Thakur et al v. Trump et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
NEETA THAKUR, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-04737-RFL
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND DENYING
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND PROVISIONAL
CLASS CERTIFICATION
Re: Dkt. Nos. 154, 156
I. INTRODUCTION
This action was filed in June of 2025 by University of California (“UC”) researchers,
after a wave of en masse federal grant terminations via form letters abruptly cancelled the
funding for many of the researchers’ projects. Department of Energy (“DoE”) has been a
Defendant from the start, but none of the named Plaintiffs had grants terminated by DoE. In
early October 2025, however, DoE terminated more than $7 billion in grant funding en masse
nationwide, including grants to two new proposed named Plaintiffs. The record shows that
DoE’s terminations in October 2025 heavily impacted grantees and projects located in Blue
States.1 There is also evidence that this was by design. Just before the terminations were
announced, the President threatened congressional Democrats that he could do “irreversible”
harm by “cutting things that they like, cutting programs that they like,” and Russell Vought, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), stated that funding for the “Left’s
1 The parties refer to those states where the majority of the electorate voted for the Democratic
presidential candidate in 2024 as “Blue States” and to those states where the majority voted for
the Republican candidate as “Red States,” so this Order does so as well.
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climate agenda is being cancelled” and listed 16 Blue States as the location for DoE projects
targeted for termination. (Dkt. Nos. 159-3, 159-5.) In its termination letters, however, DoE
claimed in boilerplate fashion that the terminations were based on changes in agency priorities.
Plaintiffs seek leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, adding the two proposed named
Plaintiffs whose project funding was summarily terminated by DoE in early October 2025. (Dkt.
No. 154.) The proposed named Plaintiffs seek to assert several class claims against DoE,
including claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) that DoE’s en masse
termination of grants using form letters was arbitration and capricious and contrary to law, and
that DoE violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment when it terminated grants
for projects being performed in Blue States. Plaintiffs also bring a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction based on their equal protection claim and seek provisional class certification in order
to support a classwide grant of preliminary injunctive relief. (Dkt. No. 156.)2
Plaintiffs are entitled to amend their complaint. However, at this stage, there is not
enough information in the record to support a finding that the terminations likely violated the
Equal Protection Clause. No administrative record is available at this early stage, and Plaintiffs
have not submitted sufficient evidence to support a determination that the terminations likely
lacked any conceivable legitimate purpose and were based solely on political animus. Therefore,
no preliminary injunctive relief will issue and no provisional class is certified. At the same time,
as a matter of case management, the Court recognizes the importance of the issues raised and the
urgency of promptly resolving the claim on the merits. A separate order will issue setting a case
schedule to proceed directly to cross-motions for summary judgment on the equal protection
claim after production of the administrative record and discovery, in line with the schedule set
for the other constitutional claims in the case.
2 Plaintiffs’ motion initially sought class certification and preliminary injunctive relief on behalf
of a class of Plaintiffs asserting APA claims as well. However, as discussed below, the parties
have now jointly requested that the Court instead withhold ruling on this issue.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
In this action, four classes have been provisionally certified, and two preliminary
injunctions have issued, that together (i) prohibit the EPA, NEH, NSF, DoT, DoD, and HHS-
NIH from “giving effect to any grant termination” that is “communicated by means of a form
termination notice” that lacks a reasoned explanation; and (ii) prohibit the EPA, NEH, NSF, and
DoT from “giving effect to any grant termination” pursuant to Executive Orders 14151 or 14173,
which bar funding of research on certain DEI-related topics. Thakur v. Trump, 787 F. Supp. 3d
955, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“Thakur I”); Thakur v. Trump, 800 F.Supp.3d 1044, 1065–67,
1072–75 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“Thakur III”).3
The government moved to stay the Thakur I injunction pending appeal. The Ninth
Circuit initially denied the government’s request, Thakur v. Trump, 148 F.4th 1096 (9th Cir.
2025) (“Thakur II”), but it recently issued an amended order granting the stay with respect to
Plaintiffs’ arbitrary and capricious claim under the APA. Thakur v. Trump, No. 25-4249, 2025
WL 3760650 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2025) (“Amended Order”). In the Amended Order, the Ninth
Circuit explained that it was bound by the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in National
Institutes of Health v. American Public Health Ass’n, 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025) (“NIH”), which
held that the “APA’s limited waiver of sovereign immunity did ‘not provide the District Court
with jurisdiction to adjudicate’ similar APA claims challenging grant terminations.” Amended
Order, 2025 WL 3760650, at * 3 (citing NIH, 145 S. Ct. at 2660). The Ninth Circuit did not
disturb its denial of the government’s stay request with respect to the viewpoint discrimination
claim. Id. at *6.
