Baptiste v. Bondi et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Dieunette Jean Baptiste,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV 26-02586 PHX SPL (CDB)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE STEVEN P. LOGAN:
Petitioner proceeds pro se in this § 2241 matter which is briefed and ready for the
Court’s review.
I. Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Haiti.1 Petitioner entered the United States on or
about June 9, 2023, after inspection at the El Paso, Texas, port of entry, pursuant to an
appointment scheduled through the CBP One system. (ECF No. 1 at 8). Upon inspection
Petitioner was deemed inadmissible pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), for want of
a valid visa or other entry document. (ECF No. 1 at 8, 30). Petitioner was served with a
Form I-94 paroling her into the United States, with an “Admit Until Date” of June 7, 2025.
(ECF No. 1 at 29). Petitioner was paroled “based on the individualized facts” of her
situation, pursuant to § 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), codified
at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (ECF No. 1 at 7-8, 29). Petitioner was paroled under the “DT”
1 Throughout the petition Petitioner is more commonly referred to by female pronouns, but
sometimes referred to by male pronouns. “Dieunette” is most commonly a name given to females.
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“Class of Admission” (ECF No. 1 at 29),2 i.e., she was paroled into the United States for
urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit; the DT class includes those
paroled into the United States via the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela (“CHNV”)
Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) designation, although it is not clear from the record
that Petitioner was allowed entry into the United States specifically via the humanitarian
TPS parole for citizens of Haiti.3 Petitioner was also served with a Notice to Appear,
2 If an immigrant is classified for admission under “DT” status, i.e., humanitarian parole,
they are eligible for work authorization, and this form of permission to enter the United States
generally includes an expiration date. An alien classified for admission on humanitarian parole
may apply for an adjustment of status because they have been “inspected and admitted or paroled
into the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (emphasis added). Humanitarian parole satisfies this
criteria for this threshold requirement, whereas “conditional” parole does not satisfy this
requirement. See Ortega-Cervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, passim (9th Cir. 2007).
3 The designation providing temporary protected status (“TPS”) for Haitian immigrants
was published in the Federal Register as Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75
Fed. Reg. 3476, 3477 (Jan. 21, 2010). See National TPS All. v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739, 753 (9th Cir.
2026), rehearing en banc denied, 169 F. 4th 796 (9th Cir. 2026). TPS designation for Haitians has
been extended multiple times since 2010. Id. at 752. Haiti was redesignated for TPS in August
2021. See Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 86 Fed. Reg. 41863 (Aug. 3,
2021). The Secretary of Homeland Security extended and redesignated Haiti TPS in 2023, see 88
Fed. Reg. 5022 (Jan. 26, 2023), and this status was extended again in 2024. See National TPS All.,
166 F.4th at 752-53.
For individuals who have already been granted TPS under Haiti's
designation, the 60-day re-registration period runs from July 1, 2024, through
August 30, 2024. USCIS will issue new EADs with a February 3, 2026 expiration
date to eligible beneficiaries granted TPS under Haiti’s designation who timely re-
register and apply for EADs. Given the time frames involved with processing TPS
re-registration applications, DHS recognizes that not all re-registrants may receive
a new EAD before their current EAD expires. Accordingly, through this Federal
Register notice, DHS automatically extends through August 3, 2025, the validity of
certain EADs previously issued under the TPS designation of Haiti.
Extension and Redesignation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 89 FR 54484-01, at 54485
(July 1, 2024) (emphasis added).
On February 7, 2025, DHS prepared and circulated a draft decision partially
vacating [the] July 2024 extension. The draft decision was reviewed and signed off
by DHS staff between February 14 and 17 and signed by Secretary Noem on
February 18, 2025. DHS announced the vacatur in a press release on February 20,
2025, and it was published in the Federal Register on February 24, 2025 (“Haiti
Partial Vacatur”). See Partial Vacatur of 2024 Temporary Protected Status Decision
for Haiti, 90 Fed. Reg. 10511 (Feb. 24, 2025).
The Haiti Partial Vacatur explained that it was shortening Haiti’s TPS
designation period “from 18 months to 12 months,” such that the designation would
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placing her in regular removal proceedings and ordering her to appear in immigration court
in Miami, Florida, on July 9, 2026. (ECF No. 1 at 30). Petitioner has been living at the
same address in Orlando, Florida, since arriving in the United States. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 7,
30). Petitioner avers, and Respondents do not dispute, that she appeared for all of her “ICE
check-ins.” (ECF No. 1 at 8).
On December 13, 2023, prior to expiration of her parole, Petitioner filed an
application for asylum. (Id.).
On June 29, 2024, Respondents issued Petitioner authorization to work pursuant to
8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(11) (as a noncitizen “paroled into the United States temporarily for
urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of
the Act.”), which authorization is valid through June 27, 2029. (ECF No. 1 at 8, 27-28).
Petitioner alleges, and Respondents do not dispute, that Petitioner has no criminal
record since entering the United States in 2023.
