Rozyyev v. Rokosky et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Nazar Rozyyev,
Petitioner,
v.
Eric Rokosky, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-04773-PHX-KML
ORDER
Petitioner Nazar Rozyyev was taken into immigration custody in January 2026.
(Doc. 1 at 4.) Ten days later, through counsel, he filed a habeas petition that ultimately
preserved one argument for decision: whether the procedures the government used in
taking Rozyyev into custody comported with due process given his previous receipt of
immigration parole. See Rozyyev v. Bondi, No. CV-26-00371-PHX-KML (JFM), 2026 WL
1453657, at *1-*2 (D. Ariz. May 22, 2026). The court denied the habeas petition, ruling
Rozyyev was “only entitled to the procedural due process rights provided by” the
immigration parole statute, binding Ninth Circuit authority foreclosed an argument that the
statute conferred substantive due process rights in temporary parole, and the applicable
regulations did not give rise to a due process claim because Rozyyev’s parole had expired.
Id. at *2-*3 (discussing Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 967-68 (9th Cir. 2004)).
In July 2026, Rozyyev filed a second habeas petition pro se. (Doc. 1.) This petition
raised four grounds for relief, each one a variant of a Fifth Amendment substantive due
process claim based on prolonged detention. (Doc. 1 at 9-12.) The petition noted an
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immigration judge (“IJ”) had denied asylum but granted Rozyyev withholding of removal
on March 10, 2026. (Doc. 1 at 5, 19.) Subsequent filings ultimately explained Rozyyev had
appealed the denial of asylum; his appeal apparently remains pending before the Board of
Immigration Appeals. (Docs. 7 at 1; 9 at 4; 11.)1
Respondents moved to dismiss Rozyyev’s second petition instead of responding to
it. (Doc. 6.) Their one-page motion contains two sentences worth of argument for dismissal,
unsupported by any case citations: “Respondents move to dismiss Petitioner’s second
petition for writ of habeas corpus for alleging the same material facts and arguments that
were already litigated to completion in 26-cv-00371. No material facts have changed that
warrant a different analysis of Petitioner’s case.” (Doc. 6 at 1 (simplified).) After
Rozyyev’s response pointed out that the second petition “presents a different constitutional
question” (Doc. 7 at 2), respondents shifted to arguing he was subject to mandatory
detention as an alien held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) in reply (Doc. 8 at 2-3).
Assuming respondents were attempting to make a res judicata argument, they did
not preserve it such that dismissal is warranted on that basis. See United States v. Graf, 610
F.3d 1148, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Arguments made in passing and not supported by
citations to the record or to case authority are generally deemed waived.”). But even if they
had, their motion would fail on the merits. Res judicata precludes parties in privity “from
relitigating all issues connected with the action that were or could have been raised in that
action.” Rein v. Providian Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2001). Respondents
do not argue prolonged detention was actually raised in the prior habeas petition and the
1 Rozyyev submitted multiple contradictory filings attempting to clarify the procedural
posture of his immigration case. (See Docs. 9-11.) At least one of these was an improper
sur-reply filed without the court’s leave (see Doc. 9), and another should have been filed
as a notice of errata rather than another amended reply (Doc. 11). One of these filings was
procedurally improper for an additional reason: within it, Rozyyev made an additional
motion for a prompt ruling. (Doc. 10 at 2.) That motion was unnecessary, contrary to the
District of Arizona’s rules of practice, and is denied as moot. See LRCiv. 7.2(n) (allowing
a party to file a “Pending Motion[ ] Notification” only when a motion has been under
advisement for “more than one hundred and eighty (180) days”). Although he is proceeding
pro se, Rozyyev must take more care in the future to ensure his filings comply with the
rules. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds
by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (pro se litigants “must follow
the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants”).
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court explicitly did not decide that question. See Rozyyev, 2026 WL 1453657, at *3.
Because Rozyyev had only been detained for ten days when that petition was filed, it also
appears he could not have raised the issue. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189,
1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2022) (discussing out-of-circuit cases requiring bond hearings for
aliens subject to statutory mandatory detention only when detention has become
“prolonged” and suggesting six months is the earliest point at which detention could
become prolonged). Accordingly, respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is denied.
Respondents must now answer the petition. Their original reply argues 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) mandates detention for aliens subject to the “entry fiction” but does not
address the substantive due process standards applicable to those individuals, nor how the
expiration of Rozyyev’s parole before his re-detention may affect his status as an “entry
fiction” petitioner. (See Doc. 8 at 2-4 (citing Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591
U.S. 103 (2020)).) A recent Ninth Circuit case bears on these issues and respondents must
address it. See Padilla v. United States Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL
2822044, at *10-*15, *18-*19 (9th Cir. 2026) (discussing persons to whom “entry fiction”
applies, interpreting Thuraissigiam as “an admission, not a detention, case,” and describing
the “long history” of substantive due process limitations on the government’s ability to
detain people, including “the widespread availability of bail” and “judicial review of the
legality of confinement”). To be clear, respondents must address both the impact of Padilla
on aliens subject to the “entry fiction” and whether the “entry fiction” continues to apply
to an individual paroled into the country who remains out of custody after the expiration
of his parole. Respondents must also address whether the IJ’s grant of withholding of
removal, which happened while the first petition was pending, may constitute materially
changed circumstances warranting a bond hearing.
/
/
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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) is denied.
(2) Petitioner’s motion for prompt ruling (Doc. 10) is denied as moot.
(3) No later than October 30, 2026, respondents must answer the petition for writ of
habeas corpus as set forth above. Petitioner may reply within seven days of when
the answer is filed.
Dated this 16th day of October, 2026.
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