Plaintiffs have requested reconsideration or en banc review of the Amended Order. See
Motion, Thakur v. Trump, No. 25-4249 (9th Cir. Dec. 29, 2025), Dkt. No. 74.1. The government
has appealed both the Court’s preliminary injunction orders. Thakur v. Trump, No. 25-4249 (9th
3 Capitalized terms not defined in this Order are defined in Thakur I and Thakur III. All citations
to page numbers refer to ECF pagination.
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Cir. July 10, 2025); Thakur v. Trump, No. 25-7342 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2025). In light of these
ongoing appellate proceedings, the parties have asked the Court to withhold ruling on Plaintiffs’
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Provisional Class Certification with respect to Plaintiffs’
APA claims against DoE, pending further guidance from the Ninth Circuit. (Dkt. No. 180 at 2.)
Therefore, the motion is denied without prejudice as to those claims, so that it may be re-raised
at a later juncture if appropriate.
B. Factual Background
In late September 2025, the President responded to a likely lapse in congressional
appropriations by threatening to retaliate against congressional Democrats. Shortly before the
terminations at issue, on September 30, 2025, the President stated “[w]e can do things during the
shutdown that are irreversible, that are bad for them and irreversible by them, like cutting vast
numbers of people out, cutting things that they like, cutting programs that they like.” (Dkt. No.
159-3 at 3; see also Dkt. No. 159-4 at 2 (statement by the President on October 9, 2025, after the
terminations at issue, reiterating that “[w]e’re only cutting Democrat programs”).) On
October 1, 2025, the first day of the federal government shutdown, OMB Director Russell
Vought issued the following statement on X:
Nearly $8 billion in Green New Scam funding to fuel the Left’s
climate agenda is being cancelled. More info to come from
@ENERGY.
The projects are in the following states: CA, CO, CT, DE, HI, IL,
MD, MA, MN, NH, NJ, NM, NY, OR, VT, WA
(Dkt. No. 159-5 at 2.) The following day, DoE announced the termination of 321 financial
awards totaling more than $7.5 billion.4 Although the record indicates that DoE initially selected
more than 600 awards for potential termination—including projects in states with a Republican
voting history—Plaintiffs have presented evidence that 98% of the awards actually terminated in
October supported projects with a primary place of performance listed as a state where the
4 (Dkt. No. 159 ¶ 3); https://www.energy.gov/articles/energy-department-announces-termination-
223-projects-saving-over-75-billion. All websites were last visited January 29, 2026.
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majority voted for the Democratic candidate in the 2024 presidential election and have two
Democratic-caucusing Senators.5 Defendants have introduced a report from the nonprofit
Energy Futures Initiative Foundation, finding that the October terminations ultimately impacted
projects in 49 states, and that many of the impacted projects span multiple states.6 However, the
analysis appears to incorporate downstream effects, and includes five grants terminated in May
2025 but announced in October 2025, making a precise comparison difficult.7
Dr. Plamen Atanassov is the Chancellor’s Professor of Chemical & Biomolecular
Engineering at UC Irvine. (Dkt. No. 158 ¶ 2.) His research spans engineered materials, fuel cell
electrocatalysts, and materials for power production, energy conversion, and storage. (Id. ¶ 5.)
In 2023 and 2024, Atanassov and his team received DoE funding for three largescale projects to
be implemented in collaboration with private sector partners. The projects include the
production of “the first industrial-scale, U.S.-manufactured fuel cell catalysts [with] . . . 30%
‘Made in USA’ content” and $1.2 billion in funding to create a hydrogen hub in California. (Id.
¶¶ 17, 27.)
Dr. Louise Wells Bedsworth is the Executive Director at the Center for Law, Energy, and
the Environment (“CLEE”), the Director of the Land Use Program at the CLEE, and Senior
Advisor at the California-China Climate Institute at UC Berkeley School of Law. (Dkt. No. 157
¶ 2.) In August 2024, DoE approved Bedsworth and her team’s proposal to conduct a
“Feasibility Study to Co-Create a Community Alliance for Direct Air Capture,” and executed an
assistance agreement to provide more than $2.6 million in funding between 2024 and 2026. (Id.
¶¶ 8, 13.)
Between October 1–2, 2025, DoE terminated all four projects via brief form letters as
5 (Dkt. No. 159 ¶¶ 3–6, 10); DOE Floats New Cuts to Hundreds of Clean Energy Grants, E&E
News, https://perma.cc/5B76-VGQP.
6 https://efifoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2025/11/EFI-Foundation-Unpacking-
DOEs-October-Award-Cancellations.pdf, at fig. 8.
