Baca v. United States of America

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Juan Antonio Baca,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden Hudson,
Respondent.
No. CV-25-00276-TUC-JCH (LCK)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Juan Baca has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to
Magistrate Judge Kimmins for Report and Recommendation. LRCiv 72.2(a)(2). Before
this Court are the Petition (Doc. 5), Respondent's Answer (Doc. 19), and Petitioner's Reply
(Doc. 27). The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent
review of the record, deny the Petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The background information below is set forth in a Declaration of Michael Amos,
Management Analyst at the Designation and Sentence Computation Center:
4. On December 11, 2020, the Petitioner was arrested by Amarillo Police
Department in Potter County, Texas for Possession of a Firearm, and Drug
Paraphernalia. The State did not pursue these charges, however, continued to
hold him for parole violations on case 48,664-B.
5. On December 23, 2020, the Petitioner was borrowed on Writ of Habeas
Corpus [Ad Prosequendum] and placed in the custody of the United States
Marshals Service. See Attachment 1.
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6. On September 21, 2021, the Petitioner was sentenced on case 2:20-CR-
123-Z-BR-(1) 	out 	of 	the 	Northern 	District 	of 	Texas, 	to 	69 	months
consecutively to case 48,664-B Potter County[,] Texas. See Attachment 2.
7. On October 4, 2021, Petitioner was returned to the State of Texas. On
October 29, 2021, the Petitioner's parole was revoked. See Attachments 3, 4.
8. On June 30, 2022,1 the Petitioner was paroled from Texas Department of
Criminal Justice to the federal detainer. On that day . . . his federal sentence
computation began.
(Doc. 19, Ex. A.)
Petitioner initiated this habeas case in the Northern District of Texas where he was
convicted and sentenced. (Doc. 3.) Upon review of the Amended Petition, that court
concluded Petitioner had raised habeas claims arising under both § 2241 and § 2255. (Doc.
11 at 2.) The Court severed the § 2241 claim—seeking federal sentencing credit for time
spent in state and federal custody prior to June 30, 2022—and transferred it to this Court,
because Petitioner was incarcerated in Arizona at the time he filed the case.2 (Id. at 2-3.)
ANALYSIS
Within Claim 1 of the Amended Petition there is a limited allegation that falls under
the parameters of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner alleges that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
should give him credit towards his sentence for the time he spent in state and federal
custody prior to June 30, 2022, the date on which BOP calculates that he commenced
service of his federal sentence. (Doc. 5 at 5.) Respondent argues that this claim is not
exhausted and is without merit.
1 In the Reply, Petitioner asserts he was paroled from state custody and returned to
federal custody around April 12, 2022, although he did not reach the facility at which he
would begin serving his sentence until June 30, 2022. (Doc. 27 at 2-3.) Petitioner did not
provide any evidence to support his assertion; therefore, the Court follows the official
documentation provided by Respondent. (Doc. 19, Ex. A ¶ 8 & Attach. 3 at 2.)
2 Although Petitioner is currently confined in the Fort Worth Medical Center in
Texas, this Court’s “jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and
it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change.”
Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Santillanes v. United States
Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985)).
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Exhaustion
Typically, the Court requires an inmate to exhaust all available administrative
remedies before it agrees to reach the merits of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claim. Martinez v.
Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). The administrative exhaustion requirement
serves several purposes, including protecting an administrative agency's authority by
promoting respect for the agency's procedures and by affording it the opportunity to correct
its own mistakes before being hauled into court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006).
The requirement also promotes efficiency by advocating a process that is quicker and more
economical than resolution in federal court. Id. Finally, should the matter ultimately reach
the court, the exhaustion requirement facilitates the "preparation of a useful record." Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not
a jurisdictional requirement of a §2241 claim. Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th
Cir. 2012). The Court can waive the exhaustion requirement if exhausting administrative
remedies would be futile, inadequate, void, or would cause irreparable injury. Laing v.
Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004).
Petitioner contends he submitted a dispute about his sentence computation to
"R&D" in Safford, Arizona, where he was held at the time he initiated this case, and the
Designation and Sentence Computation Center in Texas. (Doc. 5 at 4.) According to
Respondent, however, Petitioner did not complete the proper three-step administrative
remedy process before bringing this claim to court. (Doc. 19, Ex. B ¶¶ 15-17 & Attach. 3.)
In his Reply, Petitioner took issue with how the Defendant described the administrative
remedy process, but he but did not assert that he had properly exhausted this claim or that
the process in place prevented him from engaging in administrative exhaustion. (Doc. 27
at 4-5.) Error in the calculation of Petitioner's sentence could have been corrected by way
of the administrative process; therefore, exhaustion was not futile. Luna v. Howard, No.
