Flores v. Chlarson

OCR transcription for search; preserved printed pages are authoritative

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1
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FILED & ENTERED
3
4 NOV 04 2013
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CLERK U.S, BANKRUPTCY COURT
6 Sonar Benue
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SS)
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
LOS ANGELES DIVISION
11
12 || In re: CHAPTER 7
13 i Case No.: 2:12-bk-36407-TD
a Justin Thomas Chlarson, Adv. No.: 2:12-ap-02406-TD
15 MEMORANDUM DECISION
Debtor.
16 Date: October 17, 2013
47 Kendra Vorhies Flores, Time: 11:00 a.m.
Courtroom: 1345
18 Plaintiff,
V.
19
20 Justin Thomas Chlarson,
21
22 Defendant.
23
24 This memorandum addresses Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
25
(sometimes, Motion) brought in the above-captioned adversary proceeding pursuant to
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97 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 as made applicable by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
28 || Procedure 7056. The Motion is based on a judgment awarded to Plaintiff by the
ar) A.

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Superior Court of the State of Washington. The superior court judgment was based on
an arbitrator’s detailed findings and conclusions. The relevant history leading up to the

superior court judgment is set forth below.

Plaintiff Kendra Vorhies Flores (Flores) sued Defendant Justin Thomas Chlarson
(Chlarson) in the superior court in August 2011. Flores’ complaint alleged, among other
things, conversion, outrage, and malicious injury to an animal based on allegations of
Chlarson’s involvement in the death of Flores’s cat. Chlarson filed an answer to the
superior court complaint. The matter was sent to arbitration, both parties participated
and testified, and on April 19, 2012, the arbitrator rendered written findings and
conclusions. On April 20, 2012, the superior court entered judgment in Flores’ favor

based on the arbitrator’s findings and conclusions and awarded Flores $25,460.00."

On August 1, 2012, Chlarson filed a voluntary chapter 7 petition in this court.
Flores timely filed this adversary proceeding on September 26, 2012, seeking
nondischargeability of her $26,460 superior court judgment pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
523(a)(6).* Flores’ adversary complaint asserted that there was no appeal from the
superior court judgment and that Chlarson’s right to appeal expired on May 20, 2012.

Thus, it appears that the April 20, 2012, superior court judgment is final.

Chlarson did not file an answer or motion in response to Flores’ adversary
complaint. Attorney Thomas Allison, Chlarson’s bankruptcy attorney, entered an
appearance for Chlarson in connection with the first adversary status conference

hearing on January 3, 2013, by signing a joint Status Conference Report on Chlarson’s

' The complete arbitrator's decision is attached as Appendix A. The Judgment Summary and Order
Granting Judgment on Award is attached as Appendix B.
2 All such references are to Title 11 of the United States Code unless otherwise indicated.

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behalf and appearing for Chlarson at a status conference hearing on January 3, 2013.
Chlarson’s attorney later signed a Pretrial Stipulation filed on July 18, 2013, in the
adversary. The parties’ Pretrial Stipulation acknowledged that no issues of fact
remained to be litigated. On September 4, 2013, Flores filed her Motion for Summary
Judgment. Chlarson and his attorney were both properly served with Flores’ Motion for
Summary Judgment. Chlarson did not oppose Flores’ Motion.° Chlarson’s attorney did
not appear at the October 17, 2013 hearing on the motion. Based on the record and
evidence before the court, * the court grants the Motion and renders this court's findings

of fact and conclusions of law, as follows:

Summary judgment is appropriate here because “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R.
Civ. P. 56. The arbitrator's findings and conclusions are entitled to preclusive effect in
this adversary;” they establish the elements necessary to support a judgment pursuant
to § 523(a)(6) and no issues of material fact remain to be litigated. Grogan v. Garner,
498 U.S. 279, 284, 111 S. Ct. 654, 661, 112 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1991) (finding that collateral
estoppel principles apply in exception to discharge proceedings). Section 523(a)(6)
states in relevant part, “(a) A discharge under section 727. . . of this title does not
discharge an individual debtor from any debt . . . (6) for willful and malicious injury by

the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity.”

3 Under the court’s local rule 9013-1(h) Chlarson’s failure to oppose the Motion is deemed to be his
consent to the court granting the relief requested therein.

“ The court takes judicial notice of the arbitrator’s written decision and the judgment from the superior
court. Judicial notice is appropriate for records and “reports of administrative bodies.” See United States
ex rel. Robinson v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992).

° Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738, as a matter of full faith and credit, federal courts are required to apply the
pertinent state’s collateral estoppel principles. Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In re Nourbakhsh), 67 F.3d 798,
800 (9th Cir. 1995).

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The uncontroverted and undisputed facts® of the arbitration decision establish
both a willful and malicious injury. The arbitrator's detailed findings of fact were
meticulous. Testimony was provided by Dr. Trish Roisum, DVM, which established blunt
force trauma as the cat’s cause of death resulting from broken ribs and severe injury to
the diaphragm and thoracic wall. Dr. Roisum opined that the cause of these injuries was
likely a kick; the injuries were consistent with a fast firm object that came into contact
with the cat’s lateral chest causing the ribs to fracture in two places and the diaphragm
to tear. Dr. Roisum did not believe the injuries were caused by the cat falling off a bed
or from a dog attack. In fact, Dr. Roisum’s testimony refuted Chlarson’s testimony that
the latter two scenarios, or others asserted by Chlarson, could have been the cause of

the cat’s injuries.

The arbitrator also noted that Chlarson was the only individual alone with the cat
during the time the cat suffered its fatal injuries, the cat was an indoor cat, and the
injuries occurred while the cat was inside the house with Chlarson. The arbitrator
rejected Chlarson’s argument that Flores may have caused the cat's injuries because

Chlarson was the only person present with the cat when its injuries occurred.

Chlarson also admitted to sending Flores a text message threatening injury to the
cat just before the cat was fatally injured. The arbitrator noted that the timing of
Chlarson’s message, Chlarson’s admission that he shooed the cat off the bed and
couch, and the testimony of the parties’ marital difficulties, provided the requisite motive
and explanation as to why it was more probable than not that Chlarson caused the cat's

injuries.

® Chlarson pled guilty to misdemeanor charges against him based on his involvement with the death of
Flores’s cat, but the arbitrator gave only minimal weight to this fact based on his assessment of the
mitigating effects of a plea agreement entered into by Chlarson.

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Animal control officers Quinn and Berg provided testimony about their
investigation into the cat’s death. The arbitrator carefully analyzed their reports with
respect to what occurred with the cat. Chlarson admitted to the officers that he was very
angry with the cat and had shooed the cat off the bed. Chlarson admitted that he and
Flores were the only individuals present at any time with the cat. The investigating
officers rejected Chlarson’s explanations of what could have caused the cat's injuries

because those explanations were not consistent with the injuries the cat sustained.

The arbitrator rejected Chlarson’s testimony that he merely shooed the cat off the
bed. Weighing the evidence presented, the arbitrator determined that Chlarson likely
scooped the cat off the bed with such strength and velocity that the cat struck a hard-
edged object that caused the fatal injury. The arbitrator concluded that “based upon all
the admissible evidence as a whole, there is a finding that the injury and death of the

cat was directly due to an act by the defendant, Mr. Chlarson.”

After considering the possible inferences from the evidence before him, the

arbitrator added:

... The amount of force applied to generate this severe
injury to the cat and the volitional nature of the act itself of
scooping or tossing the cat leads to the conclusion that
such was a[n] intentional act by defendant as defined in
legal terms. | conclude that such an act by defendant was
intentional as opposed to pure negligence.

Based upon the preponderance of the evidence, | find for
the plaintiff with regard to the causes of action for
conversion, for outrage, and for malicious injury to an
animal. Conversion was due to the willful deprivation of the
chattel by the act of defendant. Outrage [was] due to the
intentional and reckless act of the defendant. | also find that
plaintiff has met her burden to show that such intentional

—_

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act amounted to malicious injury to an animal due to the
legally intentional act and evidence that the defendant was
aware of plaintiff's long standing ownership and relationship
to the cat, his threat in the text message, and his frustration
with regard to plaintiff's reluctance to end [their] marriage [to
each other].

The arbitrator carefully explained and then awarded damages for the intrinsic
value of the cat in the amount of $15,000 and $10,000 for emotional damages.
Attorney's fees and statutory costs also were awarded. The judgment includes accruing

interest.

The arbitrator's recitation of the evidence, the legal issues and his award are
thorough, clear, logical and appear to bring the superior court judgment within the
requirements for nondischargeability in bankruptcy pursuant to § 523(a)(6). These
findings of fact and conclusions of law are sufficient under the Ninth Circuit standards
for nondischargeability pursuant to § 523(a)(6). Under § 523(a)(6), this means that for

nondischargeability debtor's actions equated with “willful and malicious” injury.

