Robbins v. Pima, County of et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jacob Robbins,
Plaintiff,
v.
County of Pima, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-23-00362-TUC-AMM
ORDER
On February 4, 2026, Magistrate Judge Eric J. Markovich issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending this Court grant Defendant Pima County’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 60.) The motion is fully briefed, and the Magistrate
Judge heard argument on January 29, 2026. (Docs. 49–50, 53–54, 57, 59.) Plaintiff Jacob
Robbins timely objected to the R&R, and Pima County responded. (Docs. 61, 64.) For the
reasons discussed herein, the Court will adopt the R&R in part and reject it in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Robbins brings this employment dispute against Pima County alleging it
discriminated against him by failing to reasonably accommodate his disability and deprived
him of his property interest in his continued employment. (Doc. 1.) He brings his claims
pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701–709, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 6–10.)
Robbins worked as a corrections officer at the Pima County Sheriff’s Department
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(“PCSD”) from 2006 to 2020. (Defendant’s Statement of Facts (“DSOF”), Doc. 50 ¶ 1;
Plaintiff’s Statement of Facts (“PSOF”), Doc. 54 ¶ 55.) In 2020, PCSD promoted Robbins
to a corrections sergeant. (DSOF ¶ 2.) It is undisputed that Robbins has cerebral palsy, a
disability that Pima County was aware of throughout his employment. (Id. ¶ 3; PSOF ¶ 56.)
Despite his disability, Robbins had not previously sought an accommodation. (PSOF ¶ 56.)
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Pima County released an October 21, 2021
memorandum requiring employees working with “vulnerable populations” to receive the
COVID-19 vaccine. (DSOF ¶ 4; PSOF ¶ 57.) PCSD determined that corrections personnel
working in detention centers, such as Robbins, worked with vulnerable populations and
were therefore required to be fully vaccinated. (See DSOF ¶ 5.) Pima County subsequently
issued a statement advising that employees with a medical condition that prevented them
from being vaccinated could receive an accommodation. (Id. ¶¶ 8–9.)
On November 5, 2021, Robbins contacted Pima County Human Resources (“HR”)
to ask about the accommodation process, and HR sent him ADA accommodation
paperwork the same day. (Id. ¶ 10.) HR followed up with Robbins in December 2021 to
inquire whether he intended to seek a workplace accommodation. (Id. ¶ 11.) On December
15, 2021, Robbins submitted the ADA paperwork to HR indicating that he was medically
unable to receive the COVID-19 vaccine and requesting an accommodation. (Id. ¶ 12;
PSOF ¶ 81.) The request specified that Robbins wanted “reassignment to any of the
positions for Corrections Sergeants in PCSD headquarters,” which would allow him to
“remain in his pension program.” (PSOF ¶ 82.) Robbins’s corrections sergeant
compensation rate at this time was $29.25 per hour. (See Doc. 50-1.)
The next day, Pima County found Robbins eligible for accommodation and
thereafter initiated the interactive accommodation process. (DSOF ¶ 13; PSOF ¶ 83.) In
mid-December, HR spoke with PCSD about whether Robbins could be reassigned to PCSD
headquarters. (PSOF ¶ 84.) Specifically, PCSD Lieutenant Christy Anderson testified that
she spoke to Emily Kruspig, nurse liaison for HR, and Lieutenant Anderson told Kruspig
that there were no positions available at headquarters to be filled by a corrections sergeant
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at that time. (Doc. 50-12 at 7–8.) Lieutenant Anderson further stated a corrections sergeant
assigned to the jail could not “just be physically working” at headquarters while being
assigned to the jail. (Id. at 8.) She explained that “if something happens at the jail, they
have to go to the jail, [be]cause that’s where the work is.” (Id.) Notably, neither employee
documented this conversation. (See PSOF ¶ 86.) Pima County contends that because the
corrections sergeant position requires regular contact with vulnerable populations, no
accommodation would allow Robbins to continue in that position and “reappointment” was
the “only option left to accommodate” him. (DSOF ¶¶ 17–18.) Robbins disputes this
statement, pointing to multiple corrections sergeants working outside the detention center
or jail during that time. (Plaintiff’s Response to DSOF (“PRSOF”), Doc. 54 ¶ 18.) Pima
County acknowledges that, at the time Robbins submitted his ADA paperwork, there were
four positions filled by corrections sergeants outside the detention center: three at PCSD
headquarters and one at the training center. (DSOF ¶ 26.) The three corrections sergeant
positions at headquarters included one personnel position and two internal affairs positions.