7 Id., at fig. 1.
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part of its en masse termination of grants. The letters each included language to the effect that
the projects were not consistent with DoE’s or the Administration’s goals, policies, and
priorities. (Dkt. No. 158-5 at 2; Dkt. No. 158-8 at 2; Dkt. No. 158-13 at 2; Dkt. No. 157-4 at 2;
Dkt. No. 157-5 at 2.) Termination was effective immediately, and Atanassov and Wells
Bedsworth assert that they lost professional opportunities, funding to pay their staff and graduate
students, and the ability to continue their research. (Dkt. No. 158 ¶¶ 14, 22, 36–37; Dkt. No. 157
¶¶ 18–19.)
III. LEAVE TO FILE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), parties are permitted a short window
during which they may amend their pleading once as a matter of course. Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(a)(1). After that initial period has passed, amendment is permitted only with the opposing
party’s written consent or leave of the court. Id. at 15(a)(2).8 Rule 15 instructs that “[t]he court
should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. The factors considered when determining
whether to grant leave to amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) include: “(1) bad
faith on the part of the movant; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the opposing party; and (4)
futility of the proposed amendment.” Ciampi v. City of Palo Alto, No. 09-cv-2655-LHK, 2010
WL 5174013, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2010) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)). Each of these factors supports granting Plaintiffs leave to amend.
First, there is no evidence of bad faith or undue delay. Plaintiffs’ counsel has submitted a
declaration stating that Plaintiffs have continuously sought information related to DoE’s
termination of grants to UC researchers, including through a California Public Records Act
request. (Dkt. No. 160 ¶¶ 2, 8.) However, it was not until the recent wave of terminations on
October 1–2, 2025 that they were able to identify individuals they believed could properly assert
8 Defendants do not argue that Plaintiffs are required to show good cause under Rule 16(b)(4), as
an extension of the case schedule to accommodate amendment had already been authorized, per
the parties’ stipulation. (Dkt. Nos. 151–52.) Regardless, even if Plaintiffs were required to show
good cause, they have shown the necessary diligence for the reasons stated in this section.
See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992).
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claims on behalf of a class, as well as a sufficiently high volume of terminations to merit class
treatment. (Id.) Counsel states that the recent government shutdown and information access
issues caused by the terminations themselves further delayed Plaintiffs’ ability to file their
proposed Third Amended Complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 9.)
Defendants respond that Plaintiffs could have sought amendment six months earlier, but
it is undisputed that very few DoE terminations impacted UC researchers prior to October 2025,
and that none impacted existing named plaintiffs. (Dkt. No. 165 at 13 (identifying a total of 24
DoE awards terminated in May 2025, compared to more than 300 in October); id. at 24
(identifying only three awards funding UC researchers suspended before October 2025).)
Therefore, the relevant start date for the timeliness analysis is early October 2025, when DoE
engaged in an en masse termination of grants. Plaintiffs’ delay of less than two months to file
this motion does not constitute undue delay, in light of Plaintiffs’ counsel’s diligent efforts to
identify potential named plaintiffs, and to gather the necessary information to support their
complaint and request for class-wide preliminary injunctive relief. Defendants submit no
evidence to contradict Plaintiffs’ counsel’s description of these efforts, and only speculate that
the delay was the result of Plaintiffs’ non-party status to the grants at issue, or that it was a
tactical decision by counsel. (Id. at 18–19.) None of this raises an inference of bad faith or
undue delay.
The prejudice factor also favors amendment. The parties have stipulated to an amended
case schedule. (Dkt. Nos. 151–52.) Furthermore, Defendants have separately proposed delaying
briefing of dispositive motions in this action pending finalization of the en banc process in the
Ninth Circuit. (Dkt. No. 180 at 3.) Finally, while the Ninth Circuit has declined to stay the
Court’s injunction relating to Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, the government “cannot suffer
harm from an injunction that merely ends an unlawful practice.” Amended Order, 2025 WL
3760650, at *5 (quoting Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013)). Therefore,
the brief delay caused by the amendment does not unfairly prejudice Defendants.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ proposed amendments are not futile. As further explained below,
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although there is insufficient evidence to issue a preliminary injunction on the equal protection
claim, Plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly identify signs that the terminations were indeed based
purely on partisan animus and lacked any rational connection to a conceivable legitimate
government purpose. See Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[A]
proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to the
pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim.”). Moreover, the jurisdictional
issues concerning Plaintiffs’ APA claims are still being litigated in the Ninth Circuit, and are
sufficiently complex that both parties have requested the Court withhold ruling pending
resolution of those proceedings. See, e.g., Green Valley Corp. v. Caldo Oil Co., No. 09-cv-
04028-LHK, 2011 WL 1465883, at *6 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (identifying the “general preference
against denying a motion for leave to amend based on futility”). The motion for leave to file a
Third Amended Complaint is granted.