The first question under § 523(a)(6) is whether there is “willful” injury, which must
entail a deliberate or intentional injury. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62
(1998). In the Ninth Circuit, the intent required to be considered “willful” is either the
subjective intent of the actor to cause harm or the subjective knowledge of the actor that
harm is substantially certain to occur. Carrillo v. Su (In re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1144-45

(9th Cir. 2002).

Chlarson’s intentional and deliberate act as established in the arbitration decision
was an intentional act as defined by Geiger and Su. The decision concluded that

Chlarson did not engage in a negligent act. Rather, the arbitrator concluded, “The

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amount of force applied to generate this severe injury to the cat and the volitional nature
of the act itself of scooping or tossing the cat leads to the conclusion that such was an
intentional act... .” This constitutes a willful injury as defined by § 523(a)(6); it is fair to
infer from the arbitrator’s decision that Chlarson had the subjective intent to cause harm
to the cat and Flores and/or the subjective knowledge that harm was substantially
certain to occur based on his intentional actions in shooing or tossing the cat with a

significant amount of force.

The second step in the 523(a)(6) inquiry is whether Debtor’s conduct was
“malicious.” The relevant test for finding “malicious” conduct is whether the evidence
establishes: “(1) a wrongful act; (2) done intentionally; (3) which necessarily causes
injury; and (4) is done without just cause and excuse.” Jett v. Sicroff (In re Sicroff), 401
F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has stated that when a wrongful
act is voluntarily committed, with knowledge that the act is wrongful and will necessarily
cause injury, it constitutes a willful and malicious injury within the meaning of §

523(a)(6). See Petralia v. Jercich (In re Jercich), 238 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001).

The elements for malicious injury under § 523(a)(6) also were established in the
arbitration decision. The evidence persuaded the arbitrator that Chlarson committed
wrongful acts of conversion, outrage and malicious injury to an animal. In committing
these wrongful acts, the arbitrator found that Chlarson committed “intentional act[s],”
which “amounted to malicious injury” to the cat. The arbitrator’s decision supports a
conclusion here that this malicious injury was done without justification or excuse. The
arbitrator rejected Chlarson’s exculpatory testimony with respect to his actions. The

arbitrator's decision also carefully establishes the maliciousness of the injuries and

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damages suffered by Flores. Thus, the Ninth Circuit standards for a malicious injury are

satisfied.

Based on the foregoing analysis, this court concludes that summary judgment is
warranted because the arbitration decision, as confirmed in the superior court judgment,
obviates the need for any further litigation of the matter. As discussed, (1) the issues of
willful and malicious injury in this adversary proceeding are identical to those litigated in
the superior court, (2) they were actually litigated and necessarily decided there, (3) the
parties are the same, and (4) the superior court judgment is final.’ Moreover, giving
preclusive effect to the superior court judgment is fair and furthers the public policies
underlying the doctrine, including judicial economy and conservation of the court’s time

and resources.
Chlarson’s debt is nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).

IT 1S SO ORDERED.

Date: November 4, 2013 Thomas B. Donovan
United States Bankruptcy Judge

’ Under Washington law, for collateral estoppel to apply, the party seeking application of the doctrine
must establish that (1) the issue decided in the earlier proceeding was identical to the issue presented in
the later proceeding, (2) the earlier proceeding ended in a judgment on the merits, (3) the party against
whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to, or in privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding,
and (4) application of collateral estoppel does not work an injustice on the party against whom it is
applied. Christensen v. Grant Cnty. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 152 Wash. 2d 299, 307 (2004)

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APPENDIX A

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| | EXPEDITE
[x | No hearing set
| | Hearing is set

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF THURSTON

KENDRA VORHIES, Case No.: 11-2-01832-3
Plaintiff, ARBITRATOR’S FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS
Vs,

JUSTIN T. CHLARSON;

Defendant.

On Feb. 29, 2012, Arbitrator Harold Carr heard the arbitration of the above matter. On
Mar, 19, 2012, he prepared an award to plaintiff in the sum of $25,000 plus statutory costs and

attorney's fees against Defendant Justin Chlarson. Attached is a true copy of his findings and

conclusions.
Dated this Apr. 19, 2012.
ANIMAL LAW OFFICES
~ Shawn I. Newman for Adam P. Karp, WSBA #28622 -
Attorney for Plaintiff
ARBITRATOR’S FINDINGS AND ANIMAL LAW OEPICES OF
CONCLUSIONS - 1 ADAM P, Karp, ESQ.