(Id. ¶ 27.)
Thereafter, on January 3, 2022, HR began searching for a reappointment position
for Robbins. (Id. ¶ 19.) HR sent Robbins weekly job summaries of Pima County’s open
positions from January 7, 2022 until February 25, 2022. (Id.) In mid-January, Robbins
contacted PCSD about reappointment and discovered HR had not yet contacted them
regarding the interactive process.1 (Id. ¶ 20; Doc. 50-19.) PCSD subsequently identified
four positions available for Robbins to apply for, one of which was a 911 Dispatcher.
(DSOF ¶¶ 21–22.) While Robbins tested for this position, he was unable to qualify. (Id. ¶
23.)
During this time, Robbins learned that Sergeant Manny Hernandez, a fellow
corrections sergeant, was reassigned to PCSD headquarters to work on a new body worn
camera project. (Id. ¶ 24; PSOF ¶ 92.) It is unclear when this project was created and filled
by PCSD. Pima County asserts inconsistently that the position “did not exist” in December
1 The identity of the person at PCSD whom Robbins contacted is unknown.
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2021 but also that it was “created and filled in late 2021/early 2022.” (DSOF ¶¶ 28, 48–
49.) Hernandez, like Robbins, was unable to be vaccinated due to a medical condition,
however there is no record that Hernandez went through the accommodation process, only
that he faxed HR information indicating he could not receive the COVID-19 vaccine on
January 3, 2022. (DSOF ¶ 50; PRSOF ¶ 50; PSOF ¶ 93.) When Robbins contacted PCSD
to inquire about Hernandez’s reassignment, HR explained that Hernandez filled the
position based on PCSD’s “specific needs” and “[s]taff are not always privy to the
decisions of management or why an employee was selected or not for an internal
reassignment.” (DSOF ¶¶ 24, 32.) HR confirmed that Robbins’s accommodation request
had not been denied and that “reappointment” was the accommodation offer. (Id. ¶ 32.)
Shortly after this, another corrections sergeant position at headquarters (in the personnel
unit) opened in early February 2022, to which Robbins was likewise not assigned.2 (PSOF
¶ 98.)
To continue in the accommodation process, Pima County extended Robbins’s
unpaid medical leave for an additional two weeks until March 4, 2022. (DSOF ¶ 33; Doc.
50-29; Doc. 54-3.) Robbins informed HR that his salary cutoff for a new position was $24
per hour. (Id. ¶ 33.) On March 8, 2022, Pima County offered Robbins a position as Program
Coordinator within the Central Human Resources Department. (DSOF ¶ 35.) Robbins
requested an increase in the position’s starting pay, and HR sought and was approved to
offer $25.69 per hour (a five percent raise over the starting salary). (Id. ¶¶ 36–37; Doc. 54-
35.) Robbins accepted the position on March 10, 2022, and he began working as a Program
Coordinator on March 14, 2022. (DSOF ¶¶ 38–39; PSOF ¶ 111.)
Although Robbins was hired to be a Program Coordinator for Occupational
Medicine, HR placed him in the Leave Administrative Unit because that unit had other
employees available to mentor him. (DSOF ¶ 40.) One of Robbins’s supervisors, Jason
2 While Pima County contends this corrections sergeant position was never vacant, (Doc.
64 at 9), the Court construes this fact in the light most favorable to Robbins. See Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (holding on a motion for summary judgment, “courts are
required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences ‘in the light most favorable to
the’” nonmoving party (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962))).
