Target National Bank v. Nelson

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RIVERSIDE DIVISION
In re:
ELIZABETH BLANCHE NELSON,
Debtor.
Case No. 6:12-bk-30664-SC
Chapter 7
Adv. No. 6:12-ap-01480-SC
TARGET NATIONAL BANK,
Plaintiff,
v.
ELIZABETH BLANCHE NELSON,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IMPOSING
SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO FRBP 9011
Hearing:
Date: November 13, 2013
Time: 1:30 p.m.
Ctrm: 5C, Ronald Reagan Federal Building
and United States Courthouse
411 West Fourth Street
Santa Ana, California 92701
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter came on to be heard on November 13, 2013 on the Court’s sua sponte
order to show cause (the “OSC”) why sanctions should not be imposed against Weinstein,
Pinson & Riley, P.S. (“WPR”), the attorneys for Target National Bank (“Target”), pursuant to
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011.1 William S. Weinstein, Esq. (“Weinstein”), Josh
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all “Chapter” and “Section” references are to the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101–1532, all “FRBP” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, all “Rule” references are
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and all “LBR” references are to the Local Bankruptcy Rules for the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.
FILED & ENTERED
DEC 11 2013
CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
Central District of California
BY DEPUTY CLERK	zamora
FOR PUBLICATION
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Harrison, Esq. (“Harrison”), Gail A Rinaldi, Esq. (“Rinaldi”), and an officer from Target, Adam
Grim, appeared on behalf of Target.
II. BACKGROUND
Elizabeth Blanche Nelson (the “Debtor”) filed chapter 7 on September 6, 2012 (the
“Petition Date”), and listed an unsecured debt to Target in the amount of $6,659.00, regarding
a credit card account with Target (the “Account”). Schedule F, Bk. Dk. 1.2 The Debtor listed
$23,927.91 in additional unsecured credit card debt. See Schedule F, Bk. Dk. 1. The Debtor’s
statement of financial affairs reflects that she moved from New Jersey to California in February
of 2011. SOFA, Bk. Dk. 1. The Debtor’s Schedule B lists “household goods, furniture,
furnishings, appliances, stereo, televisions, computer printer” with an aggregate value of
$3,500. Schedule B, Bk. Dk. 1.
On October 10, 2012, Target referred the Account to WPR and provided WPR with a
case referral sheet (the “Referral”). WPR’s Motion for Preliminary Hearing (the “WPR Motion”),
Adv. Dk. 41, Exh. 2. The Referral reflected that Debtor had incurred only two charges on the
Account. See WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, Exhs. 2. The Referral further reflects that the Debtor
had made regular payments well above the minimum payments due on the Account up until
August of 2012 (shortly before the Debtor filed bankruptcy). See WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41,
Exhs. 2. One charge on the Account was made 82 days prior to the Petition Date, on June 17,
2012, in the amount of $2,294.52 at a Sears Roebuck store in Succasunna, New Jersey (the
“Sears Charge”). The only other charge indicated by the Debtor on the Account was a charge
dated April 29, 2012, in the amount of $1,948.65, at a Jennifer Convertible store in Rockaway,
New Jersey (the “Jennifer Convertible Charge”).3 The Referral reflected that the Debtor had a
credit limit of $6,900, and that she had incurred a principle balance of only $4,243.17. WPR
Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, Exh. 2.
2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to “Adv. Dk.” refer to the adversary docket in adversary proceeding
number 6:12-ap-01480-SC, and all references to “Bk. Dk.” refer to the bankruptcy case docket in bankruptcy case
number 6:12-bk-30664-SC.
3 At the hearing on the OSC, Weinstein represented that the Sears Charge was for a washer/dryer and that the
Jennifer Convertible Charge was for a sofa/sleeper. This was the first time that WPR or Target had made any
affirmative representation concerning what types of goods were purchased by the Debtor.
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On October 29, 2012, WPR sent a letter to the attorney who, at that time,4 represented
the Debtor, in which WPR stated that it was investigating a potential Section 523(a) proceeding
(the “Inquiry Letter”). WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, Exh. 3. The Inquiry Letter stated that the
Debtor had incurred a charge within the 90-day presumption period, and that the Debtor had
“no disposable income . . . available to pay the minimum monthly requirement on unsecured
debt.” WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, Exh. 3. The Inquiry Letter stated that “[i]n lieu of Rule 2004
examination, please describe in writing all developments and/or events which contribute
directly to your client’s decision to file the Chapter 7 Petition.” WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, Exh.
3. The Debtor did not respond to the Inquiry Letter, but WPR never sought a Rule 2004
examination of the Debtor. See WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, 10:3-4.
Richard Ralston (“Ralston”), an attorney at WPR who has since retired, claims that he
reviewed the Debtor’s statements and schedules and the Account and concluded that “based
on the [Debtor]’s use of her card to incur two large charges, one within 90 days of the Petition
Date, and one shortly outside the presumption period, and based on her financial condition at
the time she incurred the charges, that there was a basis to believe that these charges were
non-dischargeable pursuant to section 523(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.” WPR Motion, Adv.
Dk. 41, 7:19-24.
The deadline to object to dischargeability or discharge was December 12, 2012. Bk. Dk.
5. On December 11, 2012, Target filed a dischargeability complaint under Sections
523(a)(2)(A) and (C) (the “Adversary Complaint”). Count I of the Adversary Complaint
centered on the Sears Charge, made 82 days prior to the Petition Date, and stated that “[u]pon
information and belief, certain Charges may have been incurred for goods/services not
reasonably necessary for the maintenance or support of the [Debtor] . . . such as charges to
Sears Roebuck.” Adversary Complaint, Adv. Dk. 1, 2:12-14. Count II alleged actual fraud
based on the Debtor’s intent, applying the Dougherty factors. Adversary Complaint, Adv. Dk.
1, 3-5. Count III alleged “credit card kiting,” stating that “[a]ny payments made on the credit
4 The Debtor’s former counsel, Winfield S Payne, III, Esq., withdrew from representation of the Debtor by order
entered July 11, 2013. Adv. Dk. 17.
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account appear to have been made from a cash advance from the account or from another
credit card.” Adversary Complaint, Adv. Dk. 1, 5:22-23. The only documentary evidence
attached to the Adversary Complaint was the Referral. See Referral, Adv. Dk. 1, Exh. A.
On January 15, 2013, the Debtor answered the Adversary Complaint. Adv. Dk. 5.
Shortly after filing the Adversary Complaint, Ralston “resigned from WPR on January 4,
2013, and retired from the practice of law.” WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, 8:10-11. On March 6,
2013, Lourdes Slinsky (“Slinsky”), Ralston’s “successor” on this matter at WPR, engaged in
settlement discussions with Debtor’s counsel. WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, 9:1-2.
On March 6, 2013, the parties filed a joint status report, wherein Target stated that it
needed to conduct additional discovery in the form of “Interrogatories, Requests for Admission,
Requests for Production, Deposition of Debtor.” Joint Status Report, Adv. Dk. 6, 2. Target
never engaged in any formal pretrial discovery.5 See, e.g., WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, 10:3-4.
While Slinsky had apparently resigned from WPR sometime before the March 20, 2013
status conference [WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, 9:1-8], Harrison, Slinsky’s “successor” on this
matter at WPR, attended the March 20, 2013 status conference [WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41,
9:15-26]. On March 22, 2013, the Court entered a scheduling order (the “Scheduling Order”),
providing that “[t]he last day to have pre-trial motions heard and resolved is: July 31, 2013”;
“[t]he last day to conduct discovery, and have discovery motions heard and resolved, is: May
31, 2013”; “[t]he trial date is: September 25, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.”; and:
Parties must comply with all applicable, Federal Bankruptcy Rules, Local
Bankruptcy Rules, and Judge’s Procedures/Instructions.
. . . .
b. All exhibits and appropriate copies must be served on chambers at
least fourteen (14) days before trial.
. . . .
c. Witness lists must be served on chambers at least fourteen (14) days
before trial. The witness list must include the subject of each witness’
testimony.
5 The Court notes that although at the hearing on the OSC, Weinstein characterized the parties’ settlement
negotiations as “informal discovery.”
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d. Trial Briefs must be filed and served on chambers at least fourteen (14)
days before trial. There will be no opening statements at trial. The Court
will rely upon the Trial Briefs.
Failure to timely submit exhibits or witness lists will result in the exhibits
and/or witnesses, as applicable, being excluded from use at trial.
Scheduling Order, Adv. Dk. 9.
On July 25, 2013, WPR filed a motion to extend the discovery cutoff date (the “Motion to
Extend”). Adv. Dk. 20. WPR failed to serve any exhibits or to file or serve any witness lists
fourteen days before trial, as required by the Scheduling Order. See Adv. Dk. 9. As a result, on
September 12, 2013, the Court denied the Motion to Extend on September 12, 2013 for cause,
based upon a review of the Motion to Extend and all other documents and papers filed in the
proceeding. Adv. Dk. 22.
On September 12, 2013, Rinaldi filed an appearance on behalf of Target [Adv. Dk. 23]
(Rinaldi started working at WPR in August 2013) [Rinaldi Declaration, Adv. Dk. 41, 2:2].
On September 18, 2013, Rinaldi filed a motion on shortened notice to strike the
Debtor’s answer and for default judgment (the “Motion to Strike and for Default”). Adv. Dk. 26.
On September 23, 2013, the Court denied the Motion to Strike and for Default because:
The motion may be brought on regular notice pursuant to LBRs. Additionally,
the Court has read and reviewed the Motion to Strike the Answer and Enter
Default. The Movant has not set forth any legal or factual basis to strike
[Debtor]’s answer. Therefore, the Court is DENYING the Application for
Shortened Time as there does not appear to be any basis to grant the
underlying motion.
Order Denying Motion to Strike, Adv. Dk. 28 (emphasis in original).
On September 26, 2013, the trial on the Adversary Complaint was held. Adv. Dk. 30. At
trial, Rinaldi appeared on behalf of Target, and the Debtor did not appear. At trial, Rinaldi was
unprepared to proceed, and the Court dismissed the Adversary Complaint. See WPR Motion,
Adv. Dk. 41, 13:8-9 (“Ms. Rinaldi advised the Court that she was not prepared to proceed with
the trial because she did not have the necessary documentation. . . .”); Adv. Dk. 30.
