Poulsen v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Jason Edward Poulsen,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner 	of 	Social 	Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-08120-PCT-MTL
ORDER
At issue is the denial of Plaintiff Jason Edward Poulsen’s application for a period of
disability and disability insurance benefits by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”).
Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial. (Doc. 1.)
After reviewing the briefs (Docs. 16-18), and the Administrative Record (Doc. 13, “A.R.”),
the Court affirms.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. 	Procedural History
Plaintiff filed for disability insurance benefits on November 1, 2021, alleging his
disability began on March 18, 2021. (Doc. 16 at 2.) After initial and reconsideration
denials, the SSA denied his claim on February 7, 2024. (Id.) On February 13, 2025, the
SSA Appeals Council denied a request for review. (Id.) Plaintiff now asks the Court to
review the denial pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Id.)
B. 	ALJ Determination
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity
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since November 1, 2021, the application date.” (A.R. at 24.) The ALJ then determined that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “asthma, chronic pain syndrome, anxiety
disorder, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar disorder.” (Id.) The ALJ next concluded that
Plaintiff did “not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or
medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404.” (Id. at
26.) The ALJ then determined that Plaintiff had the following residual functional capacity
(“RFC”):
to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b), but he can never
climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and he can only occasionally balance,
stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps or stairs. He is limited to
occasional exposure to vibrations, to extreme cold, and to concentrated dusts,
fumes, odors, gases, poor ventilation, and other pulmonary irritants. He also
must 	avoid 	all 	exposure 	to 	hazards 	such 	as 	unprotected 	heights 	and
dangerous moving machinery. He is able to understand, remember, and carry
out simple instructions, and he has the concentration, persistence and pace to
perform simple and routine tasks. He is unable to perform fast-paced
production rate pace-work (i.e. assembly line work), but can perform goal-
oriented work. The claimant is limited to occasional interaction with the
public, coworkers and supervisors, with no tandem tasks. He is limited to
simple work-related decisions and only occasional changes within a routine
work setting. In addition, he will be off task up to 10 percent of the workday
in addition to regular breaks while remaining at the workstation.
(Id. at 29.)
The ALJ found that while Plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work, he
could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy due to his age,
education, work experience, and RFC. (Id. at 36-37.) Examples of such jobs include
housekeeper, hand packager, and sales attendant. (Id. at 37.) Accordingly, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged onset date through the date of
the decision. (Id. at 38.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the ALJ’s
decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set
aside the ALJ’s determination only if it is unsupported by substantial evidence or if it is
based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence
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is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion considering the entire record. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence
supports a decision, the Court must consider the entire record and may not affirm simply
by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). Generally,
“[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which
supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart,
278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). The substantial evidence threshold “defers to the
presiding ALJ, who has seen the hearing up close.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 108
(2019); see also Thomas v. CalPortland Co., 993 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting
substantial evidence “is an extremely deferential standard”).
To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the ALJ follows a five-step process.
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four
steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d
1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is
presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). If so,
the claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If the claimant is not working in a
substantially gainful activity, then the claimant’s case proceeds to step two. Id. At step two,
the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical
or mental impairment. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). If not, the claimant is not disabled, and
the inquiry ends. Id. If the claimant’s impairment is severe, then the inquiry proceeds to
step three. See id. At step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or
combination of impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix
1 to Subpart P of Part 404. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically
found to be disabled. Id. If not, then the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC to determine
whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work before moving to
step four. Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e)-(f). At step four, the ALJ must determine whether the
claimant retains the RFC to perform the requirements of past relevant work. Id. If so, the
claimant is not disabled, and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and
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final step, where the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other work in
the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.
Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). If so, the claimant is not disabled; if not, the claimant is
disabled. Id.
III. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by improperly rejecting (1) the medical evidence from
Dr. Shannon Tromp, and (2) his own symptom testimony. (Doc. 16 at 10-21.) The Court
considers each claim in turn.
A. 	Medical Evidence
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to provide a rational explanation supported by
substantial evidence as to why the assessment from Dr. Tromp was unpersuasive, and the
ALJ failed to explain the ALJ’s evaluation of the supportability and consistency factors
with support from substantial evidence.” (Id. at 15-16.)
Dr. Tromp examined Plaintiff on July 6, 2022 and opined that he “would likely have
trouble with more detailed instructions” and would “likely have trouble with concentration
and persistence in a competitive workplace.” (A.R. at 561.) She further opined that “he
would be impaired in interacting with the public, peers, and supervisors” and would have
trouble adapting to change or stress. (Id.) Ultimately, the ALJ found Dr. Tromp’s opinion
“partially persuasive.” (Id. at 35.)
An ALJ must assess all the medical evidence when formulating a claimant’s RFC.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). RFC is an administrative, not medical, finding concerning a
claimant’s ability to work. Id. § 404.1546. In examining medical evidence, an ALJ must
articulate how persuasive he or she finds all the medical opinions from each doctor or other
source. Kitchen v. Kijakazi, 82 F.4th 732, 739 (9th Cir. 2023). Under the revised regulations
applicable here,* supportability and consistency are the “most important” factors for an
ALJ 	to 	consider 	in 	this 	analysis. 	Woods, 	32 	F.4th 	at 	791 	(quoting 	20 	C.F.R.
* Plaintiff filed his benefits application after March 27, 2017, so the revised SSA
regulations govern how the ALJ evaluates and considers medical opinions. Woods v.
Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 790 (9th Cir. 2022).