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Parrish, stated that Robbins communicated to him that Robbins was pleased to be working
with former PCSD employee Doreen Press, who had previously helped Robbins with leave
requests. (Id.) Parrish further stated that, during this time, Robbins regularly stopped by his
office to discuss the position and Robbins’s life and consistently answered positively. (Id.
¶ 41.) However, Robbins disputes this fact to the extent it misrepresents that, while he was
pleased to be working with Doreen Press, he was not satisfied with the “overall
accommodation process” nor did he approve of the reassignment. (PSOF ¶¶ 40–41.) During
this time, Robbins indicated to HR coworkers that he did not intend to stay in the Program
Coordinator position and was getting a job at the Pinal County Department of Corrections.
(DSOF ¶ 41.) Robbins’s last day in the office was March 31, 2022, and he exhausted his
leave through April 15, 2022. (Id. ¶ 42.) On April 15, 2022, Robbins emailed his
resignation to his supervisors. (Id. ¶ 43.) In his resignation email, Robbins thanked them
for their “help throughout the last month.” (Id.; Doc. 50-31.)
Robbins asserts that “[a]lthough [he] technically ‘resigned’ . . . he felt compelled to
do so because the new position did not match his background, training[,] or experience,
and that the reassignment did not feel like a true accommodation but rather a way to move
him out of his prior career track, and that he did not feel welcome.” (PSOF ¶ 115.) Robbins
argues he was “constructively discharged” on April 15, 2022. (Id. ¶ 116.) Because of this,
Robbins filed an administrative claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) and the Arizona Civil Rights Division (“ACRD”).3 (DSOF ¶ 54.)
Robbins’s administrative claim included a discrimination claim for failure to accommodate
but did not include retaliation or failure to rehire claims. (Id.; Docs. 54-15.) In his EEOC
claim, Robbins asserted Pima County’s failure to reassign him to a comparable position
resulted in his pay decreasing by between $5 and $10 an hour and his pension not
transferring, thereby pushing back his retirement 10 to 15 years. (Doc. 50-37 at 3.)
///
3 Robbins signed his EEOC claim on February 22, 2022, and the EEOC received it on
March 8, 2022. (Doc. 50-37.) Robbins signed his ACRD claim on April 27, 2022. (Doc.
50-38.)
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
a. Report and Recommendation
“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The Court considers de novo only objections which are specific.
See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (the Court
reviews de novo those portions of the R&R to which specific objection is made); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (requiring objections be “specific [and] written”). The Court reviews
portions of the R&R that are not objected to for clear error. See Prior v. Ryan, CV 10-225-
TUC-RCC, 2012 WL 1344286, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2012). However, “while the statute
does not require the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does not
preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the request of a party, under
a de novo or any other standard.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985). A district judge
may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations” of
the magistrate judge. § 636(b)(1)(C).
b. Summary Judgment
A court may grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,
viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
An issue is genuine when the disputed fact “could reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–51 (1986)). A disputed fact is material if it “might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248
(“Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”).
III. DISCUSSION
The Magistrate Judge found Robbins failed to make a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc. 60 at 29.) Specifically, the
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Magistrate Judge found that Robbins was not a “qualified individual,” and Pima County
engaged in the interactive process in good faith resulting in Robbins receiving the
reasonable accommodation of reassignment. (Id. at 28.) The Magistrate Judge further
found no evidence exists to support an Equal Protection or Due Process violation because
Robbins resigned and voluntarily relinquished any protected interest. (Id. at 29–32.)