Specifically, Rinaldi states in her declaration of October 18, 2013 regarding the OSC that
“[b]ecause WPR had not received [Target]’s original business records affidavit authenticating
the account statements before the trial date, I advised the Court that I was not prepared to
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proceed with the trial because I did not have the necessary documentation. . . .” Rinaldi
Declaration, Adv. Dk. 41-1, 2:21-25.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued the OSC concerning whether Target and WPR
should be sanctioned for violation of FRBP 9011(b). The OSC set forth the specific conduct
that appeared to violate FRBP 9011—namely, Rinaldi’s own admission that she lacked any
documentary evidence to proceed at trial, coupled with the failure of WPR to “file a trial brief,
witness list, or exhibit list, as required by the entered scheduling order of this Court.” OSC,
Adv. Dk. 31, 2:4-5.
On October 9, 2013, Rinaldi filed a motion to schedule a preliminary hearing on the
OSC, to treat the November 13, 2013 OSC hearing as a preliminary hearing, or to shorten the
time for the motion to be heard (the “Rinaldi Motion”). Adv. Dk. 34. On October 18, 2013, WPR
filed a substantively similar motion, which requested similar relief (the “WPR Motion”). Adv. Dk.
41.
WPR’s request for a preliminary hearing or to change the November 13, 2013 OSC to a
preliminary hearing was denied by order entered October 30, 2013. Adv. Dk. 44.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The Bankruptcy Court’s Authority to Sanction
Bankruptcy courts have inherent authority to regulate the practice of attorneys who
appear before them. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (federal courts
are vested with inherent powers to manage their cases and courtrooms and to maintain the
integrity of the judicial system); Caldwell v. Unified Capital Corp. (In re Rainbow Magazine,
Inc.), 77 F.3d 278, 284–85 (9th Cir. 1996). Bankruptcy courts also have express authority
under the Bankruptcy Code and the FRBP to sanction attorneys. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a);
FRBP 9011, LBR 9011-3; In re Nguyen, 447 B.R. 268, 280-81 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011).
B. Sanctions Under FRBP 9011
Generally, FRBP 90116 allows a bankruptcy court to impose sanctions in three
situations—where papers are submitted demonstrate factual frivolity, legal frivolity, or where
6 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
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papers are submitted for an “improper purpose.” Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
Communications Enterprises, Inc., 892 F.2d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1989), affirmed 498 U.S. 533
(1991) (analyzing Rule 11).
C. Improper Purpose
The Court need not address whether WPR filed the Adversary Complaint for an
“improper purpose” because, as discussed more fully below, the Court finds that the Adversary
Complaint itself was “frivolous” within the meaning of FRBP 9011.
D. Frivolity
The standard for “frivolousness” is objective and entails a “filing that is both baseless
and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry.” Townsend v. Holman Consulting
Corp., 929 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
(b) Representations to the court
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a petition,
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to
the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances,--
. . . .
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically
so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for
further investigation or discovery;
. . . .
(c) Sanctions
If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b)
has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate
sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
. . . .
(B) On court’s initiative
On its own initiative, the court may enter an order describing the specific conduct
that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party
to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
FRBP 9011 (emphasis added).
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1. The Adversary Complaint Was “Baseless.”
The facts of this case demonstrate that the underlying Adversary Complaint is
“baseless” within the meaning of FRBP 9011. In determining whether the Adversary Complaint
is objectively “baseless” and whether reasonable and competent inquiry by WPR was
performed, the Court should analyze the underlying substantive law as applied to the facts.
Each count of the Adversary Complaint is analyzed below pursuant to the standard of FRBP
9011.
a. There is no evidence that could reasonably support Count I of
the Adversary Complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C).
WPR contends that, because the Debtor made the Sears Charge within 90 days of the
Petition Date, a rebuttable presumption of nondischargeability pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section
523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I). However, Section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) only applies to purchases for “luxury
goods or services.” There is no presumption that all charges made within 90 days of
bankruptcy are for “luxury goods or services.” Moreover, charges within 90 days for “goods or
services reasonably necessary for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependant of
the debtor,” as defined in Section 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II), do not trigger the rebuttable presumption
of Section 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(I). As set forth below, WPR lacked an objectively reasonable basis
for Count I of the Adversary Complaint.
Cases in the Ninth Circuit that analyze Section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) purchases, look to the
nature of the underlying purchase with factual specificity to determine if the charges were
“luxury,” as defined under Section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I), as opposed to “goods or services
reasonably necessary for the support or maintenance of the debtor or a dependant of the
debtor,” as defined in Section 523(a)(2)(C)(ii)(II). See, e.g., In re Venegas, 08-54541-ASW,
2010 WL 2165370 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 26, 2010) (“Most of the remaining charges appear,
on their face, to be for luxury goods and services incurred within the 90–day presumption
period under section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I), and includes such charges as $1,406.10 at Disneyland;
$428.88 at various restaurants; $207.25 at the AT & T Ballpark; $175.88 at Toys “R” Us;
$167.80 at the Monterey Bay Aquarium; $48.47 at Designer Perfume; $36.25 at Maya
Cinemas; $32.22 at TLF*Flower Magik; $22.07 at Choice Fashion; $18.00 at Top Nails; $5.98
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at Geni Sweet Things; and $5.90 at Sherri’s Cookies. An additional $235.46 represents cash
advance fees, a late fee, an overlimit fee, and finance charges based solely on the charges at
issue.”).
WPR has not provided any admissible evidence substantiating that the goods
purchased by the Debtor for the Sears Charge were “luxury goods.” 7 The bankruptcy petition
reflects that Debtor had recently moved from New Jersey to California in February 2012, just
prior to the time she incurred the Sears Charge. Moreover, both purchases were at retail
stores, which sold, among other things, appliances and furnishings.
At the hearing on the OSC, Weinstein represented—for the very first time8—that the
Sears Charge was for a washer/dryer; however, Weinstein failed to provide any admissible
evidence or sufficient argument otherwise as to why a washer/dryer is a “luxury good.”
Paragraph 9 of the Adversary Complaint states that “[u]pon information and belief,
certain Charges may have been incurred for goods/services not reasonably necessary for the
maintenance or support of the Defendant or Defendant’s dependents, such as charges to
Sears Roebuck.” Adversary Complaint, Adv. Dk. 1, 2 ¶9. The Adversary Complaint provides
no evidence of the basis for such information or belief. At the OSC, the Court asked Harrison
what information formed the basis of his belief that the Sears Charge was for “luxury goods”;
however, Harrison was unable to provide a satisfactory response. Specifically, Harrison
represented that at the time he signed the Adversary Complaint,9 he believed that the Sears
Charge was for “luxury goods,” but that he could not remember the basis for his belief.
7 In fact, prior to the OSC (where it was revealed for the first time that the Sears Charge was for a washer/dryer
and the Jennifer Convertible Charge was for a sofa/sleeper) WPR essentially admitted in its own motion that it still
lacked any evidence concerning what the Sears Charge or the Jennifer Convertible Charge was for—rather, WPR
merely infers without basis that these charges were “non-essential.” See WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, 6:10. The
Court notes that WPR argues in the WPR Motion that, if these were appliances or furnishings, the Debtor did not
include these items on Schedule B, because the value of these assumed purchased assets “should have totaled
approximately what she paid for them, which was $4,243.18 in the aggregate – which is more than her entire
household furnishings according to Schedule B.” Adv. Dk. 41, 6:2-3. This statement ignores depreciation and
“current value” calculations for the purposes of schedule B.
8 This was the first time that WPR or Target had made any affirmative representation concerning what types of
goods were purchased by the Debtor.
9 Both Harrison and Ralston signed the Adversary Complaint.
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Based on the extant evidence, WPR lacks an objectively reasonable basis to conclude
that the Sears Charge was for “luxury goods,” within the meaning of Section 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I).
Under the facts and circumstances of this matter, Count I of the Adversary Complaint was
objectively “baseless,” within the meaning of FRBP 9011—a competent attorney would not
have reasonably believed that Count I of the Adversary Complaint was objectively grounded in
fact or law.
b. There is no evidence that could reasonably support Count II of
the Adversary Complaint under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
The Ninth Circuit adopted a “totality of circumstances” approach to determining
fraudulent intent in credit card nondischargeability proceedings. In re Eashai, 87 F.3d 1082,
1087 (9th Cir. 1996). Under this approach, intent may be inferred from the circumstances, and
the Dougherty factors are useful in analyzing the debtor’s intent. They are as follows:
1. The length of time between the charges made and the filing of bankruptcy;
2. Whether or not an attorney has been consulted concerning the filing of
bankruptcy before the charges were made;
3. The number of charges made;
4. The amount of the charges;
5. The financial condition of the debtor at the time the charges are made;
6. Whether the charges were above the credit limit of the account;
7. Whether the debtor made multiple charges on the same day;
8. Whether or not the debtor was employed;
9. The debtor’s prospects for employment;
10. Financial sophistication of the debtor;
11. Whether there was a sudden change in the debtor’s buying habits; and
12. Whether the purchases were made for luxuries or necessities.
In re Dougherty, 84 B.R. 653, 657 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988) abrogated on other grounds by
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991) (citing In re Faulk, 69 B.R. 743, 757 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1986)).
It is unknown whether Debtor consulted with an attorney before the charges were made,
but the extant evidence tends to suggests that the Debtor did not consult with an attorney prior
to incurring the charges. There were only two charges made—the Sears Charge for $2,294.52
was incurred on June 17, 2012, 82 days prior to the Petition Date, and the Jennifer Convertible
Charge for $1,948.65 was incurred on April 29, 2012, 131 days prior to the Petition Date. The
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charges total $4,243.17 did not exceed the $6,900 credit limit.10 See WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41,
5:16. The charges were, of course, not made on the same day, but rather they were spaced
apart by 50 days (between April 29, 2012 and June 17, 2012).
The Debtor was apparently employed at the time of incurring each of these charges.
See Bk. Dk. 1. The Debtor regularly paid more than the minimum payment due on these
charges up until the time that she filed bankruptcy. The financial sophistication of the Debtor is
unknown, nor is the Debtor’s financial condition at the time of the charges; however, Schedule
I indicates that the Debtor was a “transcriber,” which does not necessarily indicate a high level
of financial sophistication.
The extant facts do not support a finding that the Debtor made a sudden change in
buying habits. WPR argues that the charges indicate a “material change in the pattern of her
use of the card” because “they are the only charges [Debtor] made during the nine months or
so before the Petition Date.” WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, 19:8-9. The Court believes that two
charges alone, incurred 50 days apart from each other and 131 and 82 days prior to the
Petition Date do not appear to indicate a “sudden change in buying habits.”
WPR had several months to conduct an appropriate inquiry into the nature of these
charges prior to the dischargeability complaint deadline; however, it failed to do so. Instead, it
appears from the record that WPR’s only inquiry prior to filing the Adversary Complaint was a
letter sent to Debtor’s counsel on October 29, 2012. See WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, Exh. 3.
