Gardner v. Bullhead City, City of et al

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WO JDN
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Dale Gardner,
Plaintiff,
vs.
City of Bullhead City, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-23-08078-PCT-GMS (CDB)
ORDER
Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendants Tempe Emergency Physicians,
Micheal Treiman, and Andrea Vasquez’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 142); (2)
Defendants Bullhead City Police Department, Bullhead City, Estrellita Sandoval, and Sean
Watson’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 144); (3) Defendant Bullhead City Hospital
Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 145); and (4) Defendants Bullhead
City Police Department, Bullhead City, Estrellita Sandoval, and Sean Watson’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 147).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants Tempe Emergency
Physicians Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 142), and Defendant Bullhead City
Hospital Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 145), grants in part and
denies in part Defendants Bullhead City, Bullhead City Police Department1, Watson, and
1 The parties agree that Bullhead City Police Department is not a proper Defendant. To
clear up any confusion and to correct the docket in this matter, which lists Bullhead City
Police Department as a Defendant, the Court will grant the request to dismiss Bullhead
City Police Department as a Defendant.
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Sandoval’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc 147), and denies the Motion in Limine
(Doc. 144) without prejudice.
I. Background2
On May 12, 2022, just before 11:00 a.m., the Las Vegas Metro Police Department
responded to a 9-1-1 call reporting that a “male looks distraught and looks like he is going
to jump” from the Laughlin bridge. (Doc. 161-1 at 2.) The Plaintiff’s Decedent, Jesse
Gardner, threw his belongings into the river, and then he jumped off the bridge. (Id. at 3;
Doc. 161-1 at 2.)
Las Vegas Metro Police Officer Jeter reported that a male was swimming over to
the dock. (Doc. 161 at 15 ¶ 6; Doc. 161-1 at 2.) Jesse swam over towards Jeter and got
out of the water; Jesse told Officer Jeter that he was just cliff jumping. (Doc. 161 at 15
¶ 6; Doc. 161-1 at 3.) Jesse was cooperating and sitting on the ground when, after a few
minutes, he suddenly stood up, ran down the dock, stated that the world would be better
without him, and jumped in the water. (Doc. 161 at 15 ¶ 8; Doc. 161-1 at 3; Doc. 161-1 at
15, Jeter Dep. 32:7–18.) Officer Jeter reported that Jesse was making no effort to swim
and was floating down the river. (Doc. 161-1 at 3.)
A Clark County Fire Department Boat arrived on the scene; however, Jesse refused
to get into the boat and said he would fight with anyone attempting a rescue. (Doc. 161 at
15 ¶ 9; Doc. 161-1 at 11, Jeter Dep. 16: 21–17:1; Doc. 161-1 at 3.) Jesse refused to grab
hold of a catch pole that Officer Jeter, who was in the boat, was holding out for him and
Jesse refused to grab a floating device. (Doc. 161-1 at 12, Jeter Dep. 18:9–15, 18:22–25.)
Eventually, Jesse stopped trying to come up and stay above water. (Id. 18:5–8.) Officer
2 In this case, there is video footage of the incidents giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims. (See
Doc. 152, Exs. 4–15, Videos.) The Court considers the facts in the light depicted by the
videos but still draws all inferences from the videos in Plaintiff’s favor. See Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (a court may properly consider video evidence in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment and should view the facts “in the light depicted by the
videotape”); Williams v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 2:13-CV-1340-GMN-NJK,
2016 WL 1169447, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 22, 2016) (“[t]he existence of the video does not
change the usual rules of summary judgment: in general, the court will draw all reasonable
inferences from the video in plaintiff’s favor”) (citing Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485
F.3d 463, 468 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007)).
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Jeter was finally able to get hold of Jesse, and he cuffed Jesse’s wrist to secure him to the
boat. (Id. 18:18–21, 19:13–23.) Officer Jeter and boat personnel were unable to get Jesse
into the boat because he was “pretty much dead weight,” so the boat went into shallow
water where two other officers walked into the water, uncuffed Jesse, and walked him to
shore. (Id. 20:3–21:2.)
Officer Jeter filled out a Police Department form titled “Application for Emergency
Admission of a Person in a Mental Health Crisis to a Mental Health Facility or Hospital,”
which is referred to as an “L2K.” (Doc. 161 at 16 ¶ 17; Doc. 161-3 at 91.) This form
authorizes police officers to transport an individual for mental evaluation. (Doc. 161-1 at
13, Jeter Dep. 23:18–23.) On the L2K form, Officer Jeter checked a box indicating that
Jesse attempted suicide, and he wrote that Jesse had been released from prison four days
prior, that he jumped into the river from the Laughlin Bullhead City Bridge, and that “Jesse
mentioned that he had nothing to live for and he wanted to die. Jesse refused all help from
rescue and LVMPD until he was to[o] tired to swim away.” (Doc. 161-3 at 91.)
Jesse was transported by an American Medical Response ambulance to WARMC—
Western Arizona Medical Center. (Doc. 161 at 16 ¶ 14.) Ambulance personnel
documented that Jesse was on an “involuntary” psychiatric hold. (Doc. 161-3 at 89.)
Ambulance personnel also completed a Patient Care Report form documenting that upon
their arrival to the scene, Jesse was restrained to a gurney, “pt [patient] jumped in river and
tried to hurt himself . . . pt sts [states] he is off his meds and jumped in river to drown . . .
pt taken out of truck and wheeled into hospital . . . was ambulatory to ER bed . . . report
given to RN [registered nurse].” (Id. at 87.)
Jesse arrived at the emergency department around 1:00 p.m. (Doc. 161-1 at 28.)
Jesse first saw a nurse, who documented that emergency service personnel stated Jesse was
suicidal, but Jesse denied suicidal ideation. (Doc. 155-1 at 31.) The nurse noted Jesse’s
report that he was bi-polar, that he had been up for five days, and that he went into the
water to help him sleep. (Id.) The nurse noted that a Metro police officer said he heard
Jesse say he didn’t think the world would miss him. (Id.) Jesse informed the nurse that he
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was on speed. (Id.) The nurse assessed Jesse at “ESI [emergency severity index] Level
2,” which is the second highest risk category—or “second worst level”—in the ESI system.
(Doc. 155 ¶¶ 26–27; Doc. 155-1 at 31; Doc. 155-1 at 62, Treiman Dep. 74:21–75:9.)
At this time, an assessment called the “Columbia Suicide Risk Assessment” was
conducted. (Doc. 155-1 at 31.) This assessment consists of three questions: (1) have you
wished you were dead or could go to sleep and never wake up; (2) have you actually had
any thoughts of killing yourself; and (3) have you ever done anything, started to do
anything, or prepared to do anything to end your life. (Id.) The nurse documented that
Jesse answered “no” to each question; however, the nurse documented:
Highest Assessed Suicide Risk Level: High risk for suicide. Provider
notified; Michael Treiman MD Other High Risk interventions applied; pt
present in only underwear pt w/o other clothing pt waiting in hall at nurses
station d/t [due to] overcrowding of ed.
(Id.)3
Jesse was treated by Defendant Dr. Treiman, who noted on the “ED Physician
Documentation” form that he medically screened Jesse from 1:02 to 1:09 p.m. (Doc. 161-
1 at 28.) Dr. Treiman testified that he had a conversation with Jesse in the hallway where
Jesse was sitting in a gurney. (Doc. 155-1 at 47, Treiman Dep 15:12–14.) Dr. Treiman
also testified that, from the time he interviewed Jesse, he made the judgment that Jesse was
not suicidal but that he would likely benefit from drug and alcohol treatment, which he
offered, and Jesse accepted. (Id. at 45, Treiman Dep. 9:9–13.) Dr. Treiman then instructed
his secretary to try to find a placement for Jesse. (Id. 9:12–13.)
At 2:00 p.m., a nurse noted that Jesse received a snack, tolerated a blood draw well,
and agreed to go to Talus Harbor Psyche Facility, although Jesse still denied suicidal
ideation. (Doc. 155-1 at 32.)
At 3:06 p.m., Defendant Dr. Treiman ordered a drug screen and labs. (Doc. 155-1
at 28.) At 3:29 p.m., Dr. Treiman documented that Jesse presented to the emergency
3 There is no indication in the medical records of what “Other High Risk
interventions” were applied or the results of those interventions.
