Kamau v. Herrod et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
John Muturi Kamau,
Plaintiff,
v.
Micheal J Herrod, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-26-01847-PHX-DJH
ORDER
Plaintiff John Muturi Kamau (“Plaintiff”) has filed an Application to Proceed in
District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Cost (Doc. 3). Upon review, Plaintiff’s
Application, signed under penalty of perjury, indicates that he is financially unable to pay
the filing fee. The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application and allow him to proceed in
forma pauperis (“IFP”). The Court will proceed to screen Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Doc. 1).
I. Legal Standard
When a party has been granted IFP status, the Court must review the complaint to
determine whether the action:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1 In conducting this review, “section 1915(e) not only
1 “While much of § 1915 outlines how prisoners can file proceedings in forma pauperis,
§1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis proceedings, not just those filed by prisoners.”
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permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a claim.”
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
II. Plaintiff’s Complaint
On March 18, 2026, Plaintiff filed suit against Judge Michael J. Herrod
(“Defendant”) of the Maricopa County Superior Court of Arizona. (Doc. 1 at 3).2 Therein,
Plaintiff alleges that he initiated the underlying action in Superior Court on December 19,
2025, “challenging the legality of actions relating to a trustee sale.” (Id. at 4). After the
parties exchanged “disclosures and evidence,” Plaintiff alleges that an evidentiary hearing
was eventually set for January 21, 2026. (Id.) However, Plaintiff states that his case was
reassigned to Defendant, and the hearing was vacated. (Id. at 5). At a January 27, 2026,
status conference, Defendant permitted briefing on the motion to dismiss filed in Plaintiff’s
case, and Defendant granted the motion to dismiss on February 25, 2026, without holding
any further hearing. (Id.)
Plaintiff now presents the following issues to the Court for review: 1) “Whether the
Superior Court abused its discretion by dismissing the case without conducting the
evidentiary hearing previously ordered to resolve disputed factual issues;” 2) “Whether
dismissal without receiving evidence previously deemed necessary constitutes a procedural
irregularity resulting in substantial prejudice;” and 3) “Whether extraordinary relief is
warranted where a trial court terminates a case after requiring evidentiary preparation but
before receiving the evidence.” (Id.) The relief requested by Plaintiff includes the Court
accepting “special action jurisdiction,” “vacat[ing] the Superior Court’s order dismissing
the case,” and “remand[ing] the matter to the Superior Court with instructions to conduct
the evidentiary hearing previously ordered.” (Id. at 8).
Long v. Maricopa Cmty. College Dist., 2012 WL 588965, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2012)
(citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[S]ection 1915(e) applies
to all in forma pauperis complaints[.]”)).
2 Plaintiff lists “Davinder Singh” and “International Shopping Center Investments, LLC”
as “Real Parties in Interest,” not Defendants, so the Court will proceed to examine
Plaintiff’s Complaint with the assumption that Judge Herrod is the sole Defendant. (See
Doc 1 at 3–4).
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III. Discussion
This Court lacks the jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff’s requested relief. Under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d
1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). “If a plaintiff brings a de facto appeal from a state court
judgment, Rooker-Feldman requires that the district court dismiss the suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir.
2004). Rooker-Feldman applies when a federal plaintiff claims the state court’s legal errors
as their injury and seeks relief from a state court judgment as their remedy. Id. at 1140.
Here, Plaintiff’s requested relief only concerns prior state court actions and orders.
(See Doc. 1 at 8). Primarily, Plaintiff asks the Court to vacate the Superior Court order
dismissing his case. (Id.) His request seeks relief from a state court judgment and is clearly
barred under Rooker-Feldman. The alleged errors in Plaintiff’s state court proceedings do
not change this conclusion. (See id. at 6–7). “The clearest case for dismissal based on the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when ‘a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an
allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment
based on that decision....’” Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir.
2007) (quoting Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164).
In addition to Rooker-Feldman, Eleventh Amendment and judicial immunity
prohibit Plaintiff’s Complaint as the Complaint only speaks to Defendant’s actions in his
official capacity. See Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Super. Ct., 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“Plaintiff cannot state a claim against [Arizona Superior Courts] (or its
employees), because such suits are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”); Olsen v. Idaho
State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Absolute immunity is generally
accorded to judges and prosecutors functioning in their official capacities.”).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks to reverse or alter rulings in his
state court case, it is dismissed as the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent
Plaintiff claims error in the state court proceedings, his relief lies in an appeal to a higher
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state court, not with a federal district court. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1154. Given the Court’s
lack of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Stay
Pending Special Action (Doc. 2) is denied.
IV. Leave to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) requires that leave to amend “shall be freely
given when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 15(a). The Court “may exercise its
discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on [the]
part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed
undue prejudice to the opposing party . . . [and] futility of amendment.’” Carvalho v.
Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Foman v. Davis,
371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962)). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court determines
that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly
cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393,
1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Put differently, leave to amend “is properly denied [where]
amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002,
1008 (9th Cir. 2011).
Here, there are no other consistent factual allegations that could cure Plaintiff’s
Complaint of the foregoing deficiencies. The Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s
claims because they wholly regard alleged errors in his state court case. The proper remedy
for Plaintiff is an appeal to the state court of appeals. Bringing an amended complaint to
this Court would risk futility and, therefore, leave to amend is denied.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
(Doc. 3) is GRANTED but his Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice. The
Clerk of Court is kindly directed to enter judgment and terminate this matter.
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT that Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Stay
Pending Special Action (Doc. 2) is DENIED as moot.
Dated this 2nd day of April, 2026.
Honorable Diane J. Humetewa
United States District Judge
Case 2:26-cv-01847-DJH Document 6 Filed 04/03/26 Page 5 of 5