Despite failing to conduct any meaningful investigation prior to filing the Adversary
Complaint, WPR apparently argues that the Adversary Complaint was justified based upon
purported settlement negotiations that took place with Debtor’s counsel on March 6, 2013
[WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, 9:2], after the filing of the Adversary Complaint. See WPR Motion,
Adv. Dk. 41, 3:7-8 (“[T]he theory of the case was substantiated when [Debtor]’s counsel
advised his client to enter into a material settlement of the claims asserted in the complaint.”).
Notwithstanding whether evidence of purported settlement discussions would even be
10 The Court notes that the letter sent by WPR on October 29, 2012 suggests that these charges “nearly
exhausted” the credit limit. See WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, Exh. 3.
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admissible to establish the Debtor’s liability for fraud,11 this type of post hoc justification for
filing the Adversary Complaint is falls below the minimum standards of competence and
reasonableness set forth in FRBP 9011. WPR had several months, pursuant to the Scheduling
Order, to conduct discovery to investigate the underlying nature of these charges; however, it
failed to do so.
Based on the extant evidence, under the Dougherty factors, Count II of the Adversary
Complaint was objectively “baseless,” within the meaning of FRBP 9011—a competent
attorney would not have reasonably believed that Count II of the Adversary Complaint was
objectively grounded in fact or law.
c. There is no evidence that could reasonably support Count III
of the Adversary Complaint concerning “credit card kiting”
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A).
Count III of the Adversary Complaint asserted allegations of “credit card kiting.”
Specifically, Count III states that “Defendant was insolvent at the time of the Charges.
Defendant’s net monthly income, after the deduction of expenses, was -$849.31, as listed on
Defendant’s Schedule J. Any payments made on the credit account appear to have been
made from a cash advance from the account or from another credit card.” Adversary
Complaint, Adv. Dk. 1, 5:19-23.
11 WPR argues that the Court should use the alleged settlement negotiations between WPR and Debtor’s former
counsel, which allegedly took place several months after the Adversary Complaint was filed, to infer the Debtor’s
liability for fraud, thereby justifying the filing of the Adversary Complaint. WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41-1, 24:9-13
(“[T]he Court can and should infer that a responsible debtor’s attorney would not support a settlement at that level
unless he believed his client was exposed to a risk of a finding that she had committed fraud. This inference
further supports the conclusion that the complaint establishes a prima facie case for fraud.”); WPR Motion, Adv.
Dk. 41-1, 9:26-10:1-2 (“[T]he Court should infer from the size of the agreed settlement and from Mr. Payne’s
eagerness to accept it on behalf of his client that Defendant did not dispute Target National Bank’s allegations.”).
The Court notes the very purpose of Federal Rule of Evidence 408 is to exclude the use of this type of evidence
to prove liability on, for example, a fraud claim. See 2 Federal Evidence § 4:57 (3d ed.) (“Clearly Fed. R. Evid.
408 excludes actual settlement agreements and actual offers, which is what is meant by the phrase ‘furnishing or
promising to furnish’ or ‘accepting or offering or promising to accept’ some ‘valuable consideration’ in
compromising a claim, when offered to prove what the Rule calls the ‘liability’ or ‘invalidity’ of a claim . . . . These
broad terms describing the reach of the exclusionary principle (the proof cannot be used to prove ‘liability’ or
‘invalidity’ of a claim or its ‘amount’) were clearly intended to reach any use of the material covered by the
principle in proof of any point that counts toward establishing ‘liability’ or ‘invalidity’ of a claim . . . .”). WPR, as the
proponent of this evidence, has failed to provide any legal basis for the admissibility of any purported settlement
evidence, such as a hearsay exception or an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 408.
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WPR provided no evidence of cash advances from other credit cards. On the contrary,
the only evidence alluded to by WPR under Count III was the Debtor’s monthly budget deficit
based on Schedules I and J, which WPR extrapolated retroactively to the time when the
Debtor incurred the two charges. Even if this retroactive extrapolation were proper, and
Schedules I and J were evidence of the Debtor’s monthly budget deficit as of the time of the
two charges in question, such evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of
“credit card kiting.” In re Anastas, 94 F.3d 1280, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1996) (Ninth Circuit, finding
that there was “is no evidence, such as in Eashai, that the payments were made through any
sort of kiting scheme,” reversed bankruptcy court for clear error in finding fraud under Section
523(a)(2)(A) based “almost exclusively” on debtor’s financial condition). The Ninth Circuit
specifically held that “the hopeless state of a debtor’s financial condition should never become
a substitute for an actual finding of bad faith.” In re Anastas, 94 F.3d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir.
1996).
Based on the extant evidence, Count III of the Adversary Complaint for “credit card
kiting” lacks an objectively reasonable evidentiary basis. Therefore, Count III of the Adversary
Complaint was objectively “baseless,” within the meaning of FRBP 9011.
Moreover, as set forth below, WPR failed to conduct an objectively reasonable inquiry
into whether any of the allegations contained in the Adversary Complaint were grounded in fact
or law.
2. The allegations and other factual contentions lack evidentiary
support and were not based upon a reasonable and competent
inquiry.
WPR failed to conduct an objectively reasonable investigation into the factual or legal
merits of their claims prior to filing the Adversary Complaint. The only apparent inquiry
performed by WPR prior to filing the Adversary Complaint was a review of the statements and
schedules, a review of the Referral, and the Inquiry Letter of October 29, 2012. As discussed
above, the statements and schedules did not provide a reasonable factual basis for filing the
Adversary Complaint. The statements and schedules reflected that the Debtor had recently
moved and started a new job in California, which apparently paid her less than her previous
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job in New Jersey. The Referral reflected that the Debtor had incurred two charges, well below
the credit limit, and had regularly made payments well above the minimum amount due for
each of the several months leading up to her filing bankruptcy.
With respect to Count I of the Adversary Complaint—that the Sears Charge was
nondischargeable because it was incurred within the 90-day presumption period for “luxury
goods or services”—WPR failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into whether the Sears
Charge was for “luxury goods or services.” The initial question under FRBP 9011 is whether
WPR was objectively reasonable and competent in deciding to sue the Debtor without
investigating these facts first.
For example, the Court finds persuasive the reasoning of In re Pusateri, where
bankruptcy court found nondischargeability complaint was not “substantially justified” under
Section 523(d) where creditor failed to conduct proper investigation prior to filing complaint as
to whether charges made within 90-day presumption period were for “luxury goods” or
necessities. The Pusateri Court said “These charges might represent indulgences. They might
be personal necessities. For this group of charges, it was incumbent upon [creditor] to make
further inquiry before filing suit under § 523(a)(2)(C).” In re Pusateri, 432 B.R. 181, 203 (Bankr.
W.D.N.C. 2010). The Pusateri Court further found lack of “substantial justification” where
creditor neither reviewed its own accounts nor conducted Rule 2004 examination of debtor but,
instead, based its decision to file complaint solely on fact that debtor charged more than
$1,000.00 on his credit card in 90 days prior to bankruptcy. The Pusateri Court explained what
the creditor should have done before filing the complaint as follows:
The inquiry as to indeterminate charges need not require the formality or
expense of a 2004 exam or an oral deposition. [Creditor] could have: (1)
contacted debtor’s counsel by email, letter, or phone to request explanation and
substantiation of these charges, (2) attended [debtor’s] § 341 meeting to ask for
further explanation under oath; and/or (3) sought a further extension of time to
object to discharge/dischargeability in order to make additional inquiries.
In re Pusateri, 432 B.R. 181, 203 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010). The Court notes that “substantial
justification” is thus a higher standard than that used to determine whether litigation is
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frivolous. In re Machuca, 483 B.R. 726, 735 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (citing Pierce v. Underwood,
487 U.S. 552, 566 (interpreting EAJA)).
Here, the charges were made shortly after the debtor moved into her new condo and
started her new job. Right up until filing bankruptcy, Debtor made regular $200 payments on
the account, well above the minimum required payments of $84, $105, $134, $180, $198.
Based on the dearth of evidence here, the allegations and other factual contentions
wholly lacked evidentiary support and were not based upon a reasonable and competent
inquiry by WPR. WPR had ample time and resources to conduct an appropriate investigation.
For example, WPR could have 1) questioned the debtor at the 341(a) hearing; sought to
extend the dischargeability deadline; or 3) conducted a 2004 exam; and 4) subpoenaed
records from Sears. Instead, WPR merely sent the Inquiry Letter, then filed the Adversary
Complaint and attempted to settle the matter with Debtor’s counsel before any trial on the
merits.
Because the Debtor did not respond to the Inquiry Letter, and WPR otherwise lacked a
sufficient reasonable basis to file the Adversary Complaint, WPR must have followed up with
reasonable competent inquiry. Indeed, the Inquiry Letter itself threatened a 2004 examination
of the Debtor, which would have been appropriate given the fact that Debtor’s counsel did not
respond to the Inquiry Letter. Unfortunately, WPR never followed up on this threat and never
conducted a 2004 exam of the Debtor. Moreover, even after the Adversary Complaint was
filed, WPR failed to propound any discovery on the Debtor, despite anticipating the need for
such discovery. See Joint Status Report, Adv. Dk. 6, 2 (WPR stated that it needed to conduct
additional discovery in the form of “Interrogatories, Requests for Admission, Requests for
Production, Deposition of Debtor”; however, WPR never engaged in any pretrial discovery, see
WPR Motion, Adv. Dk. 41, 10:3-4.).
In sum, WPR failed to conduct a reasonable and competent inquiry prior to filing the
Adversary Complaint. WPR’s failure to do so, indeed, throughout each stage of litigation,
constitutes woeful departure from the minimum standards of competence and diligence set
forth under FRBP 9011.
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In light of the foregoing, WPR violated FRBP 9011 by filing the Adversary Complaint
because the underlying complaint lacked an objectively reasonable basis and WPR failed to
conduct an objectively reasonable investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding
the allegations contained in the Adversary Complaint. While WPR contends that the pleadings
were “all filed in good faith,” FRBP 9011 makes no exception for a “pure heart, empty head”
defense. See Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 (9th Cir. 1986); Smith v.
Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478 (9th Cir. 1994).
E. Appropriate Sanctions
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 authorizes the Court to impose both
monetary and nonmonetary sanctions, except that the Court may not issue monetary sanctions
against a “represented party” for violations of FRBP 9011(b)(2) and in instances of voluntary
dismissal or settlement. FRBP 9011(c)(2). Here, although WPR represents that they
discussed settlement with Debtor’s counsel, no such settlement was ever provided to or
approved by the Court. In addition, the Adversary Complaint was not voluntarily dismissed,
but rather the Court sua sponte dismissed the Adversary Complaint for failure of WPR to
prosecute.