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department with depression and that his prior diagnoses included bipolar disorder and
depression. (Id. at 27.) Dr. Treiman also documented the following:
35 Y/O MALE WITH PMHX [past medical history] OF BIPOLAR
DISORDER PRESENTS TO THE ED VIA EMS WITH C/O [complaints
of] DEPRESSION. PT WAS USING METH TODAY AND JUMPED
INTO THE RIVER. THE POLICE W[ERE] THERE AND PT WAS
PULLED OUT. PT TOLD THE POLICE THAT HE WAS SICK OF
LIVING AND WAS BROUGHT TO THE ED. PT STATES THAT HE
HAS SUICIDAL IDEATION BUT WOULD NOT COMMIT SUICIDE.
(Id.) At 3:30 p.m., Dr. Treiman documented the results of an exam, which included
examination of Jesse’s abdomen, where he had a tattoo memorializing his sister with the
date of her death—May 12—the same date of Dr. Treiman’s exam. (Id.) Another blood
draw was done and sent to the lab per Dr. Treiman’s order. (Id. at 33.)
At 6:21 p.m., a nurse noted that Jesse was in no acute distress, he was moved to a
private room, and he was given a portable phone. (Id.) Jesse was also provided a “sitter”
when he was moved to a private room; sitters are employed by the hospital to watch patients
who are deemed unsafe, and they watch patients to make sure they don’t harm themselves.
(Doc. 155 at 20 ¶¶ 63–64; Doc. 155-1 at 53, Treiman Dep. 40:6–8, 101:15–16; see Doc.
155-1 at 33 (med. records referring to the sitter’s reports).)
At 7:10 p.m., the sitter reported on a walkie talkie that Jesse exited his room and
was in the hall. (Doc. 155-1 at 33.) Jesse later explained to Defendant Officer Watson that
he had been asleep but then woke up and was paranoid; he did not have any clothes, he
started panicking, and he wanted to leave. (Doc. 161-3 at 108; Doc. 152, Ex. 4, Video
13:55–14:4.) A nurse documented that she approached Jesse and asked where he was going
and tried to get him back into his room or calm him down, but Jesse headed towards the
door. (Doc. 155-1 at 33.) Security personnel and other nurses tried to talk to Jesse, but he
became more anxious and started to head toward another door to exit, since the first door
was for ambulances and would not open. (Id.) Jesse panicked as nurses circled him and
then he allegedly shoved a medical tech who stood in front of him when he went towards
an emergency exit door, causing a minor scratch on her arm. (Id.; Doc. 161-3 at 108; Doc.
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152, Ex. 4 Video 29:55–30:00, 30:43–31:36). Nurses and security personnel then eased
Jesse to the floor to secure him, and the police were called. (Doc. 155-1 at 33.)
Around 7:18 p.m., Defendant Officer Watson arrived at the hospital. (Doc. 152, Ex.
4, Video 4:48–4:55.) Jesse, who was wearing only boxer shorts, was lying face down on
the floor in front of an exit door with three hospital staff securing him; Officer Watson
handcuffed Jesse, and he and a staff member helped Jesse up and walked him to a chair in
the hallway. (Id. 5:00–6:15.)
Defendant Officer Watson had his body cam on, and the video footage shows that
Watson stayed with Jesse in the hallway until approximately 8:35 p.m., when he escorted
Jesse to his truck. (Id. 6:15–1:20:00.)
Right after Jesse sat down in the chair, a nurse approached and told Officer Watson
that Jesse was found in the river, there was concern about Jesse potentially hurting himself,
and Jesse had said “the world would be better without him, that he might commit suicide.”
(Id. 7:08–7:20.)
A minute later, Defendant Dr. Treiman approached Defendant Officer Watson. (Id.
8:21.) Dr. Treiman told Officer Watson that Jesse jumped in the river, and that Jesse said
he had done meth and wanted to swim in the water to cool off. (Id. 8:35–8:48.) Dr.
Treiman stated he was about to discharge Jesse, but then Jesse said he was not suicidal,
just a little depressed, and Jesse told him, “I thought about killing myself, but I haven’t,”
and Jesse asked Dr. Treiman if he could get Jesse into rehab. (Id. 8:48–8:56.) Dr. Treiman
said he responded, “let me try,” and he told Officer Watson that he spent the last six hours
trying to get Jesse into rehab, but failed. (Id. 8:56–9:06.) Dr. Treiman then started to tell
Officer Watson what he heard about Jesse’s attempt to leave and Jesse’s abusive conduct
toward the medical tech, at which point Jesse said he did not attack the medical tech, and
Jesse asked that they watch the footage Dr. Treiman said they obtained from the hall
cameras. (Id. 9:10–9:30.) After some debate about exactly what transpired, Jesse stated
that he deals with mental health issues, he is bipolar, he has been up for five days, and he
used methamphetamine three times, so his mind was a little whacked. (Id. 10:52–11:04.)
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When Jesse made a comment that hospital staff turned on him, Dr. Treiman sharply told
him, “Look at you, you’re all scuffed up and bloody, you did it to yourself. I didn’t turn
on you, I’ve been polite. I’ve been a gentleman this whole entire time.” (Id. 11:23–11:33.)
Dr. Treiman confirmed to Officer Watson that Jesse was “clear” for discharge. (11:50–
11:54.)
The medical tech said she wanted to press charges, so Defendant Watson’s partner,
Defendant Officer Sandavol, got a statement from the medical tech and went to watch the
hospital footage of the incident. (Doc. 148 ¶ 58.) Officer Sandavol interviewed the
medical tech, who said that Jesse was in the emergency department because he went into
the river, he has psych problems, and he was brought in to be evaluated. (Doc. 152, Ex. 7,
Video 00:45–00:55.)
While Defendant Officer Watson and Jesse were in the hallway, they engaged in
conversation, and, at one point, Jesse told Officer Watson, “If they’re going to release me,
I guess I’m suicidal and I need to go to an in-patient crisis bed.” (Doc. 152, Ex. 4, Video
38:56–39:03.) Jesse later told Officer Watson, in response to Watson stating that people
can die jumping off the very top of the bridge, that “that’s where they took this the wrong
way,” and that he had been suicidal a few times this past week, but that if he would have
died in the river, “oh . . . well, I died having a blast.” (Id. 44:40–44:52.)
Defendant Officer Sandoval informed Officer Watson of the results of her interview
with the medical tech. (Id. 29:06–30:35.) Officer Watson noted that the medical tech had
no injuries, when asked if she wanted to prosecute, she said “sure,” and Jesse was trying to
leave the hospital at the time and he was entitled to leave; thus, Watson was unsure whether
an arrest was warranted, so he instructed Officer Sandavol to call the on-call county
attorney. (Id. 35:00–35:55, 36:47–36:59.) During the phone call, which occurred around
8:00 p.m., the on-call county attorney said that if there is documentation that Jesse had a
serious mental illness, like bi-polar, then they should not pursue aggravated assault. (Id.
46:35–46:46.) Officer Watson responded, “we don’t have any of that documentation
today,” and he stated that the hospital did not have documentation of a bi-polar or
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schizophrenia diagnosis. (Id. 46:46–47:06.) The county attorney and Officer Watson then
agreed to go ahead and charge Jesse. (Id. 47:07–48:42.)
Jesse’s belongings were in a bag on a chair in the hallway next to Defendant Officer
Watson. (Id. 37:29–37:31.) Officer Watson acknowledged the bag and accessed it once
to show Jesse that his rings and stuff were in the bag. (Id. 41:23–41:38.) The bag also
contained paperwork from Southwest Behavioral Health that included Jesse’s mental
health information, but neither Watson nor Sandoval looked at the information. (Doc. 161
¶¶ 69, 71.)
Defendant Officer Sandoval went to go watch the hospital video, while Officer
Watson and Jesse remained waiting in the hallway. Jesse asked Officer Watson to call his
probation officer, Melissa Hardy, because she would know about his mental health
problems; Watson asked Jesse if he knew her phone number, but he did not. (Doc. 152,
Ex. 4, Video 51:35–51:55.) But then Jesse stated he thought his probation officer’s number
was in his bag on the chair. (Id. 52:28–52:40, see id. 55:31.) Officer Watson did not check
Jesse’s bag. (See id.)
The medical records show that another Columbia Suicide Risk Assessment was
purportedly conducted at 8:09 p.m. (Doc. 155-1 at 32.) A nurse documented that Jesse
answered “yes” to the first question—have you wished you were dead or you could go to
sleep and never wake up—and “no” to the remaining questions. (Id.) The space for
documenting the assessed suicide risk level is blank. (Id.)
But the video evidence shows that, at this time, there was no risk assessment
conducted, and no hospital staff questioned Jesse about his mental health. (See Doc. 152,
Ex. 4, Video 55:00–58:00.) During the entire video of Jesse at the hospital, no such
assessment was ever done. (See id. 00:01–1:22:30.)
