(HC) Yantao J. v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
YANTAO J.,
Petitioner,
v.
WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE
ANNEX, et al.,
Respondents.
No. 1:26-cv-00021-TLN-SCR
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Yantao J.’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 1.) On January 6, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to file a
response to Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief. (ECF No. 3.) On January 15, 2026,
Respondents filed an opposition to Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (ECF No. 7.)
For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner’s petition is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native of China who entered the United States in August 2023 without
being admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration officer. (ECF No. 7-1 at 9.)
Following apprehension, Petitioner was given a Notice to Appear and released on his own
recognizance. (Id. at 7–9.) On September 26, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained. (Id. at 1–5.)
///
Case 1:26-cv-00021-TLN-SCR Document 8 Filed 01/15/26 Page 1 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
II. STANDARD OF LAW
The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every
individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas
corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has
served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its
protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a
district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
III. ANALYSIS
Petitioner claims he is being unlawfully subjected to mandatory detention without a
hearing in violation of his due process rights. In response, Respondents argue Petitioner’s
detention is lawful as he is being detained pursuant to the mandatory detention statute, 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(2) (“§1225(b)(2)”), and Matter of Yajure Hurtado.1 The Court will address each of these
arguments in turn.
A. Statutory Claim
The Court begins with the central dispute in this case: whether § 1225(b)(2) or 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”) governs Petitioner’s immigration detention. The issue turns on whether
Petitioner is an applicant “seeking admission.” Section 1225(b)(2) mandates detention during
removal proceedings for applicants “seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond hearing.
Section 1226(a) “provides the general process for arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are
present in the United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189,
1 Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 291 I. & N. Dec. 216, 225 (BIA 2025) (stripping Immigration
Judges of authority to consider bond requests for any person who entered the United States
without admission pursuant to a recent DHS policy mandating detention for those persons).
Case 1:26-cv-00021-TLN-SCR Document 8 Filed 01/15/26 Page 2 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
3
1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the Government has broad discretion whether to release
or detain the individual. Id. Section 1226(a) provides several layers of review for an initial
custody determination and it confers “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the
opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right
to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Until the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) changed its policy in July 2025, the Government
consistently applied § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who
were detained by an immigration authorities and subject to removal. See id. at 1196.
Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’
arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful. See e.g., Hortua v. Chestnut, et al., No. 1:25-
cv-01670-TLN-JDP, 2025 WL 3525916 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2025); Barco Mercado v. Francis, No.
25-CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (estimating over 350
cases ruled DHS’s July policy improper across 160 different judges sitting in about 50 different
courts nationwide); Mirley Adriana Bautista Pico, et al. v. Kristi Noem, et al., No. 25-CV-08002-
JST, 2025 WL 3295382, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases); Armando Modesto
Estrada-Samayoa v. Orestes Cruz, et al., No. 1:25-CV-01565-EFB (HC), 2025 WL 3268280, at
*4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) (collecting cases).
“These courts examined the text, structure, agency application, and legislative history of
1225(b)(2) and concluded that it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a category that
does not include noncitizens like [Petitioner], living in the interior of the country.” Salcedo
Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12,
2025) (collecting cases). In comparison, “[t]he government’s proposed reading of the statute (1)
disregards the plain meaning of [§] 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between [§§]
1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to [§] 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is
inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, No.
1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting
cases). This Court agrees with the well-reasoned and compelling decisions and finds no reason to
reconsider its prior rulings.
Case 1:26-cv-00021-TLN-SCR Document 8 Filed 01/15/26 Page 3 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
4
For these reasons, the Court finds Petitioner is not an applicant “seeking admission”
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner is subject to § 1226(a) and
therefore he is entitled to the statutorily permitted process including a bond hearing at minimum.
However, Petitioner has not been afforded a bond hearing, and Respondents maintain that
Petitioner is not eligible for one. Thus, the Court finds Respondents improperly subjected
Petitioner to mandatory detention without a hearing.
B. Due Process Claim
Petitioner also argues that his continued indefinite civil detention without a hearing
infringes upon his liberty in violation of due process. (ECF No. 1 at 16.) Respondents argue that
Petitioner is detained under § 1225(b)(2), which mandates detention. (ECF No. 7 at 2.)
The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an
individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d
976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of
the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
(“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including
noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These
due process rights extend to immigration proceedings, including deportation proceedings. Id. at
693–94; see Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003).
Courts examine procedural due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there
exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the
procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the
Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies,
the question remains what process is due.”).
i. Liberty Interest
“Freedom from imprisonment — from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint — lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or
Case 1:26-cv-00021-TLN-SCR Document 8 Filed 01/15/26 Page 4 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
5
over whose liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their
liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025).
The Court finds Petitioner has a substantial liberty interest based on his release from
immigration custody. Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *6 (“Accordingly, a noncitizen
release from custody pending immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest in
remaining out of custody.”).
ii. Procedural Due Process
Having found a protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is necessary to
ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. The Court
considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2)
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Due process rights in the immigration context “must account for the
government’s countervailing interests in immigration enforcement.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at
1206.
As to the first Mathews factor — Petitioner’s private interest — as discussed above,
Petitioner has been out of custody. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) The length of time Petitioner has been in
the United States, as well as his established relationships, create a powerful interest for Petitioner
in his continued liberty. See Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025).
As to the second Mathews factor — the risk of erroneous deprivation — the Court finds
the risk here be considerable. The risk of an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest
is high where he has received virtually no procedural safeguards such as a bond or custody
redetermination hearing. A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at
*5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025). This is particularly so where, as here, an immigration judge has
already determined that Petitioner is neither dangerous nor a flight risk. (ECF No. 6 at 4); see
R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2686866 at *6 (“Civil immigration detention, which is ‘nonpunitive in
Case 1:26-cv-00021-TLN-SCR Document 8 Filed 01/15/26 Page 5 of 6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
purpose and effect,’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the
community.”).
As to the third Mathews factor, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without a
hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is negligible. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2686866 at *6.
Custody hearings in immigration court are “routine and impose a ‘minimal’ cost.” “The
government has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been determined not to
be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future immigration proceedings can be
reasonably ensured by [ ] bond or alternative conditions.”). Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994.
Having found that Respondents violated Petitioner’s statutory and constitutional rights,
the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s petition. (ECF No. 1.)
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED;
2. Respondents must IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Petitioner Yantao J. from custody.
Respondents are ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining Petitioner unless they
demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral
decisionmaker, that Petitioner is a flight risk or danger to the community such that his physical
custody is legally justified. Respondents must file a notice certifying compliance with this
provision of the Court’s Order by January 17, 2026; and
3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of Petitioner and close this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 15, 2026
___________________________________
TROY L. NUNLEY
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:26-cv-00021-TLN-SCR Document 8 Filed 01/15/26 Page 6 of 6