114 W. Magnolia St, Ste. 425 » Bellingham, WA 98225
(360) 738-7273 @ Facsimile: (360) 392-3936
adam(@animal-iawyer.com

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aro d D. Car r 5 PS. Marion Von to om Renee Kicks »Gine Snow» fasha Emerson * Leslie ‘cuech

Martin Barnett * Shirley McKay * Tonya Page * Alicia Mendova
Attorneys at Law Elizabeth A. Abfott Rosie Delgadilla "enna lumen * Jernifer schoonocer "Josie Madrid
A Professional Service Corporation Andrew B. Williams Stacy Rex * Jessica Beasley * Cheryl Pritiar* Diane Winters
Michael W. Montgomery
Thurston County www.haroldcarrattorney.com Pierce County
4535 Lacey Blvd SE, Lacey, WA 98503 10136 Bridgeport Way SW, Lakewood, WA 98499
Ph: 360-455-0030 Fax: 360-455-0031 Yax LD. #91-1508016 Ph: 253-365-6565 Fax: 253-365-6350

Arbitration Decision March 16, 2012

Re: Vorhies vs Chlarson Thurston Case No 11-2-01832-3

I apologize for taking the entire 14 days to render my opinion. I took
additional time to mull over the evidence presented and to consider all legal
arguments carefully. |

The burden of proof in a civil matter is preponderance of the evidence.
Essentially this requires proving a matter by greater than fifty percent (50%)
probability, which is defined as more likely than not likely. This is plaintiffs
burden and if met, defendant is required to present sufficient evidence to
controvert plaintiff's evidence.

After careful consideration, I find for the Plaintiff.

Most arbitration opinions are bare and the arbitrator simply writes an award
amount without any explanation. | find that this case warrants a written
analysis so that the parties can understand how the decision was made.

My decision was based upon the evidence presented as a whole. However, I
will discuss factors that I found relevant.

Fact Issues
1) The guilty plea

I gave some weight to this, however, I understand that there are some
instances where an innocent individual may choose to plead guilty to a
misdemeanor in order to avoid the possibility of a felony conviction that
might carry more severe consequences or perhaps end defendant's military
career. I certainly did not find this dispositive.

2) Declaration of Dr. Trish Roisum, DVM

The veterinarian made it clear with a high level of confidence beyond
reasonable medical certainty that the injury to the cat was caused by blunt
trauma force. The doctor describes the injuries as broken ribs and severe
injury to the diaphragm and thoracic wall. She gives her opinion that this is
consistent with a fast firm object that came into contact with the cat’s lateral

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chest causing the ribs to fracture in two places and the diaphragm to tear.
The doctor states that this could be caused by a kick. Dr. Roisum states that
these injuries were not a result of a fall off the bed or a bite from a French
bulldog. She gives her opinion that the injuries were due to an attack.

Neither the defendant’s testimony that the cat might have been injured by a
fall off the bed or by rough playing with their French bulldog, nor his
statements to the Animal Control Officers that the cat “could have tried to
squeeze through too small of a space or something”, or that “some animals
are born like that” are sufficient to controvert this evidence.

3) Defendant and Plaintiff were the only individuals with care and control of
the cat

It is undisputed that the cat was an indoor cat and therefore the injuries
must have occurred in the home. Mr. Chlarson was the only person present
and alone with the cat during the most probable timeframe that the cat
suffered the injuries. Ms. Vorhies was present with Mr. Chlarson later in the
day on Friday when the symptoms of the cat’s distress were first noticed. I
do not accept a res ipsa loquitur legal argument with regard to this evidence.
However, this evidence does isolate the causes of injuries to the cat to an
event during that timeframe and in the home occupied by only the Defendant
and the Plaintiff. Mr. Chlarson’s mention that one explanation is that Ms.
Vorhies might have caused the injury is not persuasive in light of the other
evidence presented as analyzed below.