Finally, at 8:35 p.m., Defendant Officer Watson placed Jesse in the back of his
police truck, and they headed to Bullhead City Police Station. (Id. 1:22:30–1:24:05.)
During the drive, Jesse asked Officer Watson to take him to the crisis center, but Watson
said “no, you’re going to have to go to Kingman tonight.” (Id. 1:27:04–1:27:16.)
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At the police station, Defendant Officer Watson removed Jesse’s handcuffs, and
Jesse was booked by Watson and Sandoval. (Id. 1:35:00–1:39:00.) Jesse again asked
Officer Watson to contact his probation officer, but Watson said Jesse would see a judge.
(Id. 1:38:58–1:39:19.) Officer Watson then shared that he empathized with Jesse’s
situation because the Arizona justice system is “shit” and that the system failed his son,
who ended up committing suicide as a result. (Id. 1:39:40–1:39:59.) At one point, Jesse
asked Officer Watson to throw his jewelry and property away, but Watson explained that
they had to book it into property and Jesse could figure out what to do with it later. (Id.
1:42:11–1:42:44.) At 9:08 p.m., Officer Watson had to go out on another call, so he gave
Jesse a “blanket,” which was a paper sheet, and placed him in a holding cell. (Id. 1:55:41–
1:57:04.) Jesse still wore only his boxer shorts. (Id.) Officer Watson directed Officer
Sandoval to do cell checks until Jesse was out of there. (Id. 1:57:02–1:57:05.) Under
Bullhead City Police Department policy, monitoring checks are to be done in person every
15 minutes. (Doc. 148 ¶ 45; Doc. 161 at 8 ¶ 45; Doc. 148-1 at 82, Sandoval Dep. 41:13–
22.)
Jesse was in the holding cell for approximately 19 minutes. (Doc. 152, Ex. 11,
Video.) During this time, Jesse was swaying and pacing; he repeatedly hit himself; and he
appeared to hold a conversation—at times animated and threatening—with someone who
was not there. (See id. 9:24–11:15, 16:00–18:12.) Defendant Officer Sandoval did not
conduct any in-person cell checks while Jesse was in the holding cell. (See id., Video;
Doc. 161 ¶ 83.) Officer Sandoval periodically observed Jesse on a monitor while she
worked on her booking. (Doc. 148 ¶ 65; Doc. 161 at 10 ¶¶ 65; id. at 28 84–85.) Officer
Sandoval’s booking duties included writing out, or inventorying, all of Jesse’s property,
which included his bag with the Southwest Behavioral mental health documents. (Doc.
148-1 at 84, Sandoval Dep. 46:2–6; Doc 161 ¶ 71.) This booking paperwork had to be
completed before Jesse was transferred. (Id. 46:20–24.)
At 9:37 p.m., Transport Officer Menendez arrived and began collecting paperwork
in the booking area. (Doc. 152, Ex. 10, Video 35:48–35:60.) Officers Jiminez and Morales
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arrived to the booking area a few minutes later to shackle Jesse and escort him to the
transport van. (Id. 40:12–40:15.) Defendant Officer Sandoval told the Officers that Jesse
had been acting crazy and talking to himself. (Id. 40:12–40:30.) Officer Menendez asked,
“is he a problem?” and Sandoval responded, “yes. Well, he was.” (Id. 40:47–52.)
Menendez then stated he would call the jail and give them a heads up. (Id. 40:52–40:55.)
Officers Jiminez and Morales went to the cell to get Jesse; Jesse was docile and
cooperative, and he followed the officers’ directions while they shackled his wrists and
ankles, brought him out to the booking area, and escorted him to the transportation van.
(Id. 43:20–46:40; Doc. 148 ¶¶ 70–72, 77.) Jesse did not display any behavior or make
statements indicating that he was a danger to himself or others. (Doc. 148 ¶¶ 78–79; Doc.
161 at 12 ¶¶ 78–79.)
Transport Officer Menendez testified that, when the officers brought Jesse out to
the van, Jesse was “a little unruly . . . mouthy, threatening. That’s why I called ahead for
a welcoming committee.” (Doc. 161-5 at 23, Menendez Dep. 21:7–18.) Menendez also
testified that Jesse initially balked at entering the van, but the officers talked him into
entering the van, but he did so slowly and after unnecessarily turning different ways. (Id.
21:17–22:02.)
The video does not corroborate Menendez’s testimony. When Jesse arrived at the
back of the transportation van, he remained docile and cooperative as he stepped up and
crouched down to back up into the back compartment of the van, without any turning or
talking. (Doc. 152, Ex. 15, Video 1:53–2:16.) Officers did not apply any type of seat belt;
Jesse remained in handcuffs and leg shackles with the lose chain in front of him. (Id. 2:14–
2:23.)
The transportation van did not allow for the transport officer, while driving, to
perform visual checks on Jesse while he was in the compartment at the back of the van.
(Doc. 161 at 34 ¶ 122.) Transport Officer Menendez explained that the driver cannot really
hear anything with the noise of the tires, but he was able to hear Jesse’s chains rattle, and
at one point Jesse moved toward the front of the compartment because Menendez heard
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Jesse ask that the air conditioning be turned on and the lights be turned off. (Doc. 161-5 at
24, Menendez Dep. 22:13–23:4.) Menendez testified that he then heard Jesse’s chains and
heard Jesse “scuffle along the seat,” which was the last thing he heard. (Id. 23:9–12; 24:14–
21.)
When the transportation van arrived at the Mohave County Jail, Jesse was found
unresponsive with his feet near his head. (Doc. 148 ¶ 88; Doc. 161 at 13 ¶ 88.) Jesse
appeared to be crouched down in a fetal position as if sitting on his heels, when one officer
suddenly yelled that the chain was around his neck. (Doc. 161-5 at 33, Menendez Dep.
31:19–32:12.) The receiving officers instantly pulled Jesse out of the van, put him on the
ground, and started CPR. (Id. 33:9–34:12.) Other officers called 9-1-1, the fire department
and an ambulance arrived, and about 1.5 hours later, Jesse was declared dead. (Id. 34:20–
)4Plaintiff Dale Gardner, on behalf of himself and as personal representative on behalf of
Jesse Gardner, brought this action against multiple Defendants. (Doc. 62.) Plaintiff
asserted the following claims: Fourteenth Amendment claim against Police Defendants
(Count One); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 wrongful death claim against all Bullhead City Police
Department Defendants (Count Two); Fourteenth Amendment familial relationships claim
against all Bullhead City Defendants (Count Three); state law wrongful death claim against
all Defendants (Count Four); § 1983 Monell claim against City of Bullhead and Bullhead
City Police Department (Count Five); § 1983 Monell failure to train/supervise claim
4 Bullhead City Defendants’ separately filed “Response and Objections to Plaintiff’s
Separate Statement of Additional Facts” is not permitted under the Local Rules. Hunton
v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., No. CV-16 -00539-PHX-DLR, 2018 WL 1182552, at *5 (D. Ariz.
March 7, 2018). “LRCiv 56.1(d), which permits the moving party to file a reply
memorandum, does not permit the moving party to file a separate responsive memorandum
to any additional facts in the non-moving party’s separate statement of facts.” Marceau v.
Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, 618 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1141 (D. Ariz. 2009). “Should a
moving party have any objections or replies to arguments or facts made in the Response or
its supporting statement of facts, these ‘. . . must be included in the responding party’s reply
memorandum for the underlying motion and may not be presented in a separate responsive
memorandum.’” E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., No. 06-CV-0926-PHX-SMM, 2008 WL
2509302, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 18, 2008) (quoting LRCiv. 7.2(m)(2); see Marceau, 618 F.
Supp. 2d at 1141 (“LRCiv 7.2(m)(2) requires that any response to the objection must be
included in the responding party’s reply memorandum for the underlying motion and may
not be presented in a separate responsive memorandum”) (internal quotation omitted). It,
thus, will not be considered.
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against City of Bullhead and Bullhead City Police Department (Count Six); state law gross
negligence claim against Police Defendants (Count Seven); state law malpractice claim
against Dr. Treiman (Count Eight); and state law vicarious liability claim against
WARMC, Bullhead City Hospital Corporation, and Tempe Emergency Physicians (Count
Nine). (Id. at ¶¶ 92–146.)