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 provides that sanctions “shall be limited to
what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated.” FRBP 9011(c)(2). One of the purposes of FRBP 9011 is “to deter baseless filings.”
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990); In re Grantham Bros., 922 F.2d
1438, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991). Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011(c) allows the Court to
“impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.” FRBP 9011(c). A bankruptcy court should
“apply the general rule that sanctions are to be allocated between counsel and client according
to their relative culpability.” In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 136 B.R. 545, 554 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1992) overruled on other grounds by Lockary v. Kayfetz, 974 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11 directs the Court to consider the following
factors to determine the appropriate amount of sanctions:
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1. whether the improper conduct was willful or negligent;
2. whether it was part of a pattern of activity or an isolated event;
3. whether it infected the entire pleading or only one particular count or
defense;
4. whether the person has engaged in similar conduct in other litigation;
5. whether it was intended to injure;
6. the effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense;
7. whether the responsible person is trained in the law;
8. that amount, given the financial resources of the responsible person, is
needed to deter that person from repetition in the same case;
9. the amount needed to deter similar activity by other litigants.
1993 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11.
When the Court questioned Weinstein about how many times WPR had been
sanctioned for filing frivolous pleadings, Weinstein represented to the Court as follows: “We
have never been sanctioned in our firm’s 27 year history for filing a baseless complaint before.
Ever. . . . This is the first sanction I am aware of of any type against our firm for any purpose
other than issues of missing scheduling orders and so on.” Record at 2:31 pm. In accordance
with the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 11, the Court conducted a brief inquiry of recent,
similarly-situated cases involving WPR, to ascertain whether WPR has engaged in a similar
pattern or practice. The Court’s inquiry, concerning only published cases within the last year
or so, reflects numerous similar dischargeability complaints filed by WPR where WPR was
sanctioned for filing baseless complaints.
One case, also involving Ralston, decided in February of 2012 (appeal dismissed in
late-June 2012) sanctioned WPR almost $15,000 pursuant to the “fee shifting” provisions of
523(d) in a very similar proceeding as the one at task. The bankruptcy court in that case found
that:
In addition to the complaint’s factual deficiencies, the complaint also lacked a
reasonable basis in law. . . . In plaintiff’s brief on the attorney’s fees issue, in
addressing the justification for its suit, plaintiff continues to use this faulty
argument. Further, plaintiff adds facts that are not in the record, relies on
statements of law without providing any statutory or case citation, and fails to
provide any remotely persuasive argument that its complaint was justified.
In re Shahidulla, 465 B.R. 511, 515 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2012) appeal dismissed, CIV. 12-670
SRN, 2012 WL 2402817 (D. Minn. June 26, 2012). Moreover, the Shahidulla Court stated that
“[t]he amended complaint was replete with inaccuracies and misstatements, was no better
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than the first complaint, and, in fact, was worse in that, grasping for something to allege and
without prudently using ‘on information and belief’ language, plaintiff made untrue and
seriously misleading allegations.” Id. at 512. The Shahidulla Court sanctioned WPR for filing a
“frivolous” complaint, finding WPR’s “repeated failures to provide a legal or factual basis for its
claims” warranted almost $15,000 in sanctions. Id.
In another case from last year, also involving Ralston, the bankruptcy court awarded
sanctions in the amount of $9,583.75 against WPR for facts similar to the instant matter. See
In re Conant, 464 B.R. 511, 518 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) aff’d sub nom. FIA Card Servs., N.A.
v. Conant, 476 B.R. 675 (D. Mass. 2012) (finding complaint “deficient” and substantially
unjustified under § 523(d)).
In a similar case, also involving Ralston, which was affirmed on the merits in May of
2012, the District Court awarded almost $6,000 in attorney fees as fee-shifting sanctions under
523(d) against WPR. In re Dunbar, CV 11-159-M-DWM, 2012 WL 1757427 (D. Mont. May 15,
2012). The Dunbar Court found WPR’s 523(a)(2) claim “unjustified” and found that there was
no fact investigation before the complaint was filed. Id. at *4.
At the hearing on the OSC, the Court questioned Weinstein about how many times
WPR had been sanctioned in the Central District of California. Weinstein replied that he
believed WPR had been sanctioned “eight or ten times” in the Central District. When the Court
questioned Harrison about how many times he had been sanctioned in the Central District, he
stated that he had probably been sanctioned “under half a dozen” times. Harrison also
represented that each time he is sanctioned, WPR pays the sanction.12 In accordance with
Rule 11, the Court performed an inquiry into the record of the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Central District of California to ascertain whether WPR has engaged in a similar pattern
or practice in other adversary proceedings. Attached as Appendix A is a summary of the
results of the Court’s inquiry, which reflects numerous orders to show cause regarding
sanctions filed against the same WPR attorneys involved in the instant proceeding.
12 The Court notes that Weinstein represented to the Court that sanctions affect Harrison’s pay “indirectly.”
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In addition, at the hearing on the OSC, the Court inquired whether Weinstein was aware
of the percentage of adversary proceedings by WPR which actually proceeded to trial on the
merits. Harrison represented that he “wouldn’t be surprised” if none of them proceeded to trial.
When asked how many proceedings were prosecuted by WPR against pro se defendants,
Weinstein represented to the Court that the “vast majority are represented by counsel.” To the
contrary, the Court’s own inquiry into the records of the Central District reflect that none—not
one—of the proceedings filed by the same subject attorneys to this sanctions order ever went
to trial on the merits. Moreover, of the 340 adversary proceedings filed by Ralston in the
Central District of California, 86% were prosecuted against pro se defendants (only 14% were
represented by counsel). See Appendix B. In addition, of the 115 adversary proceedings filed
by Harrison in the Central District of California, 77% were prosecuted against pro se
defendants (only 23% were represented by counsel). See Appendix C. These percentages, of
course, do not reflect any settlements between WPR and pro se defendants that may have
occurred prior to the filing of an adversary proceeding.
At the OSC hearing, WPR represented that they use a computer program, dubbed
FAST (Fraudulent Activity Screening Technology), which purportedly “analyzes many indicia of
fraud that are identified as factual elements of objective intent to commit fraud under [among
other cases, In re Anastas]. . . .” Weinstein Declaration, Adv. Dk. 46, 2:11-12. “Objective
intent,” of course, is not the standard of inquiry in the Ninth Circuit, but rather, as specifically
addressed in the Anastas case, subjective intent is the focus.13 While indicia of fraud may
13 The Court notes the Shahidulla Court specifically admonished WPR for their misunderstanding or
mischaracterization of the Anastas case:
Plaintiff’s complaint implied that defendant acted fraudulently by taking out credit without the
ability to repay plaintiff. In plaintiff’s responses to defendant’s motions to dismiss, plaintiff relied
on Anastas v. American Savings Bank (In re Anastas), 94 F.3d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996), for the
proposition that such an argument could be used to show fraud. However, Anastas explicitly
stands for the proposition that courts should not look to debtor’s ability to repay, but rather should
look to debtor’s intent to repay a debt in order to establish fraud. Id. at 1285–86 [quotation
omitted]. In plaintiff’s brief on the attorney’s fees issue, in addressing the justification for its suit,
plaintiff continues to use this faulty argument.
In re Shahidulla, 465 B.R. 511, 515 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2012) appeal dismissed, CIV. 12-670 SRN, 2012 WL
2402817 (D. Minn. June 26, 2012).
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indicate bad faith, the Court believes that it is unreasonable to delegate this legal
decisionmaking process to a non-attorney, let alone a computer system. The FAST program
uses a computer model that was developed in the 1990’s to allegedly uncover “fraud.” But,
there is no evidence that the algorithms are correct. Indeed, given the very high percentages
of pro se defendants that WPR prosecutes in Section 523 actions, the Court questions whether
FAST’s algorithms are resulting in a disparate impact on pro se parties. Moreover, the issue of
intent in a Section 523(a) proceeding is highly nuanced and requires a minimally competent
level of legal expertise and diligence. No matter how advanced the FAST program has
become, the Court believes that they are an insufficient substitute for due diligence in this
respect.14
The Court believes that certain monetary and non-monetary sanctions are appropriate
in this instance. Weinstein either made a misrepresentation to the Court by stating that WPR
had never been sanctioned for filing frivolous complaints, or he actually was unaware of the
tens of thousands of dollars in sanctions imposed by bankruptcy courts, just within the past
year or so, against WPR for filing frivolous Section 523(a) actions. Assuming that Weinstein
was completely truthful (i.e., “to my knowledge”) to the Court, it is apparent that tens of
thousands of dollars (and perhaps more) in monetary sanctions are merely the cost of doing
business for WPR.
Based upon the particular facts of this case, the Court believes that sunlight is the best
disinfectant. Because monetary sanctions alone seem to be ineffective in meeting the
deterrence goals of FRBP 9011, true deterrence calls for both a monetary sanction and for the
exposure of this pattern and practice by WPR.
Weinstein and WPR are hereby jointly and severally sanctioned the sum of $5,000.00
pursuant to FRBP 9011 for bringing this frivolous proceeding. Weinstein is required to
14 The Court believes that the FAST program is based on the doctrine first elucidated by Professor Ralph
Brubaker (University of Illinois) as the “jam it to the debtor good and hard” doctrine. Ralph Brubaker, The
Absolute Priority Rule for Individual Chapter 11 Debtors: To Be or Not to Be?, 32 Bankr. L. Letter No. 10 at 9-10
(October 2012) (quoting Jack Ayer, Justice Kagan’s Torture Memo: “It Can’t Possibly Mean That,” available at:
http://facultyblog.law.ucdavis.edu/post/Justice-Kagans-Torture-Memo-It-Cant-Possibly-Mean-That.aspx (posted
Jan. 12, 2011)).
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immediately report this sanction to the State Bar of California. This Order and Memorandum
shall be published and posted on the Court’s website for the Central District of California.
Weinstein is further ordered to send a true and correct copy of this Order and
Memorandum by overnight mail, within 10 days of its entry, to the following entities:
1. The State Bar of California, 1149 South Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299;
2. The Offices of the United States Trustee for the Central District of California,
Northern District of California, Eastern District of California, and the Southern
District of California;
3. Public Counsel Law Center, 610 South Ardmore Avenue, Los Angeles, CA
90005;
4. Public Law Center, 601 Civic Center Drive West, Santa Ana, CA 92701-4002;
5. Bet Tzedek Legal Services, 3250 Wilshire Boulevard, 13th Floor, Los Angeles,
California 90010;
6. Jennifer Dasteel, Director of Pro Bono, Inner City Law Center, 1309 East 7th
Street, Los Angeles, California 90021; and
7. American Bar Association, Center for Pro Bono, 321 North Clark Street, Chicago,
IL 60654.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
###
Date: December 11, 2013
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APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX A
1. Richard Ralston
Case/Proceeding Document Description
8:06-ap-01200-ES Order Dismissing
Adversary Complaint,
dated July 11, 2013.