Petitioner asserts that she “was arrested in Florida after ICE encountered Petitioner
on the street [on June 30, 2025, after expiration of her parole but prior to the expiration of
Haiti TPS status on August 3, 2025]. ICE did not set bond, and Petitioner requested review
of [her] custody by an IJ.” (ECF No. 1 at 8). Petitioner has been detained at the Eloy
Detention Center since November 11, 2025. She asserts release on bond was denied on
January 16, 2026, “because she [was] deemed an ‘applicant for admission,” and the
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) stated ‘No jurisdiction.[’]” (ECF No. 1 at 2, 8). On February 12,
expire on August 3, 2025, instead of February 3, 2026. Id. … Secretary Noem
subsequently terminated Haiti’s TPS, effective September 2, 2025 (“Haiti
Termination”). See 90 Fed. Reg. 28760 (July 1, 2025).
National TPS Alliance, 166 F.4th at 752-53 (emphasis added).
On January 28, 2026, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Northern District of
California’s conclusion that the plaintiffs in National TPS Alliance were entitled to relief on their
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) claims, finding Secretary Noem “exceeded her statutory
authority … by partially vacating Haiti’s TPS designation.” Id. at 749, 767. The Ninth Circuit
determined “the proper remedy under APA § 706(2) is to set aside [the Secretary’s] actions and
restore the status quo,” id. at 767, noting “foreign nationals with TPS who, absent the Secretary’s
unlawful actions, would be protected from deportation and could receive work authorization, have
suffered immense harms that are both concrete and particularized.” Id. at 768.
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2026, an IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding of removal, and
ordered Petitioner removed to Haiti. (ECF No. 10-1 at 1). Respondents assert Petitioner
“subsequently filed an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) where the case
remains pending.” (ECF No. 10-1).4
II. Claims for Relief
Petitioner contends that because she was inspected at the border and paroled into
the United States her detention is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and she is eligible for
release on bond. Petitioner argues: “While the statute states that the expiration of
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole returns the parolee to the custody from which he was paroled
district courts across the country have consistently held that the expiration of § 1182 parole
does not require treating the noncitizen as if they had never been paroled in the first place.”
(ECF No. 1 at 10) (internal quotations omitted). In support of this argument Petitioner cites
Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F. Supp. 3d 274 (E.D.N.Y. 2025), Coalition for
Human Immigrant Rights v. Noem, 805 F. Supp. 3d 48, 85 (D.D.C. 2025), Linarez v.
Stamper, No. 26-cv-101, 2026 WL 592294, at *5 (D. Me. Mar. 3, 2026), Qasemi v.
Francis, No, 25-cv-10029, 2025 WL 3654098, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025), and
Walizada v. Trump, No. 25-cv-768, 2025 WL 3551972, at *15 (D. Vt. Dec. 11, 2025).
(ECF No. 1 at 10-11). Petitioner argues that, “logically,” after her parole expired and she
remained in the United States “undetected,” her status would be similar “to any other
undocumented immigrant who entered the United States without inspection and without
DHS having any clue as to there whereabouts,” and accordingly she would be entitled to a
bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (ECF No. 1 at 10-11).
Petitioner asserts that her continued detention without an individualized bond
hearing is in violation of her Fifth Amendment rights to due process of law. Petitioner also
contends the immigration court’s finding that she is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b) is legal error, citing Barrera v. Tindall, No. 25-cv-541, 2025 WL 2690565, at *4
(W.D. Ky. Sep. 19, 2025), Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12486, 2025 WL
4 As of May 21, 2026, the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s case information
website states “Case information is unavailable” with regard to Petitioner’s appeal.
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2496379, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); Ochoa Ochoa v. Noem, No. 25-cv-10865, 2025
WL 2938770, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2025), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’
decision in Castañon-Nava v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 161 F.4th
1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025). (ECF No. 1 at 17-18).
Respondents maintain Petitioner’s detention is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) because she was deemed inadmissible at the border, and they assert her
parole has been “revoke[d].” (ECF No. 10 at 3). Respondents do not specify by what means
parole was revoked, or clearly state that Petitioner was arrested because her parole was
revoked rather than expired. Respondents further argue Petitioner’s detention is mandatory
because her parole into the United States is not considered “entry” into the United States.
(ECF No. 10 at 4).
Respondents assert:
… courts have held that Section 1182(d)(5) parolees are “treated as though
they have not effected an entry into the country at all.” Lopez-Sorto v.
Garland, 103 F.4th 242, 252 (4th Cir. 2024); see also Romero v. Garland,
999 F.3d 656, 661 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Aliens paroled elsewhere in the country
for years pending removal are treated for due process purposes as if stopped
at the border.”) (quoting Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 140); Make the Road
N.Y. v. Noem, __ F.4th __, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 31160, at *63 (D.C. Cir.
2025) (“[T]he entry fiction extends to individuals who have been paroled and
are awaiting removal proceedings.”).
(ECF No. 10 at 4). Respondents also contend: “On June 9, 2023, Petitioner presented
themself at a port of entry and was charged as an ‘arriving alien’. Doc. 1 at 30. Petitioner
thus ‘cannot be said to have effected an entry, and must be treated accordingly. See
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 139-40.” (Id.). Respondents maintain “Petitioner has no due
process right to release.” (ECF No. 10 at 2).