II. Summary Judgment Standard
A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). The
movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying
those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not
produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099,
1102–03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden then
shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact
in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248, 250 (1986); see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th
Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its
favor, First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–89 (1968); however,
it must “come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal
citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and
determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson,
477 U.S. at 249. In its analysis, the court does not make credibility determinations; it must
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believe the nonmovant’s evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Id. at
255; Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). The court need
consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
III. Medical Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 142)
A. Expert Witness Requirement Under Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-2604
Under Arizona law, in medical negligence cases, the standard of care must be
established by expert medical testimony. Id. (quoting Seisinger, 203 P.3d at 492 (citations
omitted)). Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-2604 establishes the criteria a person must meet
to be permitted to give expert testimony on the appropriate standard of care in an action
alleging medical malpractice. The statute provides:
A. In an action alleging medical malpractice, a person shall not give
expert testimony on the appropriate standard of practice or care unless the
person is licensed as a health professional in this state or another state and
the person meets the following criteria:
1. If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is
offered is or claims to be a specialist, specializes at the time of the occurrence
that is the basis for the action in the same specialty or claimed specialty as
the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered. If the
party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is or claims
to be a specialist who is board certified, the expert witness shall be a
specialist who is board certified in that specialty or claimed specialty.
2. During the year immediately preceding the occurrence giving
rise to the lawsuit, devoted a majority of the person’s professional time to
either or both of the following:
(a) The active clinical practice of the same health
profession as the defendant and, if the defendant is or claims to be a
specialist, in the same specialty or claimed specialty.
(b) The instruction of students in an accredited health
professional school or accredited residency or clinical research
program in the same health profession as the defendant and, if the
defendant is or claims to be a specialist, in an accredited health
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professional school or accredited residency or clinical research
program in the same specialty or claimed specialty.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2604; see Massara v. United States, No. CV-13-00269-TUC-BPV,
2014 WL 12527303, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 9, 2014) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2604(A)(1),
(A)(2)(a)). In his deposition Dr. Tamkin testified that, in the year prior to the May 12,
2022 incident, he spent approximately 40 hours per month in active clinical practice at
Mercy Medical Center. (Doc. 155 Ex. F, Tamkin Dep. 21:15–22.) He testified that he
spent approximately 10 hours per month training first responders and giving paramedic
training as the statewide Medical Director for the California Highway Patrol. (Id. 23:13–
21.) He also testified that he spent approximately 20 hours per month as an executive with
US Acute Care Solutions, a staffing company that staffs ERs around the country. In his
role at US Acute Care Solutions, he taught leadership development, risk management, and
provided other development training of ER professionals. (Id. 26:22–29:1.) He also
testified that he spent about 10 hours per month doing expert witness work. (Id. 29:9–11.)
Plaintiff does not show that Dr. Tamkin’s paramedic training of cadets and officers
with the California Highway Patrol meets the requirement of § 12-2604(2)(b). The
instruction of students must be “in the same health profession as the defendant.” Ariz. Rev.
Stat. § 12-2604(2)(b). Plaintiff acknowledges that Dr. Tamkin’s work with the highway
patrol is “teaching a lesser degree of medicine than is expected of ER physicians.” (Doc.
154 at 12; Doc. 155-2 at 8, Tamkin Dep. 22:14–23:6.) Thus, the hours working with the
California Highway Patrol do not count as qualifying professional time to establish Dr.
Tamkin’s eligibility as an expert in this case.
Nor does Plaintiff show that US Acute Care Solutions qualifies as “an accredited
health professional school or accredited residency or clinical research program” as required
under subsection (2)(b). Dr. Tamkin testified that he was a vice president at US Acute
Care Solutions and that his role was a management administrative position, and he
described US Acute Care Solutions as a staffing company that contracts with hospitals to
provide emergency physicians and hospitalists to work in hospitals. (Doc. 155-2 at 9,
Tamkin Dep. 26:25–27:13, 29:3–8.) Plaintiff makes no showing that this company is
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accredited, that it is a school, or that it has a residency or clinical research program. As
such, Dr. Tamkin’s hours working with US Acute Care Solutions do not count as qualifying
professional time to establish Dr. Tamkin’s eligibility as an expert in this case.
Consequently, the only hours that count as qualifying professional time are Dr.
Tamkin’s time spent in active clinical practice at Mercy Medical Center, which he testified
is approximately 40 hours per month. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 2604(2)(a). Forty hours a month
breaks down to 10 hours a week. Plaintiff’s assertion that this constituted 50% of Dr.
Tamkin’s professional time, and thus a majority of Dr. Tamkin’s professional time,
suggests that Dr. Tamkin worked part-time.
In Cutler v. County of Pima, the plaintiff maintained that his proposed expert
satisfied the requirements of § 12-2604 even where the expert worked part-time because it
still constituted the majority of the expert’s professional time. No. CV-18-00383-TUC-
JCH, 2021 WL 2685616, at *6. (D. Ariz. June 30, 2021). The plaintiff argued that “the
Arizona legislature did not set an hourly requirement to equate to a ‘majority of
professional time’ and, instead, chose to measure satisfaction of the statutory requirements
based on what an expert individually spent the majority of his or her professional time
working on.” Id. The court appeared to accept that argument but noted that, when
determining the professional time requirement, courts must consider how much time the
expert spent on both qualifying work and non-qualifying work. Id., at *7. For example, in
Zappia v. Sodhi, the proposed expert spent one day a week working as an intensive care
unit nurse and remainder of the week working as a case manager for CIGNA Healthcare
and babysitting her grandchildren. No. 1 CA-CV 18-0743, 2020 WL 1026504, at *1–2
(Ariz. Ct. App. March 3, 2020). In Hardy v. Catholic Healthcare West, the proposed expert
averred that she worked 58 hours a month, and of those 58 hours, 18 were spent engaged
in active clinical practice and the remaining 40 hours were spent teaching but not as part
of an accredited school or residency or clinical research program. No. 1 CA-CV 09-0890,
2010 WL 5059602, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2010).
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Here, Plaintiff does not present evidence of how many hours a month Dr. Tamkin
worked in the year prior to May 12, 2022, nor did Dr. Tamkin specifically testify that he
worked only part-time. Based on his testimony, 40 hours a month were spent working in
the ER and another 40 hours were spent training for the California Highway Patrol,
working at US Acute Care Solutions, and doing expert witness work. But there is no
evidence as to how Dr. Tamkin spent the remaining working hours each month and whether
he was engaged in other non-qualifying work that would render 40 hours a month in the
ER to be less than a majority of his professional time. Therefore, the record is insufficient
for the Court to determine whether Dr. Tamkin satisfies the professional time requirement
of § 12-2604(2)(b). See Cutler, 2021 WL 2685616, at *7 (because there was no evidence
as to how the proposed expert spent the entirety of his professional time in the year
preceding the subject incident, the court could not determine whether the requirements of
§ 12-2604 were met).
At any rate, Arizona Courts “consider dictionary definitions where a statute does
not define a term.” Shepherd v. Costco Wholesale Corp. 250 Ariz/ 511 ¶ 20, 482 P.3d 390
(2021); see also A.R.S. § 1-213 (“Words and phrases shall be construed according to the
common and approved use of the language.”). A majority is “the number greater than half
of any total”, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) at 1140. Thus, even assuming Dr.
Tamkin spent 50% of his professional time practicing emergency medicine at Mercy
Medical Center, that still did not amount to “a majority” Of his time.
Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to establish that Dr. Tamkin is qualified under § 12-
2604 to provide expert testimony on the standard of care in this case. Absent the required
expert testimony, Plaintiff’s medical negligence claim against Defendants Dr. Treiman,
Vasqeuz, and Tempe Emergency Physicians fails as a matter of law. See id., at *1 (if the
plaintiff’s proposed expert fails to meet the requirements of § 12-2604 governing
qualifications of expert witnesses, the plaintiff’s medical negligence claim against the
certified paramedic and his employer, Rural Metro, fails as a matter of law). Accordingly,
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the medical negligence claim against Defendant Dr. Treiman is dismissed without
prejudice.
IV. Defendant WARMC’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 145)
The Court does not reach the question of whether Dr. Treiman was an apparent agent
of WARMC because the underlying medical negligence claim against Dr. Treiman fails,
so there is nothing for which WARMC can be vicariously liable. See Ford v. Revlon, 734
P.2d 580, 584 (Ariz. 1987) (“when the master’s liability is based solely on the negligence
of his servant, a judgment in favor of the servant is a judgment in favor of the master”);
Law v. Verde Valley Med. Ctr., 170 P.3d 701, 705 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“[b]ecause the
doctors were, in the eyes of the law, adjudicated to have no liability to Plaintiff, neither did
[the hospital] have any vicarious liability to Plaintiff based on the doctors’ conduct”).