Robbins objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings that (1) no headquarter positions
were “vacant” and available for reassignment, (2) the interactive process and
accommodation were reasonable, and (3) he was not constructively discharged in violation
of the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 61 at 2–10.) The Court addresses Robbins’s objections
in turn.
a. A genuine dispute exists as to whether Pima County failed to reasonably
accommodate Robbins in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
Robbins’s discrimination claim asserts Pima County failed to engage in a good faith
interactive process when it did not consider him for the corrections sergeant positions at
headquarters. (See Doc. 1.) An employer discriminates by “not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless [the employer] can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). “To establish a prima facie case for failure
to accommodate under the ADA, [a plaintiff] must show that ‘(1) []he is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA; (2) []he is a qualified individual able to perform the essential
functions of the job with reasonable accommodation; and (3) []he suffered an adverse
employment action because of [his] disability.’” Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med.
Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Allen v. Pac. Bell, 348 F.3d 1113, 1114
(9th Cir. 2003)). Significantly, the burden of establishing a prima facie case is not onerous.
Lyons v. England, 307 F.3d 1092, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002). At the summary judgment stage,
the “requisite degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie case . . . is minimal and
does not even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (citing
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Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir.1994)).
i. A genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Robbins is
a “qualified individual.”
As a threshold matter, the Magistrate Judge found Robbins’s inability to be
vaccinated made it impossible for him to work in his current position as a corrections
sergeant and therefore he was no longer a “qualified individual.” (Doc. 60 at 20.) The
Magistrate Judge reasoned that because Robbins was assigned to the detention center,
which required work with vulnerable populations, being vaccinated was necessary for him
to meet the “job-related requirements” of that position. (Id. at 18–19.) While Robbins does
not object to this finding, (see Doc. 61), the Court nevertheless finds that a genuine dispute
exists as to whether working with vulnerable populations was an essential function of all
corrections sergeant positions, and, in the alternative, whether reassignment could enable
Robbins to perform the essential functions of a different position.
A “qualified individual” under the ADA is “an individual who, with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The Ninth Circuit
established a two-step inquiry to determine qualification for a position: the court first
considers whether the individual satisfies the “‘requisite skill, experience, education and
other job-related requirements’ of the position,” and then considers “whether the individual
‘can perform the essential functions of such position’ with or without a reasonable
accommodation.” Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 990 (9th Cir. 2007)
(first quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); then quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)). A person can be
a “qualified individual” if he “can ‘perform the essential functions of a reassignment
position, with or without reasonable accommodation, even if [he] cannot perform the
essential functions of the current position.’” Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950,
959 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dark v. Curry Cnty., 451 F.3d 1078, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006)).
It is undisputed that there were five corrections sergeant positions assigned outside
the detention center or jail setting at the times relevant to the accommodation process.
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(DSOF ¶¶ 26–27; Doc. 54-1 at 4.) Robbins presents sufficient evidence to establish that at
least one of those corrections sergeants—Corrections Sergeant Hernandez—also could not
receive the COVID-19 vaccine for medically related reasons, but he was nevertheless
allowed to remain in the “corrections sergeant” position with reassignment to headquarters.
(See DSOF ¶ 24; PSOF ¶¶ 92–93.) Because evidence exists that corrections sergeants
worked outside the detention center without exposure to vulnerable populations, the Court
finds the Magistrate Judge construed the position too narrowly. (See Doc. 60 at 18–20.)
The Court further notes the Magistrate Judge’s analysis considers the COVID-19 vaccine
requirement as a “step-one” job-related prerequisite, such as the requisite bachelor’s degree
in Anthony v. Trax Int’l Corp., 955 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2020). (Id.) However, given that
corrections sergeants could receive an accommodation to avoid this requirement, the Court
finds the vaccine requirement is more appropriately considered in the “step-two” inquiry
as relevant to the essential functions analysis. This distinction is material because
accommodation is not considered until step two. See Johnson v. Bd. of Trs. of Boundary
Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 666 F.3d 561, 565 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he first step of the
qualification inquiry, unlike the second step, contains no reference to reasonable
accommodation.”).
