USA v. Page et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Alexander Carvail Coleman,
Defendant.
No. CR-21-02605-002-TUC-RM (MAA)
ORDER
On March 20, 2025, Defendant Alexander Coleman filed a pro se Motion to Clarify
(Doc. 165), requesting explanation regarding the calculation of his state and federal
sentences and time credits. On July 17, 2025, the Court ordered Philip Kimble, the attorney
who represented Defendant in the above-captioned criminal proceedings, to confer with
Defendant and thereafter file a notice averring that Defendant’s questions had been
resolved, or in the alternative file a notice outlining any remaining issues concerning the
calculation of Defendant’s sentence. (Doc. 167.) On August 15, 2025, Mr. Kimble filed a
Notice as ordered, in which he explains that he believes: Defendant’s Motion to Clarify is
not moot; legitimate issues exist regarding Defendant’s sentence; and the Court should
issue an amended judgment in this case. (Doc. 168.) The Court has reviewed the law and
the record and concludes that Defendant’s sentence in this matter was properly imposed,
and that issuance of an amended judgment is not appropriate. Therefore, the Court will
grant Defendant’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 165) insofar as this Order explains the
calculation of his state and federal sentences, but will not grant any other relief at this time.
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I. Background
The above-captioned criminal matter was initiated on October 6, 2021, when an
indictment was filed against Defendant. (Doc. 1.) Defendant was charged with making a
false statement in connection with the purchase of a firearm and possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, with the charged conduct taking place between January 22, 2019, and
September 25, 2019. (Id.) After being arrested pursuant to a federal warrant on October 25,
2021, Defendant was released the next day on his own recognizance. (Doc. 149 at 4.) On
April 13, 2023, while this case was still pending, Defendant was arrested on unrelated state
charges of possession of a weapon by a prohibited person and discharging a firearm within
city limits, with the charged conduct taking place on February 11, 2023. (Doc. 104.) After
his arrest on the state charges, Defendant remained detained at the Pima County Adult
Detention Center. (Doc. 149 at 4.)
On July 31, 2023, this Court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum,
ordering that the Defendant be produced for an appearance in this Court for a change of
plea hearing. (Doc. 135.) On August 15, 2023, the Defendant was so produced, and pled
guilty to the federal charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. (Doc. 139.) The
Court ordered that Defendant be detained pending further proceedings, and Defendant
remained in federal custody until December 6, 2023, when he was sentenced by this Court
to 30 months imprisonment on the federal charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon. (Doc. 153.) After the sentencing on December 6, 2023, Defendant was immediately
transferred back to the custody of the state to await sentencing on the pending state charges.
(Doc. 165 at 1.) On March 1, 2024, the state court sentenced Defendant to 1.5 years
imprisonment, and ordered that its sentence run concurrently to the term of imprisonment
imposed in this federal criminal case. (Doc. 168-1 at 2.) Defendant began serving the
sentence imposed by the state court in state prison immediately thereafter. (Doc. 168-1.)
On July 24, 2024, Defendant completed his state sentence, was released from state
prison, and was immediately transferred to federal custody to begin serving the term of
imprisonment imposed by this Court. (Doc. 165 at 1.) Defendant avers that, in speaking to
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his case manager upon his arrival in federal custody, he discovered that he had only two
days credited to his federal sentence, but it had been his belief that the time he had just
finished serving in state prison would be credited to his federal sentence. (Id.)
In Defendant’s counsel’s August 15, 2025 Notice to the Court, counsel explains that
it is his belief that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) erred by not deeming Defendant’s federal
sentence to have started on December 6, 2023, the date of Defendant’s federal sentencing.
(Doc. 168 at 3.) Defendant’s counsel further argues that it was in error for the BOP to fail
to credit the presentence time Defendant spent in federal custody between August 15, 2023
and December 6, 2023 toward his federal sentence. (Id. at 4.) Finally, Defendant’s counsel
suggests that this Court issue an amended judgment in this matter ordering that the sentence
imposed in this case be concurrent with Defendant’s state term of imprisonment in order
to, in counsel’s view, more accurately reflect what was “intended by the sentencing
judges.” (Id. at 5.) The Court will address each of these issues in turn.
