Singh v. Noem et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Gurinderdeep Singh,
Petitioner,
v.
Kristi Noem, et al.,
Respondents.
No. CV-26-01686-PHX-DWL (DMF)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE:
This matter is on referral to the undersigned for further proceedings and a report and
recommendation pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure
(Doc. 5 at 2).1
I. BACKGROUND, PROCEDURAL POSTURE, AND HABEAS CLAIMS
Through counsel, Petitioner Gurinderdeep Singh (“Petitioner” and/or “Singh”)
initiated these proceedings by filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”) (Doc. 1). The Court’s March 13, 2026, Order observed and
ordered:
Petitioner states he is a citizen of India who entered the United States on
April 9, 2024, and was not admitted or paroled after inspection. The same
1 Citation to the record as “Doc.” indicates documents as displayed in the official Court
electronic document filing system maintained by the District of Arizona under Case No.
CV-26-01686-PHX-DWL (DMF).
Case 2:26-cv-01686-DWL Document 12 Filed 04/23/26 Page 1 of 8

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day, he was provided a notice to appear and charged as removable.2 On
August 1, 2024, Petitioner filed an application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and for relief under the Convention Against Torture. His
immigration case remains pending.
Petitioner requested a bond hearing on December 18, 2025. The Immigration
Judge issued an order finding that the court did not have jurisdiction over the
bond request. Petitioner has no criminal history and remains in custody.
Petitioner claims he is being held in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights
to procedural and substantive due process because he is being wrongfully
detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and is entitled to a bond hearing.
Petitioner seeks immediate release from custody or, in the alternative, a bond
hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
The Court will require Respondents to answer the Petition.
(Doc. 5 at 1-2). Respondents answered the Petition (“Answer”) (Doc. 9); Petitioner replied
(“Reply”) (Doc. 10). After the completion of briefing on the Petition, Petitioner filed a
Notice of Supplemental Authority (Doc. 11).
The parties agree that Petitioner is a native and citizen of India who crossed the
border without inspection (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 9 at 1). Specifically, Petitioner represents that
he entered the United States on April 9, 2024, at or near Tecate (or Tijuana), California and
was not admitted or paroled after inspection (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 2 at 65). Petitioner was
issued a Notice to Appear (attached as Exhibit 5 in support of the Petition) charging
Petitioner as removable under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i)3 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act as “an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who
arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General” (Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 2 at 65). In August 2024, Petitioner applied for asylum
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (Doc. 1 at 6).
Petitioner appears not to have been in custody from April 2024 to at least August 2024 (see
2 Although Petitioner does not specify, it appears he was detained upon entry into the
United States.
3 Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
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Doc. 2 at 72 (reflecting that Petitioner was not detained at that time)). At some time
thereafter, Petitioner was taken back into immigration custody resulting in his present
immigration detention. In December 2025 an Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s
request for a bond hearing (Doc. 1 at 6). Based on the publicly available ICE Online
Detainee Locator System, Petitioner appears to have been transferred from the Florence
Service Processing Center and currently is in immigration detention at the Florence
Correctional Center4; Petitioner’s immigration proceedings are ongoing (Id.).
Petitioner further represents that “on or about April 9, 2024, [Petitioner] was
processed by immigration authorities at that time, and was thereafter released before being
re-detained during removal proceedings” (Doc. 10 at 2). Petitioner notes that the Notice
to Appear identified Petitioner as “an alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted or paroled” rather than as “an arriving alien” (Doc. 1 at 6; see also Doc. 2 at 65).
Indeed, Respondents’ arguments in their Answer appear to be based on a factual scenario
where an alien is detained after being present in the United States for some period of time
(Doc. 9 at 2-7 (relying on Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), for
the proposition that “unadmitted applicants for admission apprehended within the United
States are seeking admission and are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)” and acknowledging that “Petitioner appears to be a member of the Bond
Eligible Class” defined in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL
3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025)). Although neither party specifies when
Petitioner’s present detention began, the Court infers based upon the record and the parties’
representations that Petitioner was re-detained after being present in the United States for
some time.