Adv. Dk. 9.
Ralston of WPR failed to prosecute adversary
complaint. Proceeding dismissed due to
inactivity for six months.
2:12-ap-01980-TD Order Dismissing
Adversary Complaint,
dated January 10,
2013, Adv. Dk. 8
Ralston filed complaint, which was dismissed for
lack of prosecution when Ralston failed to
appear at the January 3, 2013 status conference
hearing and failed to file a status conference
report or any settlement agreement or other new
pleadings. Note that Ralston retired on January
4, 2013, but WPR apparently did not assign a
different attorney to the proceeding.
6:12-ap-01171-
MW
Judgment of Dismissal
for Defendant, dated
May 16, 2013, Adv.
Dk. 20
Ralston filed complaint, Harrison failed to
comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule provisions
concerning pleadings and an order to be filed
and/or lodged in advance of the pretrial
conference.
6:12-ap-01171-
MW
Judgment of Dismissal
for Defendant, dated
May 16, 2013, Adv.
Dk. 19.
Ralston filed complaint, Harrison failed to
comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule 7016-1(e).
Proceeding dismissed.
6:12-ap-01291-
MW
Order to Show Cause
Discharged, Adv. Dk.
35, filed July 1, 2013
OSC discharged because, although WPR
(Ralston, Slinsky, and Harrison) failed to comply
with Judge Wallace’s order, WPR explained that
“Mr. Ralston, who filed the instant case, retired
due to deeply personal and family reasons. Ms.
Slinsky, the attorney at the Firm who took over
the case, failed to properly calendar hearing
dates and monitor the case, causing the Firm to
violate this Court’s order. Ms. Slinsky has since
been terminated.”
6:12-ap-01289-
MW
Order Denying Motion
for Extension of Time
to File Default
Judgment, Adv. Dk.
25, filed September
17, 2013
“The Bank argues that its failure to comply with
this Court’s Order requiring that any motion for
entry of default judgment be heard on or before
August 31, 2013 be excused on grounds of
excusable neglect. Specifically, the Bank
contends that this case had been assigned to
attorney Paul Escobar, and that Mr. Escobar
abruptly resigned on or about June 28, 2013.
Assuming without determining that this is true,
the Weinstein law firm had the entire month of
July 2013 and a portion of the month of August
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24
2013 to examine Mr. Escobar’s case
assignments, to reassign such matters to other
attorneys and to take appropriate, timely action.
Failure to do so is inexcusable neglect, not
excusable neglect.”
6:12-ap-01417-WJ Order Dismissing
Adversary Proceeding
For Failure to Appear,
Adv. Dk. 11, filed
March 22, 2013
“On January 31, 2013 at 10:30 a.m., the Court
held the initial status conference in this
adversary proceeding. The defendant, Vicky M.
Castruita, appeared. The plaintiff failed to
appear. For the reasons stated on the record,
the Court continued the status conference to
March 21, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. and issued an
order to show cause (“OSC”) regarding why this
adversary proceeding should not be dismissed
without prejudice due to the failure of the plaintiff
to prosecute the matter. The hearing regarding
the Court’s OSC was also set for March 21,
2013 at 1:30 p.m. On March 21, 2013 at 1:30
p.m. the Court held the hearing on the OSC. The
defendant, Vicky M. Castruita, appeared. The
plaintiff failed to appear.
Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS as
follows:
1. This adversary proceeding is hereby
dismissed for failure to prosecute.”
8:06-ap-01200-ES Dismissal for Want of
Prosecution, Adv. Dk.
9, filed July 11, 2013
Adversary dismissed for want of prosecution.
8:12-ap-01350-
MW
Dismissal of
Adversary Proceeding,
Adv. Dk. 27, filed May
16, 2013
“adversary proceeding is dismissed with
prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
Local Bankruptcy Rules, including LBR 7016-1.
Specifically, Plaintiff failed to comply with Local
Bankruptcy Rule provisions concerning
pleadings and an order to be filed and/or lodged
in advance of the pretrial conference. LBR 7016-
1(c), (e).”
8:12-ap-01350-
MW
OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 29, Filed
June 4, 2013
“The Court HEREBY ORDERS that the above-
entitled adversary proceeding is set for a
hearing on July 17, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. to permit
any parties in interest to present argument to the
Court as to why Josh Harrison, Esq. and FIA
Card Services, N.A. should not be sanctioned
for violating the Local Bankruptcy Rules,
including LBR 7016-1. Specifically, Plaintiff
failed to comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule
provisions concerning pleadings and an order to
be filed and/or lodged in advance of the pretrial
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25
conference.”
8:12-ap-01350-
MW
Order Granting Motion
to Pay Defendant’s
Attorney Fees, Adv.
Dk. 50, filed August
16, 2013.
“Plaintiff is to pay Defendant’s Attorney Fees of
Six Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Five Dollars
($6,565.00) within thirty (30) days of entry of this
Order.”
8:12-ap-01351-
MW
OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 26, filed May
16, 2013
“Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Bankruptcy
Rule provisions concerning pleadings and an
order to be filed and/or lodged in advance of the
pretrial conference.”
8:12-ap-01351-
MW
Order Granting Motion
To Pay Defendant’s
Attorney’s Fees, Adv.
Dk. 48, filed August
22, 2013
“Plaintiff is to pay Defendant’s Attorney Fees of
Six Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty-Five
Dollars ($6,925.00) within thirty (30) days of
entry of this Order.”
8:12-ap-01354-CB OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 28, filed May
31, 2013
“Mr. Escobar admitted on the record that he was
not admitted to practice in the Central District of
California. He also represented that he was now
the attorney on this case for Weinstein & Riley
PS, instead of Josh Harrison who had filed a
stipulation in this case a few hours prior to the
hearing. For the reasons set forth on the record,
a review of the documents filed in this case and
good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that
Plaintiff shall show cause, if any, why sanctions
should not be imposed for having an attorney
who is not admitted to this District appear on
behalf of Weinstein & Riley PS. Any response
shall be made in writing and must be filed with
the Court at least fourteen (14) days before the
hearing. The response must contain the
following sentence, “This is a sworn statement
being signed under penalty of perjury,” and must
be served on the Office of the United States
Trustee. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a
managing partner of Weinstein & Riley PS shall
appear in person at the continued status
conference on June 25, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.”
8:12-ap-01354-CB Order Dismissing
Adversary Complaint
with Prejudice for
Failure to Prosecute,
Adv. Dk. 39, filed
August 2, 2013
“The above entitled adversary proceeding came
for a Status Conference on July 30, 2013.
Frederick Glasser specially appeared on behalf
of Plaintiff. No status report was submitted.
Based on the record of this case and the
discussion on the record at the hearing, and
good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that
this adversary proceeding is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute.”
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26
8:12-ap-01362-CB OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 22, filed May
31, 2013
“Mr. Escobar admitted on the record that he was
not admitted to practice in the Central District of
California. He also represented that he was now
the attorney on this case for Weinstein & Riley
PS, instead of Josh Harrison who had filed a
stipulation in this case a few hours prior to the
hearing. For the reasons set forth on the record,
a review of the documents filed in this
case and good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show cause,
if any, why sanctions should not be imposed for
having an attorney, who is not admitted to this
District, appear on behalf of Weinstein & Riley
PS.”
9:08-ap-01136-RR Order Dismissing
Adversary for Failure
to Prosecute, Adv. Dk.
4, filed January 13,
2009
“This above-captioned matter came on for status
conference on January 13, 2009, at 11:00 a.m.
No appearance was made on behalf of the
plaintiff. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED dismissing this adversary
proceeding for failure to prosecute.”
2. Josh Harrison
Case/Proceeding Document Description
2:12-ap-02259-BR Order Assessing
Sanctions, Adv. Dk. 8,
filed February 27,
2013
Failure to comply with LRB 7016-1.
2:13-ap-01269-BB Order Dismissing
Adversary Complaint,
Adv. Dk. 15, filed July
5, 2013
“A status conference in the above-referenced
adversary proceeding came on for hearing on
July 2, 2013 at 2:00 p.m. The Court having
found that (i) the Plaintiff’s underlying complaint
fails to state a claim for relief and (ii) the
Plaintiff’s causes of action are time-barred under
11 U.S.C. section 523.”
Note: This order was vacated by Order entered
August 9, 2013; however, it was sent for an
OSC “to show cause why the above-entitled
adversary proceeding should not be dismissed
based on lack of evidence to support the
elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case.” Before
the OSC hearing, Harrison voluntarily dismissed
the proceeding. See Adv. Dk. 25, filed August
28, 2013.
2:13-ap-01338-BB Order for Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 9, filed May
Sanctions imposed where “counsel for plaintiff
having failed to send someone who is familiar
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27
20, 2013 with the adversary proceeding to appear at the
Status Conference, and for the reasons set forth
on the record, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as
follows:
. . . .
6. Sanctions are hereby imposed on plaintiff’s
counsel Josh Harrison in the amount of $50.00
for sending an attorney to appear on plaintiff’s
behalf at the Status Conference who had no
familiarity with this adversary proceeding or its
status.
7. Josh Harrison shall pay $50.00 to the Clerk of
the Bankruptcy Court not later than thirty days
after entry of this order.”
2:13-ap-01440-RK OSC for Sanctions for
Failure to Appear,
Adv. Dk. 10, filed
September 4, 2013
“The above entitled adversary proceeding came
on calendar for a status conference hearing on
August 20, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., and counsel, failed to appear
at the hearing at which appearances were
required and failed to serve a copy of the
unilateral status conference report on any party,
including a judge’s copy for the presiding judge
as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 5005-2(d).
. . . .
It is also ORDERED that Plaintiff Wells Fargo
Bank, and counsel, shall show cause, if any,
why sanctions should not be imposed for
Plaintiff’s unexcused failure to appear at the
status conference hearing scheduled on August
20, 2013, and Plaintiff’s failure to serve the
unilateral status conference report on any party
in this case, including the judge’s copy.”
Note: WPR’s Response to the OSC states “the
attorney at WPR who was at the time assigned
to manage the case left the firm suddenly and
without prior notice. He was not replaced until
mid August, when Gail Rinaldi, an attorney
licensed to practice law in California with an
office in San Diego, joined the firm. His abrupt
departure, followed on August 16, 2013, by the
departure of the paralegal who did not file the
[unilateral status report] with the supporting
documentation, created significant disruption.”