II. Discussion
a. Start Date of Federal Sentence
Counsel argues that Defendant’s federal sentence should have commenced on
December 6, 2023, the date that Defendant was sentenced by this Court. (Doc. 168 at 3.)
“A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is
received in custody waiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service
of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served.” 18
U.S.C. § 3585(a). A defendant is only in “custody” for the purposes of § 3585(a) when the
federal government has both physical custody and primary jurisdiction over him. Johnson
v. Gill, 883 F.3d 756, 761 (9th Cir. 2018). The first sovereign to arrest a defendant has
primary jurisdiction. Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1991). When a
defendant is released on his own recognizance, however, the sovereign that executed the
arrest cedes primary jurisdiction, and if the defendant is subsequently arrested by another
sovereign, it is that sovereign which obtains primary jurisdiction. Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d
440, 444 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by Setser v. United States, 566 U.S.
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231 (2012). In Taylor, the court held that the federal government ceded primary jurisdiction
over a defendant when it released him on his own recognizance, and the state government
obtained primary jurisdiction over him when it subsequently arrested him on other charges.
Id.
Where a sovereign relinquishes physical custody of a defendant pursuant to a writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, it does not cede primary jurisdiction over that
individual; he is merely “on loan” to the other government. Thomas, 923 F.2d at 1367;
Reynolds v. Thomas, 603 F.3d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010). “A ‘loan’ in this context
indicates that the sending sovereign expected the receiving sovereign to return the
defendant following that defendant’s prosecution . . . The nature of this transfer does not
relinquish primary jurisdiction over the defendant, as it merely constitutes a transfer of
‘temporary control.’” Luckenbill v. Peters, No. CV-23-02462-PHX-SRB (DMF), 2025 WL
863857 (D. Ariz. Jan. 17, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV23-02462-
PHX-SRB (DMF), 2025 WL 862141 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2025).
Since both physical custody and primary jurisdiction are required before a
defendant’s federal sentence can commence, the sentence of one who appears pursuant to
a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum does not begin to run immediately upon
sentencing. Taylor, 164 F.3d at 444. In Taylor, the court held that a defendant who appeared
in federal court for sentencing pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum was
still under the primary jurisdiction of the state, and therefore “the district court did not have
authority to order [the defendant] into federal custody to commence his federal sentence.”
Id.
Here, when Defendant was arrested by the federal government on October 25, 2021
under a warrant issued in this criminal matter, the federal government acquired primary
jurisdiction over him. When Defendant was released on his own recognizance the
following day, however, the federal government ceded primary jurisdiction. When
Defendant was arrested and detained by the State on April 13, 2023, the state government
gained primary jurisdiction over him, just as in Taylor v. Reno. And next, when Defendant
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was transferred to the physical custody of the federal government from August 15, 2023,
to December 6, 2023, pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the state
government retained primary jurisdiction over him, since he was merely “on loan” to the
federal government during that time. Further illustrating that the state never ceded primary
jurisdiction to the federal government is the fact that Defendant was transferred back to the
physical custody of the state immediately after the completion of his federal sentencing.
Therefore, Defendant’s counsel’s contention that Defendant’s federal sentence
should have commenced on December 6, 2023, the date of Defendant’s federal sentencing,
is incorrect; the federal government had physical custody of Defendant, but did not have
primary jurisdiction over him on that date. As a result, this Court lacked and continues to
lack the authority to order Defendant’s federal sentence to have commenced on that date.
