this determination, the Court recognizes the contingent-fee
nature of this case and counsel’s assumption of risk in agreeing to represent Plaintiff under
such terms.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s Motion for
Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Accordingly, the Court hereby awards to
Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing, Inc., CPC attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
406(b) in the amount of $29,649.00. The Court further orders Law Offices of Lawrence
D. Rohlfing, Inc., CPC to reimburse Plaintiff the amount of $4,900 for EAJA fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 1, 2026
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