III. Due Process in the Context of Noncitizen Detainees
The United States Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is
“available to every individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 525 (2004). Because Petitioner is currently in the United States, she is entitled to
the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that she
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cannot be deprived of liberty “without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (holding that “once an alien enters the
country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’
within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.”); Hussain v. Rosen, 985 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2021).
In A.A.R.P. v. Trump the United States Supreme Court affirmed that “’[t]he Fifth
Amendment entitles [noncitizens] to due process of law in the context of removal
proceedings,’” which implicates due process regarding their detention during those
proceedings. 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025), quoting Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025).
See also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993), citing Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86,
100-01 (1903); Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017). The right to be
free from physical restraint is “at the heart of the liberty” guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. E.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. Although “detention
during deportation proceedings [is] a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation
process,” such detention must still comport with the detainee’s right to due process of law.
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). See also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228, 235-37 (1896). And the “essence” of procedural due process is that a person who is at
risk of losing their liberty must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard in a
meaningful manner and at a meaningful time. E.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
333, 348 (1976). Whether an individual within the United States has been denied their
Constitutional right to due process is a decision ultimately reserved to the judicial branch
of the United States government. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008)
(rejecting the notion that “the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution
on or off at will ….”). And, when considering a constitutional challenge to detention under
INA, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated “grave doubts that any statute that
allows for arbitrary prolonged detention without any process is constitutional or that those
who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the government’s arbitrary
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deprivation of liberty would have thought so. Arbitrary civil detention is not a feature of
our American government.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 256-57 (9th Cir. 2018).
IV. Analysis of Petitioner’s Claims for Relief
The gravamen of Petitioner’s claim for relief is that because she was paroled into
the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) after inspection at the border, and
she has lived in the United States for several years without committing a crime or violating
the terms of her parole, and she has an active application for asylum pending with the
immigration courts, her detention is pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) rather than 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b) and therefore her detention is not mandatory and the IJ erred by finding they
were without jurisdiction to release her on bond or otherwise.5
As the Court is aware, parole pursuant to § 1182(d)(5)(A) serves a unique function.
Although humparole pursuant to § 1182(d)(5)(A) “does not grant ... ‘admission’ to the
United States,” “it effectively halts removal of the alien until the underlying humanitarian
or public benefit purpose is achieved.” Cruz-Miguel v. Holder, 650 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir.
2011). Section 1182(d)(5)(A) allows the executive to permit certain aliens “’on a case-by-
case basis’ to enter or remain in this country ….’” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, a
5 Although habeas corpus is “civil in nature[,] and the petitioner bears the burden
of proving that his detention is illegal[,]” Carlson v. Landon, 186 F.2d 183, 188
(9th Cir. 1950), the mechanics of habeas proceedings are unique. See Harris v.
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294-95 (1969). When a court confronts a viable habeas
petition, it must either award the writ or order respondent(s) to show cause—i.e., to
“make a return certifying the true cause of [ ] detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see also
Harris, 394 U.S. at 298-99 (citation omitted). …“Where specific allegations before
the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully
developed, be able to demonstrate that he is confined illegally and is therefore
entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the necessary facilities and
procedures for an adequate inquiry.” Harris, 394 U.S. at 300. … Importantly …, a
detained habeas petitioner should “not be burdened by the impossible task of
imagining and refuting [the] causes” of his detention. Id. As the Supreme Court
“has emphasized, taking into account the office of the writ and the fact that the
petitioner, being in custody, is usually handicapped in developing the evidence
needed to support in necessary detail the facts alleged in his petition, that a habeas
corpus proceeding must not be allowed to founder in a ‘procedural morass.’”
Harris, 394 U.S. at 291-92 (citation omitted).
L.M. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02194, 2026 WL 103231, at *7 (D. Nev. Jan. 14, 2026).
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§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parolee’s physical presence within the United States is authorized by the
Attorney General, and parole for humanitarian reasons or for public benefit is understood
to constitute lawful status. See, e.g., Suarez-Lugo v. Bondi, ___ F. Supp. ___, 2026 WL
332317 at *5-6 (S.D. Tex. 2026); Rodriguez-Acurio, 811 F. Supp. 3d at 294-95. Moreover,
although humanitarian parole does not render the parolee “admitted” into the United States,
the federal courts have uniformly held that a noncitizen paroled into the United States, who
has remained in the United States for at least two years after parole, is not an “arriving”
noncitizen subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b). See, e.g., Cabrera Martinez v.
Marich, 816 F. Supp. 3d 356, 373 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); Rodriguez-Acurio, 811 F. Supp. 3d
at 303 (concluding that “the grant of humanitarian parole to [petitioner] moved her out of
expedited removal proceedings and related mandatory detention [under section 1225(b)]”);
Qasemi, 2025 WL 3654098, at *9 (finding that “when ICE affirmatively chose to release
[petitioner] on parole, it made the decision that he would no longer be subject to the
mandatory detention provision of [s]ection 1225(b)(1), as is mandated by subsection
(b)(1)(iii)(II)”).