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§ 404.1520c(a)). Supportability means the extent to which a medical source supports the
medical opinion by explaining the relevant objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(c)(1). Consistency measures how a medical source compares with others;
“[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is
with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the
more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.”
Id. § 404.1520c(c)(2). “[A]n ALJ need only provide ‘an explanation supported by
substantial evidence,’” not account for every possibility. See Kitchen, 82 F.4th at 740
(quoting Woods, 32 F.4th at 792).
The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr.
Tromp’s opinion. In addressing consistency, the ALJ explained that although Dr. Tromp
observed symptoms such as poor memory, confusion, and decreased intellectual capacity,
Plaintiff at “other times showed largely intact mental functioning including appropriate
cognition, language, abstract reasoning, and fund of knowledge, as well as average
intelligence.” (A.R. at 27.) In addition, the ALJ believed Dr. Tromp’s assessments of these
difficulties were vague and did not specify how they would limit Plaintiff in the workplace.
(Id. at 35.) Based on a review of the overall record, the ALJ found that Plaintiff only
showed moderate limitations in these areas. (Id. at 27.)
Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ had a duty to develop the record further” if he felt that
Dr. Tromp’s assessments were vague. (Doc. 16 at 14-15.) Although the ALJ may not have
addressed each part of Dr. Tromp’s opinion, the Court reviews the decision as a whole and
may look to “all the pages” of the ALJ’s decision in determining whether substantial
evidence supports the findings. Kaufmann v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022)
(emphasis in original). Read in context, the decision makes it clear that the ALJ’s decision
was supported by medical reports detailing Plaintiff’s mental functioning in direct conflict
with the opinion of Dr. Tromp. (See A.R. at 415, 783-85, 870-73.) Where, as here, the
record contains conflicting evidence but also substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s
interpretation, the Court must defer to the ALJ’s resolution of those conflicts. Matney ex
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rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992).
Therefore, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to find Dr. Tromp’s
opinion partially persuasive due to inconsistency with other medical evidence. Any alleged
deficiency in the supportability discussion would therefore be harmless. See Woods, 32
F.4th at 792-94, 793 n.4 (suggesting that even where an ALJ provides no supportability
analysis for a medical opinion, the ALJ may properly find the opinion unpersuasive so long
as there is an inconsistency finding supported by substantial evidence); Archunde v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-24-01993-PHX-JAT, 2025 WL 520534, at *6 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 18, 2025). Accordingly, the ALJ adequately explained his evaluation of Dr.
Tromp’s opinion under the applicable regulations, and substantial evidence supports his
finding that the opinion was only partially persuasive.
B. 	Symptom Testimony
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to specify which portions of his testimony
the ALJ found not credible and that the ALJ failed to provide “specific, clear, and
convincing reasons,” supported by the record, for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective
symptom testimony. (Doc. 16 at 16.) Plaintiff particularly points to his testimony regarding
his mental symptoms persisting “despite multiple medication trials.” (Id. at 19.)
In evaluating a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ applies a two-step
analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). First, “the ALJ must
determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying
impairment ‘which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
alleged.’” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v.
Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991)). If there is such objective evidence, and “no
evidence of malingering,” “the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity
of [his] symptoms only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.”
Id. (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). The question on review
is not whether the Court is convinced, but whether the ALJ’s rationale is “clear enough that
it has the power to convince.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022)
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(emphasis added). In making this determination, the ALJ may consider inconsistencies
between the claimant’s testimony and the objective medical evidence, treatment history,
and daily activities. Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014).
The 	ALJ 	found 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	“medically 	determinable 	impairments 	could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” but that Plaintiff’s “statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [those] symptoms [were] not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (A.R.
at 30.)
Because the ALJ made no finding of malingering, the question is whether he
articulated specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.
The ALJ did so. He explained that Plaintiff’s “mental health conditions have remained
largely stable and well-managed during the relevant period.” (Id.) The ALJ further
reasoned that Plaintiff’s record indicated inconsistencies with anxiety and depression
symptoms, improvement in functioning with medication, overall intermittent symptoms,
and lack of overwhelming impairments. (Id. at 31.) These are recognized bases for
discounting subjective symptom testimony. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959 (holding that
inconsistencies between subjective complaints and objective medical evidence is a clear
and convincing reason for discounting claimant’s testimony); Wellington v. Berryhill, 878
F.3d 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]vidence of medical treatment successfully relieving
symptoms can undermine a claim of disability.”).
There is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s reasoning. Although Plaintiff
testified of disabling mental health struggles, the record indicates that Plaintiff has
experienced a largely stable mood overall. (See, e.g., A.R. at 414, 556, 1154, 1638.)
Plaintiff has also denied anxiety and depression symptoms several times. (See A.R. at 524,
526, 528.) The record further shows examples of Plaintiff claiming functional improvement
with medication without side effects. (See, e.g., A.R. at 415, 566, 569, 1135.)
Finally, Plaintiff often demonstrated mostly normal functioning with his cognition,
attitude, memory, concentration, and other tracked areas of function, demonstrating a lack
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of overwhelming impairments. (See, e.g., A.R. at 415-16, 612-14, 782-85, 994-96.) Viewed
as a whole, the ALJ adequately identified which aspects of Plaintiff’s testimony were
inconsistent with the record and provided clear and convincing reasons, supported by
substantial evidence, for discounting his subjective symptom allegations.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s decision.
IT IS ORDERED affirming the ALJ’s decision (A.R. at 22-38).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter final judgment
consistent with this Order and close this case.
Dated this 15th day of June, 2026.
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