4) Defendant’s text message

The text message and the contents therein was presented by way of
testimony of the plaintiff and plaintiffs mother. Mr. Chlarson admitted both
the fact that he sent the text message and the content of the message. 1
found that the contents of the text message, “If your f**ing cat gets on my
bed again, I swear .. .” shows an unusual degree of anger and threat directed
towards the cat and to Ms. Vorhies. The timing of the message by
Defendant’s own admission occurred just a few seconds after he admits
shooing the cat off the bed. There was testimony by Mr. Chlarson that he
previously shooed the cat off the bed 15-20 times before and 10 times off the
‘couch. The difference in this instance is the threat and anger in the text
message that occurred just subsequent to this event. This coupled with
evidence with regard to the marriage difficulties provides both motive and

- explanation as to why this injury to the cat occurred on a more probable that
not basis due to plaintiff's actions. I found this fact important as to whether
the injury to the cat was a legally intentional act or legally negligent act.
How this evidence applies to the arbitration award and to legal arguments
regarding the cause of action is addressed below.

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5) Report and declaration of Animal Control Officers Quinn and Berg

I gave weight to the interview of Mr. Chlarson by the investigating officer
with regard to defendant's statements to the officers and the discrepancies
therein.. 1 gave weight to the observations of Mr. Chlarson’s demeanor by
both officers during his interview and no consideration to their conclusion
that they felt he was not telling the truth. With regard to his statements to
the officers, Mr. Chlarson admits that it was on Friday that Ms. Vorhies told
him that she noticed something wrong with the cat. Both plaintiff and
defendant were at home at that time. Therefore the injury to the cat
occurred on Friday. He admitted to being angry at the cat in the past for
throwing up and him stepping in it. Mr. Chlarson admitted to the Animal
Control Officer that he told Mr. Vorhies that “at first the puppy hurt the cat”
and stated that he did not state that he “tossed the cat off the bed”, but that
he said he “shooed the cat off the bed”. Mr. Chlarson admitted that only the
two of them were present at any time with the cat. He gave several other
possible explanations regarding the cat's injuries which were insufficient to
explain the injuries to the cat and which are controverted by Dr. Roisum’s
opinion. I could not consider statements made by the other witnesses
interviewed by the Animal Control Officer, as those statements were not
presented in person or by declaration with the exception of Ms. Georgia
Vorhies, mother of Plaintiff. Most of that information was redundant and it
is admitted by both parties that there was a great deal of stress in the
household due to Mr. Chlarson wanting to separate from Ms. Vorhies; his
wishes to obtain a divorce; and his frustration due to Ms. Vorhie’s reluctance
to leave the marriage and the residence. 1 understand that this evidence
was presented by Plaintiff in order to demonstrate a motive for the alleged
act directed towards the cat in a moment of anger.

5) Defendant’s testimony that he shooed the cat off the bed and that his
statement that he did not kick the cat.

Dr. Roisum opines that the injuries to the cat could have been inflicted by a
kick. She describes the injury happening when a fast, firm object came into

- eontact with the cat’s lateral chest causing the ribs to fracture and the
diaphragm to tear. She goes on to make it clear that such injuries do not
occur by falling or by accidental household activity or by a small French
bulldog. As stated earlier, this defeats Mr. Chiarson’s other explanations.
Mr. Chlarson states that he did not kick the cat. This may be true, but from
consideration of all of the evidence, this statement seems to be a technical
truth, but not the whole truth. Assuming that Mr. Chlarson did not kick the
cat with his foot, he does admit to shooing the cat off the bed and admits to
sending the angry text message immediately following.

The defendant's allegation that he simply “shooed the cat off the bed” is not
consistent with the preponderance of the evidence. There is much more
evidence presented than just “her word versus his word” as to what occurred.

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Based upon all the evidence the most likely explanation is that Defendant, in
anger and frustration scooped the cat off the bed with sucn strength and
velocity that he tossed the cat and that the cat struck a hard-edged object,
most likely furniture such as the edge of a dresser or chest of drawers causing
the injury. Mr. Chlarson may not have meant to have the cat strike the
furniture or meant to cause such severe injuries to the cat. The other most
likely explanation based upon the preponderance of the evidence points to a
direct attack upon the cat by Defendant.

Either way, based upon all the admissible evidence as a whole, there is a

finding that the injury and death of the cat was directly due to an act by the
defendant, Mr. Chlarson.