Defendant WARMC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
V. Bullhead City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 147)
A. Count One—Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Defendants
Watson and Sandoval
1. Legal Standard
“Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees
have a right to receive medical treatment while in police custody.” Hyde v. City of Willcox,
23 F.4th 863, 873 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “A heightened suicide risk or an
attempted suicide is a serious medical need[ ]” for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment right to medical treatment. Conn v. City of Reno, 591 F.3d 1081, 1095 (9th
Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. City of Reno, Nev. v. Conn, 563 U.S. 915 (2011), opinion
reinstated in relevant part, 658 F.3d 897 (9th Cir. 2011); see NeSmith v. Cnty. of San Diego,
No. 15-CV-629, 2019 WL 1326701, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2019) (“[t]he Ninth Circuit
has held that a suicide risk or an attempted suicide is a serious medical need”) (citing Conn,
591 F.3d at 1095).
Under Ninth Circuit law, “claims for violations of the right to adequate medical care
‘brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the Fourteenth
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Amendment’ must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard.”
Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Castro v.
Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016)). Under this standard, a plaintiff
must show that the denial, delay, or otherwise unreasonable course of medical care was
taken in “reckless disregard” of an excessive risk to the plaintiff’s health or safety. Id. at
1125. Unlike in the Eighth Amendment context, where a showing of subjective deliberate
indifference is required, a plaintiff need not show subjective intent. Id. at 1125.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that the objective reasonableness standard cannot
be applied “mechanically.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). Rather,
the court must examine the “facts and circumstances of each particular case” through the
lens of a reasonable officer and refrain from invoking the “20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id.
(citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
The elements of a pretrial detainee’s medical care claim against an individual
defendant are:
(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions
under which the plaintiff was confined;
(ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious
harm;
(iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate the
risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have
appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of
the defendant’s conduct obvious; and
(iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.
Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125 (quoting Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071).
2. Discussion
The “inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and
responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have
caused the constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633–34 (9th Cir.
1988). Therefore, the Court analyzes the liability of each Defendant separately.
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a. Defendant Watson
There is no dispute that Defendant Watson made the intentional decisions to arrest
Jesse, take him to the police station, and not to take Jesse to a crisis center when Jesse
asked. Thus, the first Gordon element is met. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1070 (noting that
this first element would not be satisfied only if the defendant’s conduct resulted from
something totally unintentional, such as an accident).
“[T]he ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ prong [i]s met if there was a ‘serious
medical need,’ such that a ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further
significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’” Russell v. Lumitap,
31 F.4th 729, 739 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2014)). This element is a purely objective standard and includes the “existence of an
injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or
treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s
daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Id. (quoting Colwell v.
Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014)).
Bullhead City Defendants argue that Dr. Treiman medically cleared Jesse for
custody and advised Defendant Watson that Jesse was not an imminent suicide risk, and it
was reasonable for Watson to rely on Dr. Treiman’s medical determinations. (Doc. 147 at
8.) They further argue that Jesse’s behavior and statements to Watson thereafter did not
establish any new basis for Watson to determine that Jesse was an imminent suicide risk
because Jesse did not make any statement that he would imminently harm himself or
others; therefore, this second prong is not met. (Doc. 147 at 8.)
In Response, Plaintiff relies on the expert report of David T. Sweeney, a former
Watch Commander for the Seattle Police Department with 35 years of police experience.
(Doc. 161-6 at 38.) Sweeney opines that Defendant Watson should have, but failed, to
consider facts made known to him at the hospital about Jesse; namely, that Jesse had
attempted suicide by jumping off the Laughlin Bridge, that he was at the hospital for
evaluation, that he was bi-polar and had not slept for 5 days, that he was a transient, and
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that Jesse made comments that he needed to go to an inpatient crisis facility. (Id. at 41.)
Sweeney opined that, instead of focusing on criminal charges, Defendant Watson should
have asked Jesse more questions about his background, family information, prior
hospitalizations, any medications prescribed for his mental health, and whether he intended
to kill himself. (Id. at 42.) Sweeney further opined that the proper standard of care would
have been to take Jesse to a mental health facility. (Id. at 43.)
But Defendant Watson encountered Jesse at the hospital, where medical personnel
had already evaluated Jesse. Sweeney puts the onus on nonmedical police officers to
determine Jesse’s mental health status despite a medical professional having just informed
Watson that Jesse was not a suicide risk and he could be released into custody. While a
review of the medical records and the record in this case may raise questions regarding Dr.
Treiman’s medical determination, Watson was not privy to those records and did not have
the hindsight the parties and the experts had later. Watson testified that Dr. Treiman told
him Jesse was not suicidal, and that “nothing up until the point that we left the hospital and
Dr. Treiman signed his clearance led [Dr. Treiman] to believe, as far as I’m aware, that
there was any concern.” (Doc. 148-1 at 65, Watson Dep. 94:10–24.) Watson was only
aware that Jesse had been at the hospital for many hours and was evaluated by a physician,
who determined that Jesse was not a suicide risk.
Courts, including this one, have held that non-medical personnel are entitled to rely
on the opinions and determinations of medical personnel pertaining to the medical
treatment of detainees and prisoners. Luster v Pima Cnty., No. CV-22-00519-TUC-RM,
2024 WL 4554026, at *4 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2024) (in case brought by a jail detainee,
recognizing that “[n]on-medical personnel may rely on the medical opinions of health care
professionals unless ‘they have a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison
doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner’”) (quoting McGee v.
Adams, 721 F.3d 474, 483 (7th Cir. 2013)); see Haynes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516, 518–20
(7th Cir. 2008) (explaining that lay officers are entitled to rely on the judgment of medical
professionals); Caplinger v. CCA, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1214 (D. Idaho 2014) (non-
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medical personnel are generally entitled to rely on the opinions of medical professionals
with respect to medical treatment of an inmate); Barber v. Santa Barbara Cnty., No. CV
11-2365-DMG (MLG), 2011 WL 6951838, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011) (no deliberate
indifference where non-medical officers relied upon the judgments of the examing
physicians). “This remains true even when an inmate is in obvious distress and even when
the medical staff has misdiagnosed an inmate—or worse, accused him of faking a very real
illness.” McGee v. Parsano, 55 F.4th 563, 573 (7th Cir. 2022). But nonmedical officers
may be found deliberately indifferent if “they have a reason to believe (or actual
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a
prisoner.” King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see
Luster, 2024 WL 4554026, at *4.
Because Defendant Watson was entitled to rely on Dr. Treiman’s medical
determination that Jesse was not a suicide risk, Plaintiff cannot meet the substantial risk of
serious harm prong. Jesse’s comments to Watson—that he had been suicidal a few times
that week, that he guessed he was suicidal and needed to go to an inpatient facility, and his
request to be taken to a crisis center—are not enough to overcome Watson’s reasonable
reliance on Dr. Treiman’s determination that Jesse was not suicidal. See Collins v. Seeman,
462 F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2006) (because inmates request to see crisis counselors for a
variety of reasons, including to manipulate staff, “a request to see a crisis counselor,
standing alone, is not sufficient to put a defendant on notice that an inmate poses a
substantial and imminent risk of suicide”). Waston had no reason to believe that Dr.
Treiman and medical personnel at the hospital were mistreating or not treating Jesse.
Further, during the majority of Watson’s time with Jesse, Jesse was conversational andmild
mannered. (Doc. 152, Ex. 4, Video 53:00–53:45.) As a non-medical officer who was just
informed by a medical professional that Jesse was not a suicide risk, Watson was not
expected to determine from Jesse’s statements and demeanor that he was at a substantial
risk for suicide and override Dr. Treiman’s determination, nor was he constitutionally
obligated to do so. See McGee, 55 F.4th at 573 (“officers are not constitutionally obligated
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to override the judgment of medical professionals”); see also Gray v. City of Detroit, 399
F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[s]uicide is a difficult event to predict and prevent and often
occurs without warning. Both the common law and recently developed constitutional law
applying to those in custody have taken this uncertainty into account”); Domino v. Texas
Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[s]uicide is inherently
difficult for anyone to predict, particularly in the depressing prison setting”).
Based on the above, Officer Watson cannot be liable under the Fourteenth
Amendment, and Bullhead City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted as
to the claim in Count One against Watson.
b. Defendant Sandoval
There is no dispute that Defendant Sandoval made the intentional decisions to take
no extra or special action in response to Jesse’s conduct in the holding cell and to make no
mention to the transport officer that Jesse had jumped off the Laughlin Bridge earlier that
day.