In his Petition, Petitioner asserts that his detention violates his Fifth Amendment
rights to procedural and substantive due process because he is not subject to detention
under to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (Doc. 1 at 7-12). Petitioner reasons that, as an alien present
in the United States, Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and in turn
4 See https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/search (last accessed Apr. 21, 2026).
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Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing (Id.). For relief, Petitioner asks the Court to order
Petitioner’s immediate release from immigration custody or, in the alternative, order
Respondents to provide Petitioner a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (Id. at 12).
In Respondents’ Answer, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention is lawful
because Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 despite that
Petitioner was re-detained after being present in the United States for some time (Doc. 9 at
2-4). Respondents cite Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494, and Chavez v. Noem, No. 26-
CV-00323-PHX-MTL, 2026 WL 381618 (D. Ariz. Feb. 9, 2026), in support of their
position that § 1225 applies to aliens present in the United States (Doc. 9 at 4).
Nevertheless, Respondents acknowledge:
that the majority of district courts, including this one, have rejected their
position. See, e.g., Echevarria v. Bondi, No. 2:25-cv-03252-PHX-DWL,
2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2025); Barco Mercado v. Francis, No.
25-cv-6582 --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 3295903, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
26, 2025) (listing 350 decisions that found for the habeas petitioner).
(Doc. 9 at 4). Respondents recognize that Petitioner appears to be a member of the Bautista
class, but Respondents argue that Bautista is a legal nullity outside the Central District of
California (Id. at 4-7). Respondents oppose the relief requested in the Petition but “request
that any order granting Petitioner relief direct the Respondents to provide a bond
redetermination hearing within fourteen (14) days or release Petitioner from custody under
the same conditions that existed before detention” (Id. at 7).5 Respondents did not attach
any supporting documentation to the Answer.
5 Respondents also argue that “[o]nly Warden Luis Rosa Jr. is a proper respondent” and
request the Court to “dismiss all Respondents other than Warden Luis Rosa Jr.” (Doc. 9 at
1-2). “[I]n habeas challenges to present physical confinement—‘core challenges’—the
default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is
being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official.” Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has “affirm[ed]
the application of the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules to core habeas
petitions filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, including those filed by immigrant detainees.”
Doe v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2024). Although Doe and Padilla set forth
the rule that a habeas petitioner must name the warden of the facility where they are
detained, the decisions did not preclude naming more than one Respondent as long as the
immediate custodian is named. Because Petitioner named his immediate custodian as a
Respondent, the dismissal of the remaining Respondents is not recommended.
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In his Reply, Petitioner concedes that Bautista does not control but maintains that it
supports the proposition that detention of aliens present in the United States must be
supported by individualized process (Doc. 10 at 4-5). Petitioner also argues that any
authority under § 1225 as discussed in Buenrostro-Mendez is not dispositive of Petitioner’s
underlying Fifth Amendment claim (Id. at 2-5). Finally, Petitioner contends that immediate
release of Petitioner is appropriate relief because a bond hearing cannot cure the
constitutionally insufficient process (Id. at 5-7).
After the Petition was fully briefed, Petitioner filed a notice of supplemental
authority attaching several cases from the District of Colorado finding that a bond hearing
and/or release are adequate remedies to unlawful immigration detention (Doc. 11).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
A federal district court is authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 where the petitioner is “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1), (3). Generally, “challenges to the statutory framework that permits
the alien’s detention without bail,” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 295 (2018),
“questions of law” raised in the application or interpretation of detention statutes, Leonardo
v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011), and “[c]laims that the discretionary bond
process itself was constitutionally flawed are cognizable in federal court on habeas because
they fit comfortably within the scope of § 2241.” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976,
987 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2011)).
Thus, this Court has jurisdiction over the Petition.
B. Petitioner is Entitled to a Bond Hearing Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
Four statutes grant the Government authority to detain certain aliens during removal
proceedings: 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), 1226(c), and 1231(a). Avilez v. Garland, 69
F.4th 525, 529 (9th Cir. 2023). An alien’s place “within this statutory scheme can affect
whether his detention is mandatory or discretionary, as well as the kind of review process
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available to him if he wishes to contest the necessity of his detention.” Id. (quoting Prieto-
Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008)). Sections 1225(b) and 1226(a) are
at issue in this action.