Legal Analysis

There are some scenarios in which it could have been concluded that the cat
could have been injured due to defendant’s negligence. However, the facts as
presented above do not support this conclusion. The amount of force applied
to generate this severe injury to the cat and the volitional nature of the act
itself of scooping or tossing the cat leads to the conclusion that such was a
intentional act by defendant as defined in legal terms.

I conclude that such act by defendant was intentional as opposed to pure

‘ negligence.

Based upon the preponderance of the evidence, I find for the plaintiff with
regard to the causes of action for conversion, for outrage, and for malicious
injury to an animal. Conversion was due to the willful deprivation of the
chattel by the act of defendant. Outrage due to the intentional and reckless
act of the defendant. I also find that plaintiff has met her burder to show
that such intentional act amounted to malicious injury to an animal due to
the legally intentional act and evidence that the defendant was aware of
plaintiffs long standing ownership and relationship to the cat, his threat in
the text message, and his frustration with regard to plaintiffs reluctance to
end the marriage. I find that the damages under any of the theories of
recovery are as follows:

Damages
Intrinsic Value of cat

With regard to the intrinsic value of the cat, I award $15,000, I am
persuaded that the intrinsic value is not market value as there is none. I
reject that I am limited to the market value based upon the costs of $64.00 for
adopting another cat. The value should be the intrinsic value to the owner. I
want to make it clear that no amount of this award is punitive in nature.
Nor is any of the value based upon “unusual sentimental value”. While juries
may make this error, be assured that this arbitrator did not. I am aware that

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to an animal owner, such amount may seem very small but the law does not
allow for “mawkishly emotional evaluation” with regard to measuring
damages. To an individual who is not the owner, the value may seem high.
If an animal were newly acquired, while the owner might be “attached” to the
cat, the intrinsic value would be low in such case. If an animal were in the
last stages of life, the owner might again be highly bonded to such animal,
but such intrinsic value might be lower than during the point of ownership
when the animal has been owned for a considerable time with considerable
time left for ownership based upon the animal’s life expectancy. The evidence
shows that Plaintiff owned the cat for ten years and that there was no
indication that the cat was ill or that there was a shortened life expectancy
limiting the value of this animal. Addition al evidence considered was the
willingness of the Plaintiff to incur high medical expenses for the surgery and
seeking medical care in an attempt to save the life of the cat.

Emotional damages of Plaintiff

With regard to emotional damages, I award $10,000. I have separated out
the issue with regard to the value of the cat to the owner and assessed
damages based upon the emotional distress to the plaintiff related only to the
injuries and resultant death of the cat. Part of the emotional damages is
based upon the initial emotional damage caused by witnessing the injuries
and resultant suffering of the animal. A portion of the damages is assessed
for the grief associated with the death of the cat. A portion of the damages is
assessed for the continued emotional distress experienced by the plaintiff, not
allowing the plaintiff to consider another companion cat. A portion of the
damages is assessed for plaintiffs emotional feelings of guilt for not
protecting the cat from the injury by staying in the marriage.

Loss of Use

I do not award any loss of use based upon a daily value of the loss of the cat
‘to the owner as requested by the Plaintiff. I am not persuaded that I can
determine fairly a daily loss of use, as I do not find that such animal has a
replacement value during the interim that I can separate out from the value
assessed in the intrinsic value. Since the replacement value of the animal is
not easily ascertained, it would be difficult for the defendant to have paid
that value in order to stop the assessment of a daily loss of use of such
animal. Although that difficulty alone would not normally prohibit a loss of
use claim, I find that awarding a daily loss value in this particular case
would trivialize the value of this animal to the owner. More simply put, such
loss of use value has been considered to be a portion of the intrinsic value as I
have assessed a total value of the cat based upon consideration of both past,
present,and future value to the owner. -

y

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Total award is $25,000.00. I award statutory costs and attorney’s fees to the
Plaintiff as the prevailing party.

Dated this 16 day of March, 2012

fice

Aarold D. Carr
Arbitrator

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APPENDIX B

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a re
eRe

“RIOR COURT
THURSTON COUNTY. WA

[ | EXPEDITE OMiZ APR 20 ANI: 25
2 ine peoree set -
x] Hearing is set rout. c
5 ||Date: Fri, Apr. 20, 2012 BETTY J: GOULD. CL
Fine: 9:00 a.m.