The substantial risk of serious harm prong examines whether Jesse’s conduct in the
holding cell put Defendant Sandoval on notice of a substantial risk of suicide. Plaintiff’s
expert, Sweeney, opined that any officer observing Jesse’s conduct—hitting himself in the
head, talking to the wall and bench, shouting and gesturing—should have realized that
these behaviors, combined with Jesse’s prior report to Defendant Officers that he was bi-
polar, paranoid, and depressed, established a need to get Jesse mental health help rather
than book him into jail. (Doc. 161-6 at 45.)
As discussed above, Sandoval was entitled to rely on Dr. Treiman’s medical
determination that Jesse was not a suicide risk. The fact that, following Dr. Treiman’s
determination, Jesse was talking to himself, hitting himself, doing pushups, and acting
erratically is not enough to provide notice of a substantial risk of suicide. See Jackson v.
West, 787 F.3d 1345, 1354 (11th Cir. 2015) (“‘[a]nti-social, aggressive behavioral
problems’ do not rise to the level of a strong risk of suicide”); Estate of Novack ex rel.
Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2000) (“strange behavior alone,
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without indications that that behavior has a substantial likelihood of taking a suicidal turn,
is not sufficient to impute subjective knowledge of a high suicide risk to jail personnel”);
see also Carvell on behalf of H.A.A.W. v Gibson, No. 23-30252, 2024 WL 4533312, at *6
(5th Cir. Oct. 21, 2024) (“[e]ven if Misty behaved ‘erratically’ by resisting arrest, lying
about a pregnancy, and faking seizures, that is not enough under this court’s precedent to
suggest that [jail] officials had subjective knowledge that she was at a heightened risk of
suicide”). None of Jesse’s actions in the holding cell indicated an intent to harm himself
such that Sandoval was on notice of a substantial risk of suicide.
Absent evidence of a substantial risk of suicide, Defendant Sandoval’s failure to
specifically mention to the transport officer that Jesse had jumped off the Laughlin Bridge
earlier that day does not give rise to any liability. The video evidence shows that Sandoval
told the transport officer that Jesse had been acting crazy and talking to himself, and that
he had been a problem earlier. (Doc. 152, Ex. 10, Video 40:12–40:52.) Sandoval’s failure
to provide any further detailed information did not create a substantial risk of harm for
which the consequences of taking no further action were obvious.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Sandoval failed to keep a proper custody log and fill
out the booking paperwork correctly, and, had she done so, it “would have likely put a
reasonable Transport Officer on alert to keep a constant watch on Jesse, instead of
transporting him to the Mohave County Jail with no direct visual observation and very poor
audio observation for over an hour.” (Doc. 159 at 18.) Nevertheless, the video evidence
shows that the Transport Officer collected the booking paperwork and put it in a notebook
but did not read through it. (Doc. 152, Ex. 10, Video 39:09–39:30.) The Transport Officer
testified that he only checks the booking packet to ensure it includes the booking, the “PC,”
the medical records if necessary, and an inventory list; however, he only gives a cursory
look at the papers and does not review them in any detail. (Doc. 161-5 at 42, Menendez
Dep. 40:2–17.) Thus, even if the booking paperwork was filled out correctly, the Transport
Officer did not read it.
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For the above reasons, Defendant Sandoval cannot be liable under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Bullhead City Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted
as to the claim against Sandoval in Count One.
B. Count Two—§ 1983 Wrongful Death Claim Against All Bullhead City
Defendants
1. Defendants Watson and Sandoval
The Court construes Plaintiff’s § 1983 wrongful death claim against Defendants
Watson and Sandoval as a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, which is redundant of
the claim against these Defendants in Count One. (See Doc. 62 ¶¶ 100–103.)5 See Smith
v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 141617 (9th Cir. 1987) (analyzing the survivor action
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Arres v. City of Frenso, No. CV F 10-1628 LJO SMS,
2011 WL 284971, at *12–13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2011) (explaining that “if a constitutional
claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth
Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific
provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process[,]” and therefore the court
construed the Plaintiff’s § 1983 wrongful death claim as one under the Fourth Amendment
and found that it was redundant of the complaint’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive
force claim). The Court has determined that Watson and Sandoval cannot be liable under
the Fourteenth Amendment; thus, Watson and Sandoval cannot be liable for wrongful death
under § 1983. Summary judgment will be granted on the wrongful death claim against
Watson and Sandoval in Count Two.
2. Defendant Bullhead City
In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that liability for the § 1983
wrongful death claim was based on the conduct of Defendants Watson and Sandoval.
(Doc. 62 ¶¶ 101, 103.) The Court has determined that Watson and Sandoval are not liable
for wrongful death under § 1983 because there was no underlying Fourteenth Amendment
5 In the Response, Plaintiff does not distinguish the § 1983 wrongful death claim in
Count One from the Fourteenth Amendment claim in Count Two. (See Doc. 159.)
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violation; therefore, the City cannot be liable. See Conde v. City of Atlantic City, 293 F.
Supp. 3d 493, 508 (D.N.J. 2017) (a § 1983 wrongful death claim is predicated upon an
underlying constitutional violation). Summary judgment will be granted on the wrongful
death claim against the City in Count Two.
C. Count Three—Fourteenth Amendment Deprivation of Family
Relationship Claim Against all Bullhead City Defendants
1. Legal Standard
“A parent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and
society of his or her child.” Kelson v. City of Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir.
1985). A violation of the right to family integrity is subject to remedy under § 1983. Id.
To amount to a violation of substantive due process, the harmful conduct must “shock [ ]
the conscience” or “offend the community’s sense of fair play and decency.” Rosenbaum
v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Rochin v. Cal., 342 U.S.
165, 172–73 (1952)). Typically, only “conduct intended to injure in some way
unjustifiable by any government interest” will “rise to the conscience-shocking level”
necessary to violate substantive due process. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833, 849 (1998).
Where the officer had time for actual deliberation, or time to correct his or her
actions, a plaintiff must show the officer “acted with deliberate indifference.” Porter v.
Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2008); see Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320
(1986) (applying deliberate indifference standard to custodial prison conditions); Lee v.
City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 684 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying deliberate indifference
standard to a wrongful incarceration). If the officer did not have time for deliberation and
“faced an evolving set of circumstances that took place over a short time period
necessitating ‘fast action,’” a plaintiff must make a higher showing that the officer “acted
with a purpose to harm.” Porter, 546 F.3d at 1137–38.
2. Discussion
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Watson and Sandoval do not relate to
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split-second decisions they made without time for deliberation. Rather, both Defendants
had time for actual deliberation with regard to the actions they took during their interactions
with Jesse during the arrest, booking, and detention of Jesse. Plaintiff must therefore show
that each officer acted with deliberate indifference. Id. The Court has already conducted
the deliberate indifference analysis in Count One and found that neither Defendant was
deliberately indifferent. Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted as to the claims
in Count Three against Watson and Sandoval.
For a loss of familial relationship claim to be actionable, the claim “must be based
on underlying wrongful governmental conduct that amounts to a constitutional
deprivation.” Corales v. Bennett, 488 F. Supp. 2d 975, 986 (C.D. Cal. 2007). Plaintiff’s
claim in Count Three against Defendant Bullhead City is based on the alleged
unconstitutional conduct by Defendants Watson and Sandoval. (Doc. 62 ¶¶ 6, 105–106.)
Because the Court has found that Watson and Sandoval were not deliberately indifferent
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no underlying, dependent constitutional
violation to support the loss of familial relationship claim against the City. See Corales,
488 F. Supp. 2d at 986; see also Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 569 n.11 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“Plaintiffs’ family relations substantive due process claim also fails, as there is no
underlying dependent constitutional violation”). The Court will grant summary judgment
on the claim in Count Three against Bullhead City.
D. Counts Five and Six—Monell Claims Against Defendant Bullhead City
Plaintiff advances two different theories of Monell liability: (1) a lack of a policy
directing officers to shackle detainees with a belly belt and to visually monitor detainees
during transport, and (2) a failure to train/supervise officers on how to properly assess and
manage detainees who have serious mental health concerns. (Doc. 62 ¶¶ 113–121.)
1. Lack of Policy
A governmental entity may be liable under Monell where its policy causes a
constitutional violation through an employee’s “inaction or omission,” and “may be based
on failure to implement procedural safeguards to prevent constitutional violations.” Tsao
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v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012). To prevail on a lack-of-policy
theory under Monell, a plaintiff must show (1) the deprivation of a constitutional right,
(2) that the entity’s policy, or lack thereof, amounts to deliberate indifference to the
constitutional right, and (3) that the policy caused the violation such that the entity could
have prevented the violation with an appropriate policy. Id. at 1143.
a. Deprivation of Constitutional Right
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Bullhead City has a long-standing practice or
custom of transporting detainees in the back of transportation vans that lack adequate visual
surveillance and audio monitoring, and without proper restraint measures to ensure
detainees’ safety, and that this practice is deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of
serious harm to detainees transported in the back of transportation vans. (Doc. 62 ¶¶ 115–
116.) These allegations support an alleged Fourteenth Amendment violation. See Castro,
833 F.3d at 1067 (detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right to be protected from
harm).