The federal courts have generally determined that an individual who has lived freely
in the United States under humanitarian parole since their inspection at the border, who is
seeking asylum, is “present” in the United States and does have full due process rights. See,
e.g., Strunin v. Garcia, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 958952, at *7-8 (S.D. Tex. 2026);
Cardoso v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-13935, 2026 WL 468200, at *2 (D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2026). The
majority of federal district court that have considered circumstances similar to Petitioner’s
have found that a person paroled into the United States under § 1182(d)(5)(A), who has
committed no crime nor violated the conditions of their parole, is detained under § 1226(a)
rather than § 1225(b) and may not be detained during the pendency of their removal
proceedings without a bond hearing. See Rincon v. Hyde, 810 F. Supp. 3d 101, 106-07 (D.
Mass. Nov. 7, 2025); Lopez-Campos, 797 F. Supp. 3d at 784 (“the Court finds that Lopez-
Campos is not subject to the provisions of Section 1225(b)(2)(A). Rather, he clearly falls
under the provision of Section 1226(a), and is subject to the discretionary bond
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determination outline therein.”); Matkarimov v. Noem, No. 26-cv-48, 2026 WL 700072,
at *2 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 12, 2026); Wu v. Stamper, No. 26-cv-0090, 2026 WL 608286, at *4
(D. Me. Mar. 4, 2026) (finding that “a more judicious reading” of § 1182(d)(5)(A)
“suggests that a noncitizen whose parole has expired should be treated similarly to the vast
majority of undocumented immigrants currently living in this country who are not
subjected to expedited removal.” (internal quotations omitted)); Millan v. Voorhies, No.
25-cv-02779, 2026 WL 248376, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2026);6 Baabekov v. Raycraft,
No. 26-CV-37, 2026 WL 183515, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2026); Kozubaev v. Lynch,
No. 25-cv-1873, 2026 WL 116797, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2026) (“The Court
concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who
have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested....”) (collecting cases); Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420,
at *17; Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *7-9 (E.D.
Mich. Sep. 9, 2025); Destino v. FCI Berlin, No. 25-cv-374, 2025 WL 4010424, at *7
(D.N.H. Dec. 24, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 26-1181 (1st Cir. Feb. 20, 2026); Aviles-
Mena v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06783, 2025 WL 2578215, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 5, 2025). See
6 The Millan court and others have “rejected the notion” that the statement in Department
of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam that
… “aliens who arrive at ports of entry—even those paroled elsewhere in the country
for years pending removal—are treated for due process purposes as if stopped at
the border,” 591 U.S. at 139, extends to treating all aliens as continually “arriving”
when applying § 1225(b)(2)(A) against them. E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-CV-2069,
2025 WL 2938594, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025), citing Coal. for Humane
Immigrant Rights v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-00872-JMC, 2025 WL 2192986, at *3
(D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025), appeal pending 25-5289 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2025); see also
Make the Rd. New York v. Noem, No. 25-CV-190 (JMC), 2025 WL 2494908, *12
n.15 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025). Those cases look to the plain meaning of the term
“arrive” to determine the label of “arriving alien” is inapplicable to someone who
previously reached a port of entry, underwent inspection, and then was paroled into
the country. E.V., 2025 WL 2938594, at *3. As this Court has stated, “‘the only
way to make sense of the statutory scheme Congress created is to see that parolees
fall under neither [provision of Section 1225(b)(1)]. Any other result conflicts with
other aspects of the statute and regulations, Congress’s evident purpose, and the
ordinary meaning of the statute's words.’” Id., quoting Coalition, 2025 WL
2192986, at *39.
Millan v. Voorhies, No. 25-cv-02779, 2026 WL 248376, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2026).
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also Thelusma v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 26-cv-01443, 2026
WL 1162804, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2026) (“Many district courts in the Ninth Circuit
have found that non-citizens paroled into the United States ... have a liberty interest in their
continued release, entitling them to certain due process protections, the extent of which are
determined by applying the test provided in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976),” citing, e.g., D.L.C. v. Wofford, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 145646, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. 2026) (“[N]umerous courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that when a noncitizen is
paroled under that section, his liberty interest does not expire along with his parole.”)
(collecting cases), and Anderson v. Chernut, No. 26-cv-01960, 2026 WL 809990, at *2
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2026) (“Even though petitioner’s parole authorization expired,
petitioner maintains her liberty interest in continued release”). Cf. Kamal Raj v. Mullin,
No. 26-1323, 2026 WL 1300423, at (W.D. Wash. May 12, 2026) (“Courts throughout this
circuit have found that where a noncitizen’s parole has expired, and the Government makes
no effort to re-detain the noncitizen after expiration despite opportunities to do so, the
noncitizen’s liberty interest continues to grow post-expiration and is incompatible with
mandatory detention”).
Although Petitioner’s parole expired three weeks prior to her arrest, this does not
mandate her detention. Although the statutory language of § 1182(d)(5)(a) provides that
upon expiration of parole the parolee returns “to the custody from which [s]he was
paroled,” district courts across the country have consistently held that the expiration of
humanitarian parole does not require treating the noncitizen as if they had never been
paroled in the first place, i.e., that they were never found to not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community and that they were allowed to seek asylum in the United States. See, e.g.,
Torres v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 26-cv-646, 2026 WL 947955, at *4-6 (M.D.