IV. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
“[I]njunctive relief [is] an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7,
22 (2008). In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must establish that they are
likely to succeed on the merits, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in their favor, and that an injunction is in the
public interest. Id. at 20.9 When the nonmoving party is the government, the final two factors
merge. Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418, 435 (2009)).
9 Preliminary injunctive relief may also issue where a plaintiff shows “serious questions going to
the merits” of their claim, that the “balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor,” and
that the two other Winters factors are met. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Peña, 865 F.3d 1211,
1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted and emphasis in original). “Serious questions are issues
that cannot be resolved one way or the other at the hearing on the injunction because they require
more deliberative investigation” and “parties do not show serious questions when they raise a
merely plausible claim.” Assurance Wireless USA, L.P. v. Reynolds, 100 F.4th 1024, 1031 (9th
Cir. 2024) (quotations omitted). It is not clear from Plaintiffs’ Motion whether they seek relief
under the serious questions standard. To the extent they do, the standard is not met for the
reasons described below.
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A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Plaintiffs have presented evidence that 98% of the more than 300 financial awards that
the DoE terminated in October 2025 supported projects with a primary place of performance
listed as a Blue State. At the time, the President described this effort as “cutting things that
[Democrats] like,” and OMB Director Vought stated that funding for the “Left’s climate agenda
is being cancelled.” (Dkt. Nos. 159-3, 159-5.) Plaintiffs argue that these facts amount to an
equal protection violation on the following theory: Defendants, guided by partisan animus,
chose DoE grants for termination based principally on their location in a Blue State—a factor
that bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. As a result, Plaintiffs are
allegedly being treated differently from other researchers based on the fact that they are working
on projects in Blue States.
Rational basis review applies to Plaintiffs’ claim, as Plaintiffs concede. (Dkt. No. 167 at
16.) Although heightened scrutiny is required for classifications that “proceed[ ] along suspect
lines[ ] or infringe[ ] fundamental constitutional rights,” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313 (1993), those exceptions do not apply here. In this context, residents of states that
voted for Democrats do not represent a suspect class, and Plaintiffs do not contend that their
interest in continued federal funding constitutes a fundamental right.10 Therefore, the question is
whether “any reasonably conceivable state of facts [] could provide a rational basis for the
classification.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (quotation omitted). That standard is
highly deferential and requires the courts to begin with a “strong presumption of validity” in
favor of the government action. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313–14.
To prevail on their claim, Plaintiffs bear the burden to demonstrate “that a class that is
similarly situated has been treated disparately.” Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d
1053, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of San
10 Plaintiffs are not asserting a First Amendment challenge based on the October 2025 DoE
terminations. Cf. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, N.J., 578 U.S. 266, 269–70 (2016); Mt. Healthy
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283 (1977).
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Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1990)). The comparator group “need not be similar in
all respects, but they must be similar in those respects relevant to the Defendants’ policy.” Id. at
1064 (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992)). Next, Plaintiffs must negate “every
conceivable [rational] basis which might support” such disparate treatment. See Olson v.
California, 104 F.4th 66, 77 (9th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (quoting Armour v. City of Indianapolis,
566 U.S. 673, 685 (2012)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 382 (2024).
Plaintiffs have not carried their burden of showing a likelihood of disparate treatment
with no possible rational basis. Defendants contend that DoE has shifted its priorities to align
with those of the new Administration, and that it terminated projects that did not further its
priorities. (Dkt. No. 165 at 32–33.) The termination letters are consistent with this stated
rationale, as is Vought’s public statement discussing canceling the “Left’s climate agenda.”
Plaintiffs concede that re-orienting agency priorities would be a legitimate government interest,
and the current record does not foreclose that DoE selected grants for termination in a manner
rationally related to this basis. It is conceivable that DoE’s new priorities generally align with
projects in Red States, and not with projects in Blue States—which would account for the high
number of Blue State terminations Plaintiffs have identified. Atanassov’s hydrogen hub project
provides an apt example. The record shows that, as part of the October 2025 terminations, DoE
cancelled the only two hubs that could produce clean hydrogen from renewable energy (which
Plaintiffs call “green” hydrogen hubs), but did not cancel five other hydrogen hubs, which are
not green. (Dkt. No. 160 ¶ 11; Dkt. No. 167 at 13.) The green hydrogen hubs are both in Blue
States, while the non-green hydrogen hubs are at least partly located in Red States. (Dkt. No.