Generally, the Government’s decision regarding who may enter the United States
and who may stay here after entering “begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry,”
and is governed by § 1225. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Under § 1225, “an alien who
‘arrives in the United States,’ or ‘is present’ in this country but ‘has not been admitted,’ is
treated as ‘an applicant for admission.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)). Sections
1225(b)(1) and 1225(b)(2) authorize detention of applicants for admission through
expedited removal proceedings or through regular removal proceedings. Id. at 287-88.
On the other hand, “[s]ection 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and
detaining” aliens present in the United States if the alien falls “within one or more . . .
classes of deportable aliens.” Id. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1227). “Section 1226(a) sets
out the default rule: The Attorney General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention
of an alien ‘pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United
States.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). “Except as provided in [§ 1226(c)] and pending
such decision, the Attorney General . . . may release the alien on . . . bond . . . or conditional
parole[.]”6 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). “Federal regulations provide that aliens detained under
§ 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306
(quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)). At the bond hearing an immigration judge
considers whether the alien is a flight risk or danger to the community. Avilez, 69 F.4th at
530; see also Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2022) (“If at this
hearing the detainee demonstrates by the preponderance of the evidence that he is not ‘a
threat to national security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or
otherwise a poor bail risk,’ the IJ will order his release.” (citations omitted)).
Petitioner and Respondents disagree as to whether § 1225 or § 1226 applies to the
6 Section 1226(c), which applies to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” is not implicated
in this action because Respondents do not allege, much less demonstrate, that Petitioner
has been convicted of an enumerated crime.
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detention of Petitioner. Petitioner contends that § 1226 applies to aliens such as himself
who were apprehended within the United States. Respondents oppose, arguing that
Petitioner is an “applicant for admission” under the text of § 1225 and subject to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents’ logic regarding the applicability of § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not square
with the order of events here. As set forth above, supra Section I, Petitioner entered the
United States without inspection, Petitioner thereafter encountered ICE and was issued a
Notice to Appear charging him as removable as “an alien present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place
other than as designated by the Attorney General,” Petitioner appears to have been released
pending his immigration court proceedings and sometime later placed in his present
immigration detention. In short, the sequence of events based upon the record before the
Court and the parties’ representations comport with the default process as set forth in
§ 1226. Only now in these habeas proceedings do Respondents attempt to recast their
detention authority as being pursuant to § 1225. Further, the Court finds the reasoning in
Echevarria persuasive and adopts such, rejecting Respondent’s contention that § 1225
governs Petitioner’s immigration detention. Thus, Petitioner should be afforded a bond
redetermination hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner’s other arguments are moot. Additionally, the
Court rejects Petitioner’s assertion that immediate release is the appropriate remedy here
(see Doc. 10 at 5-8; Doc. 11 at 2). Section 1226 requires only consideration of release on
bond and a bond redetermination hearing is sufficient. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
III. CONCLUSION
As discussed above, the statute governing Petitioner’s detention is 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) and thus Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. The Court will recommend that
the Petition be granted and will recommend that Respondents be ordered to hold a bond
hearing or in the alternative release Petitioner.
Accordingly,
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IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition (Doc. 1) be granted to the extent that
Petitioner be provided a bond redetermination hearing.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Respondents be ordered to provide
Petitioner a bond redetermination hearing within ten (10) business days of the entry of
judgment; absent a timely bond redetermination hearing, Respondents should be ordered
to release Petitioner from ICE custody under the same conditions that existed before
Petitioner’s present immigration detention.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Respondents be ordered to file a notice
of compliance within three (3) days of providing Petitioner a bond redetermination hearing
or releasing Petitioner.
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s
judgment. The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this
recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days within which
to file responses to any objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and
Recommendation by the District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-
Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to any factual
determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to
appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. In addition, LRCiv 7.2(e)(3)
provides that “[u]nless otherwise permitted by the Court, an objection to a Report and
Recommendation issued by a Magistrate Judge shall not exceed ten (10) pages.”
Dated this 23rd day of April, 2026.
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