Fla. Apr. 8, 2026); Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076, at *2 (W.D.
Mich. Jan. 6, 2026); Qasemi, 2025 WL 3654098, at *10 (rejecting the argument that
§ 1182(d)(5)(A)’s prescription that a noncitizen be returned to the “custody” from which
they were paroled requires a return to the detention authority to which they would have
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been subject prior to any grant of parole); Rodriguez v. Rokosky, No. 25-cv-17419, 2025
WL 3485628, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 3, 2025) (same). See also Walizada, 2025 WL 3551972,
at *15 (calling “absurd” the idea that the expiration of the petitioner’s parole placed them
in the “perpetual status” of an “arriving alien” as distinguishable from an inadmissible
noncitizen); Chanaguano Caiza v. Scott, No. 25-cv-00500, 2025 WL 3013081, at *6 (D.
Me. Oct. 28, 2025) (“However, it does not necessarily follow that all those paroled under
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) were detained under § 1225 in the first instance”); Aviles-Mena, 2025 WL
2578215, at *4 (“termination of parole does not generally require treating noncitizens as if
they had never been paroled in the first place”).
Petitioner, having previously been paroled into the United States by the executive,
is already present in the United States with pending asylum proceedings. The expiration of
her parole does not implicate any requirement to return to a port of entry and undergo a
new inspection or screening. See Perez Yepez v. Stamper, No. 26-cv-00113, 2026 WL
765350, at *5-6 (D. Me. Mar. 18, 2026); Linarez, 2026 WL 592294, at *5; Qasemi, 2025
WL 3654098, at *6; Walizada, 2025 WL 3551972, at *12. The federal courts have
routinely concluded that a noncitizen paroled into the United States has a due process
liberty interest — as balanced in a due process analysis — that is not extinguished by parole
expiration. See, e.g., Cabrera Martinez v. Marich, 816 F. Supp. 3d 356, 372-73 (W.D.N.Y.
2025); Seyed H. H. v. Andrews, No. 26-cv-00256, 2026 WL 253426, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 30, 2026); Faqeri v. Scott, No. 26-cv-00003, 2026 WL 194475, at *3 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 26, 2026); Guzman v. Weiss, No. 25-cv-02146, 2025 WL 4657897, at *2-3 (D. Or.
Dec. 8, 2025); Omer G.G. v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-0147, 2025 WL 3254999, *5 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 22, 2025). Instead, “[§] 1182(d)(5)(a) suggests that rather than reverting to any prior
status, a noncitizen whose parole has expired is treated like the vast majority of
undocumented immigrants currently living in this country” who are not subjected to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b). Qasemi, 2025 WL 3654098, at *11 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). See also Rodriguez-Acurio, 811 F. Supp. 3d at 298-308
(discussing why a noncitizen who has been paroled is not an “arriving” noncitizen, and
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distinguishing Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020)),
cited in Bamurange v. Woosley, No. 26-cv-251, 2026 WL 1269850, at *2 (W.D. Ky. May
8, 2026), and Bashir K.A. v. Klang, No. 25-cv-4559, 2026 WL 452353, at *5-6 (D. Minn.
Feb. 17, 2026). See also Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rts., 805 F. Supp. 3d at 81-94;
Vasquez-Rosario v. Noem, No. 25-cv-7427, 2026 WL 196505, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26,
2026); Harmanpreet Singh v. Albarran, No. 25-cv-01821, 2025 WL 3640678, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. Dec. 16, 2025); Walizada, 2025 WL 3551972, at *15; Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No.
25-cv-13202, 2025 WL 3022294, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Rodriguez v. Rokosky,
2025 WL 3485628, at *4-6; E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 2938594, at *4
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025); Aviles-Mena, 2025 WL 2578215, at *4.
The expiration of parole does not require nor permit detention without a bond
hearing. The federal district courts that have considered the question have held that a
noncitizen’s “parole remains active despite the expiration of [the Form] I-94.” Arias v.
Larose, No. 25-cv-02595, 2025 WL 3295385, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).7 See also
Hernandez v. Scott, No. 26-cv0759, 2026 WL 933361, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2026).
Various federal district courts have concluded that the expiration of parole does not warrant
a noncitizen’s arrest and detention absent some form of process. And multiple federal
district courts have held that valid revocation of parole requires more than mere expiration.
7 The Arias court concluded the revocation of a Colombian petitioner’s humanitarian parole
was not the product of reasoned decision-making and therefore the respondents did not engage in
the required procedure before “purporting” to terminate the petitioner’s parole, in violation of the
Administrative Procedures Act. The court declined to reach the petitioner’s constitutional claim,
and ordered the petitioner be released.
… The Form I-94 given to Arias listed the departure date by which she “must exit
the U.S.” … But that form is issued to “travelers who are admitted to the U.S., who
are adjusting status while in the U.S., or extending their status, among other uses.”
[] The I-94 is not specific to noncitizens paroled under Section 1182. The listed
departure date is unlikely to bind humanitarian paroles who are governed under the
parole framework discussed earlier. Moreover, the departure date is recorded at the
time the form is issued. An ex ante record cannot constitute the real-time “opinion
of the Attorney General” that the purpose of parole has been served and the
noncitizen must be detained or removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). In other words,
Arias’s parole remains active despite the expiration of her I-94.