160 ¶ 11.) Therefore, on the current record, it is conceivable that Atanassov’s hydrogen hub
project was cancelled not because it is located in California, but because DoE no longer
prioritizes green hydrogen hubs.
Plaintiffs dispute whether this is a plausible basis for the classification on the existing
record. They note that DoE initially compiled a list of 600 grants to terminate, but ultimately
terminated almost exclusively Blue State grants, while declining to cancel some Red States’
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renewable energy projects on the list. See Section II.B. While a close call, Plaintiffs have not
submitted evidence sufficient to conclude that the Court will likely be able to rule out
Defendants’ proffered basis for the classification. For example, Plaintiffs have not submitted
evidence that the bulk of the non-terminated grants funded Red State projects, and that those
projects were materially similarly situated to the terminated projects, such that the only
conceivable distinction between terminated and non-terminated projects was the projects’
geographic location in a Blue State.11 Rational basis review permits DoE to draw lines that are
“to some extent both underinclusive and overinclusive.” Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108
(1979). “[C]ourts are compelled under rational-basis review to accept [] generalizations even
when there is an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Heller, 509 U.S. at 321. On the
existing record, there is not enough information to determine that Defendants’ classification was
likely based solely on a distinction between Red States versus Blue States, though there are
certainly some signs of that.
Plaintiffs also argue that the terminations amount to an equal protection violation if one
motivating factor was animus towards residents of Blue States, even if it was not the only factor.
But in the context of pure rational basis review, “so long as there is some conceivable legitimate
purpose” behind the decision, courts “need not inquire into the [decisionmaker’s] actual
purpose.” Olson, 104 F.4th at 78; see also id. at 81 (declining to address “impermissible
animus” argument because “we have identified plausible legitimate purposes” behind the
statute). By contrast, a different analysis applies when courts assess whether the government has
acted based on a form of invidious discrimination that triggers heightened scrutiny, such as race.
When race discrimination is a “motivating factor” in the government’s actions, strict scrutiny
applies even if it cannot be proven that the decision was “motivated solely” by that purpose.
11 Plaintiffs identify two multi-state initiatives where, they assert, DOE terminated grants for
projects in Blue States but not Red States. (Dkt. No. 156 at 29 nn.12–13.) However, the
websites cited do not provide enough information for the Court to determine that the various
awardees in those programs were materially similarly situated.
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Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977). That line of
cases, however, is inapplicable because rational basis review undisputedly applies here, even
assuming Blue State grantees were targeted.12
Cleburne, Moreno and Romer, on which Plaintiffs rely, are not contrary. Each of those
cases involved a finding of a “bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” and no
conceivable legitimate government interest. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432, 445, 447 (1985) (individuals with intellectual disabilities) (cleaned up); U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (members of “hippie communes”); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (“gays and lesbians”). No such record exists here.
Plaintiffs have not identified a persistently “politically unpopular group” being targeted in this
action. Rather, they have identified voters of a party that won 48.32% of the popular vote in the
2024 presidential election.13 Nor, as described above, have Plaintiffs carried their burden to
show a likelihood that the only conceivable basis for the terminations was animus toward Blue
State residents.
Because the existing record does not suffice to support a finding that Plaintiffs are likely
to succeed on the merits of the equal protection claim, this Order does not reach the remaining
Winters factors, no preliminary injunctive relief will issue, and an equal protection class is not
provisionally certified.
12 In City of Saint Paul, Minnesota v. Wright, No. 25-cv-03899, 2026 WL 88193 (D.D.C. Jan. 12,
2026), the court found an equal protection violation based on a subset of DoE’s October 2025
grant terminations after the government conceded (1) that the “only identifiable difference”
between terminated and non-terminated grants was the “recipient’s state’s political identity,” and
(2) “it would be legally sufficient for equal protection purposes to find that a primary reason for
the termination decisions at issue here is because of location in blue states.” Id. at *5 (cleaned
up). However, DoE has not made the same concessions in this case. In fact, at oral argument
government counsel in this case argued that the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision
in Olson v. California, 104 F.4th 66 (9th Cir. 2024), foreclosed the second concession made in
City of Saint Paul.
13 https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/2024presgeresults.pdf, at 3.
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V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint
is GRANTED. With respect to Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim, the Motion for Provisional
Class Certification and Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for the reasons explained above.
With respect to Plaintiffs’ APA claims, the Court declines to reach these claims pursuant to the
parties’ agreement, and the Motion for Provisional Class Certification and Preliminary Injunction
is DENIED without prejudice on this basis.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 30, 2026
RITA F. LIN
United States District Judge
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