Here, the fact that Corrections Sergeant Hernandez was permitted to retain his
position as a “corrections sergeant” notwithstanding his inability to receive the COVID-19
vaccination precludes this Court from adopting the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Robbins
is not a qualified individual based solely on his inability to receive the COVID-19
vaccination. Notably, Pima County failed to meet its burden of establishing the essential
functions of a corrections sergeant position. See Bates, 511 F.3d at 991 (“Although the
plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the fact finder that he can perform the
job’s essential functions . . . ‘an employer who disputes the plaintiff’s claim that he can
perform the essential functions must put forth evidence establishing those functions.’”
(quoting EEOC v. Wal–Mart, 477 F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir. 2007))). As such, Robbins
presents sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether working
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with vulnerable populations in the detention center (triggering the COVID-19 vaccination
requirement) was an “essential function” of the corrections sergeant position.
Moreover, even if working with vulnerable populations was an essential function of
a corrections sergeant position, a genuine dispute exists as to whether reassignment could
enable Robbins to perform the essential functions of another position. Pima County
arguably determined he was able to perform the essential functions of a “Program
Coordinator” by reassigning him to that position. (See DSOF ¶¶ 39–41.)
Construing these facts in the light most favorable to Robbins, it appears he was a
“qualified individual,” even if reassignment was necessary for him to be able to perform
the essential functions of the position. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. Accordingly, the Court
declines to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s finding as to this issue and finds a genuine dispute
exists at to the material fact of whether Robbins was a qualified individual.
ii. A genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether Pima
County properly considered Robbins for the available corrections
sergeant positions in its interactive process.
The Magistrate Judge further found that Pima County engaged in a good faith
interactive process and provided Robbins with reasonable accommodation. (Doc. 60 at 20–
29.) Robbins objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that no headquarter positions were
“vacant” and available for reassignment and that the interactive process and
accommodation were reasonable. (Doc. 61 at 2–8.) The Court finds that a genuine dispute
exists as to whether Pima County properly considered Robbins for the available corrections
sergeant positions at headquarters in its interactive process. Summary judgment is,
therefore, not appropriate.
“The interactive process requires: (1) direct communication between the employer
and employee to explore in good faith the possible accommodations; (2) consideration of
the employee’s request; and (3) offering an accommodation that is reasonable and
effective.” Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002).
“Whether an accommodation is reasonable ‘depends on the individual circumstances of
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each case, and requires a fact-specific, individualized analysis of the disabled individual’s
circumstances and the [potential] accommodations.’” Dunlap v. Liberty Nat. Prods., Inc.,
878 F.3d 794, 799 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 1090, 1098
(9th Cir. 2010)). While reassignment to a vacant position may be a form of reasonable
accommodation, see 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii),
“[r]eassignment is a last resort to be utilized only if the employee cannot be reasonably
accommodated in his or her existing job,” Ransom v. State of Arizona Bd. of Regents, 983
F. Supp. 895, 900–01 (D. Ariz. 1997) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)).
From the start of the accommodation process on December 15, 2021, Robbins
requested to stay in his role as a corrections sergeant and specifically requested to work at
headquarters. (PSOF ¶ 82.) Robbins contends this accommodation would have allowed
him to maintain his sergeant status, pay, and pension benefits. (Id.; see Doc. 50-37 at 3.)
During the accommodation period, Robbins identified two corrections sergeant positions
that became available at headquarters: the body worn camera position in either “late
2021/early 2022” and the personnel position in February 2022.4 (DSOF ¶¶ 28, 48–49;
PSOF ¶¶ 92, 98.) Despite Robbins’s specific request and these arguably available positions,
no evidence exists that Pima County meaningfully considered Robbins for these positions.
Instead, it appears Pima County rejected reassigning Robbins to a corrections sergeant
position and only considered reassigning him to different and lesser paying positions.
While Pima County asserts that no corrections sergeant positions were “open” at the
beginning of the interactive process, employers are under a “continuing duty” to determine
reasonable accommodation. Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass’n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2001). Further, as the Ninth Circuit established, “in considering reassignment as a
reasonable accommodation, an employer must consider not only those contemporaneously
available positions but also those that will become available within a reasonable period.”
