Smith v. Credit Union West

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Michelle Smith,
Plaintiff,
v.
Credit Union West,
Defendant.
No. CV-26-02328-PHX-DWL
ORDER
On April 13, 2026, the Court denied Plaintiff’s application for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis (Doc. 3) and denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion for reasonable
accommodation under the ADA (Doc. 4). (Doc. 8.)
On April 16, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her
application to proceed in forma pauperis and a renewed request for limited procedural
accommodations. (Doc. 9.)
I. Motion For Reconsideration
Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and should be denied “absent a showing
of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been
brought to [the Court’s] attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv. 7.2(g).
Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy” that is available only in “highly unusual
circumstances.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
The Court’s April 13, 2026 order considered Plaintiff’s financial situation and the
Case 2:26-cv-02328-DWL Document 10 Filed 04/21/26 Page 1 of 5

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applicable law and determined that Plaintiff did not meet the standard for proceeding in
forma pauperis:
The Court cannot find that Plaintiff has established the level of financial need
that would allow Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis. Escobedo v.
Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (“An affidavit in support of
an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the
court costs and still afford the necessities of life. . . . As this court has
recognized, one need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in
forma pauperis statute. Nonetheless, a plaintiff seeking IFP status must
allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.”) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff’s monthly income is $5,000 from her employment, plus $3,976 from
Supplemental Security Income, for a total of $8,976 per month. She drives
a 2025 Hyundai Santa Fe, on which she owes $38,000. Plaintiff has four
children, ages 13, 12, 11, and 6, who rely on her for support.
Plaintiff’s monthly income far exceeds the current federal poverty guidelines
for a family of five ($38,680 per year). Badillo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020
WL 2494575, *3 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (“In assessing whether a certain income
level meets the poverty threshold under Section 1915(a)(1), courts look to
the federal poverty guidelines developed each year by the Department of
Health and Human Services.”). She drives a nearly new vehicle. Her
monthly expenses do not exceed her income, and some of those expenses
appear excessive—for example, she appears to spend $3,600-$4,800 per year
on clothing. Nor is the $200-$300 per month she spends on recreation and
entertainment a necessity of life.
Thus, Plaintiff can “pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.”
Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234. “Courts have consistently held that IFP status
should not be granted where an applicant can pay the filing fee with
acceptable sacrifice to other expenses.” Valentine v. Granville Realty, Inc.,
2025 WL 1839935, *2 (E.D. Cal. 2025). “The Court is sympathetic to
Plaintiff’s financial constraints, [but] to qualify for IFP status, a plaintiff must
be experiencing such poverty that the plaintiff cannot reasonably pay court
costs without forgoing the normal necessities of life.” Reardon v. O'Malley,
2024 WL 2160514, *2 (D. Idaho 2024).
(Doc. 8 at 1-2.)
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration argues that (1) Plaintiff’s gross monthly
income does not amount to “freely available disposable funds,” (2) the SSI benefits for
Plaintiff’s four disabled minor children “are used for the children’s support, housing
stability, utilities, food, transportation, developmental needs, and daily household
functioning” and should not be used “to pay filing fees,” (3) “Plaintiff’s caregiver-related
income also does not function as ordinary disposable wage income,” (4) Plaintiff spends
all of her income “repeatedly and quickly” on “household obligations, debt payments,
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transportation costs, child-related necessities, disability-related expenses, and ordinary
living expenses for a household of five,” such that no “meaningful funds remain available
after necessary monthly obligations,” (5) Plaintiff’s bank accounts are routinely negative,
(6) Plaintiff “does not receive housing assistance, rental subsidy, SNAP, TANF, or similar
public benefits,” (7) Plaintiff’s “vehicle is upside down in equity, making it a liability rather
than a positive asset,” (8) Plaintiff’s spending on recreation and entertainment is spent on
“child-focused outings and community-based activities for four disabled children” which
are “tied to development, regulation, socialization, adaptive functioning, and community
access,” (9) Plaintiff’s transportation costs include “travel to the federal courthouse in
downtown Phoenix,” (10) “Plaintiff has been advised that Arizona’s Division of
Developmental Disabilities (‘DDD’) is implementing changes expected to reduce
children’s authorized service hours and parent caregiver hours,” (11) Plaintiff would not
ask for a fee waiver if she did not need it, and (12) the expenses Plaintiff listed on her
affidavit were not comprehensive. (Doc. 9 at 1-6.) Plaintiff attached as exhibits a credit
card statement, bank statement, email exchange regarding Plaintiff’s effort to increase
income, Experian credit profile, and Affirm account summaries. (Doc. 9-1.)