Adv. Dk. 17, 3:11-15.
6:12-ap-01171-
MW
Judgment of Dismissal
for Defendant, dated
Ralston filed complaint, Harrison failed to
comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule provisions
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28
(Listed above in
Ralston chart)
May 16, 2013, Adv.
Dk. 20
concerning pleadings and an order to be filed
and/or lodged in advance of the pretrial
conference.
8:12-ap-01350-
MW
(Listed above in
Ralston chart)
Dismissal of
Adversary Proceeding,
Adv. Dk. 27, filed May
16, 2013
“adversary proceeding is dismissed with
prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
Local Bankruptcy Rules, including LBR 7016-1.
Specifically, Plaintiff failed to comply with Local
Bankruptcy Rule provisions concerning
pleadings and an order to be filed and/or lodged
in advance of the pretrial conference. LBR 7016-
1(c), (e).”
8:12-ap-01350-
MW
(Listed above in
Ralston chart)
OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 29, Filed
June 4, 2013
“The Court HEREBY ORDERS that the above-
entitled adversary proceeding is set for a
hearing on July 17, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. to permit
any parties in interest to present argument to the
Court as to why Josh Harrison, Esq. and FIA
Card Services, N.A. should not be sanctioned
for violating the Local Bankruptcy Rules,
including LBR 7016-1. Specifically, Plaintiff
failed to comply with Local Bankruptcy Rule
provisions concerning pleadings and an order to
be filed and/or lodged in advance of the pretrial
conference.”
8:12-ap-01350-
MW
(Listed above in
Ralston chart)
Order Granting Motion
to Pay Defendant’s
Attorney Fees, Adv.
Dk. 50, filed August
16, 2013.
“Plaintiff is to pay Defendant’s Attorney Fees of
Six Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Five Dollars
($6,565.00) within thirty (30) days of entry of this
Order.”
8:12-ap-01351-
MW
(Listed above in
Ralston chart)
OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 26, filed May
16, 2013
“Plaintiff failed to comply with Local Bankruptcy
Rule provisions concerning pleadings and an
order to be filed and/or lodged in advance of the
pretrial conference.”
8:12-ap-01354-CB
(Listed above in
Ralston chart)
OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 28, filed May
31, 2013
“Mr. Escobar admitted on the record that he was
not admitted to practice in the Central District of
California. He also represented that he was now
the attorney on this case for Weinstein & Riley
PS, instead of Josh Harrison who had filed a
stipulation in this case a few hours prior to the
hearing. For the reasons set forth on the record,
a review of the documents filed in this case and
good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that
Plaintiff shall show cause, if any, why sanctions
should not be imposed for having an attorney
who is not admitted to this District appear on
behalf of Weinstein & Riley PS. Any response
shall be made in writing and must be filed with
the Court at least fourteen (14) days before the
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29
hearing. The response must contain the
following sentence, “This is a sworn statement
being signed under penalty of perjury,” and must
be served on the Office of the United States
Trustee. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a
managing partner of Weinstein & Riley PS shall
appear in person at the continued status
conference on June 25, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.”
8:12-ap-01354-CB
(Listed above in
Ralston chart)
Order Dismissing
Adversary Complaint
with Prejudice for
Failure to Prosecute,
Adv. Dk. 39, filed
August 2, 2013
“The above entitled adversary proceeding came
for a Status Conference on July 30, 2013.
Frederick Glasser specially appeared on behalf
of Plaintiff. No status report was submitted.
Based on the record of this case and the
discussion on the record at the hearing, and
good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that
this adversary proceeding is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute.”
8:12-ap-01362-CB
(Listed above in
Ralston chart)
OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 22, filed May
31, 2013
“Mr. Escobar admitted on the record that he was
not admitted to practice in the Central District of
California. He also represented that he was now
the attorney on this case for Weinstein & Riley
PS, instead of Josh Harrison who had filed a
stipulation in this case a few hours prior to the
hearing. For the reasons set forth on the record,
a review of the documents filed in this
case and good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show cause,
if any, why sanctions should not be imposed for
having an attorney, who is not admitted to this
District, appear on behalf of Weinstein & Riley
PS.”
8:13-ap-01086-CB OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 12, filed May
31, 2013
“A status conference hearing was held on May
28, 2013 at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom 5D, located
at 411 W. Fourth Street, Santa Ana, CA 92701,
before the Honorable Catherine E. Bauer,
United States Bankruptcy Judge. Paul Escobar
of Weinstein & Riley PS appeared telephonically
on behalf of Plaintiff. Mr. Escobar admitted on
the record that he was not admitted to practice
in the Central District of California. He also
represented that he was now the attorney on
this case for Weinstein & Riley PS, instead of
Josh Harrison who had filed a stipulation in the
case on May 6, 2013.
. . . .
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show cause,
if any, why sanctions should not be imposed for
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30
having an attorney, who is not admitted to this
District, appear on behalf of Weinstein & Riley
PS. Any response shall be made in writing and
must be filed with the Court at least fourteen
(14) days before the hearing. The response
must contain the following sentence, “This is a
sworn statement being signed under penalty of
perjury,” and must be served on the Office of the
United States Trustee. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that a managing partner of
Weinstein & Riley PS shall appear in person at
the continued status conference on June 25,
2013 at 1:30 p.m.”
3. Lourdes Slinsky
Case/Proceeding Document Description
1:12-ap-01367-AA Order Dismissing
Proceeding, Adv. Dk.
35, filed June 14, 2013
Plaintiff failed to comply with local rules;
however, the case was dismissed prior to
hearing on motion for sanctions.
2:12-ap-02259-BR
(Listed above in
Harrison chart)
Order Assessing
Sanctions, Adv. Dk. 8,
filed February 27,
2013
Failure to comply with LRB 7016-1.
6:12-ap-01291-
MW
OSC re: Contempt
and Sanctions, Adv.
Dk. 27, filed May 3,
2013
“The Court held a hearing on April 23, 2013 to
consider the motion filed by FIA Card Services,
N.A. for default judgment under LBR 7055-1 [Dkt
#23] (“Motion”). Appearances are as stated on
the record. Having reviewed the record, case
docket and documents filed, and having
considered the arguments and representations
made during the hearing, the Court HEREBY
ORDERS THAT:
1. The Motion for entry of default judgment is
denied with prejudice on the ground that the
Motion was filed for a hearing over three months
late. The deadline imposed by Court order for
hearing the motion for default judgment was
January 15, 2013. The Motion was heard on
April 25, 2013.
2. An Order to Show Cause hearing is set for
June 13, 2013 at 9:00 a.m., at which hearing FIA
Card Services, N.A., Richard S. Ralston,
Lourdes Slinsky and Josh Harris, and each of
them, are ordered to appear and show cause
why they should not be held in contempt for
violating this Court’s order, and why sanctions
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31
should not be imposed on such entity and
persons for violating this Court’s order.”
6:12-ap-01291-
MW
Order, Adv. Dk. 35,
filed July 1, 2013
“Mr. Harrison explained that Mr. Ralston, who
filed the instant case, retired due to deeply
personal and family reasons. Ms. Slinsky, the
attorney at the Firm who took over the case,
failed to properly calendar hearing dates and
monitor the case, causing the Firm to violate this
Court’s order. Ms. Slinsky has since been
terminated. Mr. Harrison took over this case and
the Firm has taken remedial actions on behalf of
the Firm to fix these issues going forward.”
2:13-ap-01269-BB
(Listed in Harrison
chart)
Order Dismissing
Adversary Complaint,
Adv. Dk. 15, filed July
5, 2013
“A status conference in the above-referenced
adversary proceeding came on for hearing on
July 2, 2013 at 2:00 p.m. The Court having
found that (i) the Plaintiff’s underlying complaint
fails to state a claim for relief and (ii) the
Plaintiff’s causes of action are time-barred under
11 U.S.C. section 523.”
Note: This order was vacated by Order entered
August 9, 2013; however, it was sent for an
OSC “to show cause why the above-entitled
adversary proceeding should not be dismissed
based on lack of evidence to support the
elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case.” Before
the OSC hearing, Harrison voluntarily dismissed
the proceeding. See Adv. Dk. 25, filed August
28, 2013.
6:13-ap-01043-MJ OSC re: Dismissal,
Adv. Dk. 9, filed April
25, 2013
Vacated because proceeding was dismissed.
8:12-ap-01354-CB
(Listed above in
Harrison chart)
OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 28, filed May
31, 2013
“Mr. Escobar admitted on the record that he was
not admitted to practice in the Central District of
California. He also represented that he was now
the attorney on this case for Weinstein & Riley
PS, instead of Josh Harrison who had filed a
stipulation in this case a few hours prior to the
hearing. For the reasons set forth on the record,
a review of the documents filed in this case and
good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that
Plaintiff shall show cause, if any, why sanctions
should not be imposed for having an attorney
who is not admitted to this District appear on
behalf of Weinstein & Riley PS. Any response
shall be made in writing and must be filed with
the Court at least fourteen (14) days before the
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32
hearing. The response must contain the
following sentence, “This is a sworn statement
being signed under penalty of perjury,” and must
be served on the Office of the United States
Trustee. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a
managing partner of Weinstein & Riley PS shall
appear in person at the continued status
conference on June 25, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.”
8:12-ap-01354-CB
(Listed above in
Harrison chart)
Order Dismissing
Adversary Complaint
with Prejudice for
Failure to Prosecute,
Adv. Dk. 39, filed
August 2, 2013
“The above entitled adversary proceeding came
for a Status Conference on July 30, 2013.
Frederick Glasser specially appeared on behalf
of Plaintiff. No status report was submitted.
Based on the record of this case and the
discussion on the record at the hearing, and
good cause appearing, IT IS ORDERED that
this adversary proceeding is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute.”
8:12-ap-01406-CB ORDER re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 13, filed
January 24, 2013
“At the status conference held on January 23,
2012, the Court discussed with Ms. Slinsky why
Plaintiff failed to file a status report and failed to
comply with the Court’s ruling to attend one day
of mediation prior to December 31, 2012. A
review of the Court docket indicates Ms. Slinsky
was only recently added to this case and Mr.
Ralston was the only attorney representing
Plaintiff when mediation was ordered. For the
reasons set forth on the record, a review of the
documents filed in this case and good cause
appearing, IT IS ORDERED that: Lourdes
Slinsky of Weinstein Riley shall pay sanctions
for failure to timely file the status report, in the
amount of $100.00, payable to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court and sent to the Clerk of the
Court, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Santa Ana
Division, 411 W. 4th St., Santa Ana, CA 92701
within ten days of the January 15, 2013 hearing.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: Richard S.