Arias v. Larose, No. 25-cv-02595, 2025 WL 3295385, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
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In Benavente v. Raycraft, the Western District of Michigan determined the government
failed to follow applicable statutes and regulations when revoking parole because the
record did not indicate that purpose of the petitioner’s parole has been accomplished, i.e.,
the petitioner’s application for asylum application was pending when they were detained,
the respondents did not produce evidence suggesting the humanitarian reason or public
benefit justifying petitioner’s parole no longer applied, and there was no indication that the
respondents engaged in any individual determination regarding the revocation of parole.
See ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2025 WL 3760755, at *3 (W.D. Mich. 2025). See also Bakhtani
v. Marich, No. 25-cv-1500, 2026 WL 322625, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2026),8 citing
Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 804 F. Supp. 3d 395, 419-26 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2025)
(ordering petitioner’s release when parole was revoked “without any individualized
assessment”); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212, 2025 WL 2402780, at *7 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 19, 2025) (ordering petitioner’s release when the government had not made a case-
by-case determination to revoke parole or “provide[d] credible, direct evidence
demonstrating” that the petitioner had received any notice, “let alone adequate notice”
before parole was revoked).
Respondents assert Petitioner’s parole was “revoked” without stating any reason for
the revocation. Respondents do not present any record evidence that Petitioner was
detained solely due to the expiration of parole or that Petitioner’s parole was revoked
pursuant to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s arguably ultra vires termination of
Haitian TPS. Notably, the blanket revocation of TPS for Haitian nationals by the Secretary
of Homeland Security did not take effect until August of 2025, more than a month after
Petitioner was arrested. The expiration of parole granted under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) does
8 Because there is no evidence that Bakhtani’s parole was properly terminated, and
because his abrupt and continuing detention without notice or a meaningful
opportunity to be heard violates his right to due process, there is no lawful basis for
Bakhtani’s continued detention. And because there is no lawful basis for his
detention, this Court joins the numerous district courts that have followed its
conclusion in Mata Velasquez[, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128 (W.D.N.Y. 2025]: that the
only proper remedy is immediate release.
Bakhtani v. Marich, No. 25-cv-1500, 2026 WL 322625, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2026).
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not automatically constitute revocation of parole, as federal district courts have consistently
distinguished between automatic termination upon expiration and affirmative revocation,
which requires an individualized assessment and compliance with procedural regulations.
While parole automatically terminates at expiration without written notice under 8 C.F.R.
§ 212.5(e)(1)(ii), revocation is a distinct process requiring case-by-case determination and
written notice to the noncitizen under 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). Recent federal district court
decisions have emphasized this distinction. The Western District of Michigan recently held
that “just as a grant of parole to noncitizen requires an individualized review, revocation
of that parole requires a case-by-case assessment to comply with the Immigration and
Nationality Act.” Kenzhebaev v. Noem, ___F. Supp. 3d___, 2025 WL 3737975, at *5
(W.D. Mich. 2025). The court explained that 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i) “not only restates
the revocation authority enumerated in § 1182(d)(5)(A), but also clarifies the (admittedly
minimal) procedures the Respondents must follow when invoking the parole statute’s
revocation authority.” Id. at *5 n.4, quoting Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298, 2025
WL 3443584, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025).
And the district courts within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
have determined that even when the express terms of a noncitizen’s parole notice allows
for discretionary termination or expiration, this “does not somehow obviate the need for
the Government to provide an individualized hearing prior to re-detaining the parolee.”
Shinwari v. Hermosillo, No. 26-cv-0009, 2026 WL 262605, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30,
2026), cited in Castro v. Hermosillo, No. 26-cv-662, 2026 WL 817388, at *6 (W.D. Wash.
Mar. 25, 2026). See also Ramirez Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D.
Wash. Sep. 12, 2025).9
9 Petitioner also contends that the IJ’s failure to consider releasing her on bond because the
court found it was without the jurisdiction to do so, violates her Fifth Amendment right to due
process of law. (ECF No. 1 at 23-25). In the past IJs have denied a bond hearing or consideration
of bond based on a lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to the holding of the BIA in Matter of Yajure-
Hurtado, 29 I & N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Hurtado
is not binding on this or any other federal district court. As the Supreme Court recently emphasized,
“courts must exercise independent judgment in determining the meaning of statutory provisions”
and “need not ... defer to an agency interpretation of the law ….” Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo,
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Petitioner’s arrest and detention is contrary to law and in violation of her right to
due process. Her release into the United States after inspection at the border reflected a
determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the
community, and Petitioner has a strong interest in remaining at liberty unless she no longer
meets those criteria. “Release [therefore] reflects a determination by the government that
the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia v. Sessions, 280
F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905
F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). Petitioner’s release on humanitarian parole provided her a
protected liberty interest. See, e.g., Fernández López v. Wofford, No. 25-cv-01226, 2025
WL 2959319, *4-5 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding that a petitioner released from immigration
detention on parole had a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody); Noori v.