Defendant Bullhead City does not address Plaintiff’s allegation that failing to
conduct any security checks or monitoring of detainees confined in an enclosed
compartment in the back of a van during transport, where the transport lasts up to 50
minutes, amounts to deliberate indifference. (See Docs. 147, 169.) The Ninth Circuit has
held that, with respect to detention in cells, detainees “have a right to direct-view safety
checks sufficient to determine whether their presentation indicates the need for medical
treatment.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2021); see Estate of
Abdollahi v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1206–07 (E.D. Cal. 2005)
(denying county’s summary judgment motion where a reasonable jury could find the jail’s
failure to conduct regular safety checks posed a substantial risk to inmates).
In short, Defendants do not provide any argument or evidence regarding whether
Jesse was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment rights when he was transported in a
compartment in the back of a transportation van without visual checks or any monitoring
devices. Consequently, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to the first Monell
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factor. See TYR Sport, Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 802, 815 (C.D.
Cal. 2010) (“[b]y failing to squarely address [Plaintiffs’] theory, the Defendants have not
carried their initial Celotex burden”).
b. Deliberately Indifferent Policy or Lack Thereof
Defendants do not address whether there was a policy or practice regarding security
checks or monitoring of detainees during transport, but the undisputed evidence shows that
the transportation van had enclosed compartments in the back with no video or audio
monitoring capabilities. Plaintiff submits evidence that, immediately after Jesse’s death,
Defendant Bullhead City implemented a policy to transport all detainees in the front
compartment of the transportation van so they could be observed visually and audibly.
(Doc. 161 ¶ 127; Doc. 161-4 at 151, Jimenez Dep. 33:25–34:5; Doc. 161-5 at 62, Trebes
Dep. 14:19–23.) Plaintiff’s evidence supports that, at the relevant time, there was no policy
or practice regarding safety checks or monitoring of detainees during transport. Conn, 591
F.3d at 1104; Henry, 132 F.3d at 520.
Defendant Bullhead City does not directly address why the lack of a policy to
visually monitor detainees during transport would not constitute deliberate indifference.
Instead, Bullhead City conclusorily asserts that “its policy involving use of shackles and
the transport van was not deliberately indifferent.” (Doc. 147 at 10.)
Plaintiff submits evidence to show that, the day after Jesse’s death, Defendant
Bullhead City implemented a standard practice to shackle all detainees with a belly belt
during transport. (Doc. 161 ¶¶ 126–127; Doc. 161-4 at 28, Watson Dep. 67:19–68:6; id.
at 151, Jimenez Dep. 33:5–12.) Evidence showing a new policy is implemented post-event
is admissible to show the absence of an earlier policy or practice. Conn, 591 F.3d at 1104;
Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 520 (9th Cir. 1997).
Notably, Defendant Bullhead City had a policy to monitor detainees in holding cells
via cameras and to conduct in person cell checks every 15 minutes. (See Doc. 148 ¶ 45;
Doc. 161 ¶ 45; Doc. 148-1 at 83, Sandoval Dep. 41:13–22.) Also, instead of a cloth sheet
or blanket, Jesse was given a paper sheet when he entered the holding cell. See McMahon
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v. Beard, 583 F.2d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1978) (“[r]emoval of all cloth which might offer a
means for suicide would seem prudent”); Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 989 (11th
Cir. 2003) (noting that “cell had been stripped of implements that might assist suicide”).
These facts would allow a jury to infer that Defendant Bullhead City appreciated the risk
of self-harm by detainees and took precautions to alleviate that risk in the cells.
There is no evidence that the risk of self-harm dissipates when a detainee is moved
from a holding cell to a compartment in the back of a transportation van. Plaintiff’s
evidence that, after Jesse’s death, Bullhead City immediately implemented polices for
detainees to be shackled with belly belts and placed in that part of transportation vans where
they can be observed and heard, supports the feasibility of such measures to ensure
detainees’ safety. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 407 (evidence of subsequent measures is not
admissible to show negligence or culpable conduct; however, evidence of subsequent
remedial measures is admissible to show the feasibility of precautionary measures).
Despite the risk of self-harm, Bullhead City placed Jesse in an isolated compartment, with
no means to monitor him, and with loose shackle chains that he was able to use to harm
himself.
On this record, a reasonable jury could find that Defendant Bullhead City could
have prevented Jesse’s suicide with an appropriate transport policy.
In light of the above, the Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied as to the
Monell lack of policy claim in Count Five against Defendant Bullhead City.
2. Failure to Train/Supervise
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Bullhead City failed to adequately train its officers
on how to assess and manage pre-trial detainees who have serious mental health concerns
or who present as a potential risk for suicide, but Plaintiff did not specifically assert a
failure to train/supervise claim related to the shackling and transport of detainees from
Bullhead City Police Station to the Mohave County Jail. (See Doc. 62 ¶¶ 118–121.)
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Bullhead City argues that the
testimony of Defendants Watson and Sandoval and Officers Morales and Jiminez shows
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they were properly trained and supervised and that “thousands of prisoners have traveled
between the Bullhead City Police Station and the Mohave County Jail with the same
shackle system and transport van and they arrived safely without incident.” (Doc. 147 at
Yet, Bullhead City fails to address the claim set forth in the Second Amended
Complaint. Because Defendant Bullhead City wholly failed to address the failure to
train/supervise claim set forth by Plaintiff, they have not met their initial burden, and
summary judgment on this claim in Count Six must be denied. See Nissan Fire, 210 F.3d
at 1102–03; TYR Sport, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d at 815.
E. Counts Four and Seven—State Law Wrongful Death Claim for
Negligence Against All Defendants and State Law Gross Negligence
Claim Against Defendants Watson and Sandoval
1. Legal Standard
Plaintiff’s claim in Count Four is brought under Arizona’s wrongful death statute,
which states:
When death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the
act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action to recover damages in respect thereof,
then, and in every such case, the person who or the corporation which would
have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action for
damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the
death was caused under such circumstances as amount in law to murder in
the first or second degree or manslaughter.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-611. A prerequisite for recovery under § 12-611 is the ability of the
decedent to have maintained an action if death had not ensued. Summerfield v. Superior
Ct. in and for Maricopa Cnty., 698 P.2d 712, 720 (Ariz. 1985).
Under Arizona law, a wrongful death claim must rest on an underlying tort theory;
the statute does not itself provide an independent theory of liability. Harris v. City of
Phoenix, No. CV-20-00078-PHX-DLR, 2021 WL 4942662, at *2 (D. Ariz. Oct. 22, 2021).
Under Arizona law, plaintiffs are typically required to show public employees are “grossly
negligent” and not merely negligent. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-820.02 (providing qualified
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immunity to a public employee acting within the scope of employment unless the public
employee “intended to cause injury or was grossly negligent”).
To prevail on a negligence claim under Arizona law, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) a
duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a breach by the
defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and
the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz.
2007) (internal citations omitted). Additionally, a gross-negligence claim “requires a
showing of ‘[g]ross, willful, or wanton conduct.’” Noriega v. Town of Miami, 407 P.3d
92, 98 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Armenta v. City of Casa Grande, 71 P.3d 359, 364
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)) (other citation omitted). “A party is grossly or wantonly negligent
if he acts or fails to act when he knows or has reason to know facts which would lead a
reasonable person to realize that his conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to others but also involves a high probability that substantial harm will result.” Walls
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 826 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). “Gross or wanton
or willful misconduct negligence is different from ordinary negligence in quality and not
degree. A person can be very negligent and still not be guilty of gross negligence.” Kemp
v. Pinal Cnty., 474 P.2d 840, 843–44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970). It is “action or inaction with
reckless indifference to the result or the rights or safety of others.” Williams v. Thude, 885
P.2d 1096, 1104 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). “Generally, whether gross negligence occurred is
a question of fact for a jury to determine.” Noriega, 407 P.3d at 101 (explaining “gross
negligence need not be established conclusively, but the evidence on the issue must be
more than slight and may not border on conjecture”) (quoting Walls, 826 P.2d at 1221).
