Vanostrand v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Company et al

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
IN RE: BABY FOOD PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LITIGATION
This Order Relates To:
VanOstrand v. Beech-Nut, et al.,
25-cv-02853
Case No. 24-md-03101-JSC
ORDER RE: SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
This MDL consolidates for pretrial proceedings hundreds of state law product liability
personal injury actions. The Court ordered the parties to identify cases in which diversity
jurisdiction does not exist. The parties did so and the Court dismissed those cases without
prejudice. (Dkt. No. 734.) The parties also identified one case, VanOstrand v. Beech-Nut, 25-cv-
02853, in which diversity jurisdiction does not exist, but Plaintiff contends it pleads a substantial
federal question sufficient to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 733 at 3.) The
Court subsequently ordered the parties to brief whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction of
that action. Now pending before the Court are the parties’ written submissions in which all agree
the complaint presents a sufficient federal question. (No. 25-cv-02853 Dkt. Nos. 11, 13.) After
carefully considering the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes oral argument is not required,
see N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and DISMISSES this action without prejudice. The Court does not
have federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
“[T]he mere consent of parties cannot confer upon a court of the United States the
jurisdiction to hear and decide a case.” In re Landmark Fence Co., Inc., 801 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th
Cir. 2015) (quoting People’s Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260–61 (1880)). So, even when
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United States District Court
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both parties agree there is federal jurisdiction, the Court has “an independent duty to examine [its]
own subject matter jurisdiction.” Bank of New York Mellon v. Watt, 867 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir.
2017) (cleaned up).
The Complaint pleads only state law claims. (No. 25-02853 Dkt. No. 8.) Count VIII, a
negligence-per-se claim, is premised on violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(“FDCA”), 21 U.S.C. §§ 342 and 343. (Id. at 31-32.) Section 342 defines “adulterated food.”
Section 243 defines when a food is “misbranded.” Plaintiff contends this negligence-per-se claim
falls within a “special and small category” of state-law claims that arise under federal law for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 “because federal law is ‘a necessary element of the ... claim for
relief.’” City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Empire
Healthchoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699, (2006)). Under this narrow exception,
federal jurisdiction over a state-law claim will lie if a federal issue is
“(1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4)
capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-
state balance approved by Congress.” All four requirements must be
met for federal jurisdiction to be proper.
City of Oakland, 969 F.3d at 904–05. The third factor—whether the federal issue is
“substantial”—“focuses on the importance of a federal issue to the federal system as a whole. An
issue has such importance when it raises substantial questions as to the interpretation or validity of
a federal statute, or when it challenges the functioning of a federal agency or program.” Id. at 905.
Plaintiff contends the negligence-per-se claim poses such a substantial question because
the court will have to interpret section 342(a)(1) which provides a food is adulterated if it contains
a “poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to health.” Similarly,
pursuant to section 343, the claim presents the question of whether Defendants’ baby food labeling
is “false or misleading.” So, argues Plaintiff, “Count VII requires construction of statutory terms
that govern food manufacturers nationwide” and thus present a federal issue sufficient to confer
federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. No. 11 at 6.) Not so.
In Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), the plaintiffs alleged their
children were injured by their mother’s ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy. Id. at 805.
Their state-law complaints alleged there was a rebuttable presumption of negligence because the
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drug was “misbranded” within the meaning of the FDCA because its labeling did not provide an
adequate warning. Id. at 806. The drug manufacturer removed the complaints to federal court on
the grounds the negligence claim supported federal question jurisdiction. The United States
Supreme Court held the negligence claim alleging an FDCA misbranding violation did not support
federal question jurisdiction.
As it was (and still is) undisputed the FDCA does not contain a private right of action, the
Court concluded it
would flout congressional intent to provide a private federal remedy
for the violation of the federal statute. We think it would similarly
flout, or at least undermine, congressional intent to conclude that the
federal courts might nevertheless exercise federal-question
jurisdiction and provide remedies for violations of that federal statute
solely because the violation of the federal statute is said to be a
“rebuttable presumption” or a “proximate cause” under state law,
rather than a federal action under federal law.
Id. at 812; id. at 814 (“We simply conclude that the congressional determination that there should
be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a congressional
conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of
action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”). In so holding, the
Court specifically rejected the manufacturer’s argument “that there is a powerful federal interest in
seeing that the federal statute is given uniform interpretations, and that federal review is the best
way of insuring such uniformity.” Id. at 815. The Court reasoned:
To the extent that petitioner is arguing that state use and interpretation
of the FDCA pose a threat to the order and stability of the FDCA
regime, petitioner should be arguing, not that federal courts should be
able to review and enforce state FDCA-based causes of action as an
aspect of federal-question jurisdiction, but that the FDCA pre-empts
state-court jurisdiction over the issue in dispute. Petitioner’s concern
about the uniformity of interpretation, moreover, is considerably
mitigated by the fact that, even if there is no original district court
jurisdiction for these kinds of action, this Court retains power to
review the decision of a federal issue in a state cause of action.
Id. at 816. So, the Supreme Court held the precise claim alleged here—a state law negligence
claim relying on the FDCA—does not give rise to federal question jurisdiction.
The parties’ insistence the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Grable & Sons Metal
Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), renders Merrell Dow
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inapplicable is unavailing. They contend Grable clarified that the absence of a private right of
action in the incorporated federal statute is not dispositive of the substantial federal question issue.
True. But Grable, in fact, reaffirms Merrell’s holding that state law negligence claims premised
on the FDCA do not raise a substantial federal issue sufficient to confer federal question
jurisdiction. As the Grable Court explained:
The absence of any federal cause of action affected Merrell Dow's
result two ways. The Court saw the fact as worth some consideration
in the assessment of substantiality. But its primary importance
emerged when the Court treated the combination of no federal cause
of action and no preemption of state remedies for misbranding as an
important clue to Congress’s conception of the scope of jurisdiction
to be exercised under § 1331. The Court saw the missing cause of
action not as a missing federal door key, always required, but as a
missing welcome mat, required in the circumstances, when exercising
federal jurisdiction over a state misbranding action would have
attracted a horde of original filings and removal cases raising other
state claims with embedded federal issues. For if the federal labeling
standard without a federal cause of action could get a state claim into
federal court, so could any other federal standard without a federal
cause of action. And that would have meant a tremendous number of
cases.
Id. at 318. The Grable Court thus concluded Merrell Dow’s analysis “fits within the framework
of examining the importance of having a federal forum for the issue, and the consistency of such a
forum with Congress’s intended division of labor between state and federal courts.” Id. at 319.
Defendants’ representation that the “case law does not provide a definitive answer as to whether
this federal issue is substantial” (Dkt. No. 13 at 3) is thus wrong. Merrell Dow, and indeed
Grable, considered essentially these very state-law claims and concluded they do not present a
federal question.
CONCLUSION
As there is no diversity or federal question jurisdiction, this action is DISMISSED without
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY
United States District Judge
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