Larose, No. 25-cv-1824, 2025 WL 2800149, *4, *9-10 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (same).
When a noncitizen has been “paroled and released into the country, where she has
been living at liberty for over two years,” the government “may not revoke that liberty
without an individualized determination of the need to do so,” even when the noncitizen’s
“parole has expired or been terminated.” Marceau v. Noem, 26-cv-237, 2026 WL 368953,
at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2026). Accord Piurbeev v. Rose, No. 26-cv-910, 2026 WL 499907,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2026) (finding an immigrant’s due process rights were violated
when they were detained two years after their parole had expired). In Hernandez v. Scott,
603 U.S. 369, 394, 403-04, 412-13 (2024) (“Courts must exercise their independent judgment in
deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority.”). Accordingly, the federal
district courts within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have generally
determined that an IJ’s reliance on Hurtado, involving immigrants who have lived within the
United States prior to being placed in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, is not
dispositive with regard to whether an immigrant is entitled to bond or a bond hearing. See, e.g.,
Escobar Salgado v. Mattos, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1133 (D. Nev. 2025); Rafael R. M. v. Warden,
Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 26-cv-00902, 2026 WL 730999, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16,
2026), report and recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 812750 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2026). See also
Restrepo v. Jamison, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2026 WL 141803, at *3 (D. Pa. 2026) (“The Court
reminds the parties that it is not bound by the BIA’s interpretation of Sections 1225 and 1226. [].
In fact, the vast majority of Section 2241 habeas petitions decided in the wake of Hurtado, and all
of those addressed by this Court up to this point, have rejected the BIA’s interpretation of these
INA provisions and granted habeas relief.”).
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2026 WL 933361, at *2, the Western District of Washington court rejected the
government’s assertion that it could revoke the petitioner’s parole and detain them without
a hearing because their parole had expired and the government had deemed them an
“arriving” immigrant, noting that “[s]everal courts in this Circuit that have reviewed this
question determined that neither a now-expired parole nor a noncitizen’s status as an
arriving alien is sufficient for the Government to revoke parole without complying with
the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions,” i.e., a hearing pursuant to § 1226,” citing
Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1138-39 (D. Or. 2025); Dieng v. Hermosillo,
No. 26-0190, 2026 WL 411857, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 13, 2026); Arias, 2025 WL
3295385, at *3 (collecting cases).
The Court should interpret the Due Process Clause protections afforded a
noncitizen consistent with the longstanding precedent recognizing these protections must
be balanced with the government’s countervailing interests in immigration enforcement.
To determine whether civil detention violates a detainee’s right to liberty the federal courts
apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See
Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); Hernandez v. Sessions,
872 F.3d at 993; Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez
v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020). Mathews requires consideration of (1) “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. at 335.
The private interest affected by the official action in this matter is Petitioner’s right
to be free from de facto imprisonment, “the most elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi,
542 U.S. at 529. Petitioner has a right to personal freedom, to be free from detention absent
having committed any crime or otherwise violated or abused any agreement with, or
privilege afforded by, the United States of America. Petitioner did not violate the
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conditions of her parole—she presumably developed community and financial ties to the
United States and pursued the purpose of her parole by applying for asylum. Petitioner was
granted permission to work in the United States. Her liberty interest in remaining free from
detention consistent with the terms of her parole weighs in her favor. See, e.g., Ramirez
Tesara v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“When he was
released from his initial detention on parole, Petitioner took with him a liberty interest
which is entitled to the full protections of the due process clause.”) (collecting cases).
Because parole is granted based on individualized considerations “on a case-by-case basis
for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A),
this prerequisite for granting parole prevents an erroneous or arbitrary revocation of parole
that fails to consider the purposes for which it was granted and whether they have in fact
“been served.” Id. Respondents offer no explanation regarding how the purpose for which
Petitioner was paroled has been served, such that Petitioner should now be detained after
she has established ties to the community, qualified to maintain employment, and timely
filed an application for asylum. Accordingly, the Court may properly find that the first
Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
The next Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation, is extraordinarily high
because Petitioner was detained for no clearly stated reason without pre-deprivation notice
and a hearing. The Due Process Clause typically “requires some kind of a hearing before
the State deprives a person of liberty.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990)
(emphasis added). Moreover, when Petitioner was granted a hearing after her arrest, the
immigration judge stated they had no jurisdiction to release Petitioner on bond or
otherwise, an interpretation of the relevant law that has been rejected by an overwhelming
majority of the federal district courts that have considered the issue. And the decision
denying asylum and withholding of removal is without any discussion of evidence or any
reasoning supporting the decision.
As to the probable value of additional procedure, it is reasonable to conclude that
affording Petitioner an additional procedure, such as a bond hearing, would not be of value
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because the only procedure provided to Petitioner to date was a decision by an agency
official taking the stance that they do not have jurisdiction to order Petitioner’s release on
bond or otherwise. Additionally, it is noted that at this time both release on bond and relief
from removal based on a claim of asylum are routinely denied by the immigration courts
on a check-box form without any discussion of the evidence presented or any reasoned
explanation. Accordingly, the second Mathews factor also weighs in favor of Petitioner.