4 || Judge/Calendar: McPhee/Civil

7 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT GF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
; IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF THURSTON
g || KENDRA VORHIES, Case No,: 11-2-01832-3
10 Plaintiff, JUDGMENT SUMMARY AND ORDER
GRANTING JUDGMENT ON AWARD
Mt “ Clerk’s Action Required
12 JUSTIN T. CHLARSON;
13 Defendant.
14 JUDGMENT SUMMARY
+5 Judgment Creditor: Kendra Vorhies
16 Judgment Creditor’s Attorney: Adam P. Karp, Shawn Newman
1 Judgment Debtor: Justin T. Chlarson
Principal: $25,000
- Interest: $0.00 but acoming
* Costs: $230 filing fee, $30 transcript fee, $200 attorney’s fee
. Total Judgment: $25,460
a This judgment shall bear interest at 5.25 percent,’ as provided by RCW 4.56.110.
22

23

24 ||

Bank prime loan rate on 4/2/12 as reported = by Fedend Reserve is 3.25%.
25 www.federalreserve. gow/releasew/h | 3/current,
JUDGMENT/ORDER ON AWARD - 1 ANIMAL LAW OFFICES OF
ADAM P. KARP, ESQ.
114 W. Magnolia St, Ste. 425 » Bellingham, WA 98225
(360) 738-7273 © Facsimile: (360) 392-3936
adam@jeninie)-lawyer. com

—12-9-00461-0

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Desc
ORDER
5
Os Feb. 29, 2012, Arbitrator Harold Carr heard the arbitration of the above thatter. On Mar. 19, 2012. be prepared an award to plaintiff in the sunt of $25,000 plus statutory costs and Attorney's fees against Defendam Justin Chiarson. Accordingly. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that judgment is entered on the arbitrmor's jaward porsuant to MAR 6.3. as stared shove and contained in the judgment summary provided on the first pages of this pleading.
0 בכ-
Protein LAKed
Dated this Apr: 20, 2012./ Chubline tomero for The Honorabie Superior Court Judge Thomas McPher
Presented by:
ANIMAL LAW OFFICES
72
Shawn Newman for Adam P. Karp, WSRA #28622 Azorney for Plaintiff
Approved as to fornx notice of presentation waived!
Christopher Taylor, WSBA #38413 Attorney for Defendant
JUDGMENT/ORDER ON AWARD - 2
AMMAL LAW OFFICES OF ADAM P. KARP, ESQ.
D) 134-727 . Raummie: (560) 357.3935
The 10-1-2012

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NOTICE OF ENTERED ORDER AND SERVICE LIST

Notice is given by the court that a judgment or order entitled (specify): MEMORANDUM DECISION
was entered on the date indicated as “Entered” on the first page of this judgment or order and will be

served in the manner stated below:

4. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (NEF) 8B Pursuant to controlling
General Orders and LBRs, the foregoing document was served on the following persons by the court via
NEF and hyperlink to the judgment or order. As of (date) 10/25/13, the following persons are currently on
the Electronic Mail Notice List for this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding to receive NEF
transmission at the email addresses stated below.

Heide Kurtz (TR)
trustee@hkurtzco.com, ca45@ecfebis.com

Tina M Locklear on behalf of Plaintiff Kendra Vorhies Flores
tina@locklearlaw.com

United States Trustee (LA)
ustpregion 16.la.ecf@usdoj.gov

[] Service information continued on attached page

2. SERVED BY THE COURT VIA UNITED STATES MAIL: A copy of this notice and a true copy of this
judgment or order was sent by United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, to the following persons
and/or entities at the addresses indicated below:

Debtor/Defendant
Justin Thomas Chlarson
12531 Countryside St
EI Monte, CA 91732

Debtor/Defendant

Justin Thomas Chlarson

223 Burnham Loop

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Attorney for Debtor/Defendant
Thomas Allison

Law Offices of Thomas D Allison
336 1/2 S Glendora Ave Ste K
West Covina, CA 91790

(J _ Service information continued on attached page

3. TOBE SERVED BY THE LODGING PARTY: Within 72 hours after receipt of a copy of this judgment
or order which bears an “Entered” stamp, the party lodging the judgment or order will serve a complete
copy bearing an “Entered” stamp by United States mail, overnight mail, facsimile transmission or email
and file a proof of service of the entered order on the following persons and/or entities at the addresses,
facsimile transmission numbers, and/or email addresses stated below:

[] ‘Service information continued on attached page

This form is mandatory. It has been approved for use by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.

June 2012 F 9021-1.1.NOTICE.ENTERED.ORDER