The Court reiterates that it is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s financial constraints and the
reality that raising four disabled children is not easy, especially when shouldering that
responsibility alone. Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration does not demonstrate
manifest error in the Court’s analysis. The Court did not assume that the entirety of
Plaintiff’s $8,976 monthly income was freely available. Far from it—the Court accepts as
reasonable the majority of the expenses Plaintiff listed in her affidavit. Nevertheless, even
putting aside the $3,976 of monthly SSI income, which is rightly devoted to Plaintiff’s
children’s needs, Plaintiff earns $60,000 in gross annual income. Thus, Plaintiff’s is a
middle-class wage earner. To the extent Plaintiff argues that both the $3,976 of monthly
SSI income and the $5,000 of employment income as a caregiver are exempt from being
used to pay court fees, the Court rejects that proposition.1 Plaintiff does not address the
1 The Court notes that Plaintiff recently paid a $367 filing fee in state court, before
the case was removed to federal court. Smith v. Office of Administrative Hearings et al,
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Court’s observation that spending $3,600-$4,800 per year on clothing appears excessive.
Indeed, even assuming the low end of that range is correct, if Plaintiff simply reduced her
annual clothing purchases by $405—which would still leave $3,195 for annual clothing
purchases, which remains a significant sum—she would have enough money to pay the
filing fee.
Nor is there any merit to Plaintiff’s assertion that owning an expensive, nearly new
vehicle is consistent with allegations of poverty because it is “a liability”—an older, less-
expensive vehicle would adequately transport the children. Plaintiff’s focus on her current
equity level in the vehicle thus misses the point—when the in forma pauperis inquiry turns
on whether the applicant “cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life,”
Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234, voluntary splurges on unnecessary luxuries can be
disqualifying. In a similar vein, although Plaintiff’s account statements do not paint a full
picture of how her monthly income is spent, they do reveal that Plaintiff recently spent
$79.00 on a massage, paid for myriad trips to fast food and sit-down restaurants, and paid
fees for entertainment services including Audible and Now That’s TV. (Doc. 9-1 at 9-12.)
Again, the Court does not in any way begrudge Plaintiff for seeking to find some moments
of comfort and recreation in a life that is otherwise filled with important responsibilities,
but such expenditures undermine the notion that Plaintiff would be forced to forgo “the
necessities of life” if required to pay the same $405 filing fee that all litigants in federal
court are presumptively expected to pay.
Plaintiff’s contention that she pays for transportation to the federal courthouse is not
responsive to the April 13, 2026 order, which did not question the $300-400 per month
Plaintiff spends on transportation, in addition to her $695 vehicle payment and $457.63
vehicle insurance. The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff may apply for electronic filing
privileges, which would cut down on trips to the courthouse.2
To reiterate, none of the above is intended as an indictment as to how Plaintiff
2:26-cv-01515-DWL, Doc. 1-3 at 7.
2 https://www.azd.uscourts.gov/sites/azd/files/forms/ProSeMotionToEfile.pdf.
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spends the funds available to her as the sole provider for her family. Plaintiff simply has
not demonstrated that she cannot pay the filing fee for this case and still provide “the
necessities of life” for her and her children.
As such, Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration is denied.
II. Renewed Request For Accommodations
The Court carefully considered Plaintiff’s motion for reasonable accommodation
under the ADA and explained that Plaintiff’s requested accommodations all appear to be
moot or premature. (Doc. 8.) Plaintiff has not addressed any portion of the Court’s
analysis, and there does not appear to be any change in circumstance that would alter it.
Plaintiff’s renewed request is therefore denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of her
application to proceed in forma pauperis and renewed request for limited procedural
accommodations (Doc. 9) is denied
Dated this 20th day of April, 2026.
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