CV-21-00326-TUC-RM-LCK, 2022 WL 17741575, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 19, 2022), report
and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 17741061 (D. Ariz. Dec. 16, 2022). And
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Petitioner's claim "[i]nvolves the BOP's special expertise in calculating and administering
sentences"; 	therefore, 	proper 	exhaustion 	is 	particularly 	relevant 	to 	his 	claim. 	See
Henderson v. McGrew, No. CV-12-03858-PSG-VBK, 2012 WL 5188043, at *3-4 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 13, 2012) (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992), superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 732 (2001); United
States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992)), report and recommendation adopted, 2012
WL 5188039 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2012). Because Petitioner did not exhaust the BOP
administrative remedy procedure prior to filing the Petition, it is subject to dismissal.
However, for the sake of thoroughness in the Report and Recommendation process, the
Court also addresses the claim on the merits.
Merits
Petitioner alleges he is entitled to credit for time spent in custody prior to June 30,
2022.3 The Attorney General, through BOP, is responsible for administering inmate
sentences and computation of credit pursuant to § 3585(b). See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337.
By statute, a federal sentence commences on "the date the defendant is received in custody
awaiting transportation to . . . the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be
served." 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). The statute further provides:
A 	defendant 	shall 	be 	given 	credit 	toward 	the 	service 	of 	a 	term 	of
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date
the sentence commences—
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested
after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed;
that has not been credited against another sentence.
3 In the Petition, Petitioner also suggests his federal sentence should have been run
concurrently with his state parole revocation sentence. (Doc. 5 at 5.) Respondent briefly
touched on this allegation in the Answer by correctly noting that the federal court stated
expressly that Petitioner’s federal sentence was to run consecutively to his not-yet-imposed
state sentence. (Doc. 19 at 9 & Ex. A, Attach 2 at 2.) The Court does not further address
this part of Petitioner’s claim because the Court interprets that portion of the claim as
alleging ineffectiveness of counsel (for failing to obtain a concurrent sentence), which the
Northern District of Texas retained to address as a § 2255 habeas claim. (Doc. 11 at 2.)
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18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).
An inmate is "in custody" under § 3585(a) when the federal government has not
only physical custody of the inmate but also primary jurisdiction over him. Johnson v. Gill,
883 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2018). "Normally, the sovereign which first arrests an
individual 	acquires 	priority 	of 	jurisdiction 	for 	purposes 	of 	trial, 	sentencing, 	and
incarceration." United States v. Warren, 610 F.2d 680, 684-85 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that
a sovereign with priority jurisdiction may relinquish it to another sovereign). A federal
sentence does not commence if the state continues to hold primary jurisdiction. Johnson,
883 F.3d at 765 ("A sovereign's priority terminates when the sentence expires, charges are
dismissed, or the prisoner is allowed to go free."). A transfer to federal custody pursuant to
a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum operates as a "loan" and does not interfere with
a state's primary jurisdiction. Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Crawford v. Jackson, 589 F.2d 693, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
Petitioner was first arrested by authorities in Texas, and the state retained primary
jurisdiction when he was in the physical custody of federal authorities from December
2020 to October 2021 regarding his federal criminal charges. His federal 69-month
sentence was ordered to run consecutive to his state parole revocation sentence. The state
did not relinquish primary jurisdiction to the federal government until June 30, 2022, when
it re-paroled him from state custody after he completed service of his parole revocation
sentence. Therefore, BOP correctly calculated Petitioner's federal sentence to commence
on that date.
Under § 3585(b), Petitioner may receive credit towards his federal sentence for time
spent in custody prior to the date his sentence commenced, June 30, 2022, only if that time
"has not been credited against another sentence." See also Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337 ("a
defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time."). All of the time
Petitioner spent in custody from December 11, 2020, to June 30, 2022, was credited to his
state parole revocation sentence; therefore, it cannot be credited to time served on his
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federal sentence. See Shadabadi v. Apker, No. CV-10-00061-TUC-DCB-HCE, 2010 WL
5574412, at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2010) (finding Petitioner was not entitled to credit on his
federal 	sentence 	for 	time 	credited 	to 	his 	state 	parole 	revocation), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 110499 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2011). Because the BOP
correctly calculated Petitioner=s sentence, and he is not entitled to credit for any time served
prior to June 30, 2022 (when he completed his state parole revocation sentence), there is
no basis for habeas relief.
RECOMMENDATION
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent
review of the record, enter an order DENYING the Petition because Petitioner failed to
administratively exhaust the claim, and the claim is without merit.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file
written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and
Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party's objections within fourteen days.
No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the District Court. If
objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the
parties should use the following case number: CV 25-00276-TUC-JCH.
Dated this 30th day of October, 2025.
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