The third and final Mathews factor considers the government’s countervailing
interest in detaining Petitioner and the burden of providing additional procedure. Civil
immigration detention is permissible only to prevent flight or protect against danger to the
community, see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, but the government has provided no allegation
or evidence that Petitioner’s detention serves either purpose. The record does not indicate
that the government would likely be able to proffer evidence justifying Petitioner’s
detention on the basis that she is dangerous or a flight risk because she was previously
found to not be a danger or a flight risk, she has no criminal record, and she asserts (and
the government does not dispute) that she has appeared for all of her scheduled immigration
court hearings. Respondents have not identified any new information specific to
Petitioner’s circumstances to undermine its own prior determinations (in 2023, upon her
parole into the United States, and in any subsequent periodic appearances in her removal
and asylum proceedings, or when the government considered and granting her request for
work authorization) that Petitioner will now pose a danger to the community or become a
flight risk if allowed to remain at large in the population during her removal proceedings.
The government “has no legitimate interest in detaining individuals who have been
determined not to be a danger to the community and whose appearance at future
immigration proceedings can be reasonably ensured by a lesser bond or alternative
conditions.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 994.
Nor can the government suggest that the cost of releasing Petitioner or providing
her a bond hearing would be fiscally or administratively onerous. If the government has a
legitimate interest in detaining Petitioner it need only provide a hearing before a neutral
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decisionmaker where the government can present evidence substantiating that legitimate
interest. “In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a minimal cost.”
Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047-48 (E.D. Cal. 2025). Indeed, the cost to the
government of detaining Petitioner would significantly exceed the cost of providing her
with a bond hearing or ordering her release. See Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996.
Finally, the balance of the equities and the public interest, which merge in light of
the fact that the government is the opposing party, tip sharply in Petitioner’s favor. The
citizens of the United States have a strong interest in upholding procedural protections
against unlawful detention, and the the costs to the public of immigration detention are
“staggering.” Id. See also Preminger v. Principi, 422 F.3d 815, 826 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“Generally, public interest concerns are implicated when a constitutional right has been
violated, because all citizens have a stake in upholding the Constitution.”); Jorge M. F. v.
Wilkinson, No. 21-cv-01434, 2021 WL 783561, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2021). As the
federal district courts have concluded under similar circumstances, “the potential harm to
[a petitioner] is significant, while the potential harm to the government is minimal.” Pablo
Sequen v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-06487, 2025 WL 2203419, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2025).
The government is not “harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from
constitutional violations.” Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719,
727 (9th Cir. 1983). “Faced with ... a conflict between minimally costly procedures and
preventable human suffering,” the Court may reasonably conclude the balance of hardships
tips in favor of Petitioner. Singh, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 1048.
Accordingly, the Court may reasonably conclude that all three Mathews factors
weigh in favor of Petitioner and that she has established a violation of her due process
rights and Petitioner is entitled to habeas relief.
V. Conclusion
Petitioner’s due process rights are violated by her continued detention. The Court
may, in its discretion, order that Petitioner be released from custody on recognizance rather
than ordering Respondents to provide her with a bond hearing at which the government
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would bear the burden of establishing that Petitioner would be a flight risk or danger to the
community if released. The federal habeas corpus statute’s “mandate is broad with respect
to the relief that may be granted,” Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968), and
provides that “[t]he court shall ... dispose of the matter as law and justice require.”
28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court could reasonably conclude that ordering the government to
provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226 will not “fix” the problem before the
Court. Because the government has not asserted a lawful basis for Petitioner’s detention,
nor provided any documentation establishing the basis for her detention, the Court could
find that Petitioner is entitled to immediate release. See, e.g., Bethancourt Soto, ___F.
Supp. 3d___, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9 (D.N.J. 2025). Forcing an individual to wait for a
hearing when they are not lawfully detained, particularly when the outcome of that hearing
may be preordained, thwarts the purpose of habeas review. See Kashranov v. Jamison, No.
2:25-cv-05555, 2025 WL 3188399, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2025), citing Boumediene,
553 U.S. at 779. Directing Respondents to immediately release Petitioner and permanently
enjoining them from detaining her under § 1225 would be a legitimate remedy. See
Bethancourt Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *9.
Accordingly,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
§ 2241 at ECF No. 1 be granted, and that the Court order Petitioner’s immediate release
from custody or order that Petitioner be given a bond hearing before a neutral arbiter at
which hearing the government shall bear the burden of producing clear and convincing
evidence that Petitioner would pose a flight risk or be danger to the community if released
from detention on bond or on recognizance. If the Court orders a bond hearing it is
recommended that the Court further order that the adjudicator prepare a written, explained
decision, rather than checking boxes on a form, describing the clear and convincing
evidence proffered by the government that the adjudicator considered when reaching their
decision.
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This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.
Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the parties shall have fourteen
(14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file
specific written objections with the Court. Pursuant to Rule 7.2(e)(3) of the Local Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections
to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed ten (10) pages in length. Failure to
timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be
considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See
United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Dated this 20th day of May, 2026.
Case 2:26-cv-02586-SPL Document 11 Filed 05/21/26 Page 21 of 21