The Bureau of Prisons’ apparent determination that Defendant’s federal sentence
commenced on July 24, 2024—the day he completed his state sentence and was released
from state custody into federal custody—is correct.
b. Presentence Incarceration Credit
Counsel for Defendant contends that Defendant should be given presentence credit
for the time he spent in federal custody between August 15, 2023, and December 6, 2023,
when Defendant was “on loan” to the federal government pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum. (Doc. 168 at 4.) This argument is foreclosed, however, by 18
U.S.C. § 3585(b), which lists the circumstances in which a “defendant shall be given credit
. . . for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date [a] sentence commences,”
and specifically states that a defendant may only be given credit for time “that has not been
credited against another sentence.” “[W]hen it enacted § 3585(b) . . . Congress made clear
that a defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time.” United States v.
Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992); see also Kenny v. Sanders, 713 F. Supp. 2d 989, 991
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Since petitioner received credit against his state sentence for the time
he spent in custody prior to [release on parole], he is not entitled to credit against his federal
sentence for the same period of time.”).
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Here, the state court ordered that Defendant be given credit of 324 days toward his
state sentence on the conviction of possession of a weapon by a prohibited person. (Doc.
168-1 at 2.) This appears to reflect the entire time Defendant spent in custody between his
arrest by the state on April 13, 2023, and his state sentencing on March 1, 2024,
encompassing the period between August 15, 2023, and December 6, 2023, when
Defendant was in the physical custody of the federal government. Since that period of
presentence incarceration was credited toward Defendant’s state sentence, § 3585(b)
prohibits it from also being credited toward Defendant’s federal sentence.
c. State Court Pronouncement of Concurrent Sentence
Counsel for Defendant further argues that the state court’s order that the sentence it
imposed on March 1, 2024, be concurrent to Defendant’s previously imposed federal
sentence means that the federal sentence should be modified to conform to this decision.
(Id.)
Under federal statute “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times
run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.” 18
U.S.C.A. § 3584(a). Where a federal court imposes a sentence that is silent with respect to
whether it should run concurrently with any future state sentence, the statutory default
requires that the federal sentence be treated as consecutive to the state sentence, which was
necessarily imposed at a different time. See Setser, 566 U.S. at 238 n.3; Aragon v. Ricolcol,
No. CV 24-0247 GW (AS), 2025 WL 602177 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2025) (collecting
cases), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 24-00247-GW(AS), 2025 WL
833073 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2025), aff’d, No. 25-2676, 2025 WL 2985903 (9th Cir. Oct.
17, 2025).
Additionally, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines state that “[i]f . . . a state term of
imprisonment is anticipated to result from another offense that is relevant conduct to the
instant offense of conviction . . . the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to
run concurrently to the anticipated term of imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (emphasis
added). But a concurrent sentence is not appropriate pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) when
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the conduct giving rise to the respective state and federal offenses is unrelated. See United
States v. Chandler, No. 210CR00482GMNPAL1, 2023 WL 1110565 at *5 (D. Nev. Jan.
30, 2023).
Here, since the federal sentence imposed by this Court was silent with respect to
whether it would run concurrently with any future state sentence (Doc. 156), the statutory
default under § 3584(a) requires that Defendant’s federal sentence be treated as consecutive
to his state sentence. And in addition, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) did not support imposing a
federal sentence concurrent to Defendant’s anticipated state sentence, because the offense
for which Defendant was charged by the state was not “relevant conduct” to his federal
offense. The indictment that initiated this criminal case arose out of conduct taking place
between January 22, 2019, and September 25, 2019 (Doc. 1) whereas the conduct for which
Defendant was charged by the state took place years later, on February 11, 2023 (Doc.
104). Although both were firearms-based offenses, there is no evidence suggesting that the
crimes were part of any unified course of conduct. Indeed, the Presentence Report issued
in this case specifies that Defendant’s April 13, 2023 arrest was on “unrelated state
charges.” (Doc. 149) (emphasis added).)
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 165) is granted,
insofar as this Order explains the calculation of Defendant’s state and federal sentences.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within thirty (30) days of the date this Order
is filed, CJA Attorney Philip Kimble shall—
1. Transmit to Defendant Alexander Carvail Coleman a copy of this Order; and
2. File a Notice confirming that Defendant Alexander Carvail Coleman has been
transmitted a copy of this Order.
Dated this 14th day of November, 2025.
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