Ralston of Weinstein & Riley PS (“Mr. Ralston”)
representing FIA Card Services, N.A. shall
personally appear on February 12, 2013 at 1:30
p.m. in Courtroom 5D, 411 West Fourth Street,
Santa Ana, California, 92701.”
8:13-ap-01086-CB
(Listed above in
Harrison chart)
OSC re: Sanctions,
Adv. Dk. 12, filed May
31, 2013
“A status conference hearing was held on May
28, 2013 at 1:30 p.m., in Courtroom 5D, located
at 411 W. Fourth Street, Santa Ana, CA 92701,
before the Honorable Catherine E. Bauer,
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33
United States Bankruptcy Judge. Paul Escobar
of Weinstein & Riley PS appeared telephonically
on behalf of Plaintiff. Mr. Escobar admitted on
the record that he was not admitted to practice
in the Central District of California. He also
represented that he was now the attorney on
this case for Weinstein & Riley PS, instead of
Josh Harrison who had filed a stipulation in the
case on May 6, 2013.
. . . .
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff shall show cause,
if any, why sanctions should not be imposed for
having an attorney, who is not admitted to this
District, appear on behalf of Weinstein & Riley
PS. Any response shall be made in writing and
must be filed with the Court at least fourteen
(14) days before the hearing. The response
must contain the following sentence, “This is a
sworn statement being signed under penalty of
perjury,” and must be served on the Office of the
United States Trustee. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that a managing partner of
Weinstein & Riley PS shall appear in person at
the continued status conference on June 25,
2013 at 1:30 p.m.”
4. Gail Rinaldi
Case/Proceeding Document Description
2:13-ap-01440-RK
(Listed above in
Harrison chart)
OSC for Sanctions for
Failure to Appear,
Adv. Dk. 10, filed
September 4, 2013
“The above entitled adversary proceeding came
on calendar for a status conference hearing on
August 20, 2013 at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., and counsel, failed to appear
at the hearing at which appearances were
required and failed to serve a copy of the
unilateral status conference report on any party,
including a judge’s copy for the presiding judge
as required by Local Bankruptcy Rule 5005-2(d).
. . . .
It is also ORDERED that Plaintiff Wells Fargo
Bank, and counsel, shall show cause, if any,
why sanctions should not be imposed for
Plaintiff’s unexcused failure to appear at the
status conference hearing scheduled on August
20, 2013, and Plaintiff’s failure to serve the
unilateral status conference report on any party
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34
in this case, including the judge’s copy.”
Note: WPR’s Response to the OSC states “the
attorney at WPR who was at the time assigned
to manage the case left the firm suddenly and
without prior notice. He was not replaced until
mid August, when Gail Rinaldi, an attorney
licensed to practice law in California with an
office in San Diego, joined the firm. His abrupt
departure, followed on August 16, 2013, by the
departure of the paralegal who did not file the
[unilateral status report] with the supporting
documentation, created significant disruption.”
Adv. Dk. 17, 3:11-15.
8:12-ap-01641-CB Order Assessing
Sanctions Against
Weinstein, Pinson &
Riley, PS, Adv. Dk. 21,
filed August 23, 2013
“The Status Conference and Scheduling Order
entered on May 23, 2013 (“Scheduling Order”)
required the parties to file a joint status report by
August 6, 2013. LBR 7016-1(a) also requires the
parties to file a joint status report fourteen days
prior to any status conference, and a unilateral
status report not less than seven days prior to
the status conference if a party fails to
cooperate. Plaintiff did not file a joint or unilateral
status report at any time between the entry of
the Scheduling Order and the August 13, 2013
status conference. Based on the record of this
case and the discussions on the record at the
status conference, and good cause appearing,
IT IS ORDERED that the law firm of Weinstein,
Pinson & Riley, P.S. is sanctioned $200.00 for
failure to file a status report as required by LBR
7016-1(a).”
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35
APPENDIX B
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36
Ralston Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
Totals 293 47 340 86% 14%
1:09-ap-01279-GM 1:12-ap-01002-AA
1:11-ap-01483-MT 1:12-ap-01023-VK
1:12-ap-01008-AA 1:12-ap-01237-MT
1:12-ap-01022-AA 1:12-ap-01266-AA
1:12-ap-01030-AA 1:12-ap-01267-AA
1:12-ap-01069-AA 1:12-ap-01381-AA
1:12-ap-01070-VK 2:05-ap-01557-VZ
1:12-ap-01072-VK 2:06-ap-01232-VZ
1:12-ap-01073-MT 2:10-ap-02933-BR
1:12-ap-01074-VK 2:11-ap-02889-PC
1:12-ap-01075-MT 2:12-ap-01078-RK
1:12-ap-01104-MT 2:12-ap-01143-BB
1:12-ap-01110-MT 2:12-ap-01725-RN
1:12-ap-01120-AA 2:12-ap-01906-BR
1:12-ap-01121-AA 2:12-ap-01985-PC
1:12-ap-01144-AA 2:12-ap-02028-BB
1:12-ap-01170-VK 2:12-ap-02227-RN
1:12-ap-01196-MT 2:12-ap-02414-ER
1:12-ap-01199-MT 2:12-ap-02483-BR
1:12-ap-01202-MT 2:12-ap-02484-BR
1:12-ap-01224-VK 2:12-ap-02541-ER
1:12-ap-01227-MT 2:12-ap-02543-ER
1:12-ap-01233-VK 6:11-ap-01006-MH
1:12-ap-01238-MT 6:11-ap-01493-MH
1:12-ap-01239-MT 6:11-ap-01986-MH
1:12-ap-01307-VK 6:12-ap-01031-WJ
1:12-ap-01345-AA 6:12-ap-01126-WJ
1:12-ap-01367-AA 6:12-ap-01171-MW
1:12-ap-01368-VK 6:12-ap-01172-MW
1:12-ap-01392-VK 6:12-ap-01210-MW
1:12-ap-01402-MT 6:12-ap-01211-MW
1:12-ap-01410-VK 6:12-ap-01338-MH
1:12-ap-01427-AA 6:12-ap-01351-DS
1:12-ap-01432-AA 6:12-ap-01458-MH
1:12-ap-01434-VK 6:12-ap-01477-WJ
2:09-ap-02534-BR 8:11-ap-01419-TA
2:11-ap-02857-RK 8:12-ap-01006-TA
2:11-ap-02888-PC 8:12-ap-01350-MW
2:11-ap-03058-RN 8:12-ap-01351-MW
2:11-ap-03164-BB 8:12-ap-01587-CB
2:11-ap-03167-SK 8:12-ap-01623-TA
2:11-ap-03174-RN 9:10-ap-01401-RR
2:11-ap-03215-BB 9:11-ap-01048-RR
2:12-ap-01014-RK 9:11-ap-01374-PC
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Ralston Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
2:12-ap-01297-BR 9:12-ap-01182-PC
2:12-ap-01305-ER 9:12-ap-01256-PC
2:12-ap-01318-RN 9:12-ap-01304-PC
2:12-ap-01319-TD
2:12-ap-01322-RK
2:12-ap-01323-BR
2:12-ap-01324-RN
2:12-ap-01327-BR
2:12-ap-01411-TD
2:12-ap-01412-ER
2:12-ap-01426-BB
2:12-ap-01491-ER
2:12-ap-01492-BR
2:12-ap-01493-ER
2:12-ap-01494-ER
2:12-ap-01516-TD
2:12-ap-01560-RN
2:12-ap-01561-ER
2:12-ap-01575-RN
2:12-ap-01576-BR
2:12-ap-01629-BR
2:12-ap-01630-RN
2:12-ap-01631-RN
2:12-ap-01632-BR
2:12-ap-01657-TD
2:12-ap-01658-TD
2:12-ap-01688-TD
2:12-ap-01699-TD
2:12-ap-01700-RN
2:12-ap-01717-TD
2:12-ap-01718-TD
2:12-ap-01719-RN
2:12-ap-01723-ER
2:12-ap-01724-RK
2:12-ap-01775-PC
2:12-ap-01786-PC
2:12-ap-01787-TD
2:12-ap-01798-ER
2:12-ap-01799-TD
2:12-ap-01800-VZ
2:12-ap-01821-BB
2:12-ap-01823-ER
2:12-ap-01824-TD
2:12-ap-01825-BR
2:12-ap-01826-BR
2:12-ap-01827-ER
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38
Ralston Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
2:12-ap-01828-TD
2:12-ap-01877-BR
2:12-ap-01893-RN
2:12-ap-01907-TD
2:12-ap-01909-ER
2:12-ap-01910-ER
2:12-ap-01911-BR
2:12-ap-01915-PC
2:12-ap-01916-BB
2:12-ap-01932-PC
2:12-ap-01939-BB
2:12-ap-01942-ER
2:12-ap-01943-TD
2:12-ap-01944-RN
2:12-ap-01965-PC
2:12-ap-01966-PC
2:12-ap-01980-TD
2:12-ap-02012-ER
2:12-ap-02130-BR
2:12-ap-02234-RN
2:12-ap-02237-RN
2:12-ap-02259-BR
2:12-ap-02271-BB
2:12-ap-02363-PC
2:12-ap-02365-RN
2:12-ap-02410-RN
2:12-ap-02412-RN
2:12-ap-02435-BR
2:12-ap-02436-BR
2:12-ap-02440-RN
2:12-ap-02442-RK
2:12-ap-02452-ER
2:12-ap-02456-RK
2:12-ap-02472-TD
2:12-ap-02477-PC
2:12-ap-02490-ER
2:12-ap-02491-TD
2:12-ap-02500-TD
2:12-ap-02501-BR
2:12-ap-02503-RN
2:12-ap-02563-RN
2:12-ap-02586-RK
2:12-ap-02627-BR
2:12-ap-02637-BR
2:12-ap-02695-RK
2:12-ap-02700-RK
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39
Ralston Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
6:11-ap-01586-MH
6:11-ap-01590-MH
6:11-ap-01749-MW