2. Discussion
a. Medical Defendants
As it pertains to the Medical Defendants the Court has already determined that there
is no medical negligence claim against those Defendants due to Plaintiff’s failure to submit
qualified expert testimony as statutorily required. It follows that the wrongful death claim
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against Medical Defendants also fails, and this claim against Medical Defendants in Count
Four will be dismissed without prejudice.
b. Bullhead City Defendants
Bullhead City Defendants argue that the wrongful death claim against them is barred
by Arizona Revised Statutes § 36-525. (Doc. 147 at 13.)
Section § 36-525 provides:
[A] peace officer may take into custody any individual the peace officer has
probable cause to believe is, as a result of mental disorder, a danger to self
or others, and if during the time necessary to complete the prepetition
screening procedures set forth in §§ 36-520 and 36-521 the person is likely
without immediate hospitalization to suffer serious physical harm or serious
illness or to inflict serious physical harm on another person. The peace
officer shall transport the person to a screening agency unless the person’s
condition or the agency’s location or hours makes such transportation
impractical, in which event the person shall be transported to an evaluation
agency. A peace officer is not held civilly liable for any acts committed by
a person whom the peace officer has not taken into custody pursuant to this
section.
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-525(A). Bullhead City Defendants rely on the last sentence of this
paragraph stating that an officer is not liable for acts committed by someone whom the
officer does not take into custody under § 36-525(A). (Doc. 147 at 13.)
Plaintiff responds that any immunity applies only insofar as Plaintiff may have
argued that Defendant Officers should have initiated Title 36 proceedings. (Doc. 159 at
33.) Plaintiff maintains that such immunity does not apply to the City for its negligent
customs and practices of transporting detainees unsupervised with no monitoring, nor does
it apply to Defendant Officers’ alleged negligent acts and failures to act when Jesse was in
their custody. (Id. at 33–34.)
Jesse was initially taken to the hospital emergency room by officers pursuant to Title
36 (or the Nevada equivalent, “L2K”). Defendant Officers were later called to the hospital
for an alleged assault committed by Jesse, and they were informed by the treating physician
that Jesse was not suicidal or likely to suffer serious harm. In Counts Four and Seven,
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Plaintiff did not allege that Defendants’ negligence or gross negligence was based on the
failure to initiate proceedings under Title 36. Thus, § 36-525 immunity is not applicable
to the specific facts in this case and the alleged negligence by Bullhead City Defendants.
As to whether Bullhead City Defendants were negligent or grossly negligent,
Bullhead City Defendants rely on their arguments put forth in the Fourteenth Amendment
deliberate indifference analysis to assert that their conduct did not rise to “wanton”
misconduct. (Doc. 147 at 13–14.) Plaintiff, likewise, relies on his prior arguments, arguing
that “given the clear deliberate indifference . . . outlined above,” there is evidence to
support that Bullhead City Defendants were grossly negligent. (Doc. 159 at 34–35.)
Plaintiff specifies the negligent conduct that allegedly support the state law claims
against Bullhead City Defendants, including (1) Defendant Watson’s negligent disregard
of Jesse’s admissions that he had been suicidal that week, (2) Watson’s negligent failure to
relay to Dr. Treiman information about Jesse’s intent to kill himself that day, (3) Watson’s
negligent failure “to truly listen to Jesse and consider” that his case should have been
handled as a mental health care issue and not a criminal matter, (4) Watson’s negligent
failure to order more frequent watches on Jesse, (5) Watson’s negligent failure to order
transport in a way that allowed for visual observation, (6) Watson’s negligent failure to
order that Jesse be transported with a belly belt and shackles, (7) Defendant Officers’
negligent failure to investigate Jesse’s mental health history, (8) Defendant Sandoval’s
negligent failure to properly do cell checks, (9) Sandoval’s negligence in not recognizing
Jesse’s concerning behavior in the holding cell, (10) Sandoval’s negligent failure to fill out
all booking paperwork properly, and (11) Defendant Officers’ negligent failure to relay
Jesse’s medical history to the other officers and the transport officer. (Doc. 159 at 33–34.)
Plaintiff fails to show that any of the above actions would support a negligence or
personal injury claim brought by Jesse had he not died. Summerfield, 698 P.2d at 720. As
such, Plaintiff fails to meet the requirement for bringing a wrongful death claim under § 12-
611. See id.; Schoenrock v. Cigna Health Plan of Ariz., Inc., 715 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1985) (§ 12–611 provides that the right to bring a wrongful death action exists
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only when the decedent would have been able to maintain an action for damages “if death
had not ensued”). The Court will grant summary judgment on the wrongful death claim
against Bullhead City Defendants in Count Four.
Plaintiff also fails to establish gross negligence. “To establish gross negligence, the
claimant essentially must show wanton misconduct that is flagrant and evinces a lawless
and destructive spirit.” Badia v. City of Casa Grande, 988 P.2d 134, 141 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1999) (quotation omitted). None of the actions cited by Plaintiff amount to flagrant or
wanton conduct or reckless indifference to Jesse’s safety in light of facts showing that
Defendant Officers Watson and Sandoval took custody of Jesse from the hospital after a
physician had confirmed that Jesse was not a suicide risk, and thereafter Jesse did not
exhibit such extreme behavior that Defendant Officers were put on notice of a substantial
risk of suicide. See Walls, 826, P.2d at 1221; Noriega, 407 P.3d at 100 (“gross negligence
. . . falls closer to [the] recklessness standard” that “usually involves a conscious disregard
of a risk”). The opinion of Plaintiff’s expert—Sweeney—that Defendant Officers did not
act reasonably or take the proper course of action, does not change the conclusion there is
no showing of gross negligence. (Doc. 161-6 at 43–45.) “Expert opinions, without more,
do not necessarily render a plaintiff’s allegations of gross negligence triable issues of fact.”
Badia, 988 P.2d at 142; see Florez v. Sargeant, 917 P.2d 250, 255 (Ariz. 1996) (expert
“affidavits that only set forth ultimate facts or conclusions of law can neither support nor
defeat a motion for summary judgment”).
Summary judgment is therefore granted on the gross negligence claims against
Defendants Watson and Sandoval in Count Seven. See Badia, 988 P.2d at 141 (summary
judgment is appropriate “if ‘no evidence is introduced that would lead a reasonable person
to find gross negligence’”) (quoting Walls, 826 P.2d at 1221).6
6 Bullhead City Defendants also move to bar Sweeney’s opinions for lack of
foundation, expertise, and speculation. (Doc. 144.) As set forth above, even when
considering Sweeney’s opinions, Bullhead City Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment as to all claims against them except the § 1983 Monell claims in Counts Five and
Six. The Court did not consider Sweeney’s report in its analysis of the Monell claims.
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IT IS ORDERED:
(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants Tempe
Emergency Physicians, Micheal Treiman, and Unknown Treiman’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 142); Defendants Bullhead City Police Department, Bullhead City,
Sandoval, and Watson’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 144); Defendant Bullhead City Hospital
Corporation’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 145); and Defendants Bullhead City,
Sandoval, and Watson’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 147).
(2) Defendants Tempe Emergency Physicians, Treiman, and Vasquez’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Doc. 142) is granted, and the claims against Tempe Emergency
Physicians, Treiman, and Vasquez are dismissed.
(3) Defendants Bullhead City, Sandoval, and Watson’s Motion in Limine (Doc.
144) is denied without prejudice.
(4) Defendant Bullhead City Hospital Corporation’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 145) is granted, and the claims against Bullhead City Hospital
Corporation are dismissed.
(5) Defendants Bullhead City, Sandoval, and Watson’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 147) is granted in part and denied in part as follows:
(a) the Motion is granted as to Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and
Seven, and these Counts are dismissed, and the request to dismiss Bullhead City
Police Department as a Defendant is granted; and
(b) the Motion is otherwise denied.
(6) Tempe Emergency Physicians, Bullhead City Hospital Corporation,
Treiman, Vasquez, Watson, Sandoval, and Bullhead City Police Department are dismissed
as Defendants.
Thus, the Court need not address the Motion in Limine at this time, and it will be denied
without prejudice.
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(7) The remaining claims are the Monell policy claim against Defendant
Bullhead City in Count Five and the Monell failure to train/supervise claim against
Defendant Bullhead City in Count Six.
(8) This action is referred to Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine to conduct a
settlement conference.
(9) Counsel must arrange a joint call to Magistrate Judge Fine’s chambers at
(602) 322-7620 within 14 days to schedule a date for the settlement conference.
Dated this 18th day of March, 2026.
Case 3:23-cv-08078-GMS-CDB Document 175 Filed 03/18/26 Page 36 of 36