Dark, 451 F.3d at 1089–90.
It is undisputed that Pima County filled two corrections sergeant positions at
4 As noted above, while Pima County argues these positions were never vacant, the Court
construes this disputed fact in the light most favorable to Robbins.
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headquarters during Robbins’s accommodation period. Robbins’s allegation that Pima
County failed to consider him for these positions raises a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether Pima County engaged in good faith in the interactive process. Id. at 1082 n.2,
1090 n.7 (explaining that although a “nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials in the pleadings,” a plaintiff’s allegation that positions became
available sometime within a five-month period after his termination did not require “any
greater specificity” to raise a genuine issue of material fact (first citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e); then citing McGregor v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 187 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir.
1999))).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Robbins, a genuine issue of
material fact exists concerning whether Pima County meaningfully engaged in the
interactive process and considered Robbins’s individualized request for accommodation.
As such, summary judgment is precluded as to Robbins’s failure to accommodate claims.
See Anthony, 955 F.3d at 1134 (“[A]n employer cannot prevail at the summary judgment
stage if there is a genuine dispute as to whether the employer engaged in good faith in the
interactive process.” (quoting Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000)
(en banc), vacated on other grounds sub nom. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391
(2002))).
b. Pima County did not deprive Robbins of a protected interest when he
voluntarily resigned from his position.
Lastly, Robbins objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that he was not
constructively discharged in violation of the Due Process Clause. (Doc. 61 at 8–10.)
Robbins contends that the Magistrate Judge improperly resolved the “fact-intensive”
constructive discharge analysis as a matter of law. (Id. at 9.) He asserts that “[w]here the
record supports competing inferences about whether conditions were intolerable and
whether resignation was compelled, constructive discharge is typically a jury question.”
(Id.) As support for his “intolerable conditions,” Robbins offers “[c]ircumstantial evidence
that [he] reasonably believed his continued employment path was being foreclosed,”
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“[a]ccommodation-process missteps,” and “loss of pension.” (Id. at 10.)
The Due Process Clause establishes that an employee’s “constructive discharge”
may deprive him of a protected interest in his continued employment where the employee
“resigned due to intolerable working conditions” or “coercion.” See Knappenberger v. City
of Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 940 (9th Cir. 2009). “Under the constructive discharge doctrine,
an employee’s reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is
assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes. The inquiry is objective: Did
working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee’s
position would have felt compelled to resign?” Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184
(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Penn. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004) (citation
omitted)).
Here, Robbins presents no evidence that a reasonable jury would find his new
position intolerable or that Pima County coerced his resignation. On the contrary, the
evidence shows Robbins negotiated and was granted a more-competitive starting pay,
communicated he was pleased to be working with Doreen Press, frequently stopped by his
supervisor’s office to talk, and thanked his supervisors in his resignation email. (DSOF ¶¶
36–37, 40–43.) The undisputed facts do not support the conclusion that Robbins was
constructively discharged. Accordingly, Pima County is entitled to summary judgment
because a reasonable jury could not find that Robbins is entitled to a favorable verdict on
his due process claim. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court has reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (Doc. 60), Robbins’s
Objections (Doc. 61), Pima County’s Response (Doc. 64), Pima County’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and Statement of Facts (Docs. 49–50), Robbins’s Response and
Controverting Statement of Facts (Docs. 53–54), Pima County’s Reply (Doc. 57),
Robbins’s Complaint (Doc. 1), and Pima County’s Answer (Doc. 10). Upon a de novo
review of the objected to portions of the R&R, and clear error review of the unopposed
portions, the Court adopts the R&R in part and rejects it in part.
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED IN PART
AND REJECTED IN PART. (Doc. 60.)
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Pima County’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. (Doc. 49.) Robbins’s Equal
Protection and Due Process claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claims III and IV) are
DISMISSED.
Dated this 31st day of March, 2026.
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