6:11-ap-01755-MH
6:11-ap-01849-WJ
6:11-ap-01864-WJ
6:11-ap-01938-MW
6:11-ap-01998-MH
6:11-ap-02022-DS
6:11-ap-02036-SC
6:11-ap-02039-DS
6:11-ap-02075-DS
6:12-ap-01005-MH
6:12-ap-01010-SC
6:12-ap-01056-DS
6:12-ap-01057-MJ
6:12-ap-01058-MJ
6:12-ap-01059-MJ
6:12-ap-01063-DS
6:12-ap-01065-MJ
6:12-ap-01066-MH
6:12-ap-01067-DS
6:12-ap-01068-DS
6:12-ap-01108-WJ
6:12-ap-01109-WJ
6:12-ap-01116-SC
6:12-ap-01124-DS
6:12-ap-01127-DS
6:12-ap-01151-DS
6:12-ap-01157-MW
6:12-ap-01160-DS
6:12-ap-01169-MH
6:12-ap-01170-MH
6:12-ap-01175-DS
6:12-ap-01193-SC
6:12-ap-01213-MH
6:12-ap-01234-SC
6:12-ap-01236-MH
6:12-ap-01242-WJ
6:12-ap-01247-DS
6:12-ap-01248-DS
6:12-ap-01258-MW
6:12-ap-01262-MH
6:12-ap-01266-DS
6:12-ap-01277-DS
6:12-ap-01278-MJ
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40
Ralston Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
6:12-ap-01286-SC
6:12-ap-01289-MW
6:12-ap-01291-MW
6:12-ap-01305-MH
6:12-ap-01314-WJ
6:12-ap-01325-SC
6:12-ap-01327-MH
6:12-ap-01337-WJ
6:12-ap-01364-MH
6:12-ap-01377-MW
6:12-ap-01384-DS
6:12-ap-01393-MW
6:12-ap-01397-MJ
6:12-ap-01404-MJ
6:12-ap-01407-DS
6:12-ap-01417-WJ
6:12-ap-01422-MH
6:12-ap-01443-DS
6:12-ap-01451-SC
6:12-ap-01460-WJ
6:12-ap-01461-WJ
6:12-ap-01480-SC
6:99-ap-01734-MJ
8:06-ap-01065-ES
8:06-ap-01200-ES
8:09-ap-01819-ES
8:11-ap-01333-TA
8:11-ap-01366-TA
8:11-ap-01396-TA
8:11-ap-01485-TA
8:11-ap-01506-TA
8:11-ap-01522-MW
8:11-ap-01523-ES
8:12-ap-01004-ES
8:12-ap-01005-TA
8:12-ap-01015-TA
8:12-ap-01017-MW
8:12-ap-01030-TA
8:12-ap-01064-ES
8:12-ap-01065-ES
8:12-ap-01066-ES
8:12-ap-01067-ES
8:12-ap-01119-MW
8:12-ap-01165-CB
8:12-ap-01194-ES
8:12-ap-01211-MW
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41
Ralston Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
8:12-ap-01240-ES
8:12-ap-01253-TA
8:12-ap-01254-TA
8:12-ap-01267-TA
8:12-ap-01268-ES
8:12-ap-01325-MW
8:12-ap-01341-CB
8:12-ap-01352-MW
8:12-ap-01354-CB
8:12-ap-01362-CB
8:12-ap-01368-ES
8:12-ap-01369-TA
8:12-ap-01371-TA
8:12-ap-01377-MW
8:12-ap-01378-TA
8:12-ap-01379-TA
8:12-ap-01380-ES
8:12-ap-01381-CB
8:12-ap-01384-MW
8:12-ap-01392-ES
8:12-ap-01394-TA
8:12-ap-01407-CB
8:12-ap-01419-TA
8:12-ap-01420-CB
8:12-ap-01458-ES
8:12-ap-01524-TA
8:12-ap-01525-ES
8:12-ap-01551-ES
8:12-ap-01572-CB
8:12-ap-01573-ES
8:12-ap-01574-CB
8:12-ap-01575-ES
8:12-ap-01588-CB
8:12-ap-01589-TA
8:12-ap-01594-SC
8:12-ap-01595-CB
8:12-ap-01596-ES
8:12-ap-01607-CB
8:12-ap-01613-ES
8:12-ap-01625-TA
8:12-ap-01634-SC
9:08-ap-01136-RR
9:09-ap-01049-RR
9:12-ap-01045-RR
9:12-ap-01046-RR
9:12-ap-01092-RR
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42
Ralston Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
9:12-ap-01111-RR
9:12-ap-01115-RR
9:12-ap-01126-PC
9:12-ap-01127-PC
9:12-ap-01151-RR
9:12-ap-01192-RR
9:12-ap-01209-PC
9:12-ap-01214-RR
9:12-ap-01215-RR
9:12-ap-01216-RR
9:12-ap-01225-RR
9:12-ap-01277-RR
9:12-ap-01278-RR
9:12-ap-01305-PC
9:12-ap-01321-PC
9:12-ap-01323-RR
9:12-ap-01325-PC
9:12-ap-01326-PC
9:12-ap-01344-RR
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43
APPENDIX C
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44
Harrison Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
Totals 88 27 115 77% 23%
8:12-ap-01354-CB 6:12-ap-01171-MW
1:12-ap-01367-AA 1:12-ap-01266-AA
1:12-ap-01410-VK 1:12-ap-01267-AA
1:13-ap-01074-AA 1:12-ap-01381-AA
1:13-ap-01098-VK 1:13-ap-01141-MT
1:13-ap-01116-VK 2:12-ap-02028-BB
1:13-ap-01142-AA 2:12-ap-02541-ER
2:12-ap-01909-ER 2:12-ap-02543-ER
2:12-ap-02259-BR 2:13-ap-01060-RN
2:12-ap-02440-RN 2:13-ap-01207-BR
2:12-ap-02490-ER 2:13-ap-01266-RK
2:12-ap-02491-TD 2:13-ap-01338-BB
2:12-ap-02705-ER 2:13-ap-01440-RK
2:12-ap-02707-ER 6:12-ap-01210-MW
2:12-ap-02708-PC 6:12-ap-01211-MW
2:12-ap-02715-TD 6:12-ap-01458-MH
2:12-ap-02731-TD 6:12-ap-01477-WJ
2:13-ap-01101-TD 6:12-ap-01497-MW
2:13-ap-01179-ER 6:13-ap-01110-WJ
2:13-ap-01204-TD 8:12-ap-01350-MW
2:13-ap-01269-BB 8:12-ap-01351-MW
2:13-ap-01323-PC 8:12-ap-01587-CB
2:13-ap-01352-BB 8:12-ap-01623-TA
2:13-ap-01353-BB 8:13-ap-01008-CB
2:13-ap-01354-SK 8:13-ap-01032-MW
2:13-ap-01374-PC 8:13-ap-01227-TA
2:13-ap-01400-ER 9:13-ap-01037-RR
2:13-ap-01541-BB
2:13-ap-01615-ER
2:13-ap-01634-TD
2:13-ap-01635-ER
2:13-ap-01640-BB
2:13-ap-01708-ER
2:13-ap-01847-BR
6:12-ap-01289-MW
6:12-ap-01291-MW
6:12-ap-01417-WJ
6:12-ap-01422-MH
6:12-ap-01461-WJ
6:12-ap-01480-SC
6:12-ap-01489-SC
Case 6:12-ap-01480-SC Doc 57 Filed 12/11/13 Entered 12/11/13 16:12:13 Desc
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45
Harrison Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
6:13-ap-01006-MH
6:13-ap-01025-MH
6:13-ap-01043-MJ
6:13-ap-01067-SC
6:13-ap-01068-MJ
6:13-ap-01077-WJ
6:13-ap-01101-DS
6:13-ap-01109-SC
6:13-ap-01115-DS
6:13-ap-01116-MH
6:13-ap-01160-SC
6:13-ap-01161-MW
6:13-ap-01168-DS
6:13-ap-01194-MJ
6:13-ap-01213-SC
6:13-ap-01228-DS
6:13-ap-01232-MJ
6:13-ap-01253-DS
6:13-ap-01273-WJ
8:12-ap-01362-CB
8:12-ap-01380-ES
8:12-ap-01589-TA
8:12-ap-01595-CB
8:12-ap-01607-CB
8:12-ap-01634-SC
8:12-ap-01639-TA
8:12-ap-01641-CB
8:12-ap-01649-TA
8:13-ap-01034-MW
8:13-ap-01044-TA
8:13-ap-01045-SC
8:13-ap-01084-SC
8:13-ap-01086-CB
8:13-ap-01097-SC
8:13-ap-01101-CB
8:13-ap-01109-CB
8:13-ap-01148-ES
8:13-ap-01177-ES
8:13-ap-01202-TA
Case 6:12-ap-01480-SC Doc 57 Filed 12/11/13 Entered 12/11/13 16:12:13 Desc
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46
Harrison Pro Se Not Pro Se Total Adversaries % Pro Se % Not Pro Se
8:13-ap-01214-TA
8:13-ap-01215-CB
9:12-ap-01277-RR
9:12-ap-01278-RR
9:12-ap-01355-RR
9:13-ap-01032-RR
9:13-ap-01069-RR
9:13-ap-01103-RR
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47
NOTICE OF ENTERED ORDER AND SERVICE LIST
Notice is given by the court that a judgment or order entitled (specify): MEMORANDUM AND ORDER IMPOSING
SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO FRBP 9011 was entered on the date indicated as “Entered” on the first page of this
judgment or order and will be served in the manner stated below:
1. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (NEF) Pursuant to controlling General
Orders and LBRs, the foregoing document was served on the following persons by the court via NEF and
hyperlink to the judgment or order. As of 12/11/2013, the following persons are currently on the Electronic Mail
Notice List for this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding to receive NEF transmission at the email addresses
stated below.
 Josh Harrison advnotices@w-legal.com
 Winfield S Payne Wpaynelaw@aol.com
 Richard S Ralston richardr@w-legal.com, advnotices@w-legal.com
 Gail A Rinaldi gailr@w-legal.com, Advnotices@w-legal.com
 Lourdes R Slinsky lrslinsky@gmail.com, advnotices@w-legal.com
 United States Trustee (RS) ustpregion16.rs.ecf@usdoj.gov
Service information continued on attached page
2. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA UNITED STATES MAIL: A copy of this notice and a true copy of this
judgment or order was sent by United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following persons and/or
entities at the addresses indicated below:
Elizabeth Blanche Nelson
2400 Del Mar Way, No. 106
Corona, CA 92882
William S. Weinstein
Weinstein, Pinson & Riley, P.S.
2001 Western Ave., Ste. 400
Seattle, WA 98121
Service information continued on attached page
3. TO BE SERVED BY THE LODGING PARTY: Within 72 hours after receipt of a copy of this judgment or order
which bears an “Entered” stamp, the party lodging the judgment or order will serve a complete copy bearing an
“Entered" stamp by United States mail, overnight mail, facsimile transmission or email and file a proof of service
of the entered order on the following persons and/or entities at the addresses, facsimile transmission numbers,
and/or email addresses stated below:
Service information continued on attached page
Case 6:12-ap-01480-SC Doc 57 Filed 12/11/13 Entered 12/11/13 16:12:13 Desc
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